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Abstract 
The thesis seeks to examine practices of British economic warfare towards Germany 
during the First World War. In particular it focuses on the development of methods to 
weaken the German will for war by convincing Germany that winning, a military 
victory would be pointless if it destroyed her commercial position. In doing so it 
brings together two separate elements of British economic warfare -trade war and 
control of raw materials - into a single strategy with a unified aim. 
It explores British attempts to destroy Germany's foreign trade organisation in 
order to induce German commercial interests to end to the war through fear of losing 
post-war markets. However, in attempting this Britain was hampered by wartime 
conditions which interrupted the provision of shipping, capital and goods needed to 
make the policy a permanent success. 
Many Germans believed their production and marketing methods would 
enable them to reclaim their share of world trade after the war. This was providing 
there was no punitive post-war penalisation of Gen-nan trade. In June 1916 the Allies 
met in Pans to outline such a plan which involved the creation of an economic bloc to 
isolate Germany from the world trading system. 
At this point supplies rather than markets became the focus of economic 
warfare against Germany. With control of the world's raw materials, the Allies hoped 
to create an economic weapon capable of threatening German post-war recovery and 
thus have an important psychological impact on the German commercial mind-set. 
However such a scheme had to contend with the differing variables of Allied, 
American and Imperial interests. 
It is hoped the thesis will not only illuminate British economic policies during 
the First World War, but also contribute to the debate amongst historians on the 
relationship between international economic relations and foreign and security 
policies in the twentieth century. 
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Introduction 
In 1914 the British Government, in common with the rest of Europe, failed to predict or 
prepare adequately for the type of war that was to be fought during the next four years. I Z-) 
Before the outbreak of war it was commonly assumed that modem industrial economies 
and international financial markets would collapse under the strain of a long vvar, or that 
the social fabric of Britain would be tom apart. The economic mobilisation of a nation's 
resources had never been contemplated and in 1914 the Asquith Government was forced 
to address this problem without prior warning. Early in the war Sir Edward Grey 
subordinated diplomatic policy to military strategy and similarly economic planning was 
also influenced by military necessity. The operation of economic factors as an offensive 
measure may not have been as resounding or manifest as that of the armed forces. 
However they had the capacity to form a gradual and largely invisible weapon which, if 
allowed to develop to its full potential, could not help but have a debilitating effect on the 
Genuan war effort. 
This work hopes to examine a specific aspect of the practice of British economic 
warfare strategy. In particular it focuses on the development of methods to weaken the 
Gennan will for war by convincing Germany that winning a military victory would be 
pointless if it destroyed her commercial position. In doing so it brings together two 
previously separate elements of British and Allied economic warfare - trade war and 
control of raw materials - into a single strategy with a unified aim. The rationale behind 
the policy was outlined by Walter Runciman. in the Commons: 
2 
In Germany at the present time, with its widespread degree of suffering 
and the prospects of ruin which face many of their commercial and 
industrial classes in the future ... there must be a great section of German 
opinion which will thank God for the first prospects of an early peace. If 
we can do anything to really persuade that section of German public 
opinion that peace is attainable on terms which will leave to them a chance 
of existence after the war, with the world open to them for trade so long as 
they are prepared to abide by the Pact of Peace, so long as they are not 
guilty of bad behaviour, I believe a great deal will have been done to 
prepare the atmosphere without which no peace will be possible in the 
future. ' 
This strategy was distinct from the plans to blockade Germany. Although blockade 
measures induced shortages in enemy countries, they alone were not enough to induce a 
collapse of the German war effort. However they did provide an administrative 
framework with which to attempt to exercise a more coercive power through the 
implementation of a statutory list policy. Sirmlarly, whilst hopes of starving Gen-nany out 
quickly diminished, it was recogrused that a post-war deficiency of raw materials was an 
outcome the German authorities most dreaded. The cessation of the physical blockade 
would not necessarily ensure the restocking and revictualing of the Central Powers. First 
'markets' and then 'supply' were to be the keystones in this offensive economic strategy. 
Studies of British economic war aims and planning have considered issues from a variety 
of different perspectives. The domestic economic challenge facing Britain was to provide 
the financial and industrial backing for the Entente whilst also attempting to raise a 
continental sized army. The industrialisation of modem warfare meant that men, money 
and munitions were required on a vast scale. The problem for the government was how to 
organise these economic and human resources with utmost efficiency. The stress of 
1 100 H. C. Deb. Ss. cols. 2087-8.19 December 1917. 
attempting to simultaneously pursue these policies began to show on the economy by 
1916. As the market economy failed to adequately cope with the demands of vvar the 
government was forced to intervene in the running of the economy to ensure the 
2 
prosecution of the war was not i copardised . 
David French has studied this steady movement, from a policy of limited liability 
(blockading Gennany, resisting raising a large army, financing the war through exports, 
minimising inflation and shortages) towards 'total war'. 3 He maintains that'business as 
usual' was obsolete as an effective strategy by early 1916 with Liberal ministers like 
Runciman and McKenna trying to fight a rearguard action to mitigate the onset of total 
war. 4 A. D. Harvey turns this notion around and suggests the position taken up by 
McKenna, Runciman and other advocates of financing the war by exports "did in fact 
represent a retreat from a rather more adventurous policy which had seemed feasible 
during the first months of the war. " 5 He suggests that Britain attempted to pursue total 
war from the outset, only to realise that her resources could not sustain the immense 
combined financial, industrial and military effort. John Turner also maintains that Britain 
2 See E. M. H. Lloyd, Experiments in State Control (Oxford, 1924), S. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great 
Britain. (New York, 1949), Peter Dewey, 'The New Warfare and EconorrUc Mobilization' in Britain and the 
First World War, John Turner (ed. ) (London, 1988), G. C. Peden, British Economic and Social Policyftom 
Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher (Hemel Hampstead, 1990), Sidney Pollard, The Development of the 
British Economy, 1914-1967 2nd edition (London, 1969), Alan Milward, The Economic Effects of the Two 
World Wars on Britain (London, 1970). 
3 The concept of 'total war' has been the source of recent discussion. It has been questioned whether the 
phrase 'total' can be used to describe any war. If anything it has become a convenient narrative in which to 
place the history of conflict which begins with the lev& en masse dunng the Napoleonic conflict and ends 
with global nuclear annihilation. The First World War is seen as a stage in the development of this process. 
Seeing the events of 1914-18 as a process rather than an end result allows greater analysis of its form and 
evolution and also its constraints and limitations. See John Home, 'Introduction: mobilizing for 'total war', 
1914-1918' in State, societ ,v and mobilization 
in Europe during the First World War, John Home (ed. ) 
(Cambridge, 1997) and Roger Chickering, 'Total War. The Use and Abuse of a Concept' In Anticipating 
Total I Far. The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, Manfred F. Boemeke et al (eds. ) 
(Cambridge, 1999). 
4 Scc David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905-15 (London, 1982), British Strat, -,, _i and War, 4iins, 1914-1916 (London, 1986). 
5 A. D. I larveý', Collision QI-Empires. Britain in Three World Wars, I -ý3-1 945 (London, 1972) p. 285. 
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went all out for victory from the outset. The 1916 offensive was intended to bring an 
early victory before economic and financial constraints or mediation by the United States 
forced an unfavourable peace. To get such a result, the Govemment had knowingly C) 
s ificed the c*v*l* Inc 6 The acri 11 lan economy and hugely' reased Britain's overseas debt. 
financial aspect of this dilemma has been explored by Kathleen Burk who examines 
Britain's purchasing practice in the United States. She studies the financial implications 
of this policy and charts the shifting balance in power between the two countries during 
the war. 
7 
The role and effectiveness of the blockade is a dominant feature in the discussion 
of economic warfare. Although hesitant at first in the application of blockade measures, 
by the end of 1916 the British had developed an extensive blockade system. Exports of 
food and raw materials to neutral countries adjacent to Gen-nany were rationed to the 
minimum domestic consumption on the understanding that the goods would not be re- 
exported to the enemy. Goods were consigned for distribution to specific organisations 
recogmsed by the Allies and subject to the supervision of inter-Allied trade committees. 
Finns suspected of trading with the enemy were blacklisted and prohibited from trading. 
Some of the surplus domestic output of adjacent neutrals was purchased by the Allies to 
prevent its export to the enemy. 8 
Arthur Marsden attributes the lengthy process in imposing a vigorous blockade to 
6 John Turner, British Politics and the Great War (New Haven, 199 1) p. 126. 
7 Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-18 (London, 1985). 
8 For a general overview see Marion Smey, TheAllied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916 (Michigan, 1957) 
and Maurice Pannelee, Blockade and Sea Power. The Blockade, 1914-1919 and its significancefor a world 
state (London, 1924). The official history of the blockade by A. C. Bell-4 History of the Blockade of 
Germany 1914-1918 (London, 1937) was written in 1937 but due to the sensitivity of the subject during the 
iriter-war years was not published until 196 1. See also studies by officials responsible for the blockade such 
as W. A. Forster, The Blockade. 1914-1919 (London, 1939) and H. W. Carless Davis, .4 Historv, of the Blockade. EmergencY Departments (HMSO, 1920). 
Bntish appeasement of Amencan interests, to the detnment of the blockade. He states 
that America was only placated by the growing prosperity of the economy due to huge I 
Allied orders and by the relaxation of the rules in individual cases. The tough 
enforcement of restrictions against neutral countries adjacent to Germany was only 
possible if the United States remained diplomatically inactive. 9 John Coogan argues the 
opposite stating that, although the Bntish Govemment would have backed down at the 
first concrete sign of resistance, the British sensed American indecision over the issue 
and strengthened the blockade regardless. Wilson's attitude towards the blockade was 
conditioned by the War of 1812 when the United States fought Britain for her own 
commercial reasons rather than aiding in the fight to secure the freedom of Europe from 
Napoleon. According to Coogan, Wilson's maritime rights policy was based on the fact 
that American national security would be endangered by a German victory, that neither 
trade nor legal rights were a sufficient reason to break relations with Britain and public 
opinion should not be allowed to undermine Presidential authority (as it had done in 
1812). The United States government thus became a partner in the Allied campaign to 
economically strangle Germany long before she entered the war. 10 
M. W. W. P. Consett, as wartime naval attach6 to Sweden, identifies diplomatic 
concerns over political relations with neutral states as impeding the effectiveness of the 
' Arthur Marsden, "Me Blockade' in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, F. H. Hinsley (ed. ) 
(London, 1977). 
'0 John Coogan, The End of Neutrality The United States, Britain and Marititne Rights, 1899-1915 (Ithaca. 
1981). 
This was possible according to Bradford Perkins in The Great Rapprochement (London, 1969) because 
instinctive American dislike for England had lost much of its force in the decade before 1914. Tension had 
become ritualistic rather than actual (pp. 3- 11). Kevin Phillips notes in The Cousins' Wars (New York, 
I QQQ) that the wartirrie alliance might not have been possible if war had occurred a generation earlier, 
before German and Irish in-unigrants had been partially assimilated (p. 5-55). 
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blockade. " He clashed with the British minister to Sweden, Sir Esme Ho-,, vard, who 
thought that blockade restrictions could not be implemented in isolation but had to be 
balanced along with political considerations. Sweden had pro-German sympathies and it 
was vital that her neutrality be maintained. She also provided a vital supply route to 
Russia. 12 In reality neutral states were forced to depart somewhat from the traditional 
concept of neutrality and reach agreements with both sets of belligerents to regulate 
intemal and extemal trade. 13 
Security, both national and international, emerges as a dominating factor in any 
analysis of economic war aims and planning. The demand for economic planning to 
ensure national security against aggressive German commercial dominance was in part an 
extension of pre-war rivalry. The rapid expansion of Gennan exports in world markets 
since the turn of the century and the methods through which this expansion was achieved 
has been attributed as a fundamental cause in gowing Anglo-German hostility. 14 Yet this 
fear has been largely shown to be unfounded and contemporary reactions described as 
"emotional rather than rational". 15 Genuany was the weakest of the three leading 
industrial nations having no equivalent national market to match Britain's colonial 
empire or the continental territory of the United States. Outside Europe, Germany 
struggled for dominance in the least promising markets, already abandoned by the 
11 M. W. W. P. Consett, The Triumph of Unarmed Forces, 1914-1918 (London, 1923). 
12 1hE. Neilson, ''The Lord Howard, Theatre of Life (London, 1935-6). See also B. J. C. McKercher and Ke"t 
Triumph of Unarmed Forces': Sweden and the Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1917, 'Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 7/2 (1984) pp. 178-199. 
" D. T. Jack, Studies in Economic Waýfizrc (London, 1940) p. 144. 
14 See R. J. S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivahý,,, 1875-1914 (Philadelphia, 1933), P. M. 
Kerniedy, The Risc of the. Inglo-German. -Intagonism, 1860-1914 (London, 1980), Cain and Hopkins, 
British Imperialism, Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London, 1993). 
'5 D. C. M. Platt, Declinc and Recovei-v in Britain's Overseas Trade (London, 1993) p. 15. 
overstretched British trader. ' 6 The purpose of alarmist literature, the most famous 
example being E. E. Williams Made in Germany (1896), was not necessanly to produce 
anti-German feeling. It was often an attempt to highlight the inadequacies of British 
trading methods rather than assigning to Germany more sinister motives of political 
penetration and economic subjugation. 17 
Yet it was not the actual nature of competitive relations which mattered but how 
this was reflected in the public mind. 18 When war broke out, German trading methods 
were effortlessly integrated into the rising tide of general Germanophobia. Some stood 
out against the trend19 but, as Robert Bunselmeyer points out, old-fashioned 
protectionism and wartime anti-German economic policy combined to fashion a new 
patriotic protectiomsm' for which many liberal free-traders were prepared to forgo their 
principles, as least for the duration of the war . 
20 The War seemed like an ideal 
opportunity to destroy German commercial power and the Germans initially blamed the 
British for engineering a conflict to achieve this purpose. 21 Yet the war ultimately 
unden-nined the international economy, weakened Britain's global trading position and 
Ibid., p. 16. 
See Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (London, 1945) pp. 54-55. 
E. E. Williams, Made in Germany (London, 1896). Williams concluded: "I decline to believe that England's 
industrial character has so deteriorated that she is unable to pull herself up to the German standard of 
conduct. Her unique position as unchallenged mistress of the Industrial World is gone and is not likely to 
be regained. But some of the departed glory may yet be restored to her. " (pp. 144-5). He advocated 
initiatives such as subsidised transport, an increase in the number of commercial consuls, better technical 
education and the adoption of the metric system to regain commercial advantage. (pp. 167-172). 
" Christoph Buchheirný 'Aspects of Mth Century Anglo-German Trade Rivalry Reconsidered', Journal 
of European Economic History X (198 1) pp. 273-289. 
19 J. A. Hobson in The New Protectionism (New York, 1916) wrote: "The notion that all this expanding 
trade and finance have been the cat's-paw of the aggressive German state is baseless ... The suggestion that German traders, bankers, colonists, are merely advance agents of the German state is one of those 
impositions upon credulity which would not have been possible ui any other atmosphere than that of war. " 
(pp. 78-79). 
,,, Robert Bunselineyer, The Cost of the JVar 1914-1919, British Economic ýfarAims and the Origins of 
Reparation (Hamden, Conn. 197 5) p. -521. Andrew Marrison in British Business and Protection, 
1903-1932 
(Oxford, 1996) p. 233, endorses this view and describes how protectionists marched "proudly behind their 
new mistress, Patriotism". 
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allowed the United States to challenge her economic dominance. I-) 
Victor Rothwell observes that the notion of Military victory was supreme for the 
first two years of the war and it was only during 1916, in response to fears of post-war 
German economic plans, that planning was thought necessary to protect British industry 
and ensure future independence from Germany. 23 For Rothwell, the economic 
implications of the war for Britain included the desire to render permanent damage to 
Germany's commercial position and eliminate the German practice of using economic 
means to gain political influence over other countries. Ultimately Rothwell ends by 
stating that the Bntish would have "looked upon the abandonment of almost all economic 
war alms against Germany as a small price to pay for her transformation to the ways of 
,, 24 democracy and peace. Yet Douglas Newton, in his analysis of British policy towards 
the early Weimar Government, recounts how the fledgling German democracy was 
endangered through British insistence on maintaining the economic blockade despite its 
potentially disastrous effects on the fabric of German society. 25 
Security also features as the underlying basis in Peter Cline's study of economic 
planning during the war. 26 He takes issue with R. H. Tawney's study of the abolition of 
government controls, which surmised that the post- 1918 government had no fixed view 
of the benefits or defects of returning to the pre-war economic system. Instead they were 
pushed by businessmen, bankers and the Treasury into the pre- 1914 or-thodox policy of 
21 R. J. S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalrv, 18 75-1914, p. 273. 
22 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, Innovation and Expansion, p. 462. Burk, Britain, American and 
the Sinews of War, 1914-18, p. 22 1. 
23 Victor Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 197 1). 
24 Ibid., p. 281. 
2S Douglas Newton, British Polic 
' ill and 
the TI "eimar Republic, 1918-1919 (Oxford, 1997). 
26 Peter Cline, 'Winding Down the War Economy: Bntish Plans for Peacetime Recovery. 1916-19' in War 
and the Statc: The Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919, Burk (ed. ) (London, 1982). 
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few state controls and non-intervention. 27 Cline claims that plans to continue the practice 
of state intervention after the war were due to the desire for national security and not a 
result of economic or social issues. Similarly he believes that Paul Barton Johnson, in his 
study of reconstruction, over-emphasises the importance of social and economic issues, 
such as housing, manpower and industrial efficiency. 28 
For Cline, planning for reconstruction began in response to an expected German 
Zollverein in central Europe and the prospect of Germany 'dumping' goods in order to 
recover lost markets. In March 1916 a Reconstruction Committee was established to 
gather information on the economic problems Britain would face after the war. The Pans 
Economic Conference in June of the same year attempted to co-ordinate Allied proposals 
to form a distinct economic grouping freed from interaction with Germany. Both were 
29 
attempts to take action to ensure economic security against Germany. Marc 
Trachtenberg wonders whether the Paris Conference meant anything more to the British 
Government than a threat useful in possible peace negotiations with Gennany. 30 Cline 
claims that in Bntain the Pans Resolutions "embodied the fundamental pnnciples 
underlying economic recovery planning". 31 Yet the Paris Resolutions are only referred to 
in passing in Johnson's detailed study of British planning for reconstruction. I- 
In July 1916 Asquith established a committee under Lord Balfour of Burleigh to 
examine commercial and industrial policy after the war, with special reference to the 
27 R. H. Tawney, 'The abolition of econornic controls, 1918-2 F, Economic History Review 1, XIII (1943) 
pp. 1-30. 
28 Paul Barton Johnson, Land Fitfor Heroes. The Planning of British Reconst7-uction, 1916-19 (Chicago, 
1968). 
29 Peter Cline, 'Wmdmg Do-wn the War Economy: British Plans for Peacetime Recovery, 1916-19' in War 
and the State: The Transforination of British Governnient, 1914-1919, pp. 163-4. 
30 Marc Trachtenberg, Reparations in World Politics: France and European Econoinic Diplomacv, 1916- 
1923 (New York, 1980) p. 6. 
31 Peter Cline, 'NNITInding Down the War Economy: British Plans for Peacetime Recoverv, 1916-19' in ff"ar 
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conclusions reached at the Pans Conference. His recommendations were a mixture of 
measures aimed at countering the current influence of Germany in trade through anti- 
dumping laws, protection of essential industries and imperial control, and, measures to 
aid British trade through the organisation of Trade Associations, the rcform of the 
Consular Service and improving to export trade. 32 In a sense the Pans Resolutions were 
refracted through this committee onto the domestic British political scene. As subsequent 
discussion over economic planning revolved around the recommendations of the Burleigh 
Committee, the Pans Resolutions became enveloped in a wider domestic debate 
regarding reconstruction. 
Anne Orde, in her examination of British wartime planning for post-war European 
reconstruction, surmises that whilst domestic problems were considered "such thought as 
was given to international aspects was directed almost entirely to continuing economic 
warfare against Germany by the control of trade, rather than towards the task of 
reconstruction itself' 33 Yet with increasing scepticism as to whether Germany would be 
capable of launching a post-war economic offensive, methods of economic security and 
trade war became merged with domestic reconstruction. What started as a programme to 
control Allied materials in order to pressUnse Germany to cease hostilities, later became a 
programme to provide for Britain's own industrial needs. 34 Nevertheless, the idea that 
planning for economic warfare should cease because it became apparent that Gennany 
was in no condition to launch a post-war trade offensive was flawed. Until mid-1918, 
and the State: The Transformation ofBritish Government, 1914-1919, Burk (ed. ) p. 164, 
32 Cd. 9035, Final Report of the Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy after the IT'ar (1918). 
33 Anne Orde, British Policy and European Reconstrziction after the First World War (Cambridge, 1990) p. 
5. 
34 Rothwell, British I Far, I ims and Peace Diplomaqy, pp. 274-279. Peter Cline, 'Winding Down the War 
Fconomy: British Plans for PeacetiMe Recovery, 1916-19' in War and the State: The Transformation of 
British Government, 1914-1919, p. 173. 
Gen-nany was still capable of winning the war by military means and therefore imposing 
on Europe a favourable economic order by force of arms. In the event of such an 
outcome, structures had to be in place to counter this. 
The rationale behind econornic controls for national security collapsed along with 
Germany in November 1918. Robert Bunselmeyer examines British economic war aims 
as a prelude to his discussion of the reparation issue. The possibility that Britain might 
not have won the war discouraged detailed economic planning for reparations and instead 
encouraged planning for a trade war against Germany. As the war neared its end trade 
war planning was renounced in favour of direct compensation which required full 
German commercial and industrial strength. 35 
In the most recent study, Georges Henn-Soutou admits that economic objectives 
remained subordinated to a political vision of international relations but he also believes 
that underlying economic aims were omnipresent. 36 At the national level, an economic 
weapon would, for the French, serve as a political lever to force Gennany to accept peace 
terms but it also had a long-term function. By using inter-Allied organisation to control 
raw materials, the French could guarantee their own reconstruction and impede German 
economic development to enhance French security in Europe. 37 For Washington the 
economic weapon was a means of forcing Germany to conclude an acceptable peace and ID 
attempt to induce change to her political regime. For Wilson, political liberalism and 
economic liberalism were inseparable. The maintenance of Prussian militarism and 
35 Robert Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War 1914-1919, British Economic War A inis and the Origins of 
Reparation, p. 46. 
36 Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Or et le sang: les buts de gperre 
&ononziques de la Premiýre Guerre mondiale 
(Par-is, 1989). 
37 This theme of French economic planning and security has been developed in Marc Trachteriburg, 
Reparations in lVorld Politics: France and European Econoinic DiplonzaQ,, 1916-1923 and DavId 
Steverison, French war ainis against Gerniany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982). 
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Mitteleuropa, the German plan for a central European trading bloc, were political and 
economic dangers to future world peace. 38 
At the intemational level, Soutou takes issue with Fritz Fischer's thesis by 
demoting the importance of German annexationist ambitions. 39 Afitteleuropa was an 
economic medium designed by Bethmann. Hollweg to serve the political end of ensuring 
Continental security for Germany. This policy was ultimately abandoned on a political 
level as Berlin and Vienna could not agree to terms. On an economic level, the priority 
for Germany was a return to the international market. From the autumn of 1917 Germany 
was committed to ensuring equality of treatment for Gen-nan citizens, access to raw 
materials and the maintenance of the most-favoured-nation clause. 40 
For Soutou, the real impact of Mitteleuropa was felt outside Germany where it 
drove Allied economic planning. Soutou ascribes great importance to the Pans Economic 
Confcrcnce of June 1916 and draws a direct link between the Pans Resolutions and the 
eventual provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. In doing so he disagrees with 
Bunselmeyer's view that the Resolutions failed to find any significant place in the 
peacemaking of 1919.41 Soutou claims that Paris and London remained faithful to the 
outcomes of the Conference and continued to construct means of making themselves 
economically independent of Germany. An anti-German economic programme remained 
the order of the day and this was often more easily accepted than a programme of inter- 
38 This aspect is also covered in Georges-Henri Soutou, 'German EconornIc War Aims Reconsidered: The 
American Perspective' in Conftontation and Cooperation, Schr6der ed. (Oxford, Providence, 1993). 
39 Frit7 Fischer, Gcrnianys. Ahns in the First World ýVar (London, 1967) and TVar of flIusions (London, 
1975). 
40 Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Or et le sang. - les buts de guerre konoiniques de la Pretniýre Guerre 
niondiale, pp. 84--8. 
41 Bunsehueyer, The Cost of the IF(ir 1914-1919, British Econoniic TVarA iins and the Origins qf 
Reparation, p. 46. 
13 
42 Allied collaboration. Wartime planming by the belligerents fed off each other. The It) 
Resolutions of the Pans Economic Conference were an attempt by the Allies to ensure 
security against perceived German annexationist ambitions. The autarkic ambitions of the 
German General Staff, embodied in the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, were a 
means of countering this Allied threat of a post-war boycott and commercial 
discrimination. 
Sir George Cockenll, reflecting on his experiences during the war as director of Special 
Intelligence, commented: 
While the Navy, Army and Air Force were exchanging blow for blow with 
the enemy and forcing him to his knees, covertly ... new and strange 
weapons of war, economic and psychological, were being forged and 
sharpened, and, with them, bloodless warfare was being waged against his 
material and moral resources . 
43 
It is with these methods of 'bloodless warfare' that this thesis is concemed. As much of 
Britain's planning for economic warfare was eventually thwarted, the inevitability of this 
fact has often predetermined the way events are viewed. It is an airn of this work to avoid 
this notion and attempt to examine what the protagonists understood their-work to be and 
what they eventually hoped to achieve. 
The first half of the thesis explores British attempts to destroy Germany's 
financial and commercial foreign trade organisation in order to induce German 
commercial interests to end to the war through fear of losing post-war markets. The first 
attempt to accomplish this was by attacking overseas markets from which Germany had 
been gradually cut off by the blockade. At the outbreak of war an economic blockade had 
41 Soutou, L'Or et le sang. - les buts de guen-e iconomiques de la Pi-einiýre Guerre niondiale, pp. 305-5 
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been instituted to prevent goods useful in the prosecution of the war from reaching I 
Germany and to prevent Germany from exporting goods. 
However, there was also an attempt to use the blockade machinery to develop an 
offensive rather than passive economic weapon. The development of the Statutory List 
policy allowed British officials to judiciously attempt to close down German trade routes 
and replace them with a British alternative. H. W. Carless Davis commented the policy 
was intended "to strike terror into the hearts of German businessmen, to undermine the 
morale of the German civilian population. A4 However, in attempting this, Britain was 
hampered by wartime conditions which interrupted the provision of British shipping, 
capital and goods needed to make the policy a permanent success. The government's 
difficulty lay in determining the exact amount of interference with non-nal trade channels 
necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. 45 
The destruction of German overseas trade dunng the war was useless as a means 
of undermining German confidence unless the Allies could convince Germany that it 
would be of a permanent character. 46 Undoubtedly the German economic position did 
worsen considerably with the entry into the war of the United States and the breaking of 
relations with several of the Latin American Republics (the last remaining open neutral 
markets). Events such as these were of concern to the Gcn-nan trading community, but 
many still believed that their production and marketing methods, which had proved 
successful before 1914, would enable them to reclaim their share of trade after the war. 
43 George Cockerill, What Fools We I Vere (London, 1944) p. 7. 
44 II. W. Carless Davis,, 4 History of the Blockade. Emergency Departments, p. 193. 
45 See John McDen-nott, 'Total War and the Merchant State: Aspects of British Economic War-fare against 
Germany, 1914-16, ' Canadian Journal of History, XXI (1986) pp. 61-76 and "'A Needless Sacrifice": 
British Businessmen and Business As Usual in the First World War, '. 41bion, 21/2 (1989) pp. 263-282. 
4o CAB 24/20 GT. 1447: Memorandum on the Trade War prepared by the Foreign Trade Department, 27 
June 1917. 
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This was providing, of course, there was no punitive economic penalisation of German 
trade after the war. 
In June 1916 the Allies met in Pans to undertake just such a task. They outlined a 
comprehensive plan for their economic future which involved the creation of an 
economic bloc to isolate Germany from the world trading system, at least for a period 
after the war. The Pans Resolutions were borne out of a nuxture of self-interest, self- 
defence and the desire to punish Germany. Unfortunately the measures alarmed not only 
Genriany but also the United States. They succeeded in arousing the suspicions of the 
Washington administration (which remained long after the Pans Resolutions had ceased 
to be of active consideration by the major Allies) who saw only the consequences of the 
Resolutions and failed to appreciate the motives behind their formation. It has been stated 
that the entry of the United States into the war ended the Allies' hope of devising a 
common programrne of economic alms. 47 This is true in hindsight but at the time it was 
viewed as an opportunity to recast Allied economic planning in co-operation with the 
United States. Much of the uncertainty over the Paris Resolutions centred on the prospect 
of Germany and the United States being driven together for mutual economic security by 
an Allied economic bloc. With the United States now standing with the Allies (albeit as 
an 'Associated' Power) the hope was to reframe economic measures, which could be just 
as effective, but in a manner more acceptable to the Americans. 
From the autumn of 1917 onwards, inter-Allied co-operation for the purpose of 
co-ordinating the economic war effort had reached a level of sophistication which 
allowed a different tactic to be pursued in this 'psychological' war against Gennany. I 
With control of the world's raw materials, the Allies hoped to create an economic 
16 
weapon capable of threatening German post-war recovery and thus have a considerable 
impact on the Gen-nan commercial mind-set. Although British efforts to develop an 
economic weapon had to contend with the diffenng variables of Allied, Amencan and 
Imperial interests, progress was only halted with the sudden end to fighting. Until 
November 1918, the British government was preparing for a conference on raw materials, 
a culmination of the attempt to reframe the Pans Resolutions. After the Armistice, 
Wilson quickly detached himself from any further discussion regarding the conference, a It) 
decision he would have found more difficult had hostilities continued into 1919. 
Wartime coalitions seldom last for long once the pressure of war has been 
removed. The speed of Wilson's economic disengagement from the Allies meant that 
economic controls, which could have been used to coerce Germany during the armistice 
period, were dismantled. As demobilisation proceeded rapidly, this left only the blockade 
to ensure German compliance with the Armistice and eventual peace terms. Although the 
United States ultimately refused to endorse the continuance of Allied economic measures 
beyond the Armistice, she also failed consistently to reverse existing blockade policy. 
The European Allies refused to fully lift the economic blockade of Germany despite the 
repeated efforts of the Americans to achieve this. The blockade was a crude method of 
control and its continuance not only ensured a bitter legacy for the Gen-nans but also 
soured Allied-American relations during the peace process. 
47 Victor Rothwell, Bi-itish Wa7- Aims and Peace DiplomacY, 1914-1918, p. 267. 
PART ONE 
TRADE AS A WEAPON OF WAR AGAINST 
GERMANY 
I 
The blockade, trade and economic strategy. 
Pre-war planning for economic warfare against Germany stemmed from a realisation that 
Britain herself would be susceptible to pressure from a naval blockade. As the pattern of 
British trade expanded enormously throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
the country's economic vitality depended upon the ability to import food and raw 
materials and export manufactiired goods. Any disturbance to the Eree flow of this trade 
was considered potentially disastrous for the social stability of the nation, inducing 
unemployment and food shortages and leading to working-class unrest. ' 
However, faith was ultimately placed in the Royal Navy to protect the merchant 
fleet and keep shipping lanes open during times of war .2 During 1912-13 a Committee of 
Imperial Defence sub-committee, under Walter Runciman, investigated the consequences 
of any disruption to Britain's North Sea trade and possible ways of mitigating the 
resulting hardships. The Committee entrusted the survival of Britain to the Royal Navy 
and the enterprise of businessmen. If the navy continued to control shipping routes British 
businessmen could find new markets for exports and fresh sources of raw materials. ' 
' See Cd. 2643, Report of the Royal Commission on Supply ofFood and Raw Materials in Time of War 
(1905). 
2 An account of German pre-war naval planning to exploit this vulnerability, and its subsequent failure, can 
be found in Peter Overlack, 'The Function of Commerce Warfare 'in an Anglo-German Conflict to 1914, ' 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 20/4 (1997) pp. 94-114. 
' David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905-1915 (London, 1982) pp. 60-64. In 
response to this economic threat the government engaged in various investigations including a v, -ar 
insurance shipping scheme, control of the railways and ports and the question of gold reserves. See French 
above, chapter 4. 
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Regardless of whether this faith was justified, it allowed the British to project 
their fears on to Gen-nany. During the 1890s the German economy developed along Cý 
similar international lines to that of Britain. In doing so Germany became Britain's 
closest commercial rival and under the Kaiser also her most feared political opponent. ' 
Gen-nan imports increased by 243% and foreign trade expanded by 214% in the period 
1887 to 1912. Germany's increasing dependence on imported raw materials was evident 
by an increase in value from 5.7 million marks in 1872 to 161.3 million marks by 1910. ' 
This expansion in German overseas trade caused alarm amongst British merchants who 
now faced determined competition in overseas markets. 
Yet to planners at the Admiralty the increase in German sea-bome trade was a 
sign of weakness not strength, for it brought with it increased dependency. During 1906- 
08 the Trade Division of the Admiralty undertook a study into the change in the German 
economy since unification. They examined import and export statistics and the capacity 
for supply over sea and land routes. The report concluded that a sea blockade of Germany 
would: 
reduce the German workman to a state which he feels to be intolerable; 
want of employment, high costs of living are the first steps towards 
financial embarrassment, once this latter is achieved it is believed that no 
nation can continue the struggle for long. 7 tD 
' On this subject see the exhaustive study by P. M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 
1860-1914 (London, 1980). 
' Figures from Fritz Fischer, Germany'sAims in the First World War (New York and London, 1967) pp. 
12-13. 
' See R. J. S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914 (Philadelphia, 1933) p. 
279. 
7 ADM 137/2872: 'German Trade in Time of War - Effect on the Industrial Output of the Country due to a 
Call to the Colours, and due to a Scarcity of Raw Materials' by Captain 1-1.1-1. Campbell, c. July 1908. See 
Avrier Offer, The First 11'Orld War. -AiiAgrarian Inteipretation (Oxford, 1989) pp. 223-32. 
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Maurice Hankey, the secretary of the Committee on Imperial Defence, was a leading 
exponent of the 'econonlist' over the 'contMental' approach to defence plannmg before 
the war. Hankey believed that as the drive behind German world ambition was economic, 
an economic strategy could provide an effective deterrent. He thought the prospect of 
coniniercial prosperity, which Gerniany had built up assiduously since 1870, being 
shattered in war was a more effective deterrent than four or six British divisions fighting 
with the French. If the collective power of the Entente were added into the equation, the 
potential pressure which could be placed on German commercial intercourse would be so 
overwhelming as to render war unthinkable. ' The notion that wars were economically 
irrational was given popular credence through works such as Norman Angell's, The Great 
Illusion, VMtten in 1910. Angell argued that increasing internationalisation in credit, 
industry and communications made nations so economically interdependent that war was 
unprofitable for the victor as well as the vanquished. ' 
Despite the potential consequences for commercial prosperity, economic factors 
did not prevent the outbreak of war in 1914. The prospect of an economic blockade was 
further evidence to the Gen-nans of Entente encirclement. The German General Staff were 
not entirely oblivious to the difficulties they would face in the event of a prolonged war 
but their solution was to deal with the problem through a short, preventative war. " By 
this method Germany could achieve victory before any blockade had time to take real 
effect. However after the outbreak of war, Hankey did not lose faith in the potential 
power of the economic weapon. He maintained that if Germany's Achilles' heel was her 
Avner Offer, Thc First World 11'ar: , bizigrarian Inteipretation, pp. 294-5,298 and 35 1. 
For the impact of Angell's ideas see Henry Weinroth, 'Norman Angell and The Great Illusion: An 
Episode in Pre- 1914 Pacifism, ' Historical Journal, XVII/3 (1974), pp. 55 1-5 74. 
'0 Michael HoNN ard, The Crisis of the. 4nglo-Gennan Antagonisin 1916-17 (London, 1997) p. 9. 
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vulnerability to supply, then it was only common sense that Allied efforts should be 
devoted to attacking it systematically. " 
For the first two years of the war Britain set about InlPlementing, refining and 
tightening a policy of blockade. The use of the blockade as a offensive weapon of war, to 
induce the physical collapse of Germany, was to prove over-optimistic. However, the loss 
of imports did lead to a psychological erosion of civilian morale. The reduction in the 
quality and quantity of food undermined relations between the German people and the 
govemment. " The blockade authonties came to recognise that the impact of the blockade 
on German overseas commerce might have a similar effect on the German commercial 
mind-set. 
The move towards a prohibition on trade based on 'nationality'. 
At the beginning of the war the French imposed stem measures against trading with the 
enemy. A decree of 27 September 1914 prohibited trade with citizens of enemy nations, 
wherever they resided, and trade with any persons resident in enemy countries. Enemy 
subjects were also prohibited from trading with any persons in French territories or 
protectorates. This was a comprehensive ban based on geography and nationality and 
compared favourably, in French eyes, with lax British measures. The latter were based 
upon the existing English doctrine in which the domicile of an individual was the 
deten-nining factor of enemy character. The Trading with the Enemy proclamations of 5 
ALIgust and 9 September 1914 were strictly geographical. Trade was prohibited with any 
'' FO 800/90: Hank-ey to Drummond, 25 February 1915. 
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firm established in enemy territory but there was no objection to trade with enemy fimis 
in British or neutral territories outside Europe (so long as these firms had no transactions 
with persons within enemy nations). According to Sir John Simon, the attorney-general, 
this was partly due to the fact that much of Britain's trade with China and South America 
passed through German houses. " German merchants not only traded for themselves but 
also controlled channels of British trade in world markets. The British discovered this to 
their cost when trying to undermine Germany's trade position in foreign markets. 
From the outbreak of war Russian exports were also subject to rigorous 
restrictions. The land frontier of European Russia and the ports of the White, Baltic 
and Black Seas were theoretically closed. Russian measures were codified in the 
'Rules on the export dunng the war of goods under embargo' of 4 May 1915. There 
was an absolute embargo on exports to the enemy and exports to the Allies and 
neutrals was by licence only. " In June 1915 the Bntish extended the definition of 
enemy character by a Proclamation to include all persons or bodies of persons of 
enemy nationality resident in China, Slam, Persia and Morocco. In September, a 
circular was despatched to representatives in remaining neutral countries asking them 
'2 Alyson Jackson, 'Germany, the Home Front (2): Blockade, Government and Revolution' in Facing 
Armageddon, Cecil and Liddle (eds. ) (London, 1996) p. 574. 
" 66 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 595,9 September 1914. He stated that the Government had no objection to British 
firins entering into transactions with a branch of an enemy house in neutral territory outside Europe, so 
long as the contract was made with, and the goods delivered to, the branch and there was no direct contact 
made with the head office in Genriany. By such means "we think we have taken the security for which we 
must ask in order to protect national interests with calmness and good judgement without making J6 
unnecessarily severe rules against business necessary for continuing the trade and commerce of this 
country, and which provide employment for our own people. " 
One trader complained "... out here things are rotten, and while we English firms should be taking Copper 
trade from German houses, strange to say these said German firms who keep in touch with their shipping 
by wireless, continue shipping to London, Havre and Canada through, or should I say to Anglo-Gennan 
bankers ... I wonder it is allowed. It would 
be quiet easy to cripple these gentlemen if only our Government 
would help. " Runcirnan MSS WR 112 (1): Extract of a letter from Rio de Janeiro sent b-y Robert Donald 
(editor of the London DailY Chi-onicle) to Runciman, 9 November 1914. 
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to report on the desirability of extending the prohibition of trade to enemy subjects 
and the military, commercial and political aspects of the question. In relation to 
commerce, the Foreign Office was keen to know what amount of British trade would 
be affected, whether shipping companies would suffer and the effect of a prohibition 
on the trade of the neutral country. 
On 23 December 1915 the Trading with the Enemy (Extension of Powers) 
Act was passed which prohibited trading with any person of enemy nationality or 
enemy association and was intended to bring British legislation more in line with that 
of France. It was decided to treat with forbearance any German middleman who 
rendered indispensable services to British trade until it was possible to replace them 
with a neutral agent. The Foreign Office felt justified in pressing the policy into 
action on the grounds that temporary losses of trade would be slight in companson 
with the ultimate advantage of eliminating Gennan competition from overseas 
markets. " 
Allied efforts were finally co-ordinated at the Pans Economic Conference in 
June 1916. There the Allies agreed to prohibit their nationals and all persons residing 
within their territory from entering into commercial transactions with: 1) residents in 
enemy territory, whatever their nationality; 2) enemy nationals whatever their 
B. E. Nolde, Russia in the Economic War (New Haven, 1928) pp. 47-5 1. 
H. W. Carless Davis, A History of the Blockade. Emergency Departments (RMSO, 1920) pp. 194-5. 
In an interview with the Associated Press in July 1916 Larning Worthington-Evans, of the War Trade 
Department, stated that the Government considered the loss to British trade much less than the loss caused 
to the enemy and the sacrifice involved was necessary M the interests of the Allies. FO 
395,45/tl)2255/14472 1. 
This ýN as a complete reversal of the Government's position as declared during the introduction of the 
Trading With The Enemy proclamation of 9 September 1914, when the attorney-general stated: "the 
advantage which accrues to our home trade and commerce by allowmg ordinary dealings to be continued is 
infinitely greater than any advantage which would accrue to us from stopping such trade. " 66 H. C. Deb. 5s. 
col. ý94. 
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residency; 3) persons, firms and organisations wholly or partly controlled by enemy 
nationals or subject to enemy influence. " 
The development of the Statutory Black List. 
For the sake of rendering economic action against Germany more complete the British 
had, under the Trading With The Enemy Act of December 1915, instituted a statutory list 
of persons with whom British subjects were not allowed to trade. " The list was 
considered an alternative to a wholesale attack on German-owned firms as it would allow 
discretion to be used by the blockading authorities when severing trade connections. " 
The first list was published in February 1916. Information on traders with enemy 
nationality or association was collected from diplomatic agents, government departments 
at home and commercial sources. Where all the sources agreed that a particular firm 
should be placed on a black list it was first placed on a provisional list which was sent to 
"Resolution I (a). Cd. 8271, Recommendations of the Economic Conference of the Allies (1916). 
17 There were in fact three separate lists but all served the same function of severing Gennan trading 
connections. 
The General Black List was unpublished and consisted of two lists. Included on List A were firms against 
whom there existed conclusive proof of wrongdoing. Offences included: passing goods to the enemy which 
had only been allowed through the blockade after a declaration against re-exportation, exporting prohibited 
goods from a neutral to an enemy country in contravention of the 
laws of the neutral country, acting as an o 
intermediary for the re-exportation from neutral countries of goods of enemy origin, holding an agency for 
an enemy government, evading the blockade by using codes or fraudulent papers, transacting business 
exclusively as a agent for an enemy firm, making contracts with an enemy government, obtaining 
contraband goods by evasion of the blockade. List B contained firms who were suspected but not definitely 
convicted of Class A offences, or who had only con=tted minor offences such as receiving or 
transmitting commercial correspondence. They were watched rather than denied conimercial facilities. 
'Flie Statutory List was made public and compiled from the point of view of prohibiting British citizens 
fioni supporting enemy firrns who were strengthening the enemy. See H. W. Carless Davis,. I Histot-v of the 
Blockadc. Eincrgenc 
- i, 
Departinents, pp, 175-183. 
" 76 f I. C. Deb. 5 s. col. 1872. Statement by Lord Robert Cecil, 13 December 1915. 
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government departments and representative bodies. " Only when replies were received 
from all of these sources, and there was no serious objection, was the firm placed on the 
statutory li St. 20 Steps were then taken to encourage the reorganisation of the trade affected 
on a British basis. " Such enterprise was given official sanction. In February 1916 a secret 
War Office memorandum recommended that British traders should take advantage of the I 
Trading with the Enemy Acts and the reduction of German trade to establish themselves 
in former Gen-nan markets. 
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Naturally suspicions were aroused regarding British motives in pursuing such a 
policy. " There were also complaints from some quarters that the practice of cable and 
postal censorship and the publication of black lists were used to benefit British business 
interests. This censorship was crucial in detecting illegal enemy comi-nerce, in locating 
the source of enemy supplies and in furnishing the only reliable information respecting 
the destination of contraband. It was the main armament in the financial and commercial 
blockade of Gen-nany. Censorship was used to destroy the business of blacklisted firms, 
" These included the Foreign Office, the Trade Division of the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, Ministry of 
Munitions, War Trade Department, War Office, principal Chambers of Commerce, the Chamber of 
Shipping of the UK, the Liver-pool Steamship Owners Association, the Chairman of Lloyds, representatives 
of principal banks and the persons engaged in a particular trade or country nominated. 
2' This list was amalgamated with similar lists which had been compiled since the start of the war, such as 
the Cable Censor's Handbook, and the Admiralty Trade Division contraband control list. Lists were also 
compiled by the Foreign Office for the Contraband Control Committee, the Board of Trade for customs 
officials and by the Home Office for British traders asking about neutral firms. The combined list, entitled 
the Who's Who in Relation to War Trade, was updated periodically and constituted a triumph for diligent 
bureaucracy. See, for example, the 10' issue to 30 November, 1915 in FO 3 82/114 1 /f'8210/22164. 
2' Balfour MSS 49738: Procedure for firms being entered on the Black List, 3 March 1916. 
22 WO 106/15 1 0/no. 18: 'Secret: Note on Restrictions of German Trade', 25 February 1916. 
2' The French minister in London called into the Foreign Office on 1-5 March 1916 and stated that there 
was a growing feeling in America that the movement now being orgamsed against German commerce after I the war was in reality being directed against the United States. This prompted Runciman to give an 
interview with the tinited Press published in The Dines on 21 March. FO 368111662, D 14,50981. 
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as far as was possible, by stoppilrig transit cables. Lord Robert Cecil, minister for 
blockade, described it as "a useful auxiliary weapon against German trade". " 
In America there were complaints that business mails were opened, the bills of 
lading examined and the weights and prices taken before the information was passed to a 
central authority in Britain where it could be transmitted to British manufacturers and 
shipping agents in order to steal the trade of United States businessmen in the midst of 
war. 11 This was, of course, a fabrication. However British traders in neutral countries did 
inform against their foreign rivals in the hope that the British Government would place 
the rival firm on the black list and destroy their business. " The intercepted 
correspondence of businesses was ironically the best method of checking whether these 
accusations were true. 
Members of the Ceylon Chambers of Commerce protested that permission was 
being granted to firms other than those of British and Allied nationality to trade within 
the colony during the war. They recommended that all neutral firms should be registered 
and only pen-nitted to trade under licence, cancellable at discretion. The Governor of 
Ceylon, John Anderson, was in sympathy with the representations and was prepared to 
introduce the necessary legislation. However the Foreign Office Commercial Department 
saw purely commercial motives behind the request, an ultimate desire to exclude all non- 
24 FO 382/114 1 /f8210/20425: Minutes of a conference on the limitation of cable facilities for blacklisted 
f'irms, 26 January 1916. Sir George Cockerill, Director of Special Intelligence (1915-18) at the War Office, 
believed that the black list exerted strong economic and commercial pressure long before the Ministry of 
Blockade was fully established. 
" -flie claims were made by Senator Hitchcock. See Bell, A History of the Blockade of Gerniany 1914-18 
(London, 1937)p. 558. 
2' The political and economic dangers of indiscriminate black-listing were considerable and well known to 
the authorities. Apart from jeopardising good relations with neutral states, the position of Britain as the 
%vorld's money-market and as an entrep6t for the world's trade nught have been endangered if the neutrals 
formed the impression that they might be barred from buying or selling in Britain on the strength of mere 
suspicion. 11%V. Carless Davis_ I History of the Blockade. EniergencY Departnients, p. 146. 
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British firms from Ceylon. They opposed the policy which, when camed to its logical 
conclusion, resolved into a proposal to reserve for British subjects the exclusive right to 
trade in British colonies. The requirement of a licence to trade implied the right to refuse 
a licence and this was directly contrary to the letter and the spirit of commercial treaties 
to which the British Government and the Colonies were parties. '17 
The rationale behind the use of statutory black lists in commercial warfare. 
The objects of the new statutory list policy were varied but were invariably aimed at 
checking and hindering the activities of German commercial houses in neutral countries. 
Firstly it assisted the work of the contraband authorities in preventing supplies reaching 
the enemy through indirect routes. German firms in South America continued to send 
commodities such as wheat, rubber, coffee and nitrates to Germany during the war. By 
placing such firins on the statutory list, shipments dwindled as ship-owners were wary of 
facing Allied sanctions by dealing with black-listing firms. The threat of being placed on 4! 2 
a blacklist was often enough of a sanction for neutrals to voluntarily renounce trade with 
firins with Gen-nan connections. It was also hoped the policy would prevent the 
accumulation of goods by commercial houses which might become sources of supply to 
Gennan cruisers and submarines operating in foreign waters. Finally, it increased powers 
for the suppression and prevention of enemy activity, including attempts to foment 
disturbances in British dependencies and to stir up dissent between Britain and her Allies 
or neutral countries. 
' FO 368/18711179521) 214944: John Anderson to Walter Lon, -,, II 
October 1917 and Formn Office to 
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However the main object of the new policy, as described in a memorandum 
wrItten by the Foreign Trade Department for circulation to the press, was 
to destroy as a measure of war as far as possible the whole German 
financial and commercial organisation for foreign trade, with a view to 
putting pressure on the commercial interests of Germany by the threat of 
serious immediate injury to be followed by delay and difficulty in the 
commercial recuperation of Germany after the war, thus exercising 
pressure to bring about a speedier peace. The substitution of British or 
neutral commercial organisations and channels of distributions for 
German, if it can be attained is an essential part of this policy. " 
The statutory list thus had a primary object altogether independent of the blockade. 
Outside Europe it was practically entirely a method of trade war aimed not at blockade 
but at smashing Germany's overseas trading connections. In seeking not merely to 
weaken German firms by cutting off Allied trade but in every possible case by 
encouraging or even creating alternative channels for that trade, it was hoped to secure for 
British houses their fair share. Yet the object was not the expansion of British trade as an 
end in itself. Instead it was the weakening of Gen-nan overseas connections with its effect 
on Gen-nan opinion and Gennany's economic capacity to continue the war, since this 
depended in part on a reasonable prospect of rapid recovery when peace ensued. " 
It was the prospect of instilling apprehension in German business circles which 
was seen as being the real potential benefit of black lists. The War Trade Department 
commented in a memorandum: 
The more these interests see their future compromised by the continuation 
of war, and [feel] the pressure that the commercial measures of the Allies 
exercise on their branches established in neutral countries, the more they 
Colonial Office, 19 January 1918. 
FO ', 1)5 4511)5361/95361: 'Our'War on Enemy Trade' by the Foreign Trade Department. May 1916. 
'9 FO 100'787/135088: Memorandum by NIr Spens to Sir F. Eliot, undated but 1916. 
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will be desirous of shortening the war and the more they will consent to 
terms acceptable to the Allies. " 
The anticipation that the destruction of Germany's foreign trade organisation would have 
these results was based on several assumptions. It was expected that at the close of war all 
the belligerents would be, to a large extent, financially exhausted. Yet it would be of 
primary importance to resume industrial activities, and in particular export trade, as 
quickly as possible in order to mitigate the effects of industrial dislocation and distress. 
The distant and less developed markets of the world would be vital in aiding rapid 
industrial revival as the exhaustion of the war would limit considerably the extent to 
which export trade with any of the actual belligerents could be immediately revived. It 
was hoped that in these markets British commerce would possess an advantage from the 
fact that British exports had not been as seriously disrupted as those of the enemy. 
This advantage would soon disappear if German commercial organisation was 
still in existence after the war and ready to begin trading with geatcr energy and purpose 
than before. At the end of the war, as a result of the blockade and Germany's industrially 
isolated position, it would be necessary for her to import heavily before any substantial 
industrial or commercial revival could take place. Unless there was a simultaneous 
increase in export trade, the exchanges would go disastrously against her. The revival of 
export trade depended on a fully functioning German conunercial organisation at the 
close of the war. 
The British hoped to capitalise on this commercial predicament. For it was upon 
this commercial and industrial revival that the future military and political power of the 
10 Quoted in Marion SLney, TheAllied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916 Cvhchiggan, 1957) pp. 147-8. 
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current belligerents depended. It was hoped that such considerations 'vvould influence the 
minds of commercial leaders in Berlin, who were credited with great political influence, 
and thus contribute to the curtailment of the war. There was already evidence coming 
from the War Trade Intelligence Department that German merchants were anxiously 
trying to establish what steps, if any, had been taken to supplant them in neutral 
countnes. " They also identified a fear in Gennany that Bntain would have won the 
economic war, if Germany was unable to renew her transatlantic commerce, even if the 
peace settlement surpassed all of Germany's expectations. Only through overseas trade 
could the deep wounds suffered by German economic life during the war be healed. 
There was already doubt as to whether export trade to Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and 
Turkey would compensate for the loss of trade to Bntain and the British Empire. 32 
The ability of the British blockading authorities to achieve their intended policy 
was based on a particular reading of the situation. German overseas commercial 0 
organisation before the war had been supported by and relatively dependent upon foreign 
industry and shipping. Ironically this allowed German trading houses to remain in 
business even after a total severance of contact with Germany. Enemy firms were losing 
ground but still retained their native staffs, trade connections and kept their best 
customers supplied, maintaining their profile in markets and public circles. At the same 
time this foreign dependence would also prove to be the German traders' ultimate 
weakness. If British shipping and industry was denied to the enemy, only America 
remained available as a significant manufacturing country capable of supply. 
11 1ý0 902 1: Secret Weekly Bulletin of Trade Information, U-19 November 1915. The Bulletins Nvere 
compiled by the War Trade Department from confidential reports, Foreign Office papers, secret reports, 
censois material and information received from Paris. 
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The destruction of German trade promised greatest results in the South American 
states and the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Africa. It was here that German 
organisation was simultaneously at its most vulnerable and also most dangerous in its 
commercial, political and military potentialities. Measures of prohibition had to be 
designed to deal with the problem of neutral intermediaries being used as cover by enemy 
firms to carry on their business. Any measures had to be capable of easy variation, so as 
to meet any sudden changes in circumstances in any particular trade or country, in order 
to avoid undue disturbance and loss in those countries or to British trade. Finally, the 
measures had to define the prohibited offence as simply and clearly as possible in the 
interests of efficient administration and public and commercial convenience. " 
The announcement of a prohibition on trade based on nationality had left British 
merchants with little means of knowing who they were to trade with. There were 
complaints that British firms were losing valuable orders with innocent customers simply 
because they were uncertain of their nationality. In China it had been necessary to 
construct a White List of traders, containing over 1000 names, with whom dealings were 
permitted. However such a solution would prove impossible in a larger economy such as 
the United States or even in South Amenca. " The power of discrimination offered by the 
Statutory List was intended to afford the necessary adaptability of procedure in order to 
inflict maximum damage on enemy interests with the minimum possible disturbance of 
British or neutral interests and, in cases of doubt, weigh the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of prohibiting the supply of British goods or facilities to any particular firm 
" FO 368/1669/f6672,156466: 'Internal Conditions - Enemy Countries' from the War Trade Intelligence 
Department, 7 August 1916. 
" FO 395 45 t95361/95361: 'Our \Var on Enemy Trade' by the Foreign Trade Department, May 1916. 
34 Bonar Law M SS BL 191/61: Foreign Trade Department to the Board of Trade, 29 June 1916. 
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of enemy nationality before actually placing such a f= on the list. A German element in 
an overseas company created pri'Mafacle grounds for suspicion but did not necessarily 
constitute evidence of untrustworthiness. 35 
The British authorities would not have an easy task in prohibiting supplies from 
neutrals to Germany or breaking trade connections. Whether the German commercial 
system had been deliberately conceived and used as an engine for the furtherance of 
German political ambitions, as the Allies claimed, is open to debate. Nevertheless 
operatiVes in the field described how Germany had many 'agents' in foreign countries. 
These agents of all classes and nationalities were importers, exporters and merchants who 
remained in close touch with Gennan banks. In the years before the war, these banks had 
backed large and small German traders and also helped local traders of non-German 
nationality. When war came, German managers were able to direct the operations of their 
dependants in the task of obtaining supplies for Germany and keeping her export trade 
alive. Gen-nans abroad had often been encouraged to naturalise themselves as foreign 
citizens which gave them an entrenched position. " Gen-nan industrialists had devised 
methods before the war of using company branches situated in Switzerland as contact 
offices for branches elsewhere, in an attempt to keep operations gomg. 17 The Genrian 
export organisation was not only viewed with pride in the Gen-nan commercial world but 
" FO 382/1630/f59801/59801: Foreign Office minutes, March 1917. 
36 Frnest Hamblock, British Consul. - Memories of Thirty Years Service in Europe and Brazil (London, 
1918) pp- 225 and 250. llamblock thought that the black lists did more harin to the British cause than any 
dispute about contraband. They impinged the sovereignty of neutral countries in which they operated. The 
first appearance of American names on the British statutory list brought official complaints from 
Washington. See Siney, The Allied Blockade of GermanY 1914-1916, pp. 146-7. 
' See Gerald Feldman, 'Hugo Stinnes and the Prospect of War Before 1914, ' inAnticipating Total IVar 
Boenicke et al (eds. ) (Cambridge, 1999) p. 80. 
also enjoyed an unusual degree of support and favour from the German Government. In 
the final analysis the Foreign Trade Department concluded: 
To an organisation so constituted, so disciplined, and so supported, it 
became possible to take longer views and lay deeper plans than were in the 
power of the independent commercial houses of other countries, to incur 
losses for many years in the hope of eventually driving their rivals from an 
existing market, or heavy expense with no prospect of an immediate return 
in order to open up or create a new one. 38 
In addition there were many people in neutral countries hostile to British economic 
interference and sympathetic to German traders. In October 1914, in response to British 
advertisements in trade journals, an organisation calling itself the Argentine Commission 
in Favour of German Goods sent letters to British firms declaring it had always been 
satisfied with the quality and pnce of goods from Gennany and would continue to buy 
goods from her once the war had finished . 
39 It 
was thought that the frugality and energy 
of the German merchant, backed by the power of German industry, finance and 
diplomacy would again make Germany a powerful cominercial rival. 'O 
Conclusion. 
In fon-nulating the use of the statutory black list as a conunercial weapon against 
Germany, the blockading authorities concluded that no merely destructive war measures 
could permanently destroy the menace of German commercial organisation. They 
claimed that German organisation had secured control of some of the world's key markets 
3' F0 195,45,195361/95361: 'Our War on Enemy Trade' by the Foreign Trade Department, Nlay 1916. 
FO 368'928/80397-. Consul in Buenos Aires to the Foreign Office, 27 October 1914. 
FO 368//l 056/117626: Report on present and post-bellum conditions of the LIS market in relation to 
German imports and expectedAllied competition by the German Consulate in Philadelphia, 4 May 1916. 
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and had obtained a dangerous degree of influence over the export trade of other nations. 
Such control was used to hamper and divert the supply of goods to serve German interests 
and to promote German political aims for world domination. 
It was a dangerous policy to cut off the supply of British goods to German trading 
houses overseas in the absence of alternative British import houses. This policy could 
only be safely adopted if new channels of trade had been constructed before the old ones 
were closed down. Consequently it was necessary for the destructive policy to be 
accompanied by a constructive policy for the expansion and improvement of existing 
British facilities for trade. The constructive policy involved providing aid to British firms 
to replace enemy agents with non-enemy agents, providing assistance to British firms to 
expand or strengthen their organisation for exporting and giving encouragement to co- 
operation between British financiers, manufacturers, merchants and shipping lines for the 
capture of enemy markets. Yet, as we shall see, the conditions were not right for such 
construction with capital diminishing and material, men and ships required for war 
purposes. Wartime expansion of British commerce was inseparably connected to the 
provision of easy banking facilities, the establishment of direct shipping communications 
with Britain and the prompt fulfilment of orders. All three of these necessary factors were 
compromised by the disruption of the war. 
11 
Exporting for England: the attempt to destroy 
Germany's overseas trade connections. 
Pre-war naval planning had for many years involved the declaration of a close 
blockade of the German coastline in the event of any war between the two countries. 
This would have the effect of cutting all overseas commerce to and from Germany. In 
1912, however, the Admiralty finally recognised that with the advent of modem naval 
weapons, such as the submanne and mines, a close blockade would be impossible to 
enforce and settled for a long distance blockade across the North Sea and the English 
Channcl. 
The potential immediate impact was thought enonnous as at the outbreak of 
war around 60% of Gen-nan exports and 70% of her imports were sea-borne. 1 Soon 
after the declaration of war the German merchant manne fleet was swept from the 
seas by the Royal Navy to spend the war holed up in neutral or home ports. German 
shipping was only free in the Baltic and the majority of neutral shipping was not 4! ) 
prepared to run the risk of defying the Allied blockade and possible capture by 
entering German ports. However after the initial dislocation Gen-nan trade reorganised 
itself and switched to neutral vessels with the bulk of trade running via neutral ports, 
such as Rotterdam. Enemy goods on a neutral ship were still exempt from capture 
under the Declaration of Pans of 1856 and neutral ships on outward journeys were not 
'FI "Lirc from Cd. 9092, Report qf the Committee on Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries qfter the 
War ( 1918) pp . 
90-9-1. 
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detained at all by British naval blockading authOntles. -' During October-D ec ember 
1914 Gen-nany exported to the United States $26m. of goods compared with S47.2m 
for the corresponding period in 1913. Gen-nany was maintaining over half the value of 
her export trade to America. ' New York had also become increasingly important as a 
distnbution point for German goods to South America and the Far East. 
It was not until the Order in Council of II March 1915 that decisive action 
was taken to prohibit Gennan exports. The Order gave the British the right to seize all 
goods with an enemy destination or of enemy origin or goods which were enemy 
property. They determined to stop all goods which could be proved to be going to, or 
coming from, Germany. The effect of the Order on German exports made it one of the 
most successful actions by the blockading authorities, for German overseas trade was 
considerably curtailed within a matter of months. Goods ordered and paid for before I 
March were allowed free passage until I June, after which certificates of origin were 
needed for neutral exports to pass unhindered through British naval lines. 
A new committee, the Enemy Exports Committee, was fortned to supervise 
the task. It consisted of representatives from the Foreign Office, Admiralty and Board 
2 The Declaration of Paris stated that'neutral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband' and'neutral 
goods, except contraband, are not subject to seizure even under enemy flag. ' Before the war the British 
Government believed its interests lay in maintaining neutral rights rather than seeking to broaden its 
interests as a possible belligerent so that Britain could derive full advantage from neutrality during a 
war between other states and continue to trade freely. This had obvious disadvantages if Britain were a 
belligerent. See Marion Siney, The Allied Blockade of Gennany 1914-16 (Michigan, 1957) chapter 1. 
The Declaration of London (1909) recognised a distinction between absolute contraband (Iiable to 
capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed 
forces of the enemy'-Article 30), conditional contraband (Iiable to capture if it is destined for the use of 
the an-ned forces or of a government department of the enemy state, unless in this latter case the 
circumstances show that the articles can not In fact be used for the art of war'-Article 33) and free 
goods. Enemy conditional contraband was subject to the doctrine of 'continuous voyage' which meant 
it could be confiscated if there was good reason to believe it would be put to warlike use. Neutral 
conditional contraband was exempt from continuous voyage. The Declaration specified articles In these 
categories. The list of articles not allowed to be declared contraband included raw cotton, wool, jute, 
hemp, oil seeds and nuts , rubber and metallic ores (Article 28) which were all items of great military 
value to Germany during 1914-18. See Maurice Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power (London, 1924) 
Aplicridix I for the full provisions of the Declaration of London. The Declaration N-vas not ratified by 
Britain but morally compromised Britain's ability to place an effective blockade on Germany. 
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of Trade and sat daily at the Foreign Office. Its composition was similar to that of the 
Contraband Committee, the difference being it dealt with the question of ownership 
rather than destination. ' The manifests of outward bound vessels were reported to the 
Committee daily and if necessary they demanded certificates of neutral origin through I- 
the Foreign Office. ' In addition, throughout 1915 agreements were concluded with 
Scandinavian shipping lines in which they gave guarantees to refuse all cargoes of 
German destination or origin. 
During the course of the war Gen-nan exports dropped in value from 10,900 
million marks in 1913 to 3,000 million marks in 1918. ' The Allies could not prevent 
exports to neutral countries adjacent to Gennany' and some exports continued to pass 
through the parcel post. ' Overseas trade, though, had been reduced to a mimmum. ' 
Max Milller, an intelligence official, stated in June 1915: 
In only ten months of war Germany has been reduced to the position of 
a community commercially and industrially isolated. Very little of the 
' Runciman MSS WR 144: 'Stoppmg Germany's Export Trade During the War'by F. Leverton Harris, 
July 1915. During January-March 1915 German exports to the US were valued at $27.7m compared to 
$47.3m during the same period in 1914. 
4 Ships suspected of carrying goods with an enemy destination were detained and sent into a British 
port by the Royal Navy. The ships manifest was sent to the Contraband Committee who used 
information supplied by the War Trade Intelligence Department to decide whether to release the ship, 
request further information or send the cargo to a Prize Court. Cargoes with adequate guarantees 
against re-exportation were allowed to proceed. Ernest Pollock chaired the Committee from 1915-17. 
' Their workload was lighter than the Contraband Conunittee, scrutinising five or six cases a day. The 
Contraband Committee exammed twenty or thirty manifests daily, some of which contained more than 
500 entries. A. C. Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany, 1914-1918 (London, 1937) pp. 249-50. 
Also see Cd. 8469, Report of the Committee on the administration of the Order in Council ofMarch 
1915. The Enemy Exports Cornmittee was chaired by F. Leverton Harris, a Unionist MP who had been 
vigorously opposed to the Declaration of London. He became parliamentary under-secretary to the 
Ministry of Blockade in June 1916 and he was succeeded on the Committee by Sir Alfred Bateman. 
'Figures from D. T. Jack, Studies in Economic Warfare (London, 1940) p. 128. 
' However although native products (fish, meat, cheese, eggs, butter) continued to pass between 
Holland and Germany, goods which had to be re-exported reduced. Marion Siney, The Allied Blockade 
of Gennany 1914-1916, Appendix G, Selected Statistics on Dutch Exportation to Germany 1914-1916, 
p. 271. 
' In a memorandum entitled 'Traffic in Contraband and Enemy Goods sent by Parcel Post, ' (19 June, 
1915) Lord Crewe warned that trade would continue through this channel. On 22 June the Cabinet 
decided to take no action. It was feared that any interference with the mail may lead the Gennan 
authorities to refuse to allow parcels to reach British prisoners of war. Runciman MSS WR 144. 
' Exports from Germany to Spain had f allen from 185,370,000 pesetas (1913) to 20,99 5,000 (1915). 
Similarly for Brazil f 11,737,000 to E458,000; Chile (pesos, gold) 81,035.995 to 9,818,052; Uruguay 
(pesos) 7,811,135 to 749,375 and China (tael) 28,302.40', to 160,458. Figures from Bell, A Histon, of 
the Blockade of Gcrmany, p. 407. 
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20 or 25 per cent of the country's output that fon-nerly went abroad can 
now be exported. " 
In October 1914 Pie Contemporary Review picked up on the consequences of this by 
pointing out: 
Never before in the world's history has such an opportunity been 
offered the British trader. Secure at home, and possessing free access to 
the world's materials, he is presented with the markets of his greatest 
competitor ... It is difficult to realise that this competition has suddenly 
ceased - that it will not exist at all for a considerable period, and that 
even when the war is over it will be long before it can again become as 
fierce as in recent years. " 
British traders saw the opportunity to come to terms with the Anglo-German trade 
rivalry they had been unable to deal with before the war. It was confidently asserted 
that Britain would be free to pick up much of the Austro-Gennan export trade, worth 
f 358,000,000 in 1912. There was an obvious Germanophobic tone to the policy. In 
1915 a book entitled The Coming Trade War described 
The captivating notion of smashing the enemy's trade, and of being 
avenged upon the Gennan 'dumper' with his cheap and nasty goods, 
and even nastier methods, and for all the undercutting and devious 
trading of which we have been the Victims. 12 
Similar sentiments were expressed in a book entitled The Coming Economic Crisis 
(1918) showing that trade war was thought of as a more tangible war aim than vague 
notions of the destruction of Prussian militarism. 
Germany's trade ambition was the real cause of the war, it is the object 
of the war, and it will outlast the war ... We have to go into this new fight with the relentlessness of purpose which alone can insure us I 
ag, ainst commercial destruction. If we do not wrest trade from 
" Similarly in an extract from a letter from 0. Bergmann Company, Hamburg to their Yokohama 
house on 22 ApnI 19 15: "As far as commercial war is concerned, England has at the present time far 
and aNvay the upper hand, for the export and import of our overseas goods, via neutral lands, is to-day 
practically out of the question. " Runciman NISS WR 144: 'Stopping Germany's Export Trade During 
the Wai'by F. LeN, erton Harris, July 1915. 
I co G. Chlozza Money, 'British Trade and the War, ' Conteinporarý, Review, 106 (1914) p. 47/5. 
12 T. Farrow and W. Crotch, The Coining Trade Rar (London, 1916) pp. 2-3. 
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Germany, Germany will wrest trade from us. One of us has to be 
vanquished. " 
The Board of Trade was concerned with replacing Gennan and Austrian goods in 
home, allied and neutral markets with goods of British manufacture. 'Exchange I=> 
meetings'were organised in order to show British manufacturers samples of German 
and Austrian goods competing with British products in export markets and to bring 
British manufacturers into direct contact with purchasers who were norinally supplied 
by Germany. In the first instance goods such as toys, glass, china and earthenware, 
fancy goods, cutlery, electro-plate and clocks, enamelled, aluminium, tin and 
brushware, jewellery and haberdashery were dealt with. " Reports from the Diplomatic 
and Consular Service were published giving details of openings in countries for goods 
formerly supplied by Germany. In Tokyo the commercial attach6, Arthur Crowe, 
responded to the Commercial Intelligence Bureau of the Board of Trade identifying 
areas in which British manufacturers could compete against German goods, such as 
drugs, iron and steel, worsted yam and electrical machinery. " British consulates 
abroad urged commercial travellers to push British goods and to print catalogues and 
prices in native languages. " 
In May 1915 a Trade Fair was organised in London to rival the German 
Leipzig Fairs. These were thought to have been advantageous to German trade as 
buyers had the opportunity to inspect articles without travelling to individual firms. 
" HJ Jennings, The Coining Econoinic Crisis (London, 1918) pp. 131-2. 
14 Runcmian MSS WR 142: 'The Capture of Enemy Trade', 31 December 1914. 
By 1918 the Board of Trade had 15,000 samples from 80 different foreign markets. Board of Trade 
Jotirnal, 100 (1918) pp. 265-6. Similarly unofficial organisations such as the Trade and Industry 
Committee of tile Royal Colonial Institute attempted to provide a link between manufacturers in Britain 
and opportunities in overseas markets. See the RCI Journal, United Einpire, 5/12 (1914). 
" FO 371/ 2020, '-54444: 'Gem-ian Trade in the Far East' Crowe to Worthington, 20 August 1914. FO 
30, S; 921 40796. 'Extension of British Trade Nvith Abyssinia. ' 5 September 1914, "British agents should 
be found at Aden in order to take goods instead of German and Austrian, at present idle. " 
FO 108, ()2S 51362: 'German Export Guide, 1913' from the Consul in Buenos Aires, 24 August 1914. 
The guide was published and distributed free in the River Plate countries and printed in Spamsh. 
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Meanwhile manufacturers could collect a vast number of separate orders at once, 
ena ing them to plan requirements for finance and plant in advance. It was hoped that 
the Fair would consolidate relations between British manufacturers and buyers. " Over 
the course of two weeks 26,281 people visited the Fair but only 285 were foreign. " 
However, the desire to replace Gen-nan goods in Britain was just as important as the 
desire to supplant them in export markets abroad. Businessmen enthusiastically took 
up the challenge. At a meeting of the Sales Managers Association on 10 September 
1914,800 manufacturers, merchants and businessmen "called to give impetus, 
cohesion and direction to the general desire of British manufacturers and traders to 
carry a vigorous warfare into the arena of commerce, and to capture the world trade 
hitherto held by Great Bntain's enemies. " 19 
The policy outlined by the Foreign Trade Department essentially had two 
aspects, one destructive and the other constructive. The destruction of German trading 
connections was the responsibility of the blocking authorities. The constructive 
element was largely the responsibility of the country's merchants and manufacturers 
to provide alternative goods and channels of supply. The businessmen of Britain had 
displayed a willingness, whether for altruistic or patnotic motives, to play their role. 
However their efforts would be hindered by two main obstacles; disputes from within 
the blockade administration over the question of exports and secondly, the impact the 
immediate war effort was to have on exporting industries. 
" W. H. Clark, 'Tlie Work of the Department of Commercial Intelligence of the Board of Trade, ' 
British Electrical tiiid,. Illied, llaiilifacturers. 4ssociation Journal, 3 (1917) p. 74. 
" Figure in A. D. Harvey, Collision of Einpires (London, 1972) p. 286. -1-he Fair subsequently became 
an annual event. 
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The blockade administration and the question of exports. 
The administration of the blockade was by no means a coherent and unified effort. 
Blockading authorities represented a wide vanety of different departments and 
interests, often working towards their own individual goals without regard or recourse 
to each other. Nowhere was this fact more amply demonstrated than in relation to the 
provision for exports during the war. 
The two main direct hindrances to exports came from the desire of government 
authorities to conserve supplies of any goods considered vital to the conduct of the 
war effort in Britain and from blockade measures which forbade the exportation of 
commodities likely to find their way into enemy hands. The responsibility for 
administenng these dual restnctions fell to the War Trade Department (WTD). The 
Department had originated as the Inter-Departmental Committee on Trade with the 
Enemy, appointed on 4 August 1914. Its work largely consisted of granting, or 
refusing, licences for the export of prohibited and restricted goods which were then 
issued by the Privy Council Office. As the volume of work increased the Committee 
was replaced by the War Trade Department, created by Treasury minute on 17 
February, 1915. The WTD consisted of two separate sections; the Trade Clearing 
House Section2' and the Main Licensing Section. The latter had a Main Licensing 
Conu-nittee which was inter-departmental in character and considered applications for, 
and matters relating to, export licences. The work was mainly carried out by three sub- 
Milner MSS Box 153: Uie meeting opened with a chorus of 'Rule Bntannia'. 
The Trade Cleanng House (under Henry Penson) operated as an commercial intelligence section 
collatin- information from oovernment agents, cable censorship and intercepted letters. In December 
1914 Admiral Hall had created an unofficial body to censor overseas post. Although no traces of 
espionage \vere found it did reveal information about German purchases passing through neutral 
countries. With the founding of the NVTD an intelligence division xN as included to act as a clearing 
house for commercial infon-nation. In February 1916 it became the War Trade Intelligence Department 
and was attached to the Ministry of Blockade, although it remained officially subordinate to the NVTD 
until January 1917. See Eric Goldstein, I Vinning the Peace (Oxford, 199 1) p. 48. 
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committees representing the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, the Board of Agriculture 
and the War Office. Every commodity on the prohibited or restricted list was under 
the supervision of one of these departments and they gave a more detailed 
examination to applications for licences. There were also con=*ttees dealing with 
particular commodities such as the Rubber and Tm Exports Committee, the Coal 
Exports Committee and the Cotton Exports Committee. Attempts were made to co- 
ordinate similarity of treatment for particular commodities by regular meetings 
between the Main Licensing Committee and the vanous sub-committees. The licences 
were then issued by the Privy Council Office. " 
The procedure may have been thorough, but it was not conducive to the 
speedy issue of export licences. Traders and Members of Parliament alike complained 
of excessive interference with trade and legitimate exports. Sir Alfred Mond launched 
an attack in the Commons: 
Government Departments have set up Committees which have done 
their very best since the war started to kill the export trade of the 
country in a most unreasonable way ... There is not a practical man of business in this country who is not aware that a large amount of 
valuable export trade has been lost to this country by quite unnecessary 
and foolish restrictions, and to this day these restrictions continue. The 
delays in granting licences has caused us to lose markets ... surely it 
would be worth while to make some practical effort to stop the 
hampering of export trade which is going on through being dealt with 
by people who have really no conception of that trade. 22 
" Runciman MSS WR 142: 'Memorandum on the War Trade Department'by Emmott, August 1915. 
A statistical branch collected statistics pertaining to the blockade. It used pre-war import statistics to fix 
the level of 'rations' for the neutral nations and gathered figures from official publications (customs and 
shipping records) of Allied and neutral countries to ascertain the extent to which the rationing was 
complied with. In 1916 it became a sub-department, the War Trade Statistical Department and 
transferred to the Ministry of Blockade in January 1917. The WTD was also responsible for the upkeep 
of the Consolidated Black List, the secret register of all individuals and firins who were considered, or 
suspected as being, enermes and to whom all facilities for shipment and cabling were denied. It also 
had a secondary aim of causing damage to Germany's overseas business interests. 
4 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 037,23 September 1915. Similar sentiments , vere echoed: "I am certain that if 
the (jovernment want, as they must do, to foster our export trade, they would do a great deal by getting 
rid of old restrictions which are perfectly senseless. " Mr Holt, col. 69 1. Mond, a chemical industrialist 
(later the chaimian of ICI) m,, as initially a liberal free trader. As First Commissioner of Works (1916- 
2 1) he became a 'total NN ar' advocatc. 
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Requests from exporters to the Board of Trade for assistance were common. A letter 
from the firm of Joseph PoMt and Sons was typical. They complained that their 
business was being very severely handicapped as they had been unable to obtain a 
general licence for a quantity of felts and jackets they had for export to Norway. They 
thought they at least ought to have the same privilege as their competitors. ' Another 
trader who applied for a licence in October 1914 and had still not received it In 
January 1915 wrote 
we would ask you to consider whether this is treatment British 
manufacturers should expect from the government who are impressing 
on the one side upon the manufacturer to capture German trade and on 
the other are throwing obstacles in the way of the manufacturers so 
doing. " 
The problems were recogmsed in official quarters. Guy Harben of the War Trade 
Intelligence Department Informed RunciMan that various attempts had been made by 
more enterprising manufacturers to get into the Italian market, but in many cases these 
efforts had been squashed by the present restrictive regulations with regard to 
manufacture, export and shipping. " 
Lord Emmott, the Head of the War Trade Department, was not blind to the 
problems his Department created. Early in the war he commented: 
There is, too, a great deal of irritation and even consternation in some 
quarters of the country with reference to the latter prohibitions, and 
some traders ask indignantly what is meant by 'business as usual' and 
'capture of enemy trade' if they are not allowed to deal with new 
customers and not even permitted in many cases to deal with old 
ones. 26 
2' Runciman MSS WR 124 (2): Joseph Porrit and Sons to Lewis Harcourt (Board of Trade), 20 June 
1916. In the Commons Mr Hogge, MP, reftited the claim that it only took a week to get an export 
licence, saying it had taken him eight weeks to get a licence to export golf balls. 77 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 
1416. 
,' BT 12,104: Boardman Bros. to the Assistant Secretary of the Board of Trade (Commercial 
Dcpartn-ient), II February 1915. Quoted in David French, British Econoniic wid Strategic Plainiiiig 
1905-15 (London. 1982) p. 113. 
25 Rwicinian %ISS WR 161 (2): 20 June 1917. 
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In memoranda during and after the war he defended the Department, stating that 
imperfections in the system arose from unpreparedness for the immense task the 
Department faced under continual pressure, and from the constantly increasing list of 
prohibited commodities which increased the burden on staff. " Yet the problem was 
more fundamental than mere administrative difficulties. The War Trade Department, 
claimed Emmott, was the only body (apart fi7om a 'distracted' Board of Trade) which 
was anxious to keep the export trade functioning without detriment to the blockade. 
The Service Departments were in favour of curtailing exports for fear that anything C) 
should reach the enemy. The Foreign Office wanted to hold up trade with the neutral 
countries adjacent to Germany to force them to comply with its blockade policy and 
the Treasury were in favour of limiting exports to France and Italy for exchange 
reasons. 2' Although in theory the WTD had ultimate responsibility for granting 
liccnces, in reality a license was never authonsed if a related Department objected. 29 
This ensured political hannony but allowed the often over-zealous restriction of 
exports to continue relatively unchecked. 
The Restriction of Enemy Supplies Committee (RESC) was charged with the 
task of investigating exports from Britain and imports into neutral countries with a 
view to preventing supplies from reaching the enemy. " The difficulty was that the 
Comi-nittee was almost too effective, for whilst the members carried out their 
26 CAB 37/132/8: Memorandum by EmmoM 6 August 1914. 
2' CAB 15/6/24: Notes by Lord Emmott on the War Trade Department, c. 1919. By September/October 
1918 the weekly number of applications for licences received had risen to 19,000 with other enquires 
numbering 13,000. The number of licences issued weekly was around 16,000. 
2' CAB 27/44//EDDC. 34: 'Restrictive Policy with Regards to Exports', Emmott to Chamberlain, 13 
August 1918. 
Overriding the advice of other Departments would, according to Emmott, "result in cornmercial 
confusion and inter-departmental friction if not chaos. " Emmott to Balfour. I September, 1915. 
Emmott MSS Box 5. 
3' Appointed by the First Lord of the Admiralty on 13 August 1914, its duties were "to examine and 
xvatcli contintialk all means or routes by which supplies of food or raw materials might reach Germany 
and Austria; to report \\ eckly all irilportation's and exportations to and from these countries coming to 
their knowled-cý and to rccommend by,, vIiat methods, financial, commercial, diplomatic and military, 
45 
functions with utmost conscientiousness and vigour they failed to take ftilly into 
account obstacles faced by other Departments. " The chairman of the Restriction 
Committee was Sir Francis Hopwood, a career civil servant, dedicated to ftilfilling the 
administrative task set before him without recourse to external concerns. Emmott, on 
the other hand, had been a leading figure in the Lancashire cotton industry and was 
consequently a strong free-trader. The two men approached their tasks with different 
agendas. 
In July 1915 a scheme was proposed by Edwin Montagu, the financial 
secretary to the Treasury, for the reorganisation of all war trade committees and 
agencies. " Montagu declared the "present organisation of War Trade problems is 
confusing and embarrassing, our machinery cumbersome and ill-designed for its 
work. " He recognised that the WTD was advised, assisted and to an extent controlled 
by the committees and sub-committees either directly under it or one of the big 
departments of state. The RESC was supposed to indicate policy but had entirely 
failed to do so. Each of the big departments of state interested in war trade questions 
pursued a particularist policy and the WTD had been forced to give the Foreign Office 
the last word. 
The objective of the WTD was to restrict enemy supplies and inflict maximum 
damage on enemy trade with the minimum of disturbance to trading interests. Z-) 
Conflict, between departments of state with differing priorities, was inherent in the 
they might be hampered, restricted, and If possible stopped. CAB 15/6/5: 'Report on the Restriction of 
Enemy Supplies Committee'by Lord Southborough (formerly Sir Francis Hopwood), 15 April 1919. 
" There were cases of carpets being held up at Customs House because the backs contained jute, 75 
H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 1211. 
The Premier Oil Extracting Mills Ltd. of Hull complained that the Admiralty had placed a ban on the 
export of castor oil due to fear of shortages. They had 400 tons in store, and with the capacity to make 
200/250 tons a wcck, big stocks were accumulating. If exports were prohibited any longer the mills 
would have to close. Runciman MSS WR 114 (1): 26 August 1914. 
32 Emmott expressed his annoyance to that neither he nor Hopwood had been consulted in the name of 
efficicilcy, let alone courtesy. RuncIrnan NISS W-R 136: Emmott to Runciman. 7 August 1915. 
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pursuit of this objective. Montagu suggested that a single minister, who was not the 
head of an existing main department, should be responsible for all war trade questions. 
All the current committees and sub-committees would become branches of the WTD, 
thus restricting the power of committees like the RESC, whose decisions currently 
vied with the authority of the WTD. There would be four divisions of the new WTD 
dealing with: Export licences (to which all the commodity sub-committees were 
answerable), Import Licences, Finance (to which the Trade Clearing House and the 
Cornhill Committee were answerable) and Restriction of Enemy Supplies (to which 
the Admiralty Advisory Committee and the Contraband Control Committee were 
answerable). Asquith agreed with Montagu's proposals, commenting that the existing 
arrangement appeared to be confused and even chaotic. He recognised that the matter 
was urgent and the Cabinet approved the scheme with Curzon as head of the 
reconstructed department. 
33 
The scheme attracted little enthusiasm at the Board of Trade. Hubert 
Llewellyn Smith, the permanent under-secretary, thought that a single department 
independent of all the existing great departments of state was a chimera and, with 
pragmatic insight, saw no hope of speeding up the administrative process. Curzon 
himself was obliged to advise against the creation of such an office and admit he was 
not qualified to run it. He drew parallels with the Ministry of Munitions, stating that 
the new department would only be effective if it was created in response to admitted 
public demand; if it continued to be strongly supported by all departments concerned; 
If it was accepted as a matter of urgent public necessity by the Cabinet and if it was 
Runciman replied "that you should have been kept out of even the preliminar-y discussions is almost 
incredible. 'Flus is the doing of. \ lontagu. " Emmott NISS Box -5 -. 9 , \u-ust 19 15. " 
.. \sqtiitti MSS Box 29: Montagu's proposals of 21 July and Asquith's comment of 22 July 1915". 
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created by special legislation. Curzon was unwilling to undertake the 'drudge' work 
involved in organising the new department and ensuring its effective running. " I 
Emmott complained that the proposals for reorganisation must ha-,., c been 
written from a theoretical standpoint with no practical working knowledge of the 
Licensing Section of the WTD. The only policy being pursued, apart from the agreed 
plan of conserving necessary home supplies, was the rationing of adjacent neutrals. 
This policy had broken down with respect to many commodities as greater supplies 
than normal reached these countries from other sources. The question then was 
whether the Government acquiesced in handing Britain's trade to her chief rivals or 
retained some control of trade and benefit exporters by granting licences for moderate 
quantities. The RESC was not competent to deal with this question as it was too 
restrictive in outlook and had no consideration for the wider interests of the country. 
Whilst Emmott agreed with some of Montagu's sentiments, namely the lack of 
parliamentary representation in the Commons to explain and defend war trade policy, 
he differed as to the best method of dealing with the central problem. " Emmott 
thought the best plan was for a powerful committee of 2-3 cabinet ministers to dictate 
economic policy to which the licensing authorities could have recourse. " A single 
cabinet minister with plenary authority would still be in opposition to the policies of 
the various concerned departments. What was needed was co-operation over licensing, 
not further conflict. It is hard not to agree with the resigned view of Hopwood that the 
present system, or lack of system, had become too deeply rooted to extirpate and that 
any attempt to do so would meet with failure. Curzon's negative response meant that 
34 Asquith MSS Box 29. Minute by Llewelyn Smith of 24 July 1915. He was joined in this view by his 
colleagues Sir George Barnes and Fountain. 1 15 , \s First Commissioner of Works since 6August, 1914 Emn-iott had a seat in Cabinet and originally 
ran the \V'rD along with this post. In July 1915 he complained to Asquith that the pressure of both 
posts was too -reat wid the duties need separating to be properly dealt \vlth. In any event he left the I 
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the Montagu scheme was dropped and Asquith tried to achieve the desired result by 
simpler and less ambitious methods. 
To this end the War Trade Advisory Committee was created on 20 September 
1915. It included the chairman of all the committees responsible for contraband work 
and attempted to co-ordinate the blockade machinery. Its duties were 
to advise on the restriction of enemy's supplies, to co-ordinate the 
administration of the War Trade Department, the Contraband 
Committee and the Restriction of Enemy Supplies Committee and the 
Committees controlling the export of coal, cotton, rubber and tin and to 
advise the Cabinet on questions of policy ansing therefrom. " 
The response to the need for simplification had been to create another body, thus 
adding to the layers of bureaucracy. 
There was effective co-ordinated action to identify problems in the system but 
less success in dealing with them. A conference of relevant departments identified 
several instances of overlapping in administration. The International Commission 
purchasing for the Allied Govern-inents (which granted licences to traders in Britain 
making supplies for the Allies) had granted a licence to export aeroplane engines 
although the consignee had been objected to by the Foreign Office and the WTD. 
Meanwhile the Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign Office was placing names of 
persons on the black list to whom the WTD was prepared to grant licences. Also, 
although the Treasury minute of 17 February 1915 had given the WTD jurisdiction 
over import and export licences, the Board of Trade was endeavounng to handle and 
control import licences through its Department of Import Restrictions. " This 
Office of Works on the formation of the First Coalition Government. He subsequently remained as 
Head of the WTD but without a Cabinet seat. 
" Eirimott MSS Box 5: Emmott to Asquith, 13 August 1915. 
17 It was chaired by Lord Crewe until 24 February 1916 and then until 21 May 1917 by Sir Francis 
I lopN\ ood. CAB 15Y6 5: 'Report on the War Trade Advisory Committee'by Lord Southborough. 15 
April 1919. 
38 FO 38'-' 1155 1138423: Notes of a conference with Lord Robert Cecil, Emmott, Highmore, Hopwood 
and Bridgeman, 25 February 1916. 
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Department, nominally under the control of the Board of Trade, had been established 
to economise on tonnage but in doing so created a conflict of authority. " 
Emmott was critical of war trade policy, claiming that restrictions on trade 
were imposed too suddenly and too rigidly. The total embargo of a certain commodity 
was often out of proportion to the results achieved. Restrictive policies only had the 
effect of stimulating the development of replacement industries to the detriment of 
British trade after the war. Germany took care to provide commodities for those 
traders who sympathised with her, but British embargoes were so rigidly enforced that 
friends and enemies alike were affected. " He complained after the war there had been 
no Cabinet or higher authority able 
to survey our home and overseas trade as a whole to balance the 
exigencies of the Blockade against the urgent claims of finance and t : -) 
exchange ... The Departments of His Majesty's 
Government worked too 
much in watertight compartments and the result on our export trade 
during the recent war was in the opinion of the War Trade Department 
damaging to a quite unnecessary degree. " 
There had never been clear guidance as to how far the trade and national finances of 
the country were to be considered in reference to licensing. ' 
" Certain fabrics required by English embroidery manufacturers, given licence for export to 
Swit7erland for manipulation and a special finish before returning, were subsequently refused re- 
importation. The WTAC sub-comi-ruttee 24 reported that it was important to keep import and export 
licensing authorities together. CAB 39/83: 20 September 1916. 
4' He complained of the "constant chopping and changing of Foreign Office instructions and the 
ludicrous short-sightedness of many of the requests we receive", especially from those officials lower 
down in the Foreign Office organisation. The Foreign Office requested the WTD to hold up all oils and 
fats bound for Spain because the former were pressing her to put olive oil on the prohibited list. 
Meanwhile the commercial attach& to Spain implored the WTD to end delays in licences for oils and 
fats as the delays were having a deplorable effect politically. Emmott MSS Box 5: Emmott to Asquith, 
13 August 1915. 
41 CAB 15/6/24: Notes by Emmott on the War Trade Department, c. 1919. 
42 The Bedford Street Weaving Company complained to the Foreign Office that the War Trade 
Department had held up shipment of goods to Scandinavia on the grounds that the quantities were 
abnormal. flie company stated that the increase was due to business appropriated from Germany and 
11ch, jurn. "As xve have been ur ed by the Government, on more than one occasion to keep up the ZN 9 
exports, it is doubly disappointing that now Nve have succeeded in securing a larger position of this 
btisiness than norinally comes to this market, that we are prohibited by the %N'TD from shipping the 
,, oods. - The company considered dropping the markets altogether until the war was over unless it 
could be asstircd that goods could bc shipped when ready. FO 382115 P135041: 11 July 1916. 
The fate of British export trade to neutral countries adjacent to Germany. 
As non-nal British exports declined due to the vicissitudes of war, one branch of trade, 
British re-exports to neutral countries adjacent to Germany, expanded greatly. 
Between the last quarters of 1913 and 1914 re-exports to Norway rose by 263%, to 
Sweden and the Netherlands by 294% and to Demnark by an enon-nous 935%. " With 
markets for British traders diminishing it was important that they made the most of 
those that were available. British traders sought to supply this new trade which 
compensated for the closure of markets in Germany, but which in reality was little 
more than indirect trading with the enemy. 
Some of the increase in exports to the northern neutrals was to compensate for 
goods they could no longer obtain from the Central Powers but there was little doubt 
that many of the supplies eventually made their way to Germany. " The British 
authorities were concerned with preventing the re-exportation of contraband goods 
from the northern neutrals to Germany and sought to control the trade of neutrals 
accordingly. Cargoes from neutral countries bound for the northern ncutrals were held 
up and guarantees from neutral consignees that the goods would remain within the 
neutral country were required before release. All shippers of goods from the United 
Kingdom had to present certificates of destination to the customs authorities if they 
were trading with any port in Europe, except in Russia, France, Belgium, Spain or 
Portugal-, but these certificates were not inspected as thoroughly as the manifests of 
neutral ships. British merchants gave a simple declaration concerning ultimate I 
'3 Figures from Bell, Thc History of the Blockade of Gerinanly. p. 186. Big increases were recorded in 
coffec and tea, corn and -rain, cotton (raw), soda ash, soda compounds and oil nuts. Collectively these 
nations were known as the 'northern neutrals. ' 
44 1, ... a great increase in exports to neutrals adjacent to Germany cannot be contemplated without the 
considerable risk of some goods reaching the enemy. " CAB 37/132., S: Memorandum by Emmott, 6 
. \LlgUSt 1914. 
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destination and needed no guarantee from a neutral consignee. Since British exports to 
neutral ports were subject to fewer restraints, the northem neutrals began re-routing 
certain branches of their trade through Britain. 
The Foreign Office expressed its fear that the Government could be exposed to 
the charge of giving preferential treatment to British exporters, in contravention of the 
Order-in-Council of II March 1915, by allowing goods to be exported to countries 
adjacent to Germany without importers being compelled to give guarantees and 
undertakings. The Board of Trade maintained that the licensing of all free goods 
would not lead to greater control and would only interfere with legitimate trade and 
accentuate congestion at ports. In any event exports to Holland, Denmark and 
Switzerland were already covered by War Trade Agreements. Leo Chiozza Money, of 
the War Trade Advisory Committee, did not believe that organisations such as the 
Netherlands Overseas Trust could be relied upon to conduct operations in Britain's 
interest. He advocated a strict, universal system of licensing, even where ratiorung 
operated and trade organisations existed. " 
Neutral shipments were held up and confiscated whilst British traders 
continued to trade relatively unopposed, leading to suspicions that the blockade was 
devised to ftirther British trade. The United States complained that their trade was 
being interfered with, leading to a depression in certain industries which depended 
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upon European markets. The Contraband Committee reported on 20 March 1915, 
'5 CAB 39/76/WTAC Sub-Cornmittee 17: 'To consider the question of further control over "free 
goods" exported to countries adjacent to Germany'. Foreign Office memorandum of 30 March, Board 
of Trade comments of 14 April and memorandum by Money of 20 June 1916. 
'17hese tough measures adopted by Money are in contrast to his optimistic predictions of a trade-war in 
The Conteinporaiý, ReOcw. A journalist and Liberal NIP, he was a mernber of both the RESC (1914- 
15) and the WTAC (1915- 18). He eventually became Chairman of the Tonnage Priority Committee 
(1917-18). 
The British Govenurient responded by publishing trade figures which showed that the value of 
nierican exports to Europe had increased. Comparing figures In the month of January 19 1- 5 with those 
for January 1914, exports for Norway rose from $700,000 to $4.2in, for Sweden from S 1. Im to 
S9.9m, for Denmark froin $1.7m to $6. ý, m, for Holland from S9.4m toS 14.6m and for Italy from 
there appears to be a very general impression in America, and other 
neutral countries, that, whereas Great Britain is holding up contraband 
going to countries adjacent to Germany, she is herself, it is alleged, in 
order to encourage British trade, granting licences for quantities of 
contraband and prohibited goods for exportation from the United 
Kingdom to countries adjacent to Germany. " 
The British Government complained that the northern neutrals were becoming 
bases for supply for the Central Powers and that British supplies helped to make this 
possible. " This indirect trading with the enemy occurred due to a lack of Government 
guidance at the outset of the war, which in turn resulted from a conflict between the 
policies of economic expansion and aggression in certain markets and the complete 
cessation of trade in others. The Board of Trade issued warnings to traders but it was 
felt that the fault lay with the Govenunent: 
Had the Government in the past shown more determination not to 
allow any supplies to reach the enemy ... had they taken steps to bring home to the commercial community the truth that it is unpatriotic to 
accept suspiciously large orders from neutral countries - they would 
not now find themselves in so disagreeable a position ... As it is, 
merchants who have obtained licences to export huge quantities of tea, 
coffee, linseed oil and other commodities to neutral countries, are able 
to solace their consciences by reflecting that they are not obliged to be 
more patriotic than the Government. " 
$7.4m to $24.6m. Figures in Cave MSS 62466: 'Memorandum respecting American ships and cargoes 
detained at British ports' (Annex 1) of 14 May 1915. Also see Cd. 7816, Correspondence between His 
Majesty's Government and the United States Government Respecting the Rights ofBelligerents (1914- 
16). 
47 Cave MSS 62465: Minutes of the Contraband Committee, 20 March 1915. 
" "His Majesty's Government consider that the abnormal increase of supplies imported by neutral 
countries.. justifies their assumption as to the ultimate destination of many items of cargo consigned to 
one or other of the countries in question on vessels which they have detained, but they would call 
attention to the fact that it is only when they have believed themselves to be in possession of conclusive 
evidence of enemy destination of cargo that they have seiZed such cargo. " Cave MSS 62466: 
'Memorandum respecting American ships and cargos detained at British ports' by the Foreign Office, 
14 May 1915. 
" Editorial in The Times, 18 December 1915. 
The Board of Trade issued a warning in December stating that "they have reason to fear that in some 
instances there may have been cases of Business laxity and that goods have reached this country or 
have been exported from it which proper inquiry would have shown respectively to have been of 
eneiny origin or intended for enemy consumption. " Board of Trade Journal, 87 (1914) p. 760. 
This relationship between 'business as usual' and 'war socialism' is examined in Jonathan S. Boswell 
and Bruce R. Johns, 'Patriots or Profiteers? British Businessmen and the First World War, ' Journal of 
Funpean Economic Histoty, 11/2 (1982) pp. 423-445. 
ý 11 
The fact was that during the first six months of war the Government had not yet 
decided to pursue a campaign of unlimited economic warfare and elements of the 
Government were still attempting to give consideration to the nation's trading 
interests. 50 British merchants had continued to trade with France during the 
Napoleonic War as it was considered a valuable source of war revenue and important 
for British commercial supremacy to remain unchallenged. In 1911 a sub-committee 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, under Lord Desart, had considered the problem 
of trading with the enemy. The Admiralty had admitted that in a war between Britain 
and Germany indirect trade could not be eradicated. The Board of Trade agreed that 
direct trade between Britain and Genriany should be prevented but that there was 
nothing to be gained from ending indirect trade. If this happened neutrals would take 
the place of British traders and with it any profits. The Sub-Committee recognised that 
tradition and public sentiment guided policy in times of upheaval and that public 
opinion would probably demand a general prohibition of trade. " 
The Govenu-nent was reluctant to Intervene in the economy as a prosperous 
state of trade, regular employment at good wages, and high profits for the Revenue to 
tax and the Treasury to borrow, were regarded as essential conditions for the 
successftil prosecution of the war. 2 As the Statist declared: "We are governed by idle 
rich men ... [who] have always been careful, time out of mind, to train us up 
in the 
belief that England has always muddled through and always Will. 
1113 Manufacturers 
50 The question as to whether Government trading policy was to be governed solely on hatred of the 
rts in th enemy or was to take into account pragmatic factors (even at the cost of British expo reachi ge 
eneiny) is discussed in two similar articles by John McDermott, 'Total War and the Merchant State: 
ý\spccts of British Economic Warfare against Germany, 1914-16, ' Canadian Journal of Histoiy, X-NI 
(I QSO) pp. 61-76 and "'., \ Needless Sacrifice": British Businessmen and Business As Usual in the First 
"'orld War, ' . 41bion, 21,2 (1989) pp. _263-282. "C. \11 16/ 18Aý Report and Proceedings of the Standing Sub-Conirruttee of Imperial Defence on 
Tniding \\ ith the Enemy, 10 September 19 1 -1. I `A1.11. II oý-d, Expcriinents in State Control (Oxford, 1924) p. 261. 
Quoted in S. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain. (New York. 1949) p. 63 (footnote). 
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and traders, brought up in the laissez-faire tradition, believed in freedom of trade and 
non-interference by the state. 
Attention focused on products known as 'enemy comforts' such as tea, coffee, 
tobacco and cocoa. The debate arose as to whether it was desirable to allow these 
products, not thought to be of specific military value, through in order to help British 
trade, earn valuable export revenue and support the exchange rate or to prevent these 
goods reaching Germany entirely. The French and many hard-liners in Britain were 
anxious to have an outright ban on all goods to Germany. However many in Britain 
believed that Germany should be encouraged to import luxuries, of little military 
value, and use valuable foreign exchange. There existed a split in the official mind on 
how to deal with the question of exports and the blockade. Leverton Hams stated in 
January 1916 that he did not believe all goods reaching Gennany aided her 
prosecution of the war. He disagreed with those who desired to see every conceivable 
commodity stopped from reaching the enemy. It was more important to prevent 
Gern-iany from exporting through neutral countries. " Lord Robert Cecil, the 
Parliamentary under-secretary at the Foreign Office, thought that whilst the blockade 
on raw materials essential for the manufacture of war munitions should be maintained, 
the economic pressure on Germany would be increased by allowing 
other unessentials such as luxuries to reach her so long as the arrest of 
her exports continued both because the more luxuries she bought, the 
fewer necessaries she could afford because she would be more tempted 
to export gold and sell securities. " 
There were those who thought that Britain should concentrate exports to countries 
neighbouring GenTiany in goods that Germany was still exporting in order to deal a II 
blow to Gernian exchange and restrict the only export trade left open to her. 
Prohibitions on British (and overseas neutral) cxports to these countries simply left 
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Germany with uncontested markets which the latter used to extort various 
dispensations on the supply of home products. " 
The inconsistencies of the Government's policy were obvious, as Emmott 
explained to Hankey: 
It is clear that 'Business as Usual' and crippling German trade are 
inconsistent. It must not be forgotten also that to begin to curtail very 
sharply the quantity of goods allowed to be exported will cause a good 
deal of trouble and dissatisfaction amongst our traders at home. 57 
The problem stemmed from the fact that nobody in the Government had settled upon a 
finn line of policy. 
Coffee and tea were part of the German army field ration and were classed as 
conditional contraband at the start of the war but there was no restriction on the export 
of coffee by the Order in Council of 10 August 1914. On 19 December 1914, the 
Restriction of Enemy Supplies Committee reported that there was no substantial 
justification for putting a prohibition on the export of coffee in order to hasten the end Z: ) 
of hostilities. Nevertheless on 30 July 1915 coffee was placed on List (C) of 
prohibited exports. " The prohibition seriously threatened Bntain's entrep6t trade. 
Britain imported over one million bags of coffee per year before the war but home 
consumption was only around 250,000, the rest being shipped on. Not only was 
Bfitain left with a stockpile of some 420,000 bags but it was possible that London 
would lose future distribution trade to New York. Durmg the war London had 
replaced Hamburg as Russia's main supplier of coffee, a trade that now had to be 
abandoned. In any case, the success of the prohibition policy was called into doubt as 
54 78 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 1309-11,26 January 1916. 
" FO 800 95: 'Our blockade of Germany'. Memorandum to Grey, 19 July 1915. 
5' FO 3 82,1151/44998: Memorandum by Mr Snow in commercial despatch no. 314 from Findlay 
(Clinstina) to Grey, ", February 1916. 
57 Cave %ISS 62465. Nhnute by Emmott to Hankey, 27NIarch 1915. 
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Holland was allowed to import colonial coffee direct from the Dutch East Indies 
which it could now supply to Germany without competition. " At the Foreign Office, 
Cecil, along with the Restnction of Enemy Supplies Committee and the Cornhill 
Committee favoured relaxation but the War Office and the French Government 
dissented. On 6 October 1915 the War Trade Advisory Committee considered the 
question and decided that whilst coffee should not be taken off the prohibited list, it 
should not be prevented from going to Gen-nany and the price should be kept as high 
as possible. The recommendation was accepted by the Cabinet. 
The export of tea was prohibited by the Order in Council of 10 August 1914 
but removed from the list ten days later. The opinion of the Restriction of Enemy 
Supplies Committee was that tea was not a life sustaining beverage and withholding it 
from the enemy was unlikely to have any matenal effect on the campaign. The re- 
export of tea to the northern neutrals rose dramatically and it was placed on List (C) in 
November but only in order to protect home supplies. Exports to Denmark rose from 
830,000 lbs in 1913 to 4,422,000 lbs in 1914. " The explanation was that the rise was 
due partly to exports to Russia via Demnark, but this was not borne out by Russian 
customs figures. On 8 January 1915, tea was removed Erom the list and exports 
continued to rise. The Government must have been aware that supplies were reaching 
the enemy but considered it beneficial to have the Central Powers exhaust their 
purchasing power on relatively harmless commodities. It was the French Government 
early in 1916 who expressed their readiness to prohibit the export of tea. The scarcity 
58 Runciman MSS WR 144: 'Enemy Comforts. Coffee'by A. R. Kennedy, 10 July 1916. List (C) meant 
export was prohibited to all foreign ports in Europe and on the Mediterranean and Black Seas, other 
than those of France, Russia (except the Baltic ports), Belgium, Spam, and Portugal. 
5" Runciman MSS WR 144: Alemorandurn regarding the Coffee Trade'. Lord Inchcape (Cornhill 
Committee) to the Foreign Office, 3 31 August 19 15 - '0 Restriction of Enemy Supplies Committee, 30th Report. Re-exports to Holland had risen from 
1.201,041 lbs in '-, cptember 1914 to 5,508,412 lbs by November, against normal exports in those 
nionths during 1913 of 340,696 lbs and 344, S6S lbs respectively. Figures in Bell, . -I 
Histoiý- qf the 
Blockade o(Ger7nany, p. 181. 
of tonnage also made it desirable to reconsider policy towards entrep6t trade but the 
feeling against restriction of import to Britain held sway in the Cabinet. Yet on 28 
June tea was once again placed on List (C). Attempts were made to ration tea to the 
northern neutrals using the actions of the Contraband Committee to hold up shipments 
and by the refusal of the War Trade Department to issue licences for export from 
Britain. " 
On 18 November 1914, the Government stated that it had no intention of 
preventing the export of tobacco from Britain. Exports rose to the northern neutrals, 
especially Dem-nark and Holland. " Gen-nany had been a large exporter of tobacco 
before the war and rises in British exports to northern neutrals could have partly been 
to make good the deficiency caused by a Gen-nan export ban. However there is little 
doubt that some supplies were reaching the Central Powers. Due to restriction of 
tonnage the importation of tobacco to Britain was stopped on 15 February 1915. Due 
to the efforts of Sir Leo Chiozza Money, the War Trade Advisory Committee voted to 
withhold tobacco from the enemy on 6 April despite the fact that Germany could still 
obtain supplies of tobacco from the Dutch colonies, Bulgaria and Turkey. " On 4 July 
tobacco (which included cigars and cigarettes) was added to List 
Perhaps the most contested article was cocoa. It was not part of the German 
field ration but it did contain fat and sugar and was proven to be a valuable source of 
energy in poor diets. " However the issue involved the British colonies on the West 
Coast of Aftica which depended upon the cocoa crop for their prosperity. The 
Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Restriction of Enemy Supplies 
Runciman NISS WR 144: 'Enemy Comforts. Tea and Tobacco'by A. R. Kennedy, 12 July 1916. 
Ibid., In Denmark exports had risen from 23,940 lbs in 1913 to 1,781,900 lbs in 1915. In Holland. 
over the same period, they rose from 367,680 lbs to 3,601,000 lb. 
CAB 39/17/28th meeting of the War Trade Advisory Comn-uttee. 
CAB 39/22,33rd meeting of the War Trade Advisory Conunittee. 
RuncimanNISS WR 144. 'Enemy Comforts. Cocoa'by A. R. Kennedy, 10 July 1916. 
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Committee on 26th September 1914 that two-fifths of Gold Coast cocoa normally 
went to enemy countries. On 3 November 1914 the Committee decided not to take any 
action against cocoa deciding that the damage it would cause to the colonies would be 
out of proportion to that inflicted on the enemy. Nevertheless on 8 January 1915 the 
Government placed cocoa on List (C). Traders complained that Britain's entrep6t trade 
was threatened as overseas trade in cocoa by neutral countries by direct shipment was 
not interfered with. However it appears that licences for export were granted Ereely as 
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exports to the northern neutrals continued to grow during 1915. 
The authorities were faced with the difficulty of deciding whether the 
restriction on import to the northern neutrals (and then on to Gen-nany) was desirable 
and whether, if not desirable, it was possible to stop supplies getting through. At the 
War Trade Advisory Committee meeting on 6 January 1916, where Sir Leo Chiozza 
Money pressed for stringent measures, it was decided that cocoa should be treated 
more severely than other'enemy comforts'. In order to check supplies to northem 
neutrals, in excess of their home requirements, shipments were held up and placed in 
Prize Courts as much as possible. " 
The strengthening of direct blockade action. 
The fate of the 'enemy comforts' is indicative of the ambivalent attitude of the 
Government towards the blockade and trade. As mentioned earlier it was only with 
the Order in Council of March 1915, in response to the German declaration of 
66 Montagu stated in the Commons that there was no prohibition of export, except for cocoa powder. 73 
I-I. C. Deb. cols. 8-9,5 July 191-5. Re-exports to Holland rose from 2,205,282 lbs in 1913 to 12,968,688 
lbs in 1915. In Deninark, over the same penod, re-exports rose from 50,782 lbs to 10,236,755 lbs and 
in S%ý eden Crom 149,717 lbs to 13,7 57,034 lbs. Figures in Bell, A Historv qf the Blockade of GerinanIv, 
1). 460. 
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unrestncted submanne warfare, that the British Gove=ent began a vigorous 
economic campaign to prevent all goods reaching and leavmg Germany. Throughout 
1915 the blockading authorities endeavoured to negotiate voluntary rationing 
agreements with the northern neutrals, working on the theory that the higher the 
imports the more likely it was that some of these commodities would fmd their way to 
the enemy. The northern neutrals, whilst resenting interference with their channels of 
trade, agreed to limitations on transit trade in return for the relaxation of Allied 
policies of detention and seizure of goods at sea. In Holland, the Netherlands Oversea 
Trust Company was established in December 1914 and worked closely with the 
British commercial attach6 at The Hague. It acted as a consignee for commodities 
imported through the Allied blockade. It ftimished guarantees that these imports, or 
goods manufactured from them, would not be exported to the Central Powers. " 
However still no concerted effort was made to limit certain British exports and re- 
exports to these countnes. 
" British re-exports in total remained healthy until 1917. Their value in 1915 was f 99.1 in which 
compared favourably with the 1913 value of fI 09.6m. In 1917 they dropped to f 69.7m and in 1918 to 
f 30.9m. R. B. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988) External Trade. 
" It eventually became consignee for virtually all overseas imports to Holland. It was nominally a 
private organisation so the Dutch Government did not compromise its neutrality. In Denmark the 
regulation of imports was controlled by two trading associations: the Merchant's Guild and the 
Chamber of Manufacturers. The Soci6t& Suisse de Survelhance Economique (SSS) performed a similar 
function in Switzerland. In Sweden and Norway there were no general trading associations for the 
regulation of war trade and the British reached agreements with different trade associations. See M. 
Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power, pp. 135-145. 
In mid- 1917 the Foreign Office enquired about commercial arrangements between Britain and the 
northern neutrals, and their effect on post-war trade. Rumbold (Berne) replied that the SSS, whilst 
excellent as a blockade instrument was destructive as regards commerce. Howard (Stockholm) stated 
that not only had it been impractical to enter into commercial agreements with Sweden which might 
prove advantageous to the post-war British commercial situation, but the British Government had been 
compelled to impose numerous embargoes which had prevented the importation of goods into Sweden 
from the British Empire, and consequently damaged many existing trade connections. Gurney 
(Coperihagen) reported that difficulty in obtaining British goods had led to a much larger importation 
of American goods, especially in goods formerly supplied by Germany. These trade connections with 
US houses would undoubtedly continue after the war. If Denmark was to be financially and 
commercially independent of Germany it was necessary for trade connections to be fostered and 
Cultivated with other countries. FO 368/1849/f386: Despatches of 9 June, II June and 30 August 1917 
respectively. 
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A trade agreement with Denmark at the end of 1915 provided the pretext for 
critics of the Government, led by Lord Milner, to accuse it of being too lenient in the 
rationing of northern neutrals and allowIng goods to eventually pass through to 
Gennany. 11 Emmott responded by declaring that whatever was done to suppress 
exports only had the effect of driving trade which Britain might have won from 
Gennany or held on to herself, into the hands of neutrals. " Cecil stated that the 
blockade was directed at Germany and not the neutral countries. Evidence was 
required that any goods stopped on the seas were bound for Germany otherwise they 
would only be released by a Prize Court. " The Foreign Office was accused of pro- 
German sympathies and The Times reported "occult German influence in the very 
heart of our administration. "" 
In reality the Foreign Office was far from being Germanophile. They had 
written to the War Trade Department in early 1916 supporting additions to 
applications for licences for export to Europe. They endorsed taking steps to penalise 
firms where it was found that licences for European destinations had been applied for 
recklessly, such as refusing all licences to the firin for a set period . 
7' However the 
Foreign Office was caught between the two divergent opirtions of those who wanted 
leniency when it came to non-essential exports and those who wanted a total ban on 
Sir H. Dalziel and Sir A. Markham, two of the fiercest critics on this issue, attacked the Government 
for keeping the Commons and public in ignorance regarding the agreement with Denmark which they 
suggested allowed material to reach Germany contrary to the Government's own Orders-in-Council. 76 
H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 1723-1739,9 December 1915. 
70 The Times, 21 December 1915. 
" 77 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 740-1,23 December 1915. 
72 The Times, 21 December 1915. 
(-; rev refuted suggestions in the Commons that the Foreign Office was releasing cargoes and I 
undermining the blockade work of the Royal Navy. 78 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 1316-17,26 January 1916. 
7' FO 182/114 117114 7134: Foreign Office to War Trade Department. 7 February 1916. However they 
did not support additional checks on applications going to extra-European destinations Nvhich would Zg hamper export trade to countries where the Government Nvas trying to form new connections and hoped 
to replace 6erman trade after the Nvar. 
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trade with the enemy. In the absence of finn directives they were attempting to chart a 
course between the two. 74 
Cecil outlined the policy on rationing agreements with neutral countries: 
I do not pretend that even with these precautions you will arrive at a 
perfect success, but I do believe it is the right policy for this country to 
pursue, and I believe it not only because ... it will succeed in carrying 
out the policy we have in view of stopping goods going into Gen-nany, 
but also because ... it means that all real, genuine neutral trade goes on 
almost without interruption, and the only people who are really 
interfered with are those who are anxious still to carry on trade with 
Germany. " 
In February 1916 the Ministry of Blockade was formed. Although the Ministry 
brought many existing organisations within its orbit it was not merely another attempt 
to create a refereeing body. " It signalled a hardening of attitude towards the blockade 
of Germany in the light of the failure and subsequent recriminations over the 
Dardanelles campaign, the evacuation of the Serbian Army, German successes on the 
Eastern Front and continued stalemate in France. It undertook the vigilant scrutiny of 
the transactions of all suspect neutral traders and the listing of habitual offenders, the 
implementation of rationing schedules for the northern neutrals and agreements with 
" The difficulty in pursuing such a policy generally was illustrated by the disagreements between Esme 
Howard, British minister to Sweden, and M. W. W. P. Consett, the British naval attach6 in Scandinavia 
in trying to balance military expediency with political necessity. See B. J. C. McKercher and Keith E. 
Neilson, ''The Triumph of Unarmed Forces': Sweden and the Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914- 
1917, 'Joui-nal of Strategic Studies, 7/2 (1984) pp. 178-199. 
7' 76 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 981-2,2 December 1915. 
7' The Contraband Department of the Foreign Office formed the secretariat of the Ministry and was 
responsible for policy agreements with neutral countries. The Contraband Committee dealt with the 
treatment of suspect ships and cargoes; the RESC diverted supplies from the enemy which could not be 
touched by the naval blockade; the Foreign Trade Department of the FO was responsible for the 
preparation and administration of the Statutory List; the W-fD regulated the exports of prohibited 
goods from the United Kingdom; the Financial Department prevented the financial business of enemy 
states from being transacted through Allied countries, the WTID and the WTSD collected and 
disseminated data on which executive decisions could be based. 
In France on 23 March 1916 Deny Cochin, the president of the Comit6 de Restriction des 
Approvisionnements et du Commerce de I'Erinemi, was given ministerial rank signifying a higher 
status for blockade affairs. See SMey, The, -Illied Blockade of Germany: 1914-1916, p. 137 . Yet Maijone Farrar noted that in French Nvartime priorities, "blockade tactics ranked well below military 
and financial considerations, and blockade advocates had less influence in , overnment councils than 
representatives of more long-terin French interests". 'Preclusive Purchases: Politics and Economic 
Warfare in Hance during the First World War', Economic Histoiý- Reviciv. 'ý-XVL 1 (1973) p. 117-8. 
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neutral ship-owners, traders and associations to give undertakings in return for special 
facilities for shipments. They contained rationing clauses to automatically detain 
excess goods. 
In July 1916 a WTAC Sub-Committee reported that the existing conditions 
under which free goods were exported from Britain did not provide sufficient 
safeguard against them reaching the enemy and further measures of control were 
desirable. The methods they recommended were reliance on reports from Customs and 
Excise to the Board of Trade calling attention to marked increases in the export of 
particular articles, the right of Customs to insist on a suitable guarantee against re- 
export in the case of all free goods and the gradual inclusion of all free goods on the 
Prohibited Li StS. 77 
The time was ripe in Britain for stringent measures against Germany as losses 
on the Western Front mounted without any discermble progress. The Ministry of 
Blockade implemented the policy of forcible rationing on those neutral countries who 
refused to reach a voluntary agreement over imports with the Allies. " The Contraband 
Department issued a notification that a commodity was to be rationed. The licensing 
authorities only issued licences until the normal export figure had been reached, after 
which the Contraband Department would hold up all further cargoes of the 
commodity. It was this action which finally curbed what some considered to be the 
excessive British re-exports to the northem neutrals. Eyre Crowe was convmced that it 
was necessary to study carefully how to effectively kill German overseas trade with 
CAB 39/76, WTAC Sub-Committee 17: 'To consider the question of further control o-ver "free 
, oods- exported to countries adjacent to 
Germany'. Report presented to the Grand Com im-ittee at the 
4 2"' NIcetHil- on 20 July 1916. The Sub-Committee was chaired by Ernest Pollock, also chairman of 
thc Contraband ContTol Conintittee. 
" Runcinian NISS %VR 144: "Nlemorandum re. Blockade Policy'by Cecil, 25 February 1916. 
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the legal machinery at Britain's disposal. " Lord Robert Cecil, the new Minister of 
Blockade, who had previously supported the policy of allowing luxuries to reach 
Germany, thought there could be little doubt that the country would tolerate nothing 
less. He recommended a clear statement by Britain and her allies that they regarded 
the blockade of Germany as legitimate and essential. " 
The hindering of exporting industries by the necessities of war. 
Despite the best intentions of businessmen and officials to increase trade at the 
expense of Germany, circumstances of war meant that conditions were not suitable. In 
November 1914, Lloyd George had confidently stated to the Commons: 
This country is absolutely free from the invader. Not only that, but our 
overseas trade is carried on practically without interruption. We have 
lost a certain amount of lucrative business on the Continent, but the 
markets of the world are open, not merely for the trade we used to 
carry on, but for the trade the enemy used to carry on. "' 
The reality was, however, that overseas trade was subject to a great deal of 
interruption, much of it prohibitively stifling. Britain had lost enemy export markets 
worth f 63,047,000 in 1913 in Europe, which accounted for 12% of total British 
exports. " Trade with the rest of the world became increasingly important to cover the 
shortfall caused by the loss of European markets. The ability to export to these 
" This extended to businesses operating in Britain with alleged German connections which, until the 
I Irading With The Enemy (Amendment) Act of January 1916, were allowed to continue trading due to 
potential harm to British economic interests and laissez-faire attitudes amongst government officials. 
See John McDermott, 'Trading With the Enemy: British Business and the Law During the First World 
War, ' Canadian Journal of History, XXXII (1997) pp. 201-219. 
Quoted in Bell. .I Histoný of the Blockade of Gerinany, p. 544. 68 II. C. Deb. Ss. col. 356,17 November 1914. 
"I'lic countries included: Germany E40,667,000; ., \ustria f4.481,000; Turkey E2,414,000, Romania f 1,947,000 and Belgiun-i ý 13,528,000. Although not an enemy nation Belgium Nvas a closed market 
due to the Genrian occupation. Fig , British Finance. During and, 4fter the ff'ý7r 1914- , ures in Kirkaldy 1921 (London, 1921) pp. 168-373. 
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markets was affected by the lack of purchasing power in neutral markets and a re- 
ordering of the British national effort. 
Throughout the war there was a gradual move towards a more orgamsed 
economic system which often neglected the importance of the exporting industries. 
The imposition of state controls by the Government was haphazard and sporadic. 
They were rarely in anticipation of events, more often than not an attempt to mitigate 
problems. After the initial dislocation caused by the outbreak of war, and until late 
1915, the Government was concerned with supplying the Anny and the Allies at any 
cost. " The creation of the Ministry of Munitions in May 1915 was the first attempt to 
bring some order to the chaotic system of purchase and supply. The intensification of 
the war effort continued with an attempt to control supply and prices through the 
wholesale purchase of raw materials. The period from the middle of 1917 to the 
Armistice was the one of greatest government control, with the free-market largely 
suspended, but control was by no means total. There was no economic war council to 
guide the functions of the various departments which included the Ministry of 
Munitions, War Office, Ministry of Food and Board of Trade, each of which had an 
input into the economic affairs of the country. 
Dunng the last months of 1914 and throughout 1915 the free market failed to 
provide the resources needed to fight a war which was constantly increasing in scale. " 
" On 6 August, 1914, Kitchener asked Parliament to increase the army by 500,000. The request was 
granted the next day. On 10 September a second vote was taken for 500,000 men and on 16 November 
the House of Commons voted to increase the army by an additional million men. 69 H. C. Deb. 5s. 
1328. 
The size of the Army had reached 2.5 million men by the end of 1915. In 1916, due to conscription, 
this figure rose to 3.8m. By March 1918 the Army consisted of 5.6m men (including colonial troops). 
P. Dewey, 'The New Warfare and Economic Mobilisation' in Britain and the First World War, John 
Turner (ed. ) (London, 1988) p. 75 
'nie first industrial war with mass-production techniques also generated tremendous waste. "'I'lle 
most startlinu feature is the debris that is lying scattered on the surface and thick in the trenches. Sets of 
equipment, rifles, bayonets, shovels, shrapnel, helmets, respirators, shellcases, iron posts, overcoats, 
groundsliccts, bombs (in hundreds) -I don't suppose there is a square yard Nvithout some relic and 
reminiscence of the a\\ ful waste of war. " Malcolm Brown, Tonnny Goes to I ý`ar. p. 426. Quoted in 
, \. D. Harvey, Collision Of Einpires, p. 275. 
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Industry failed to equip the Services adequately, mainly due to government 
hindrances. Maurice Hankey observed: 
The Government had no national plan for the extension of the army, or 
for its armament. None of the problems had been worked out or 
thought of at all - exemption from military service of skilled or 
unskilled labour, machine tools, raw materials, and national industrial 
mobilisation generally. Consequently, and in particular, there was no 
basis for programme making or for estimating future requirements and 
supplies. " 
The method of placing orders was disorganised and the War Office only invited 
tenders from a small number of approved firms. No warning was given to the 
an-nament manufacturers of what would be expected of them. In the five weeks after 
25 August 1914 the War Office ordered as many field guns and howitzers as it had 
purchased over the previous ten years. " The government wanted a mass production of 
armaments on an unprecedented scale but this took time to establish, especially since 
the private sector had been kept idle during peacetime. It required an accumulation of 
specialised machinery, raw materials and labour skills previously practised by a small 
portion of industry to be spread across a large segment of civilian industry. The supply 
of war materials did not stop with munitions but a large portion of industry was tied 
up with war production. " 
The pressure of Government demand for manufactured goods and raw 
matenals pushed up prices, leading to profiteering and increased profits for 
manufacturers without any corresponding increase in supply. These windfall profits 
and a subsequent rise in the cost of living caused industrial discontent and demands 
'5 Quoted in D. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-15, pp. 127-8. 
st- C. 1'rebilcock, 'War and the failure of industrial mobilisation' in f Far and Economic Developinent, 
Denis Winter (ed. ) (Cambridge, 1975) p. 156. 
87 By Summer 1918,90% of the metals industry, 79"o of the chemical industry, 43% of mining and 
-Iw',, o of the clothino industry was engaged in war work. 61% of the iindustrial labour force was 
employed in \%ar work for British or Allied Goverriments. Figures in Dewey, 'The New Warfare and 
Fconomic Mobilisation' *in Britain and the First fforld lVar, John Turner (ed. ) p. 77ff. 
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for higher wages. No attempt was made to withdraw revenue from the purchasing 
power of the population; the result was inflation and a continuing demand for'luxury' 
goods. Non-essential industries competed unhealthily with the Government for 
materials and labour as did non-essential imports which occupied valuable freight It) 
space. The need for a controlling authority was recognised as the laws of supply and 
demand could not be relied upon to mobilise and distribute goods and services. Leo 
Chiozza Money wrote in 1915: 
Waste was forced upon us by our unreadiness for war. We had in 
desperate haste to devise the means of expanding an Army at a rate at 
which never an army had been expanded before. We had to learn how 
to do it as we went along. In such circumstances the wisest of men 
could not have avoided resort to the most extravagant devices. "' 
However, Money called for this waste to be checked and urged the Govenu-nent to 
take more vigorous action. Collectively the Allies had the resources to bring 
overwhelming pressure to bear on Germany but to be effective it needed to be 
properly organised and directed. "While Germany is using all her means only the 
fringe of our resources in men, money, foodstuffs, and raw materials have been 
touched". " 
The Government only overcame its reluctance in order to win the war. The 
imposition of controls was far from smooth or co-ordinated. The Government was 
often embarrassed into action, as with the'Shells Scandal'of 1915. Wartime controls 
grew out of necessity rather than as the product of deliberate state policy and usually 
in reaction to a specific set of circumstances which, if not remedied, would have 
courted disaster. The Govenunent took control of productive capacity in order to 
ensure supply and to control costs. Direct methods included building factories. I 
requisitioning the outpLit of Tvate factories or assuming control of privately owned 
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concerns such as the railways (August 1914), the collienes (1916-17), the flour mills 
(April 1917) and the Insh Distilleries (May 1918). 90 By the end of the war the 
Ministry of Munitions operated around 250 National Shell Factories. Where a private 
firin was taken over, the existing management was left in place with the Ministry 
issuing directives. Prices were fixed on a cost plus 'profits at pre-war level' basis. " By 
issuing regulations the Government could prohibit production except under licence 
and manage output and quality. 92 
By purchasing raw materials the state could indirectly apply pressure on 
industry who were now reliant on the Government for their raw materials. " The 
Government could also ensure an adequate supply of materials at a fixed price for 
both military and civilian use and direct their distribution. In June 1916 the 
Government purchased the domestic wool clip and continued to do so until 1919. In 
Novcmber 1916, the Government authonsed the purchase of the entire Australian and 
New Zealand clip. In December the Government began rationing the wool at fixed 
prices, generally set at the market price, firstly to government contractors, then to 
export manufacturers and finally for home use. The necessity for priority of raw 
matenals and labour for export industries was recognised, especially in light of the 
need for foreign exchange to finance purchases from America. A representative 
Leo Chiozza Money, 'Paying for the War, 'English Review, 21 (1915) p. 63. 
Edgar Crammond, 'The Cost Of War, 'Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 78/3 (1915) p. 399. 
The Defence of the Realm Act, passed in August 1914, confirmed wide and undefined Powers upon 
the government. The Crown had the right to take possession of any private property by virtue of Royal 
Prerogative. In February 1916, Regulation 2B gave the Army Council power "to take possession of any 
war material, food, forage, and stores of any description, and of any articles required for or in 
connexion with the production thereof" E. M. H. Lloyd, Experiments in State Control, p. 50ff. 
Q1 Regulation 7, March 1915, was used to requisition the goods of manufacturers which were not yet 
produced. Raw materials were given to a manufacturer who was instructed to make them up at a fixed 
price. 
"2 Regulation 30A enabled the Admiralty, Army Council, Ministry of Munitions to control trading in 
certain classes of articles and materials except through licence. 
03 Regulation 2E enabled the above authorities "to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the manufacture, use, 
purchase, sale, repair, delivery of or payment for, or any other dealing in any war material, food, 
f0ragc, stores of any description, or of any article requi ed for or in connexion with the production I ir I 
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Exporters Committee was established for the woollen, worsted and clothing trade to I 
find new markets and fix prices. The Leather Control Committee served a sinUlar 
function for the boot and leather industry, advising the War Office on the distribution 
of raw materials. However it was the Ministry of Shipping and eventually the Allied 
Maritime Transport Council who had ultimate control. If they could not, or would not, 
find the necessary tonnage then exports were stranded. The entry of America into the 
war in April 1917 removed the need for credit finance as all future Allied purchases 
were under-written by the US Government and a great incentive to keep the exporting 
industries alive was lost. " The imposition of state controls progressed steadily. To 
ensure delivery of goods the Goverriment took over production facilities; to ensure 
production they secured the relevant raw materials and to ensure the supply of raw 
materials they directed transport. 
The priorities of war: Army versus Industry. 
At the centre of any Govennnent planning during the war lay the question of 
manpower. Soldiers were needed for raising a continental sized army and to replace 
the appalling casualties suffered every month. Men were also required in industry to 
supply this army and maintain the export drive. The dilemma for the Government was 
finding the nght balance between the two. By the time the Govemment realised that 
recruitment was robbing industry of its productive capacity, much of the damage had 
already been done. Skilled labourers who enlisted in those early days of the war were 
lost to industry forever and could not be easily replaced. The Admiralty and the War 
t1jercof. " It was intended for use in fixing prices, as a legal basis for rationing manufacturers and 
dealers and enforcing a priority system of distribution. 
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Office began to distribute badges to men engaged in vital war production to prevent 
their recruitment. However no reference was made to workers in the equally important 
coal, iron and steel and food industries. The Ministry of Munitions, ý, ý-hich eventually 
took over the task of badging, was more vigorous and by September 1916 almost 2.5 
million men were in possession of badges. " 
In March 1915 at a Treasury Conference, the Government and trade union 
officials, headed by Arthur Henderson, reached an agreement over wartime working 
practices. The unions agreed to forgo strikes and accept the dilution of skilled labour 
for the duration of the war. This meant that manufacturing processes could be 
reorganised to allowed unskilled workers, especially women, into the industrial 
workplace in greater numbers. From July 1914 until November 1918,2.5 million men 
left the workplace to be replaced by 1.5 million worneW" 
Kitchener had plans to put 70 divisions in the field; however Walter 
Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, thought 54-57 divisions was the most the 
country could support. He and the Chancellor, Reginald McKenna, wanted a balance 
between economic and military strategy to stave off economic disaster. They wanted 
to prosecute the war with less vigour in order to survive to the end. It had, after all, 
taken over twenty years to defeat Revolutionary France. They warned of the dangers 
of expanding the army at the expense of industrial capacity and financial reserves: "If 
large numbers of men were to be called up rapidly, the strains on the industry of this 
country would be enonnous and gave industrial dislocation and collapse is to be 
Q4 Sec Lloyd, Evi7crinzents in State Conn-ol, chapters X-XII. In order to avoid speculation and price 
fluetuations the Postal Censorship held up hundreds of cables relating to wool during the crucial 
fortnight v, 'hilst negotiations were ui progress. 
I; igure from Christopher Addison, Politics From Within, vol. I (London. 1924) p. 198. 
Sldiicy Pollard, Development of the Biltish Econonýv, 1914-69 (London, 1969) p. 78. 
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feared. 1197 A Report by the Manpower Commission concluded that the evidence 
received clearly showed that the limit of indiscnminate recruiting through patriotic 
appeals had been reached, if not exceeded, and that in the future, every man who was 
taken must be taken after careful regard for his usefulness in other spheres. "" 
McKenna warned "Every addition to our expenditure, every withdrawal from industry 
adds to our difficulties. Our willingness to bear the burden is not in question, it is our 
capacity we must measure. "99 
In December 1915 he advised his colleagues: "Our ultimate victory is assured 
if, in addition to our military and naval activities, we can retain unimpaired our power 
to assist in financing, supplying and carrying for the Allies. "" The aim was 
to keep alive the great industries which are the mainstay of the 
country's export trade rather than to maintain all trades, or to keep 
exports at pre-war level ... The essential 
difference in this matter 
between the needs of this country and our allies is accounted for by the 
position we occupy in financing the Entente Powers, in which process 
exports play an essential part. "' 
The more munitions and war goods Bntam could produce the less need there was for 
American imports which damaged the foreign exchange rate and utillsed valuable 
shipping space and finance. "' Runciman wrote in January 1916: 
I hold that our contribution to the cause of the Alliance must be 
properly balanced so that we do not fail in financial any more than in 
military aid ... If the 
Cabinet refuses to cut the army coat according to 
our cloth, they will bring defeat on us as surely as would the presence 
of the Germans on the shores of the English Channel. "' 
" Emmott MSS Box 6: Runciman to Emmott I January 1916. CAB 27/4/Appendlx 3: Memorandum 
by the Board of Trade on the need of guidance when calling up men for the forces. 
" CAB 37/134/3: Report by the Manpower Commission, 2 September 1915. See also Stephen 
McKenna, Reginald McKenna, 1863-1943. A Meinoir (London, 1948) pp. 212-14 and 254-6. 
CAB 37/136/29: 'Adverse balance of trade in the UK'by McKenna, 22 October 1915. 
CAB 37/139/140: 'The Freight Question'by McKenna, 20 December 1915. 
CAB 37/142! 1 1: 'Cabuiet Committee on the Co-ordination of Military and Financial Effort. Report' 
1916. 
102 Runcinian MSS WR 90: Memorandum for the Cabinet by McKenna, 13 September 1915. 
"' RLinciman MSS WR 149: Unaddressed letter, I January 1916. 
Keynes noted: "Havingg taken up our historic role of furnishing our European allies witli money and the 
munitions of N\ ar and on a scale hitherto unthouzlit of, we must bend ourselves with foresight, 
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In order of priority, Runciman placed first the navy, secondly finance, thirdly 
industrial power and finally the "provision of a %rave army'. " 104 
Kitchener disagreed that a choice had to be made between men and money. He 
advocated the exercising of strict economy to allow the war to continue without any 
disruption to the flow of recruitment. The reorganisation of home industries would 
reducc the need for munitions and equipment from America, the imposition of import 
duties and limited rationing would bring economy in consumption by the nation and 
women could be used to fill the gaps in industry left by the withdrawal of men for 
war. 
This is not a Government's war on limited liability principles, but the 
Nation's war, and we shall not win it except by a supreme national 
effort such as our enemies are making ... We should remember that, if 
we do not win, no soundness of finance will avail us. We shall be bled 
white. "I 
Bonar Law held a similar view believing Britain had to risk everything, including 
national bankruptcy, in order to bring the war to an early termination. Victory would 
only come if the Allies were able to keep a superior force embodied long enough to 
exhaust and defeat the enemy; and financial resources had to be regarded in the same 
way. 
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In October 1915 Lord Derby was appointed as director of recruitment. He 
embarked upon a scheme to persuade all males between 18 and 41 to 'attest, ' or enlist 
subject to being called up for active service at a later date. His findings, made known 
in December, revealed that 2.8 million men had attested but another 2.18 million had 
intelligence and caution to the weighty task of mobilising our unequalled resources of wealth for the 
service of the coniniAments into which we have entered. " Asquith MSS Box 133: 'Note for the Prime 
Minister on the Financial Situation'. 30 October 1915. 
"' Northern Dai4v, 11ail, 26 June 1915. Quoted in Jonathan Wallace, The Political Career of 11'alter 
Runciman, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (1995), pp. 222-3. 
'0' Runcirnan N ISS WR 90: 'The Financial Situation' by Kitchener, 27 July 1915. A. J. Balfour believcd 
the conscnptioiiists were right to think- that great sacrifices were required but warns that such additional 
cfforts could not be sustained. WR 90: 'Finance and the War', 17 October 1915- 
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failed to do so. After deductions had been made for the army's immediate needs and 
those men with reserved occupations, only 522,000 new recruits remained under the 
voluntary system. " At this time the army needed 130,000 new recruits a month to 
maintain its size. It was becoming clear that the only method of resolving the situation 
would be through the introduction of conscription. Throughout late 1915 the Cabinet 
was split over the issue with Runciman, McKenna and other like-minded ministers, 
Sir Edward Grey and Sir John Simon, threatening to resign. Hankey implored them 
not to, claiming if they went the Government would be handed over to the militants 
and extremists. "' At the same time Lloyd George was arguing that victory had to be 
secured whatever the cost. In a letter to Chamberlain he wrote: 
[The Allies] must win through even though we win in rags. The notion 
of keeping up our trade as if there were no war is fatal. The single eye 
always triumphs in the end. Thus Germany fights - her trade gone and 
her people rationed on potatoes. I implore you not to give assent to the 
McKenna-Runciman position. "' 
Runciman and McKenna were diametrically opposed to this line of thinking. For 
them, military victory at the cost of economic defeat was unacceptable. 
It was decided to submit the issue to a committee, which would decide on 
acceptable limits of recruitment. Its Report concluded that the War Office should be 
able to maintain 62 divisions in the field and 5 territorial divisions for home 
defence. "' Runciman viewed this as a failure, believing the undertakings given by the 
"' Runciman MSS WR 90: Bonar Law to Cabinet, 25 October 1915. 
107 CAB 37/139/4 1: Memorandum on Recruiting, 20 December 1915. 
"' McKenna MSS MCKN 5/9: Hankey to McKenna, 28 December 1915. On the same day Asquith 
wrote to Runciman, McKenna and Simon with a sentimental appeal for them to reconsider before they 
took any action which may invalidate the authority of the Government with the country and the party. 
lie thouý, Iit their simultaneous departure would be a shattering blow to the Government and the Liberal 
cause. Simon MSS Box. 52': Letter of 28 December 1915. 
"' I-loyd George to Chamberlain. 8 January 1916. Quoted in Jonathan Wallace, The Political Career of 
lValter Runciniwi, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (1995), p. 23 2. 
"' CAB 27/4: Report of the Cabinet Committee on the co-ordination of the nuilitary and financial 
effort, 4 February 1916. 
73 
War Office were worthless for the security of the industrial and financial strength to I 
which he and McKenna attached importance. ""' 
The First Military Act of I March 1916, introduced compulsory service for 
single men aged 18-41, and a Second Military Act in May applied to married men. On 
22 August 1916, Austen Chamberlain was appointed chairman of a Manpower 
Distribution Board. Its task was to decide all questions relating to the utilisation of 
manpower and its allocation between different Government departments. The Board 
recommended the introduction of national service, yet the Government chose to stop 
short of such a proper organisation of industry. Industrial conscription was considered 
too risky to impose as the Government feared opposition from the Unions, upon 
whose goodwill they were already dependent. The shortage of labour and the need to 
keep production levels high had placed workers in a relatively strong bargainmg 
position. With the terrible losses from the Somme campaign to be replaced, the Board 
recommended another increase in the dilution of industry. Available manpower was to 
go first to the Anny and then to the Ministry of Munitions. The only sector to increase 
its employment of both men and women dunng the war was the munitions (including 
metals and chemical) industry. The exporting industries were neglected. 
Conclusion. 
In November 1914, Lloyd George stated dunng his War Budget speech: 
During the war, and during the period of reconstruction, there will be 
practically no competition in the neutral markets of the world except 
from America. We shall, therefore, practically command those markets, 
because America certainly cannot supply the demand-' 12 
'NIcKenna NISS MCKN 5/9: Runciman to McKenna, 23 January 1916. 
()s I I. C. Deb. 5s. col. 354,17 November 1914. 
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By the time the Foreign Trade Department was devising its policy of attacking I.. ) 
German overseas trade in early 1916, it was already clear that the increasing pressure I 
of the blockade and the necessities of the war effort had rendered such words hollow. 
The attempt to disconnect German trade may have been successful but the attempt to 
appropriate such trade proved more difficult. Britain's ability to trade came under 
pressure from a variety of sources. The restrictions on tonnage affected the capability 
to import raw materials and export manufactured goods. Recruiting took its toll on 
industrial manpower and intensifying blockade restrictions prohibited, hindered and 
stifled the desire and capability to trade. The nature of international trade meant that it 
was impossible to separate the trading systems of Allied countries from those of the 
Central Powers without great loss. Before the war, British ships had carried German 
goods around the world and Gernian trading houses in Latin America and the Far East 
had facilitated the import of British goods to those continents. During the war, with 
Britain preoccupied and unable to trade to her full extent, expansionist trade policies 
became increasingly unsustainable. 
III 
The dislocation of shipping and finance during the 
0 
economic war 
The war also affected the operation of British shipping and finance. Not only did this 
inhibit the commercial offensive but it also struck at Britain's invisible income, a vital 
element in the health of the economy. 1 The world economic system prior to 1914 was 
based around Britain, sterling and the multilateral settlement pattcm. After 1870 Britain 
developed a balance of trade deficit with industnalised Europe and the United States who 
in turn had trade deficits with under-developed and newly settled countries. Britain, on 
the other hand, had a trade surplus with under-developed countries and used this surplus 
to settle her debts with her industrialised partners. 
Towards 1914, Britain's surplus with these underdeveloped nations was dwindling 
as they began to export more raw materials and food to Britain and competition grew in 
those markets with industrialised rivals. As a consequence, Britain relied increasingly on 
the invisible surplus to clear the deficit with Europe and the United States, along with the 
export of manufaetured goods, mainly textiles, to a limited number of under-developed 
nations within the Empire, mainly India. 2 Britain was committed to allowing free access 
to her home market to encourage the high level of imports she required and also to enable 
her borrowers to repay their debts. If the balance between these imports, Britain's exports 
fact often under appreciated according to P. J. Cam and A. G. Hopkins in British Imperialism Crisis and 
Deco nstrilctioll , 1914-1990 (London, 1993) p. 32. 
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and the level of invisible income was disturbed, this delicate economic equilibrium. 
which operated Mi Britain's favour, would collapse. In each of these three vItal areas - 
exports, shipping and overseas investment - there was enough concern for the British to 
feel that it was they who were losing as much through trade dislocation as Germany. 
British shipping and the war. 
One of the great strengths of Britain's trading position before the war had been the size of 
her merchant fleet. It carried British and foreign goods to and Erom Britain and betwecn 
foreign ports world-wide, expanding trade and generating valuable revenue from freights. 
At the outbreak of war the navy requisitioned British shipping as transports and 
auxiliaries for use by the military. In January 1916 a Shipping Control Committee was 
established to decide upon the allocation of tonnage to the various supply departments 
and the Allies, but it failed to bring supply programmes within the capacity of transport. 
The Lloyd George Cabinet created the post of Shipping Controller, accepted by leading 
ship owner Sir Joseph Maclay. 3 He possessed wide-ranging powers to regulate shipping 4: D 
including: the employment of merchant shipping, requisitioning, the licensing of voyages, 
control of port and transit facilities, chartering of neutral vessels, direction of merchant 
shipbuildmg and the rates to be charged for freight or hire. Zýl 
By the end of 1916 much of the available tramp tonnage had been requisitioned 
and attention turned to the Imer fleets which constituted a third of Britain's ocean-going 
2 Cain and Hopkins, British Iniperialisin, Innovation and Expansion (London, 1993) pp. 223 ff. 
3 Maclay had a large shipping concern on the Clyde. He was part of the Lloyd George practice of bring 
businessmen into the Nvattime administration but it was on Bonar Law's recommendation that Nlaclay was 
sti, -, gested I'or the post. 4 C. E. Fayle, A Histoty of the Great War. Seaborne Trade, vol. Ill. (London, 1920) pp. 7 and 459-61- 
vessels and half their tonnage. The liner trade with its regular, fixed routes carrying a 
mixture of passengers and cargo suffered greater losses due to the disruption of their 
trading patterns. Liner services were important in marketing British manufactured goods. 
A considerable part of earnings on steamship liners derived from passenger traffic and 
inward freights. Thus British manufactured goods were carried abroad at rates that could 
not have been afforded but for the existence of highly organised services with 
considerable volume of trade in other directions. Bri"tish exports enjoyed an advantage in 
foreign markets through frequent and regular sailings from Britain and the stable rates of 
freight that ruled. The value of exports carried by liners represented 75% of exports from 
Britain. 
Requisitioning for the owners of tramp ships was of no lasting consequence, the 
only difference being that Government'Blue Book'rates were often not as 1-tigh as market 
freight rates. However, the redirection of liners from longer African, Eastern and 
Australian routes meant that liner companies lost not only profits but also goodwill and 
connections built up over many years of regular service. In 1916 the British Association 
of Japan telegraphed that the British authorities be informed of serious restraint of British 
trade owing to scarcity of tonnage. They urged strongly for steps to be taken to release at 
once all possible ships in order to restore reduced British services to ante-bellum 
conditions. Under present conditions it was impossible for British merchants to expand 
their export trade and there was a very real danger of actually losing business connections 
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which had been laboriously built up. "5 By the end of 1917 the British merchant fleet was 
working predominately for the war effort. 6 
The re-ordering of shipping priorities. 
In 1917, with the entry of the United States into the war, the problem of finance became 
less acute. Supply became less a question of affordability and more of the ability to 
transport the goods. As the Allied need for supplies increased and shipping losses from 
submarine attacks mounted, the importation of a large number of commodities was 
prohibited except by licence. 7Sir Joseph Maclay wanted greater consideration to be given 
to imports for manufacturing purposes to ensure that the country still had export trades 
when the war was over. The licences were 2ranted by a Tonnage Priority Comnuttee 
which selected and directed imports in the national interest. Each department presented 
the Committee with a list of its requirements and the Committee drew up a monthly 
priority list aimed at optimising the available shipping to meet tonnage deniands-' By 
placing similar restrictions on the export trade, the Government could conserve supplies 
necessary for war production, ensure priority for goods for the Allies and maintain the 
blockade on Germany. 
5 FO 371/2688/6617: Telegram from Greene (Tokyo), 11 January 1916. 
6 100 vessels as auxiliaries and 300 as naval transports (16%), 70 as troopships and 335 for the supply of 
land forces (17%), 350 for raw material imports for the munitions industry G 5%), 750 for essential civilian 
imports (31%) and 500 on loan to the Allies (21%). Salter, AlliedShipping Control (Oxford, 1921) p. 77. 
7 Imports had declined from 52,793 tons in 1913, to 42,326 tons by 1916 and to 34,417 tons by 1917. 
Arthur Salter,,. Illied Shipping Control, Table 4, p. 352. 
8 Hurwitz, State Intervention. in Great Britain (New York, 1949) pp. 194-5. The Tonnage Priority 
Committee included representatives of the Admiralty, War Office, Board of Trade, Ministry of Food, 
Ministry of Munitions, Colonial Office, India Office, Treasury, Timber Supply Department and the 
Con-Imisslon Internationale de Ravitaillement. Its chairman was Leo Chlozza Money. See Fayle.. 4 Histoq 
Qf Ilie Great P ar. Seaborne Trade, vol. 111, (London, 1920) p. 10. 
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Britain's urgent need for imported supplies led to a reordering of trade priorities. 
At the end of May 1917, the War Cabinet authonsed the Purchasing Departments to take 
the necessary steps to procure supplies as soon as possible from the United States and 
Canada and lower commitments from other markets to a minimum. The Tonnage Priority 
Committee was to take action to concentrate demand on the United States and divert 
private demand for commodities into the same channel. The policy was not to be 
disclosed to the Dominion Governments, India or the Allies until the machinery for 
purchasing was in place. 9 A monthly priority list was drawn up for each shipping route to C) 
assess the quantity of commodities that needed to be brought to Britain. Arrangements 
were then made for ships to be available to load and transport the goods. Any tonnage 
surplus to requirements along a particular route was transferred to another. The heaviest 
route was across the North Atlantic as it entailed the shortest voyage and America could 
supply most manufactured imports needed by the Allies. Shipping was reallocated at the 
expense of more time-consuming Latin American, Far Eastern and Australasian routes. 10 
Tonnage for exports now depended entirely upon routes taken to collect imports, 
which did not necessarily correspond with Britain's traditional trading patterns. There 
9 CAB 23/21W. C. 150: 30 May 1917. 
Sir Edward Carson questioned the policy warning that it would have the immediate effect of running the 
i market against Britain and leave the United States in the favourable position of middleman. He thought it 
was bound to have a disturbing financial effect in the United States and other parts of the world. CAB 
24/15/G. T. 950: Carson to Hankey, 5 June 1917. 
10 The Far Eastern priority list comprised of little except tin and rubber from the Malay Peninsula, beans 
from China and Japan and hemp from the Philippines, never more than 20,000 tons. The Australian priority 
list contained wool (most importantly), copper, hides and meat; some 50,000 tons. The South American 
trade was given priority for refrigerated shipping (for the transportation of meat) over Australia on account 
of its shorter route. Much came from the Plate with a list of 12,000-25,000 tons. There was little 
interference with the west coast South American services as they already matched the 25,000 ton list of 
nitrates, sugar, copper and other metals. The South African list was small, around 12,000-15,000 tons. 
Surplus vessels either went to Australia for trooping or to India for a homewards cargo, often carrying coal 
froni Durban to the bunker at Colombo on route. The East African list, about 40,000 tons of kernels. 
ground-nuts and palm-oil, had barely enough tonnage to service it. Fayle, .4 
Histoiy of the Great War. 
Seaborne Trade, vol. III, pp. 122-125. 
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were complaints of delays in outward shipments. Sir William Byles, MP for Salford, 
asked whether the export of cotton piece-goods to India and Bunna could be accelerated. 
He was aware of 20,000 packages waiting for shipment to Bombay alonc. worth 
f 800,000.11 This was not the concern of the Ministry of Shipping whose sole task ývas to 
ensure the delivery of supplies essential for the war effort. 12 Yet it was of gave concern 
to the Treasury as the gap between exports and imports widened. 13 There was a glut of 
outward tonnage to the United States to the detriment of Britain's imperial trade which 
had become increasingly important before 1914.14The Shipping Controller stated that 
ships being brought to aid Britain during the crisis were being taken from accustomed 
routes. Not only was there a present loss to British interests but there was the prospect of 
permanent injury in imperial markets. "Shipping lines which have been built up by 
assiduity and enterprise during long years are being depleted of tonnage, with the result 
that a great opportunity is presented to the foreign shipowner. "15 Victor Wellesley, in 
giving evidence to a committee concerned with shipping interests and the carrying trade, 
wamed: 
It is scarcely going too far to say that the whole economic condition of this 
country depends upon the supremacy and maintenance of our shipping 
industry 
... Any step, therefore, which is likely to affect this position and 
11 92 H. C. Deb. 5. s. col. 918,2 April 1917. 
12 CAB 24/12/G. T. 660: 'Proposal to secure absolutely the national safety by concentrating shipping in the 
Atlantic' by Leo Chiozza Money, 4 May 1917. Money had ambitious plans for the purchasing Of Supplies 
in the United States, the reorganisation of ports, restricting ships to the Atlantic route and maintaining a 
reserve of ships. See CAB 24/13/G. T. 711: 'Shipping Strategy in the Atlantic', II May 1917. 
13 The gap between visible imports and exports widened from f 133.9m in 1913 to f 783.7m in 1918. See 
A. W. Kirkaldy, British Finance During and After the War, 1914-21 (London, 192 1) p. 360. 
14 Between 1870 and 1914 the proportion of British exports to the Empire had risen from 23% to 35%. 
15 CAB 24/8/G. T. 284: Statement by the Shipping Controller on the mercantile marine and the shipping 
programme, 20 March 1917. 
TI 
i 
us message was reinforced by Lord Inclicape, the chairman of the P&O Line, who warned that the 
withdrawal of ships from distant 111ternational trades was opening the door to foreign competition and there 
would be great difficulty in re-establishmig British interests in many trades from which ships were 
being 
\\ ithdrawn. C, %B 24/20/G. T. 1407: Inchcape to Maclay, 6 July 1917. 
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restrict our world wide trade into narrower channels calls for the most 
utmost consideration. 16 
Shipping routes and trade connections. 
Despite this, restrictions on the import of raw materials for manufacturincg, the dislocation 
of industry and the reduction in the skilled labour pool by army recruitment were more 
responsible for the decline in exports rather than the reduction in outward tonnage. Even 
India, Britain's largest overseas market, had adequate outward tonnage largely due to the I 
fact that the priority import lists for India, Ceylon and Rangoon were very large. 17The 
implications of the reallocation of British shipping were really felt beyond Britain's direct 
overseas trade. As the owner of the world's largest merchant fleet before the war, British 
shipping also carried a substantial amount of neutral trade and plied routes between 
neutral ports. 18 Gradually the Government had requisitioned these vessels to assist in 
supplying the national war effort. By July 1917,40% of gross British tonnage was in the 
North Atlantic. Between January and July 1917, the period of greatest upheaval, the 
percentage of British shipping employed in cross-trade dropped from 32% to 22.5%. 19 
Fears were expressed over the loss of these routes as shipping freights contributed 
a substantial amount to invisible export revenue which in turn had helped to keep 
16 FO 368/1871/fl7l440/215270: Notes from a Report of the Committee appointed to advise as to the 
measures requisite for the maintenance of the British mercantile marine, I November 1917. 
17 They amounted to some 140,000 tons consisting of manganese, rice, oil-seeds, tea, sandbags and jute. 
Fayle, A History of the Great War. Seaborne Trade, vol. 111, pp. 121-2 
18 In 1914 Britain owned 44.5% of the world's merchant shipping. Germany possessed the second largest 
fleet with 12%. Fayle, A History of the Great War. Seaborne Trade, vol. 1, p. 18. Out of 8,445 ocean-goin-1-1 
vessels Britain possessed 4,174 and Germany had just 743. Salter, Allied Shipping Control, p. 8. 
19 Fayle,, -l Histori, of the Great War-. Seaborne Trade, vol. 111, P. 126. In 1913 British shipping provided 
30% of tonnage plying between foreign ports, 55% of tonnage between foreign countries and the Empire, 
60",, between flic UK and foreign countries, 80% of Miter-colonial trade and 94'o of tonnage bemreen the 
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Britain's pre-war balance of payments healthy. At a meeting of the Economic Defence 
and Development Committee in July 1918 complaints were raised in relation to British 
shipping and foreign competition. Lord Inclicape noted that the Japanese were 
appropriating trade routes that had been built up by British fin-ns prior to the Nvar largely 
unhampered by competition. During 1918, they established lines of steamers between 
Calcutta and America despite repeated requests to the Japanese Government to make their 
tonnage available for the common use of the Allies. The requests were met with 
unconditional refusals on the grounds that Japanese tonnage was required for essential 
use in Japan. British officials believed Japanese policy was to take advantage of wartime 
conditions to expand their maritime trade at the expense of other shipping interests. The 
British had attempted to keep sufficient vessels on the Calcutta-US route as the credits 
built up in America by India were vital for the Allied war effort. The intrusion of 
Japanese tonnage was wasteful and only encouraged the shipment of non-prionty goods. 
The substitution of Japanese for British shipping on the route meant that British ships 
could be released for Allied service. However these ships would probably be deployed in 
the war zone and be subject to heavy losses. Meanwhile Japanese tonnage enjoyed 
relative immunity outside the war zone enabling it to improve its Position by supplanting 
British shipping after the war-10 
Sir Kenneth Anderson stated that American competition was not merely a post- 
bellum problem but that it was already being felt. On routes between North and South 
America British lines had possessed four-fifths of the carrying trade before the war. 
UK and the Empire. Cd. 9092, Report of the Conzinittee on Shipping and Shipbuilding Inditsoies after the 
War (P) 18) p. 14 5. 
20 CAB 27/44/'EDDC. 40: 'British Shipping and Foreign Competition'. Telegram from the Foreign 
Off-ice to 
Sir C. Greene (Tokyo), 18 July 1918. 
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However, for many months, there had not been a single ship left in the trade, the majont%- 
having been withdrawn by the Government in 1916. He warned that unless British lines 
were to be supplanted owing to the preoccupation with the war needs of the Allies, 
tonnage within Britain's control must be found for their maintenance. Sir Joseph Nlaclay 
said that in connection with North and South American trade he would like to obtain the 
sanction of the War Cabinet to reinstate a dozen British ships in the trades. 21 This theme 
was taken up in the Commons but Leo Chiozza Money, parliamentary secretary to the 
Ministry of Shipping, replied that there would be no withdrawal of vessels from direct 
war service to protect British interests, "lamentable as it may be". 22 
The discussions revealed a divergence of opinion over the issue of aiding Allies at 
the expense of British interests. None of the Allies could have continued the war without 
the imports of food and munitions they received, the volume of which was far in excess 
of the tonnage they possessed to carry it. By July 1918 the French had nearly 2 million 
tons of British tonnage in their possession and the Italians had 1.1 million, with British 
ships carrying 45% of those countries imports. The bulk of French (57%), Italian (66%) 
and United Kingdom (56%) tonnage was employed in the import service of the four main 
Allies (including America). The majority of US tonnage (37%) was employed in naval or 
military or naval service of the Allies. However, America had a ftirther 27% of her 
merchant fleet engaged in the coasting and colonial trade. Only 11% of the British fIcct, 
5.5% of the Italian and 3.8% of the French fleets were engaged in this task. 23 Vaat Was 
21 CAB 27, /44/EDDC. 21: 9 July 1918. 
ines NI aclay had previously reported to the War Cabinet that the Americans had opened new conunercial 
I 
to South America. This was evidence that the US was engaged in the post-bellum development that 
Britain 
was always suspected of CAB 23/4/`W. C. 253: 10 October 1917. 
22 109. H. C. Deb. 5. s. col. 13-5 -1, Mr Pringle to 
L. Chiozza Money, 7 August 191 S I 
23 Table II in Salter, Allied Shipping Control, p. 364. 
84 
resented was tonnage assistance given to America without cause. The British believed 
that America would have tonnage to spare if she was prepared to sacnfice her coasting 
trade, as Britain had done. 24 
In August 1918 Leo Chiozza Money was questioned in the Commons: 
Is it not a trifle incongruous that while we are lending ships to America for 
all purposes, America, with new interests, should be taking the place of 
British Services between North and South America, and does he not see 
that it is reasonable to ask that, while we are giving all that to America, the 
Americans should not be collaring British trade? 25 
Chiozza Money replied that the Government was not lending ships to the United States 
but to the Allied cause, in order that 10,000 American troops each day could be 
transported to Europe. Arthur Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, endorsed this 
view believing that given the choice of American troops or raw cotton, the people of 
Lancashire would have little hesitancy in choosing American troopS. 26 
However, many thought that the American Government were relying on the 
British to transport their troops whilst leaving American vessels free to appropriate 
British trade routes. It was reported to the War Cabinet that the United States, who had 
promised to assist in transporting troops from Britain to France had not yet sent four 
coastal transports they agreed to dispatch. They were still using their steamers in the 
passenger trade whilst leaving Britain to carry their troopS. 27Between April and 
September 1918, about 850,000 American troops (60% carried in that period) were 
carried in British ships and escorted by the Royal Navy. Every passenger steamer from 
24 Me Foreign Office noted the chief routes Amencan steamers were employed on: US to Brazil, 
gar trade Aroentina, the wcst coast of South Amenca, the Philippines and the Far East; the West Indies sup 
aiid the Northern European coal trade. CAB 24/61/G. T. 5516: 'Memorandum on Shipping, Munitions, War 
Supplies and Shipbuilding' by the Political Intelligence Department, 19 July 1918. 
25 109 H. C. Del). 5. s. col. 1353. Mr Hog---e, 7 Au-gust 1918. 
S-7, 
South Affica had been used, practically killing trade with that country, and all the fast 
passenger steamers from India and Australia had been removed for the task. It meant not 
only a loss of financial earnings but also practical isolation for certain overseas 
Dominions. 28 
The original proposal had been to have 100 American divisions in Europe by 
1919 and the British were expected to supply much of the shipping to transport and I 
supply these troops. The problem of transporting American troops was discussed in 
Washington in April 1918. The president of the US Shipping Board, Edward N. Hurley, 
stated that American ships could carry 90,000 troops a month but this would require a 
reduction of imports in trade with Japan and Brazil. 29 Wilson instructed him to inform the 
British how many troops America could send without taking out the Japan and Brazil 
tonnage and then ask Britain and France to provide the balance. 30 
British aid to the American war effort. 
In August 1918 the Admiralty noted that America's output of merchant tonnage for the 
first five months of the year had been higher than it was thought possible to achieve. 
Whilst they had no complaint with the American war effort, they considered this a 
worrying situation and wanted a reconsideration of the total maritime effort of Britain and 
21,106 H. C. Deb. 5. s. col. 403,15 May 1918. At the time cotton imports were one-half pre-war levels. 
27 CAB 23/5iW. C. 355: 27 February 1918. 
21 summary of an interview wi the ,ý Lloyd George MSS F 35/2/88: Telegraphic I ith Shipping Controller for 
the American Press, 5 December 1918. 
I lurley was chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (1915-17) and no doubt saw a need for a large 
merchant marine as a means for gaining increased trade for America. 0 Y) E. David Cronon (ed. ), The Cabinet Diaries ofJosephus Daniels, 1913-1921,3 April 1918. Quoted in 
E. 
B. Parsons, 'Why the British reduced the flow of American troops to Europe in August-October 
1918, ' 
Canadian Journal of Histol-V 12, / 12 (1977-8) p. 176-7. 
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the United StateS. 31 Virtually all the British mercantile fleet had to traverse the danger 
zone infested by German submarines, resulting in substantial losses of tonnage. The 
maritime marine was not being rebuilt at the same speed as would be possible if Britain's 
contribution to the naval war effort was not so great or if the United States took a greater 
share. The material and labour currently used for repairing British and Allied ships could 
be diverted into merchant construction. The Admiralty questioned whether it should be 
the continued policy of the Government to accept responsibility for the whole burden of 
naval warfare, less such contribution the Allies felt disposed to make, to the sacrifice of 
other vital demands on resources. 32 
This problem of balancing the burden of the naval war effort was part of a mucli 
larger question concerning the contribution of the United States. With commercial 
competition from America and restrictions on the British export trade, Sir Joseph Maclay 
questioned why British factories were manufacturing materials such as clothing, boots 
and blankets for the American Anny: 
It seems to me a most questionable policy to stop our export trade even for 
the sake of exchange, in favour of helping the Americans, while the 
Americans use their material to a greater extent for export purposes, which 
they send to markets from which our merchants are being dnven. 33 
31 The Foreign Office reported that the "position of America, as a shipbuilding country, Is being rapidly 
transfon-ned; but the necessities and difficulties of the immediate present tend to obscure the possibilities of 
the future. " CAB 24/61/G. T. 5516: 'Memorandum on Shipping, Munitions, War Supplies and Shipbuilding' 
by the Political Intelligence Department, 19 July 1918. 
These ftiture possibilities were illuminated by Hurley, of the US Shipping Board, in an address to 
manufacturers: "The more vigorously we fight the war, the more tonnage we shall have at our disposal 
when peace is declared. " CAB 24/61/G. T. 5494: Geddes to the War Council, 24 August 1918. 
32 CAB 24/60/G. T. 5307: 'Naval Effort - Great Britain and the USA' by Geddes, 
2 August 1918. 
Leo Chiozza Money commented that at the present rate of construction, it was not improbable that by 
1920-21 the United states would have a bigger mercantile manne than Bntain- CAB 23/7, `W. C. 4f6,9 
Atwiist 1918. Zýý 33 Lloyd George NISS F35/2, /66: N/laclay to Lloyd George, 15 July 1918. 1 -- 
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It was British policy to supply America with all the equipment procurable fi7om British 
manufacturers which could possibly be spared. 34 This was at the expense of civil and 
export trades but it did help to reduce the balance of indebtedness to America and assist 
the foreign exchange position. 35 Austen Chamberlain, responding to criticism of the 
British war effort, stated that Britain was largely responsible for supplying American t) 
troops and making large contributions of materials of all kinds to the Allies. 36Churchill 
was particularly defensive of this position. He believed that manufacturing for the 
American Army was economically most desirable to off-set the huge burden of debt 
Britain was accumulating in the United States. He also stated that it would not have been 
possible to sustain the amount of Amenican troops currently in Europe, "saving the 
situation, " if Britain had not been willing to largely supply their clothing and 
equipment. 37 
Churchill's views were considered unsound by Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland whose 
task it was, as head of the Department of Overseas Trade, to give every encouragement to 
the export trade. He agreed that Britain's general indebtedness to the outside world was 
not affected whether she manufactured for the American Army or exported to other 
countries. What did matter was the effect the policy had on Britain's commercial position 
after the war: 
As soon as the war is over the United States orders for uniforms, etc. will 
cease. We shall have gained no good will or trade connections of any 
enduring value. On the contrary we shall have tended to lose what we C) 
34 CAB 23, ý'3/W. C. 222: 22 August 1917. The Secretary of State for War had received approval from the 
War Cabinet to ftu-nish clothing and boots for the United States army, for whom there Nvas a shortage, Z> 
should it be asked for officially. 
35 CAB 27 44 EDDC. 22: A. Weir (War Office) to Austen Chamberlain, II July 191 S. 
36 C, ýB 23,7AV. C. 44 5: 15 July 19 18. 
37 ('., \ B 27144 /EDDC. 2 6: Churchill to Austen Chamberlain, 19 July 191 S. 
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previ 
" 
ously had, and shall have enabled the United States or Japan to 
acquire these at our expense. 38 
Lloyd George noted that the United States Government was putting forward cxtravagant It) 
demands for clothing and munitions which could place a heavy strain on manpower and 
shipping. 39 The Economic Defence and Development Committee considered the various 
arguments at a meeting in October 1918 but decided that under the circumstances they 
had no choice but to continue supplying the United States Army. 40 Similarly, the 
Admiralty's request for compensatory merchant tonnage in exchange for the continuance I 
of British repairs work for the United States was thought unadvisable. The most that 
could be asked of the Wilson administration was to adjust the construction rate so that the 
ratio of warship/merchant construction was the same in both countries, with repairs 
counting as construction. Britain devoted a much larger proportion of her output to 
warship construction. 41 
Wilson and the United States merchant marine. 
Wilson was determined to free the United States from dependence on the British 
merchant marine after the war. Britain, with the largest merchant fleet in the world, 
carried the bulk of Allied supplies and also bore the brunt of shipping losses. Before the 
war Britain possessed 43.7% of the world's merchant fleet, some 18,892,000 tons gross. 
By June 1919 the tonnage had dropped slightly to 16,345,000 tons but this now 
38 CAB 27/44/EDDC. 32: Note by Steel Maitland, 7 August 1918. 
39 CAB 23/7(W. C. 459,15 August 1918. 
40 CAB 27/44 EDDC II th Mmutes: 15 October 1918. 
41 CAB 
-14'62, G. T. 552 1: Record of a meeting held at the Foreign Office 
between Balfour, Reading, 
I NI, iclay and the Third Sea Lord, 16 August 1918. 
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represented only 35.7% of the world total. In contrast the Umted States share had risen, 
42 over the same penod, from 4.8% to 21.5% or from 2,070,000 tons to 9,824,000 tons. 
This was partly due to the US shipbuilding programme inaugurated by Congress in 1916. 
However British shipbuilding construction during the war continued to outstrip that of the 
United States despite major difficulties. Merchant shipbuilding had to take place I 
alongside Admiralty building, especially orders for anti-submarme and convoy escort 
vessels. There was also the usual shortage of skilled labour, from indiscnminate 
recruiting, and a shortage of steel. Added to this was an enormous amount of repair work 
for both Royal Navy and merchant shipping taking up valuable space in the yards. The 
Government tried to relieve congestion and speed up construction by placing orders with 
overseas countries, namely America. However, on 3 August 1917 a Requisitioning Order 
was issued by the US Shipping Board for all steel ships over 2,500 tons dead-weight 
currently under construction for private owners of any nationality. This included orders 
for ships placed by Britain amounting to some 700,000 tons dead-weight. 43 
New construction for the British Empire amounted to 4,765,000 tons gross with 
America (including the Great Lakes) building 3,643,000 tons, the majority of this during 
1918. British losses, however, were much heavier than her Allies and new construction 
failed to make good the losses. British tonnage lost through enemy action amounted to 
some 7,748,000 tons leading to an overall net loss of 2,983,000 tons. The United States, 
on the other hand, lost only 389,000 tons of shipping leading to a net gain of 3,254,000 
(ieddes was unhappy with the decision and thought the issue mented further consideration. CAB 
14 02 (,. T. 5508: 28 August 1918. 
42 Table IV in Fayle, ,I Historv of the Great If"ar. Seaborne Trade, vol. 111, P. 4()'). 43 Fayle-, l Hisfori, ql'the Great War. Seaborne Trade, vol. III, pp. 81,103-4 and 214-6. 
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tons. "American ships were loath to enter the submarine infested "'aters around the 
United Kingdom if they could at all help it. Entrances and clearairices ZD of American 
shipping at British ports were lower than they had been before the Nvar. British ships 
obviously had no choice but to take the risk in order to prevent the nation ftom starving 
and the war effort from grinding to a halt. 
When the United States had declared war, Wilson ordered that all Gennan 
merchant ships trapped in American ports be requisitioned. Although this was oril-, inally 
only meant to be for the duration of the war, Wilson subsequently demanded the retention 
of these vessels as reparation for America. 45The British were vexed that the United States 
were claiming possession of twice as many ships as she had lost. A compromise was 
concluded between Wilson and Lloyd George whereby ships captured in port could be 
reamed by those who seized them but the value of the ships would be distnbuted 
amongst the Allies according to ships lost. This meant the United States had to pay a 
46 
surplus for her ships but the utility value was far greater than the actual monetary value. 
It was this great leap in the size of the American merchant fleet, combined with 
British wartime impotency, that made many ship owners and merchants fearful for the 
future of the British coasting trade and the subsequent income from freights after the war. 
From 1910 to 1920 the amount of American merchant shipping registered in foreign trade 
44 Ibid., Table 111, p. 468. Tonnage gains and losses from August 1914 to 31 October 1918. Additions do 
not include captured tonnage or gains by transfer or purchase. Deductions do not include ships interned in 0 
enemy ports, marine losses or transfers and sales. With these figures, British Empire additions came to 
6,679,000 tons and deductions to 9,763,000 tons. For America the figures are 5,08 1,000 tons and 885,000 
tons. Japan was the only other major nation to increase the siZe of its fleet, rising by 677,000 tons to 2,385 
tons. 
45 The French also claimed Gen-nan Atlantic liners for colonial commurucation. They were the best ten 
passenger ships Germany had and the acceptance of the French claim, according to Maclay, would have 
Scrious conseqticnces for Britain's position in the North Atlantic. He urged that claims should be not on 
colonial need but on an equitable basis in proportion to losses suffered. Lloyd George MSS F/35/3/ 
29: 
Maclay to Pri ic ý in M mister, 27 June 1919. 
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had nsen from 783 million tons to 9,925m tons. 47 In March 1918 the Committee 
appointed to consider the position of the shipping and shipbuilding industries after the 
war reported. They concluded that the maritime ascendancy of the Empire must be 
maintained at all costs and that the grave wastage sustained during the war had to be 
repaired without delay. They advocated the release of shipping from government control 
as soon as possible, to enable shipping companies to operate again at market rates and 
recapture their old routes: "It is of the utmost importance that as large a proportion as 
possible of the world's shipping engaged in trade should be under the British flag at an 
early date after the war. " To this end they also recommended the completion of no less 
than 2,000,000 tons of merchant shipbuilding annually. 48 
In late 1918 a conference of ministers held at the Shipping Ministry approved the 
substitution of control by requisitioning with control through direction and license. The 
object was to try to recover some of the enormous trade which during the war had been I 
lost to Britain. In other words, to restore shipping to the cross trades and more distant 
routes while there was still the chance that Britain's competitors had not yet established 
themselves too firmly. By mid- 1919 most vessels were off requisition but Maclay advised 
that the progress towards freedom of movement must be continuous. The war had 
'(' Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers (New York and London, 1986) pp. 520-1. 
47 William Woodruff, America's Impact on the World (London, 1973) Table XII, p. 262. The percentage of 
imports and exports carried in American vessels (by value) rose over the same period from 8.7% to 43%. 
48 Cd. 9092. Report of the Committee on Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries after the W(11- (1918). 
The Board of Trade Statistical Department reported that the UK had 1,980,000 tons under construction in 
1918 compared with 1,957,000 in 1913. Over the same penod the figure for the USA had risen from 
236,000 to 3,646,000 tons. Milner MSS 3 1: Summary statement showing the post-war progress of the UK, 
USA, France and Gerniany, 16 June 1919. Maclay had recommended that 3 million tons minimum ý% as 
needed to maintain the equilibrium and that it was undesirable, in view of the post-v--ar position. that the 
Unitcd States should build more rapidly than the UK. CAB 24'19/G. T. 1,4S. 
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encouraged the restriction of British ships to British trades. Before the war British 
shipping had been world-wide and mercantile supremacy had been based on that faCt. 49 
Finance and Overseas Investment 
By mid- 1916 the Asquith ministry faced conflicting war priorities. Britain's role was to 
provide a land army and naval blockade, to supply munitions, raw matenals and shipping 
to her Allies and raise loans and provide credit for purchases in the United States. 
Britain's resources were not strong enough to sustain such a gigantic effort. 50 The 
cumulative effect of being unable to meet the cost of the war and not being able to supply 
equipment and materials for the army from domestic sources, meant that Britain was 
forced to look abroad for help. The only nation with the resources to match Britain's 
needs was the United States of America. 
49 Lloyd George MSS F/35/3/24: Memorandum by the Shipping Controller, 12 June 1919. 
50 John Turner, British Politics and the Great War (New Haven, 199 1) p. 94. See also David French, 
British Strategy and War Ahns, 19144 916 (London, 1986) pp. 244ff. 
The cost of the war constantly outstripped expectations and any attempt by the Government to deal with its 
finance. In November 1914 the cost of the war was estimated to be around E900,000 per day rising to f3 
million by June 1915. During 1916 the daily expenditures rose to L5.7 million with the debt service alone 
requiring f 500,000 per day. By early 1918 this figure had reached E6.7 million. The cost of the war far 
outstripped the ability of the tax system to cope with it and on average only 25% of expenditure was 
covered by taxation. See F. McVey, The Financial I-listory of Great Britain, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1918) pp. 
42-46. 
In 1914 Treasury officials warned Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, against relying too 
heavily on borrowing to finance the war. Nearly half the cost of previous wars had been paid for by 
taxation. However the taxable capacity of the nation was not exploited vigorously enough from the outset 
of war. Successive Chancellors preferred to raise enough revenue to cover peacetime expenditure and the 
interest on any loans raised. The 'McKenna Rule, ' which became accepted practice, was not to borrow 
without imposing new taxation sufficient to provide for the interest on, and a sinking fund to reduce, the 
new loans. The tax system did expand during the war and revenue with it, from f 198 million for the year 
ending 1I March 1914 to f 1,340 million for the year ending 31 March 1920. Figure in Kirkaldy, Brilish 
Finance During andA-ftcr the War, 1914-1921, p. 209, The main additional burden of taxation fell on 
direct taxes with the'normal' rate rising from Is 2d in the pound (1913-14) to 6s (1919-20). Sidney Pollard. 
Dei, elopincia of the British Econonty, 1914-1967 (London, 1969) p. 64. The total numbers liable to income 
tax "ose from 1.2 million in 1913-14 to 7.8 million in 1919-20. 
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In order to equip Kitchener's 'new annies', orders were placed in the United 
States and American businessmen were only too ready to accept them after the Industrial 
slump of 1913-14. In 1914 Lloyd George, as Chancellor, removed financial restrictions 
on the purchase of war supplies. Britain was also under an obligation to supply her allies 
and finance their purchases. Britain had the ability to achieve this, being the financial 
centre of the world and possessing the world's largest merchant shipping fleet. To C 
facilitate this task the Commission Intemationale de Ravitaillement was established on 17 
August 1914 to take over the purchasing of supplies and prevent counter-bidding by 
different Allies scrambling for the same supplies. 51 In October 1914 the War Office sent a 
Mission to the United States to co-ordinate the purchasing of supplies. This was followed 
in May 1915 by a Ministry of Munitions Mission which became resident in America. By 
the end of 1917 the British War Mission had around 10,000 members. It purchased 
munitions and raw materials, inspected factories and ensured the safe transportation of 
supplies to prevent sabotage. 
In January 1915 it was arranged that J. P. Morgan & Co. should be sole purchasing 
and financial agents for the British in America. They would "use their best endeavours to 
secure for His Majesty's Goverriment the most favourable terms as to quality price 
delivery discourits and rebates and also to aid and stimulate by all the means at their 
disposal sources of supply for the articles required. " The three related firms, J. P. Morgan 
& Co. in New York, Morgan Grenfell in London and Morgan Harjes et Cie in Pans, 
connected the major Allies to America. Morgans negotiated the contracts and the War 
Mission ensured they were fulfilled successfully and delivered safely. Morgans was the n 
-ý I The CIR eventually handled all purchases in Britain and the Empire and most purchases in the Allied 
countries and most of the neutral countries for France, Russia, Belgium, Serbla, Italy. Portugal, 
Japan, and 
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leading investment bank in New York and its head, J. P. Morgan Jr., , vas an Anglophile C> 
and loyal to the Allied cause. 52 This was important as many of the New York merchant 
banks had German connections. Sir Edward Holden, a director of the London and City 
Bank and a member of British financial missions to the United States, feared that the 
influence of Gennans, who banked with New York bankers, would tell heavily against 
the Allied cause. 53 
The huge purchases of military and civilian goods from America naturally had an 
adverse affect on the trade figures. Imports from America rose firorn f 13 3m (1911-13) to 
f 515.4 (1918), whilst over the same period exports fell from f 60.1 m to f 27.8m. The 
trade deficit widened from E72.9m to f487.6m and by 1918 almost 40% of Britain's 
imports came from across the AtlantiC. 54 This vast expen i I diture led to a shortage of dollars 
and the deterioration of the sterling-dollar exchangc rate. From a rate of $4.85 to the 
pound in January 1915, this dropped steadily to $4.61 by August. 55 The exchange rate 
was at first allowed to slide until the declining power of the pound began to affect 
Britain's ability to purchase supplies. To allow Britain to finance the purchasing of goods 
and support the exchange rate, gold was shipped across the Atlantic. In the early months 
of the war gold was deposited in Ottawa to be shipped to America as required. Up to July 
1917, some 005 million worth of gold was transferred to the United States. To withdraw 
more gold from European banks would further affect the credit of those nations and have 
Romania. For a brief history of the organisation see Board of Trade Journal, vol. 100, (1918) p. 594. 
52 See Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of TV'ar, 1914-18 (London, 1985) pp. 19-27. 
53 McKenna MSS MCKN 5/6: Holden to McKenna, 27 August 1915. 
ý4 See Appendix V in Burk, Britain, Anterica and the Sinews oj'Uar, 1914-18, p. 267. 
55 See F-ý,. Morgan, Studies in British Financial Policy, 1914-25 (London, 195-1) p. 345. 
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an inflationary effect in the United States. In any event the shipping of gold proved 
inadequate in arresting the decline of the exchange and supporting purchases. 56 
In June 1915 Runcýman warned that the export trade would have to revive to its 
pre-war level or part of Britain's overseas investments would have to be realised to 
fumish the sums required in America. 57 From the end of 1915 onwards the Treasury 
began to acquire and borrow certain American securities from their private owners. These 
securities were intended as collateral for loans but it became clear that some would have 
to be sold to maintain payments and stabilise the exchange. At first the scheme was 
voluntary but later, securities desired by the Treasury and not surrendered were subject to 
additional income tax. In early 1917 the Treasury received powers to requisition certain 
securities to strengthen the country's financial position, however the entry of America 
into the war made this measure largely unnecessary. 58 It is estimated that f 623m worth of 
dollar securities were utilised by the Treasury. Sales by the American Dollar Securitics 
Committee (1915-22) were valued at f288m generating $1367m. 59 Measures such as 
these helped to stabilise the exchange at around $4.76 for the duration of the war. 
The only course of action available to keep Britain's financial situation fluid was 
to either reduce spending in America or borrow money to cover the purchases. Lloyd 
George, as Minister of Munitions, was not in favour of relaxing the war effort. He 
directed the War Mission to place whatever orders were thought necessary regardless of 
the cost. He believed the Wilson administration would ultimately step in to guarantee 
orders. If American manufacturers were forced to choose between losing lucrative orders 
56 Burk, Britain, America and the Sineivs of War, 1914-18, pp. 62-66 and 95-99. 
57 Runciman MSS WR 90: 2 June 1915 
58 '-'cc Ki aldy, British Finance Duri 1914-1921, pp. 183ff. S irk ng and After the I Far, 
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or making their own arrangements for financing contracts on the joint credit of the three 
Allies, they would prefer the latter. The additional cost was not worth considering in a 
war that had already proved so expensive, and was not comparable to the damalo:,, e that 
would ensue to the Allied cause if essential supplies were cut down. 60 
In October 1915 a joint Anglo-French loan of $500m was raised without collateral 
security. Dunng the autumn of 1916 and early 1917 the British Govenu-nent was forced to 
resort to frequent borrowing. During this period five loans were issued, at varying rates of 4D 
interest, all based on Canadian and American securities, an indication of how low the 
credit of the British Goverment had fallen in America. 61 The raising of loans was fraught 
with problems. The indecisive military situation on the Western Front, German victories 
over Russia and constant squabbling by the Asquith Cabinet did little to convince 
American investors that the Allies would be eventual victors. 62Amencan businessmen 
and politicians were annoyed with Britain over the blockade, black lists and interfercnce 
with the mail. 63 Keynes observed that four-fifths of the needs of Allied Powers depended 
on the issue of public loans. He warned: 
A statement from the US Executive deprecating or disapproving of such 
loans would render their flotation in sufficient numbers a practical 
impossibility and thus lead to a situation of the utmost gravity. 64 
59 Morgan, Studies in British Financial Policy, 1914-25, p. 330. This figure does not include private sales 
of securities. The total value of British-held securities in America was estimated to be E688m. 
60 Asquith MSS Box 30: Lloyd George to Asquith, 29 June 1916. 
Hardinge held a similar view, stating he was "quite confident that the Americans are making too much 
money out of the war and do not wish to do anything to stop the supply of munitions etc., and that they will 
go little further than big words and strong notes. " Hardinge MSS Box 25: Hardinge to Spring Rice, 8 
September 1916. 
61 See Kirkaldy, British Finance During and After the War, pp. 175-183, for a detailed explanation of the 
British loans raised. 
02 NIcKenna MSS NtCKN 5/6: Reading (New York) to McKenna, 25 September 1915. 
63 oil 24 May 1916, the American Government officially objected to interference with the mail. %. Ianý, US 
businessmen were convinced that the British were using the opportunity to steal commercial secrets. 
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His fears were realised on 28 November 1916 when the Federal Reserve Board ývamed 
banks against investing too heavily in foreign issues. The announcement sent the price of 
Allied war bonds and the exchange tumbling. Spring-Rice believed that the 
announcement was made with an ulterior motive. He wrote: 
Notwithstanding that the Board defend their action on technical grounds 
professedly in the public interest, it is an open secret that it is really 
instigated in German interests by Warburg and it is believed to be part of 
an organised movement to bring pressure on the Allies to entertain 
proposal of peace. 65 
The Board later clarified, after fierce objection from the British, that the statement was 
not directed against any one particular government but the incident is evidence of the 
precarious state of British finance in the United States. 66 A Treasury Mission, headed by 
Sir Hardman Lever, took up residency in New York in February 1917 in order to provide 
more immediate contact with American officials. 67 
The entry of the Uruted States into the war allowed Britain to be relieved of the 
burden of financing the Allies, a task which had caused much of Britain's troubles. 68 The 
United States Government lent to the British for purchases in America and similar loans 
64 CAB 42/23/7: Memorandum by Keynes, 10 October 1916. 
65 Runciman MSS WR 90: Telegram no. 3581 to the Foreign Office, 28 November 1916. 
66 On that day Morgans had to buy nearly $20m worth of sterling to maintain the exchange rate. See Burk, 
Britain, 4 merica and the Sinews of War, 1914-18, pp. 84ff. 
67 The Treasury were increasingly dissatisfied with Morgans handling of negotiations (but not their 
efficiency or loyalty). Hardman Lever, an expert in cost accountancy, was drafted from America in 1915 tc 
work in the Ministry of Munitions. Born in Britain, he was an ideal choice as official Treasury 
representative to the United States. He possessed a knowledge of US affairs and the contacts necessary to 
liaise with Morgans and the US Administration to find funds for British purchases. However by 1918 he 
had become persona non grata with Secretary of the US Treasury, W. G. NIcAdoo. For his part, Lever 
described McAdoo as "a Wall Street failure with designs on the Presidency, [who] presides over the 
Treasury with more than an eye on his personal ambitions and on politics. " T 172,422,13 June 1917. 
68 "The financial assistance afforded to the other Allies by the United Kingdom has been more than double 
the assistance afforded them by the United States, and that the assistance the United Kingdom has afforded 
these other Allies much exceeds the assistance she has herself received from the United States. " FO 371/3120'144-764: Bonar Law to Page, 23 July 1917. 
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were made to the other Allied Governments. 69 However the United States Treastin, was, 
at first, reluctant to provide funds to support the exchange, which was costing S40m a It) 
week to maintain during mid- 1917. An Inter-Departmental Committee stressed its 
importance: 
Large sums are at present expended by the Treasury in maintaining the 
purchasing power of the pound sterling in terms of the dollar. This 
expenditure is the pivot of our whole financial policy and the foundation 
of our credit in all parts of the world. 70 
The collapse of the exchange would have been disastrous for the Allied war effort, a fact 
American officials came to realise reluctantly. They were even less inclined to pay off the 
Morgan overdraft, despite the fact the British Government believed they had received a 
definite assurance that it was to be cleared using money from the US 'Liberty' Loan. 
McAdoo, the US Secretary to the Treasury, stated that no such promise had been made or 
could have been made, either directly or indirectly. 71 McAdoo was willing to advance 
money to Britain for current expenditure but not for capital liabilities. Lord Reading 
pointed out to the Chancellor, Bonar Law, that now the United States had entered the war 
the latter had to finance their own schemes. "Whether the resources of the world will 
allow this programme to be added to the existing programmes of other Allies, which 
themselves still show tendency to expansion, remains to be seen. "71 The British 
69 From 1914 until I April 1917, the Allies had purchased goods worth $7 billion from America. This was 
financed by: Exports to the US $1.6bn, gold $ 1.1 bn, liquidation of short-term US foreign debts $500m, 
rcpatriation of US securities and other foreign investments $1.4bn and credits $2.4bn. Gerd Hardach, Vie 
First World War 1914-1918 (Berkeley, 1977) p. 147. 
70 T 170/95: Conclusions of the Inter-Departmental Co ttee to consider the Dependence of the British 
Empire On the United States, October 1916. 
71 Churchill MSS CHAR 15/50B: Memorandum from the United States Embassy (London), 14 July 1917. 
The overdraft at this time stood at $400m. 
72 T 172446: Reading to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15 September 1915. 
Reading estimated that the American Treasury would need to find $1,250,000,000 ever,, month 
from loans 
to finance their war effort and warned: "I do not belleve these estimates can be reallised. 
. 
.. 
Tlie mere 
99 
Government eventually had to agree to subrogate the Bntish-owned American securities 
deposited with Morgan's, as collateral for the overdraft, to the US Treasury. This token of 
goodwill was in order to pursued the United States to help Britain with her capital 
liabillt, CS. 73 This humiliating concession illustrated the extent to which Britain's extensive 
commitments in conducting the war had resulted in her loss of financial independence. 
The financial challenge to Great Britain 
British financial weakness meant that America had the opportunity to challenge Britain's 
status as the world's financial leader. In 1915 Edward Pratt, Chief of the United States 
Bureau of Commerce declared: 
The banking interests of this country face an unparalleled opportunity. It is 
an opportunity for expansion into the world's markets and it is the 
opportunity of making the United States the financial centre of the world. 7ý 
British overseas long-term investment had reduced dunng the war to help strengthen the 
balance of payments. During 1916 and 1917 a series of defence regulations prohibited the 
export of capital in any form. 75 New issues on foreign account amounted to f 197.5m in 
technical difficulties of raismg regularly f 250,000,000 every month in a country with no established 
procedure at present either for temporary advance or for Treasury Bins are very formidable ... What will save the United States Treasury as it has saved ours in the past, namely, material limitation on what it is 
possible to buy. Goods will not m fact be forthcoming on a sufficient scale to absorb vast credit to which 
Departments and Allies are becoming entirely [accustomed]. This will save the financial situation. " T 
172/446: Despatch from Reading to Sir Eric Drummond, 29 September 1917. 
73 See Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-18, pp. 206-14. 74 FO 368/1446/54702: 'Relation of Foreign Trade to Domestic Prosperity', 27 May 1915. 
75 In 1916 the Atlantic Coast Development Company Ltd. approached the Foreign Office in order to gain 
support for raising capital. The Company had concessions for the development of 5,000 miles of territory 
in Liberia but wished to raise additional funds to consolidate her position especially since Germany, her 
main rival, was inactive. The Foreign Office thought the scheme would be to the benefit of British interests 
in Liberia but the Treasury Committee on the Fresh Issue of Capital refused to issue ý 5,000 of capital. -Fbe 
I 
Commercial Department commented that they had never been successful in any applications to the Vreasury for the issue of fresh capital. FO 371/2696/'215358. 
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1913 but this dwindled to just L17.6m by 1917.76 The Treasury Committcc responsible 
for considering new issues of capital lirmted its assent to undertakings directly connected 
with the war. Whilst it was considered necessary to release capital for urgent matters of 
reconstruction, necessary public undertakings and the legitimate support of the business 
community there was no consideration of the relaxation of capital for foreign enterpnse. 77 
Although this measure was effective in the short-term it, along with the sale of 
American securities, reduced future income from investment abroad. Pre-war overseas 
investment also played a role in encouraging imports from those countries Britain lent to. 
The British Governinent did not believe in the practice of 'tied loans' in order to bring 
direct orders for British business. Also the British preference for government and 
municipal securities, railways and public utilities meant that 'portfolio' investment 
brought in less to British industry than 'direct' investment. Nevertheless it was 
established that invested capital and import trade ran along the same charmels. No matter 
how ineffectively British capital was invested for the purpose of British trade, it still 
brought trade. For example, 70% of the railway system in Argentina was British-owned, 
and as a result Argentina was the largest market for British railway equipment outside the 
Empire and the destination for around a third of coal exports from South Wales. British 
investment was described as the backbone of Britain's position and its loss would be a 
blow to British influence and home industries, of which the Argentines were loyal 
supporters. 78 
76 'Fable 37 in Morgan, Studies in British Financial Policy, 1914-25, p. 264. 
I mmi 77 CAB 27/16, EOC. 43: Draft Intern-im Report No. 7 of the Economic Offensive Co imittee concerning new 
issucs of capital, 6 December 1917. 
78 See Platt et al. Decline and Recoverv in Britain's Overseas Trade, 18 73-1914 (London. 1993) pp. 
72-73 
and 106. 
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In November 1919 a general licence was granted for new issues abroad. During 
the 1920's new overseas issues averaged around El 15 million per year compared ýý Ith 
E200 million before the war. This rate was barely enough to maintain the pre-war stock of 
overseas assets. 79 The Bank of England also used unofficial pressure to persuade City 
institutions not to loan capital abroad in case this jeopardised British attempts to get back 
on the Gold Standard by 1925. American dollar diplomacy combined with European 
en financial weakness had the effect of increasing Am rican financial penetration. United 
States direct world-wide investment rose from $2.7 billion in 1914, to $3.9 billion in 
1919 and to $7.6 billion in 1929. In Latin America, for instance, total US investment in 
the continent rose from $1,644m before the war to $5,369m by 1929 and in Europe, over 
the same period, investment increased from $573 million to $1.3 billion. 80 
European nations attempting to rebuild shattered economies, or developing 
nations seeking investment capital, looked to the United States for ftinds. Britain, who 
had to finance her own recovery and also repay her war debts to America, had 
comparatively little spare capital to invest overseas after the war. American financial and 
commercial expansion was prevalent world-wide throughout the 1920s. In Britain, 
towards the end of the war, there was discussion regarding the risk of foreign capital 
dominating key industries. In British possessions in the Far East, foreign capital had been 
excluded to prevent Japanese economic penetration. However, despite the wartime 
controversy over German domination of key industries, Lord Robert Cecil thougbt it 
79 Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter- War Economy Britain, 1919-1939 (London, 1970) pp. 2 64-5. 
' "ý) Costigliola, A ivkivard Dominion: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations ",, ith 
Europe. 
1919-"-" 1 (Ithaca, 1984) p. 149. Britain was still the largest overseas investor in 1929 wi th assets totalling 
$16.86 billion but the United States was not far behind with $15.2 billion. Cain and 
Hopkins, British 
Imperialism, Crisis and Deconstruction, p. 46. 
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would be suicidal to adopt any poticy of discouraging investment of American capital III 
Bntish enterpnSeS. 81 
In the post-war Empire Americans were attempting to push forward into 
traditionally Bntish areas. It had been Britain's intention, after the war, to get back on 
terms with the United States by controlling raw materials in the Empire, especiallvoll 
and rubber. However the need for investment and the availability of American capital 
tested this policy. After a long struggle with colonial officials, the Guggenheim interests 
began tin mining in Malay. Union Carbide gained ownership of important cbrome mines 
in Rhodesia by using an all-British management as a facade. After pressure from the US 
State Department American oil companies were permitted to take a minority share of 
crude oil output in British-dominated Venezuela, Iraq and Persia. 82 
The decline in invisible income after the war was noticeable. Some investments, 
mainly those in Russia, were permanently lost and others had been liquidated for the war 
effort. Around a quarter of British overseas assets had been lost, amounting to around fI 
billion. American debts, the loss of assets, the disruption to the world economy and the 
subsequent devaluation of sterling (in which all invisible payments to Britain were made) 
reduced the net income on investment abroad. Shipping income fell due to foreign 
competition and the collapse of freight rates. Before the war the invisible surplus had 
81 CAB 27/44/EDDC. 35: 'Investment of Foreign Capital in British Industriesby Cecil, 15 August 1918. 
A major example of this post-war penetration was the attempt made by General Electric of America to 
control the whole of the British electrical manufacturing industry. G. E. had one subsidiary, British 
Thompson Houston, and bought controlling interests in three other main electrical companies. The 
chairman of their last remaining rival, British General Electric, was detenrimed to fight off the American 
challenge. He disfranchised all American shareholders in order to prevent them from gaining a controlling 
interest. His method was unorthodox but ultimately successful. In 1929, G. E. 's four Major companies were 
merged to form Associated Electrical Industries (AEI), the biggest electrical company in Britain. Dimbleby 
and Reynolds,. 4n Ocean,, Ipart (London, 1988) pp. 102-103. 
82 Cosligliola_ I ii, kward Dominion.. -linerican Political, Economic and 
Cultural Relations with Europe. 
1919-2J, pp. 150- 1. 
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been 44% of the value of imports but this was reduced to 29% in the 1920'S. 83 This all 
had the effect of reducing the amount of capital that could be reinvested abroad to 
perpetuate the cycle. 
Conclusion. 
In a Commons debate on the prosecution of the war, Walter Runciman declared that 
commercially Germany was a beaten nation. 
Her ships are swept off the seas; her export trade is practically at an end; 
her commercial travellers in SouthAmerica, in the East, in India, in China, 
and in Ceylon, are idle; the amount of goods she gets out now are a mere 
fraction of what she got out in former years, and as the War goes on that 
quantity will become smaller and smaller. 84 
Yet as Britain sustained damage to her own external trade, through the dislocation of 
shipping routes and trade connections, a reduction in overseas investment and the 
liquidation of assets, the fear was that Bntain's economic position would be just as 
dislocated as Germany's after the war. This fear was evident in the concern of British 
politicians and officials who attempted to warri of the dangers of following a policy of 
economic expediency and mitigate its effects. Economic warfare through laissezfalre 
methods, such as allowing British merchants and manufacturers to attack Gen-nan trade, 
had failed. Instead the Government attempted to put in to place practical measures, to 
provide export credit facilities and better commercial intelligence, which would aid 
British merchants in their destruction of German overseas trade and permanently assist 
British exporting industries. 
83 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, Crisis and Deconstruction, pp. 40-3. 
84 77 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 1367,10 January 1916. 
IV 
The end of the laissezfaire strategy: state aid in the 
0 
economic war. 
By mid-1917, the Statutory List had been effective in destroying channels for Germaii 
trade. Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister for Blockade, thought it was the main instrument in 
weakening German economic power and making her anxiously look to the period when 
peace could be restored. ' Whether this destruction became permanent after the war 
depended upon the extent to which satisfactory alternative sources for that trade could be 
found. 2Ernest Pollock, head of the Foreign Trade Department, thought the policy was 
capable of considerable development if the full potential of trade war measures were to be 
realised. 3 He stated 
What is required is real damage to the prospects of recuperation, damage 
by measures which were obviously bound up with the duration of 
hostilities, and damage which was of a progressive character, so that every 
additional month of the war meant an increase in the harm done. 4 
Further progressive damage might be done, he thought, by the better establishment of 
new channels of trade through the extension of the operations to replace those firms 
placed on the Statutory List. Although in China and the East, British firms had been 
' 100 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 2094,19 December 1917. 
2 In May 1917, a representative of the Frankfurter Zeitung stated in an interview at The Hague that 
"German trade threads with such important commercial centres as Singapore, Hong Kong, Sidney, and 
Yokohama have not only been broken but smashed beyond repair, because the place of the defunct German 
has already been occupied by keen trade rivals, who will not again yield the position won W1t11OUt a mighty 
stru" 
3 Pollock, a Conservative NIP, had been cha=an of the Contraband Conunittee (1915-17). 
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successful in this policy of substitution, in Central and South America it had been the 
United States who had presented themselves as an alternative source of supply. Sir 
Edward Carson, chairman of the Economic Offensive Conu-nittee, agreed w-ith Pollock's 
observation that the negative aim of prohibitmg German trade and severing her N, ý-orld- I 
wide commercial connections was of little lasting consequence unless accompanied by 
the positive aim of expanding British trade. 5 
The destruction of Gennan commerce, the cutting of threads in neutral 
countries, the uprooting of German firms and corporations throughout the 
British Empire, are all excellent things in their way, but they will only be 
of negative advantage to ourselves and only of temporary disadvantage to 
our enemies, unless we and our Allies succeed at the same time in 
substituting other organisations in their place. Commercial opinion in 
Gennany will certainly be alive to this distinction and will be much more 
depressed by a positive than by a negative policy. 6 
This attitude mirrored a shift in thinking in the Committee, from purely vindictive 
measures aimed at Germany, to more defensive measures aimed at promoting British 
security and recovery. 7 The basis of such an economic policy would be for the 
Government: a) to provide measures, in conjunction with the Allies, to ensure against a 
4 CAB 24/20/G. T. 1447: Memorandum on Trade War by Pollock, 27 June 1917. 
5 Carson, a Unionist MP, had served as Attorney-General (1915) and then as First Lord of the Admiralty 
(1916-1917). Until his resignation in January 1918 he was a Minister without Portfolio and a member of 
the War Cabinet. 
6 CAB 21/108/G-190: 'Economic Offensive Committee' by Carson, 21 January 1918. 
7 In January 1918, Carson recommended changing the name to the Economic Defence and Development 
Committee to reflect this change in emphasis. However it was not until June that action was taken to 
reconstitute the EOC, perhaps indicating the low priority of economic planning in the Government Is 
thinking ZD* A sub-committee reported that the results of the established Econorruc Defence and Development 
Committee would be "the presentation by degrees of a complete and consistent policy within the econonuc 
sphere and security for the due execution of any policy agreed upon. " The Coninuttee was to secure regular 
consultation, under the chairmanship of a member of the War Cabinet, on questions of economic policy 
and administration; the settlement, without reference to the War Cabinet, of details of mmor policy; the 
presentation to the Cabinet of matters of first class unportance; the prevention of departmental overlapping. 
and the establishment of a body which could follow up decisions. The Chairman Nvas Austen Chamberlain. 
('., \B 27,44/EDDC. 2: Report of the sub-conirruttee on the establishment of a Committee of Economic Defence and Development, 4 June 1918. 
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world shortage in foodstuffs, raw materials, instruments of production and means of 
transport during the period of reconstruction. The organisation of British and Allied 
resources would be the greatest obstacles to German commercial aggression and would 
also be a strong moral position to defend in negotiation; b) to foster trading enterprise in 
home markets, through safeguarding essential industries, and c) to foster trading 
enterprise in foreign markets, by providing facilities for the trading community.. 8 
The framework envisaged by Carson was not necessarily a unified vdiole but the 
sum of individual initiatives. The notion of an economic weapon was a vague concept for 
politicians to plan or for the Germans to worry about, but the concrete development of 
governinent organisations to assist exporting industries could be an achievable goal for 
politicians and civil servants and a source of concern to the enemy. 
Competition from America and Japan in export markets. 
At the outbreak of the war the United States remained the one non-belligerent nation with 
the manufacturing capacity to capitalise on both British and German distraction. Whilst 
Europe's normal trading patterns were incapacitated, the war stimulated industrial 
production in America. The United States was not only supplying Europe with additional 
goods she required but was also making inroads into export markets outside Europe. In 
Europe, every nation lost out in the war to the United States, with neutral nations 
losing 
as much shipping and trade as belligerent powers. Between 1913-29 the US share of 
ývorld exports increased from 12.4% to 16% whilst Britain's dropped from 15.4% to 
8 CAB 21/108/G-190: 'Econorruc Offensive Comnuttee' by Carson. 21 January 191S. 
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1.8% and Germany's from 11.4% to 9.8%. 9 The United States threatened to capture not 
only German trade but also a good deal of Great Britam's trade. The danger xvas that 
America would take advantage of a Britain economically hamstrung by war. 
The United States Department of Commerce reported in 1915: 
The blow in the face received by American industries through the 
conditions brought about by the European war has acted as a tonic, has 
forced the nation to create new branches and enlarge the scope of existing 
phases of manufacture, opened the way to utilise, on a vast scale, great 
natural resources of the United states, and induced manufacturers and 
merchants to expand their markets into foreign fields with prospects of 
permanent results. 10 
Trade journals such as the American Exporter cornmented, in tones reminiscent of similar 
Bntishjoumals: 
Never before in the history of the world has such an opportunity for the 
big and rapid development of new business presented itself, never again 
will such an opportunity present itself, as that which now invites, actually 
beckons, some manufacturers of the United States. " 
Nowhere was this more evident than in Latin America. As early as September 1914 the 
British Consul in Buenos Aires reported that there was every indication that North 
American firms were using the European crisis to capture the South American market. A 
memorandum from the Pan-Amencan Union of Washington stated that whilst the war 
and the suffering of European nations was a cause for profound regret, the business 
interests of the United States had a duty and responsibility during the crisis which had to 
be met even if it brought them vast material benefits. 12 
9 Frank Costigliola,. 4 wkward Dominion: American Political, Economic and 
Cultural Relations with 
Ettrope, 1919-33. (Ithaca, 1984) p. 142. 
10 FO 168 1443/8656: 'The Effect of War on Amencan Industries' 14 September 
1915. 
11 A incrican Exporter, September 1914. Quoted in Burton 1. Kaufman, Eff-icienc ,v 
and Expansion. Foreign 
TrUde OrganLation in the I Vilson . 
Id7ninistration, 1913-19-71 (London, 1974) p. 93. 
12 FO 368/1-)28/6005 1: 'American Trade in Argentina' 17 September 1914. 
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The Consul subsequently reported that Argentina had received visits from several 
delegations from different American Chambers of Commerce to ascertain the prospects of 
an expansion of American trade which at the time held third place in Argentine imports, 
Britain holding first and Germany the second. 13 A publishing company In New York 
produced journals aimed at acquainting customers in South America with manufacturers 
in the United States. They claimed that demand for cement, structured materials, road 
building equipment, water work supplies, hydroelectric machinery and railway 
constructive materials could be met immediately by manufacturers in America and that 
credit facilities and shipping could also be arranged. 14 In Latin America Britain had been 
the main supplier to seven republics, the main countries being Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile. By the end of the war the United States had replaced Britain as chief exporter to 
these crucial overseas markets. 15Between 1913-19, Latin American imports from the 
Umted States rose by 161.2% whilst from Britain they rose by just 3 5%. 16 
Initially American businessmen were hampered in their export penetration efforts 
due to the dislocation of the world's economic system at the outbreak of war. Before 1914 
Britain had dominated much of the carrying trade to South America and provided much 
of the investment capital used by the republics to purchase imports. As British ships were 
requisitioned by the Goverment and the provision of international credit dried up, export 
markets were stifled. It was of little concern to American businessmen who still had the 
13 FO 368/928/51366: 'Amencan Trade'21 September 1914 
14 FO 368/928/63481: 29 September 1914. 
1- 1 Exports from the UK to Argentina in 1913 were worth 350 million pesos and remained at 35 1 in 
1919. 
Anicrican imports over the same period rose from 166m to 529m. In Brazil, British imports 
dropped from 
247 inillion cruzeiros to 216m with US imports rising from 158M to 640m. Chile followed the same trend 
with British imports dropping from 99 million gold pesos to 78m and US rising from 55m to 
192m. Figures 
in B. R. M itchell. International Historical S tatistics - The Ainericas. (2nd ed. 
) (Basinastoke, 1993) p. 47 1, 
475,477-8. 
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lucrative war trade with Europe to satisfy but they were criticised in some quarters for 
their opportunism in preferring the immediate large profits of the temporary war trade 
with Europe to the pen-nanent profits offered by the opportun-ity to consolidate trade xvith 
South America. 17 Edward E. Pratt, the Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, warned that European war orders were bringing unmediate larl, ,e profits but 
were not permanent business and that they were injurious in diverting attention froni 
foreign markets in Latin America, the Far East, Africa and Australia. 18 
American reliance on Europe for markets, shipping and trade facilities was 
recognised by the authorities in Washington before the war had started. The drive for 
greater commercial organisation was a general aim of the Wilson administration to which 
the war added greater impetus. 19 To combat this the Americans began to establish their 
own shipping lines to South America and the Far East. The United States Shipping Board 
was established in September 1916 to promote the interests of the American mercantile 
marine. The Board instituted a programme of state construction and in April 1917 the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation was formed to carry out the task. 20 
Until 1914, banks in the United States were prevented by law from investing in 
foreign subsidiaries. The Federal Reserve Act (1913) was amended in 1916 to allow 
bankers in foreign trade to combine to establish foreign branches, enabling the high risks 
involved in establishing foreign branches to be spread. By 1919 the National City Bank, 
16 Victor Butmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America since Independence (Cambridge, 1994) p. 
160.1 
1 17 FO 368/1146/54702: 'United States Trade with South America' from Spring Rice (Washington), 20 Apn 
1915. 
18 FO 368/1652/11277: 'Our Share of International Trade'by Edward Pratt, 4 January 1916. 
KaLifman, fficiency and Expansion. Foreign Trade Organization in the lFilsonAdininistration, 
1913- 
1921, pp. 47 and 93. 
20 I-ayle,. I Historv of the Great War. Seaborne Trade, vol. 111. (London, 1920) pp. S2 and 103. 
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the first US multinational bank, had 42 branches in rE . me Latin American Republics. 21 
This facilitated the export of American goods, aided by a new permanent commercial 
attach6 service funded by Congress through increased appropriations to the Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Extra money was made available in 1915 for studying 
trade opportunities in Latin America. 22 The operang of the Panama Canal coincided with 
the opportunity to expand trade, as a survey of American trade observed: 
The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 supports the conclusion that the 
war found the United States "npe and ready" to take her natural place both 
as a dominating factor in world commerce and as a Pacific trader. The 
Canal exposed the whole of Pacific Latin America and the Orient to the 
economic impact of the United States. 23 
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 legalised export combinations and monopolies. 
It was now possible for competing corporations to divide foreign markets for export 
penetration. For instance, General Electnc could agree to bid for sales in Cuba whilst 
leaving Westinghouse to do the same in Peru. The signs were ominous for Arthur Steel- 
Maitland, head of the Overseas Trade Department, who saw the Act as foreshadowing the 
dumping of American goods in Britain and neutral countries, a fear that had once been 
harboured against Germany. He went on: 
Beyond this, and more important, is the likelihood that competition with 
ourselves will be more determined and based on real economies of 
organisation. The whole point is "do the Americans really Intend to 
increase their export trade and use the freedom given by this Act as one of 
their instruments for doing so? " All present indications show that they 
have this determination. 24 
21 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin Ainerica since Independence, p. 156. 
22 j, '() 168A 652, f-l 1277/11277: The new commercial attach6 service was made possible by an 
appropriation of $ 100,000 by the 63rd Congress. 
23 C. P. Ho\\ land, Sitri, cy qfAnierican Foreign Relations, 1928 (London, 1928-30) p. 160. 
24 CAB 27 44, 'EDDC. 44: 'Webb Export Bill - USA'by Arthur Steel-Maitland, 
7 October 1918. 
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There was also a feeling of unease in commercial circles at the gro,, N-mg force of Japanese 
competition. The Government of India regarded it as undesirable that the Japanese should 
establish themselves in any large scale in India as they believed that systematic 
commercial penetration might well be the precursor of wider schemes, namely the 
domination of the East. 25 In Bombay there was a general feeling that goods from 
Lancashire and local mills would suffer considerably from Japanese competition. Japan, 
being nearer to America than England, could secure cotton cheaper by dealing direct with I 
the cotton districts there and Japan had the advantage of cheap freights offered by 
Japanese steamship companies. Japanese manufacturers and agents worked on small I 
margins of profit in order to secure a footing in new markets and possessed abundant 
cheap labour. 26 This question of cheap labour did not go unnoticed by Lord Balfour, 
chairman of the committee on post-war commercial and industrial policy, who was more 
afraid of future Japanese competition in the future, in the East, than of German 
competition. He noted that Japan's one enormous advantage was cheap labour and it 
would be difficult to counteract this, especially having regard to the conditions under 
which Britain would struggle after the war. 27 In South Affica, a leading merchant from 
Port Elizabeth considered Japan to be the main competitor as they had "a wonderful 
knack of copying articles" and cheap labour made their competition most formidable. 28 
25 FO 371/2693/83294: 'Japanese Competition in Indian Trade. ' Memorandum from H. ardinge (Governor 
of India) to Austen Chamberlain (Secretary of State for India), 31 March 1916. In a minute, Lord Robert 
Cecil commented: "The conu-nercial as well as the military and perhaps the political methods of 
Japan 
appear to be founded on those of Germany. " 
20 1,0 371 ; 2693/81294: Enclosure no. 3. Note by Mr A. H. Ley, Director 
General of Comr-nercial 
Intelligence in Bombay, 21 October 1915. 
27 111' 55'1 1/C&IP 37: 7 June 1917. 
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Assisting trading enterprises in foreign markets as part of economic strategy. 6. 
The destruction of Gen-nan overseas trade had not necessarily been to the benefit of the 
Bntish. 29 The Foreign Trade Department acknowledged that on the destructive side a 
considerable amount of success could be claimed for the policy. However in general, 
constructive work had been rendered difficult by the Treasury's prohibition of new issues 
and general war conditions. As we have seen, British traders had found it difficult to 
capitalise on this opening and much of the replacement of interrupted channels of trade 
had been filled by the United States. 
British manufacturers and merchants had been encouraged to export but with little 
government assistance. Manufacturers also faced Goverment controls over post-war 
contracts for finished goods, with a view to conserving raw materials. No contract entered 
into during the war, for delivery after the war, would be considered as necessarily 
establishing a good claim for a licence to export. It meant that foreign buyers were 
reluctant to place orders for contracts as there was no certainty of export. 30 Another threat 
to continuity of trade was the fact that British firms were breaking relations with their 
agents abroad. Finns were unable to deliver goods for export due to war work. Future 
trade was jeopardised as once the agents were freed they could move to a competitor. 
31 
28 FO 368/1662/187896: 17 August 1916. 
29 CAB 27/15/EOC. 8: 'The Policy of the Statutory List' by the Foreign Trade Department, 22 October 
1917. 
30 CAB 27/15/EOC. 18: 'Post-War Contracts' by Stanley, 5 November 1917. 
Iii the Economic Offensive Committee, Stanley gave his "grave objection to any measures calculated to 
1'cstrict markets of manufacturers". Baldwin, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, indicated the 
paramount importance of war trade exports in view of the large amount of imports required to be paid for. 
CAB 27/1 5/EOC minutes of the 50' meeting, 6 November 1917. 31 'Representation abroad of UK firms, ' Board of Trade Jotirital, 100 (1918) p. 669. 
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Pollock recommended steps to remedy this through the provision of better facilities for 
traders, such as the provision of a British trade bank. 32 
The British Trade Corporation. 
It was a common complaint amongst traders that British bankers did little to assist the 
British trader but were always ready to help the foreigner. The British Trade Corporation 
(BTC) was chartered in 1917, as a product of the Board of Trade Committee on Financial 
Facilities for Trade (known as the Faringdon Committee), to remedy the situation. It was 
to fill the gap between home banks and the colonial and British-foreign banks and 
banking houses to provide facilities for the British traders. The purpose of the 
Corporation was to provide funds to industry for the extension of existing manufacturing 
plant or for the amalgamation of works to aid production. It would assist manufacturcrs in 
obtaining orders abroad and give them reasonable financial facilities for executing those 
orders. It would also give a preference in matters of finance for orders to be executed in 
Bntain. 33 
The BTC saw itself as an agent of empire and tried to serve government policy but 
Whitehall was disinclined to use it and the Foreign Office offered little support. The 
Foreign Office were opposed to the scheme from the start, believing it would hamper 
large-scale independent commercial and financial initiative in foreign countries. In their 
institution under view the investment 'plums' would be sought after by such a powerful i 
Royal Charter, which was assured of all possible facilities fi7om the Board of Trade and 
32 CAB 24 20/G. T. 1447: Memorandum on Trade War by Pollock, 27 June 1917. 
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official recognition. However the fact that the Corporation was not under formal 
government control worried some in the Foreign Office. They %vere concerned that the 
Corporation's overseas enterprises might conflict with foreign policy or that the 
Government would be duty-bound to support the monopolistic exploits of such a 
powerful British syndicate. If the Government became too closely identified with the 
Bank it might become morally obliged to support it, even if it turned out to be a failure. 
They wanted to ensure that the Bank took no decisions that might interfere Nvith general 
foreign poliCy. 34 When the Corporation's Charter was discussed In the Commons, there 
was fierce criticism of the scheme which allowed the Government's name to be used 
without any control over the operation of the institution. The Charter was seen as 
conferring great privileges and powers without any obligations. 35 
Despite concluding an agreement with joint-stock banks not to conduct ordinary 
banking business, not to open current accounts and not to take money on long or short 
notice, the BTC was still treated with suspicion by other banks and financial 
institutions. 36 The mercantile community also feared that it would not act as a bank to 
finance British foreign trade but as a rival to British exporters, engaging itself primarily 
in foreign trade. 37The Charter not only gave financial facilities to exporters but also gave 
the BTC the power to compete with exporters, "to carry on business as contractors, 
merchants, or traders on their own account. " It was thought merchants would be wary of 
33 Cmd. 8346, Report to the Board of Trade by the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Question of 
Financial Facilitiesfor Trade (1916), p. 4. 
34 FO 
-16S/1684/215174: Minutes by Parker, Wellesley, Crowe and Hardinge, 29 
October - 10 November 
1916. 
35 93 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 1838 and 1853,17 May 1917. 
36 Percy F. Mar-tin, 'Financial Facilities for Trade, ' Si-stem, 33 (1918) p. 260. 
37 Nfanchester Guardian, 5 June 1917. 
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approaching a potential competitor for financial assistance. 38 Several members of the 
Faringdon Committee, including Faringdon himself, became directors of the new Bank. 
There was criticism that the percentage of future profits the directors had apportioned 
themselves would lead to risky speculative ventures and excessive overtrading. 39 
Although the BTC was not government controlled it did attempt to act as an agent .n 
of empire. It attempted to fill the power vacuums left by the collapse of Romanov, 
Habsburg, and Turkish impenalism. The BTC capitalised the Trade Indemnity Companý, 
Limited to provide export credit guarantees for traders and aimed to imitate and supplant 
Gernian and other foreign banks in export penetration. In 1919 it bought the National 
Bank of Turkey, the Levant Company and the mercantile firm Whittall, which had 
branches at Salonica and Constantinople. It invested f 100,000 in the Portuguese Trading 
Corporation (especially started to compete with German interests), forined the Anglo- 1: 1 
Brazilian Commercial and Agency Company and participated in the Anglo-Belgian 
orientated Inter-Allied Trade and Banking Corporation. The Bank also began substantial 
operations in the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia and Kurdistan in support of anti-Bolshcvlk 
forces. 40 From this brief outline of its activities it is clear that the BTC sought to entrench 
British interests in areas where Germany was thought to have been strong before 1914 
and could be again. Consequently its business interests, based on strategic criteria, 
ultimately proved commercially unviable. 41 
38 93 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 1841 and 1861,17 May 1917. 
39 fbid., cols. 1829-3 1. 
Faringdon tound the "carping criticisms of Interested parties somewhat amazing. " Runciman MSS Ný'R 161 
(1). Faringdon to Runciman, undated. 
r _,. 19,,, 4) pp. 40 R. P. T. Davenport-Huies, Dtidlev Docker: The Lifc wid Tinics of a Trade Warrior (Camb id, 
14 2-7. 
41 -nic BTC went into voluntary liquidation m 1926. 
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In a similar attempt to the BTC, the British Stockbrokers Trust , vas launched in 
1918, intended as an issuing house to provide domestic industry with investment capital. 
The relationship between finance and industry in Germany had always been highlighted 
as a reason for their successful export penetration. This partnership, so it was claimed, 
facilitated the promotion of enterprises in foreign countries. It provided finance for 
obtaining concessions and contracts, firom local resources or the British money market, 
whilst at the same time retaining German control so that Germany could supply the 
imports of manufactured articles which habitually followed the establislinient of such 
enterprises. 42The BST was especially concerned with overcoming the high-handed and 
overbearing attitude displayed by the London Stock Exchange towards provincial ccntres. 
It also adopted the principle of 'tied loans', a policy the London Stock Exchange had 
failed to endorse leading to chticism from Bntish businessmen. 43 
Part of reason for the initial hostile attitude of the Foreign Office towards the BTC 
venture was pique at what they saw as being denied representation, by the Board of 
Trade, on the Committee to Investigate the Question of Financial Facilities for Trade. 
Crowe described it as a "good illustration of the mischief done by the jealousy of the 
Board of Trade to eliminate deliberately the considerations of diplomatic interests and 
experience from the work of their committee dealing with foreign trade. "44 This 
departmental rivalry over the control of government commercial facilities was to intensify 
over the fate of the Department of Overseas Trade. 
42 Stcel-Maitland (hereafter cited as ASM) MSS GD 193/271/83: 'Gerinan Baaking and British 
Finance 
by Steel- NI aitland, c. 1917. 
43 Da v enport- Hines, Dudley Docker: The Life and Times of a Trade IF(irrior, pp. 149-53. 
44 FO 368 1684/215174: Minute by Crowe, 30 October 1916. 
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The reorganisation of commercial intelligence. 
If the aim of establishing permanent trading connections for British manufacturers and 
merchants was to be realised, overseas commercial intelligence would play a crucial role 
in this task. The Overseas Trade Department was established in order to co-ordinate 
Government facilities towards industry and commerce at home and to provide advice, 
assistance and information for exporters. 45 Before the war official conunercial interests 
were shared uneasily by the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade. The former 
controlled commercial representation abroad; the latter was responsible for distributing, 
commercial intelligence at home and the formation of commercial pol, Cy. 46 Wartime 
conditions exacerbated this arrangement as both Departments fought for administrative 
control. The Foreign Office saw its power curtailed by Lloyd George, who preferred to 
conduct foreign affairs himself, and consoled themselves by organising the blockade 
which by 1916 accounted for over half their workload. 47Eyre Crowe was anxious to keep 
control of commercial affairs within the Foreign Office to compensate for its diminished 
45 Ephraim Maisel, 'The Formation of the Department of Overseas Trade, 1919-26, ' Journal of 
Contemporary History, 24 (1989), pp. 169-90. Maisel uses the difficulties surrounding the DOT to 
illustrate how the Foreign Office lost some of its prestige and decision making influence during and after 
the war. Whilst agreeing with his conclusions this study has a different emphasis, looking instead at how 
the tribulations of the DOT affected the Department's ability to assist the British export industry and 
British economic recovery after the war. 
46 Conu-nercial officials abroad criticised both Departments. The Board of Trade dealt with everything 
except trade issues and the rottenness of the Consul system was evinced by appointing unpaid Germans to 
represent British trading interests in Germany. Ernest Hamblock, British Consul: Memories of ThirtY Years 
ill Europe and Brazil (London, 1938) pp. 13 and 234. 
47 This factor could account for an element of paranoia which appears to creep into Foreign Office 
minutes. Parker, a clerk in the Commercial Department, thought there had been a marked and increased 
tcndency by the Board of Trade to eliminate the Foreign Office wherever they could. He cited an instance 
earlier in the year when the latter had not been invited to a meeting concerning the larger aspects of the oil 
question despite the Foreign Office having sent the Board of Trade a detailed letter dealing with the issues 
invok-ed. FO 368/1684192335: Minute of 29 September 1916. 
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political authority. 48 In any case it was obvious to infonned observers that foreign 
political affairs could no longer be separated from commercial affairs as had been the 
case before the war. 49Lord Robert Cecil stated during a Commons debate in 1918 that it 
was "absolutely true that any attempt to draw a dividing line and say that commercial 
interests stop here and diplomatic interests begin would be absolutely impossible and 
fraught with disaster both to commercial interests and to diplomacy". 50 
In August 1916 Crowe instigated his own investigation into the issue as the best 
way to forestall interference. " The Crowe Committee outlined the objectives and 
functions needed from any Government orgamsation to promote and assist Bntish trade. 
The report was critical of the lack of co-operation between the Foreign Office and the 
Board of Trade on matters of commercial intelligence. It concluded: 
There cannot be a British foreign policy as regards commercial matters 
abroad separate from general foreign policy, of which it forms an integral 
and important part. There may be special agents charged more particularly 
with carrying on in an foreign country the commercial side of foreign 
policy. But if there is to be unity of foreign policy, such agents must derive 
their authority and receive their instructions from the same Minister who 
directs the general foreign policy; and, as a general rule, unity and 
efficiency in policy will be best secured by the greatest possible 
consolidation of all such agents with the permanent foreign service. 52 
48 Eustace Percy wrote in his memoirs that members of the Foreign Office "had found in this blockade 
work a more satisfying field of activity and a more tangible touch with realities and personalities than had 
been afforded by the political moves and counter-moves of an older diplomacy; and they wished ardently 
to keep their place in this field. " Some Memories (London, 1958) p. 147. 
49 Such conclusions were also being drawn in Foreign Ministries in France and Germany where plans were 
afoot to offer commercial interests greater diplomatic support. See Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and 
Bureaucrats (Stanford, 1976) chapter 5. 
50 109 H. C. Deb. 5s, cols. 568-9. 
ý1 Maisel, 'The Formation of the Overseas Trade Department' p. 17 1. 
52 ASM MSS Gl) 193/113/5: Crowe Committee Report, 10 August 1916. The Overseas Trade Conuruttee 
of the FBI agreed that the Foreign Office was best suited to dealing with commercial questions 
in foreign 
countries, if die commercial side of the Foreign Office could be developed aloný, more efficient 
lines. FBI 
NISS 200 F'1/1'62: Meeting of 14 November 1916. The Committee also included Algemon 
Firth, President 
ol'the Associated Chambers of Commerce. 
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Despite the wisdom of such a scheme, opposition from the Board of Trade and lack of 
interest on the part of Hardinge ensured that it was not put Into practice. Indeed, the 
Board of Trade pushed for the despatch of Trade Commissioners to Portugal and Spain. I 
The activities of Trade Commissioners, who were under Board of Trade control, were 
normally confined to the self-governing Dorninions. 53 It was an attempt to expand the 
intelligence gathering capabilities of the Board of Trade, an acti I ion ivity non-nally the functi 
of the Consular and Commercial Service. Cecil resolved that the controversy with the 
Board of Trade had to be put on a proper footing or the public service would suffer. 54 
In January 1917 a Committee, under Lord Faringdon, was appointed to investigate 
the problem. However the members of the Committee were themselvcs split over the best 
course of action. All the members agreed that the commercial attach&s should remain 
under the control of the Foreign Office and that the Consular Service should be enlarged 
and improved but the question of collating and distributing commercial intelligence 
proved more divisive. 55 Dudley Docker (of the Federation of British Industnes), Sir John 
Pennefather MP and Victor Wellesley (Controller of Commercial and Consular affairs at 
the Foreign Office) believed the distribution of commercial intelligence should be carried 
out by a Trade Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office. They reported: 
53 W. H. Clark, 'The work of the Department of Commercial Intelligence of the Board of Trade, ' British 
Electrical andA Hied Manufacturers Association Journal, 3 (1917) p. 72. 
ý4 FO 368/1684/192335: Minute by Cecil, October 1916. Wellesley saw this as another "disingenuous 
attempt on the part of the Board of Trade to force the pace" and if this defiance of the Foreign Office 
continued Hardinge would be justified in denying facilities and a passport. 
55 Similar battles went on in Washington between the State Department, who wanted to assert control over 
all foreign relations whether political or economic, and the Department of Commerce. The former -wanted 
the commercial attach6 service transferred from the latter. The two departments had fought over the 
direction of foreign trade since the Department of Cornmerce's formation in 1903. The Department of State 
also resented the interference of the Treasury, Shipping Board and War Trade Board in matters affecting 
foreign relations. See Burton 1. Kaufman, Efficiency and Expansion, Foreign Trade Organisation in the 
WilsonAdministratioyl, 1913-1921, pp. 77-9 and 218-9. 
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We think it is impossible to sever questions of commercial policy in foreign countries from general foreign policy, of which they are an integral 
part. International relations in general depend, and must tend to depend 
more and more in future, upon commercial relations, and it is inevitable 
that foreign policy will consequently be affected to an ever increasing 
extent by commercial and industrial circumstances. We believe that an", 
attempt to retard this development in the interests of mere admirustrativc 
convenience will react fatally upon the general interests of the country, 
and that a favourable development can only take place if those in charge of 
foreign affairs are kept in close and constant touch with commercial 
requirements. 56 
However, Fanngdon. and William Clark (comptroller-general of the Commercial 
Intelligence Department at the Board of Trade) recommended that the organisation of 
commercial intelligence at home should remain in the hands of Clark's Department at the 
Board of Trade. The Foreign Office should continue to control the service abroad and 
closer co-operation between both Departments could overcome the problems of dual 
control. 57 Yet it was this dual system that the business community saw as the worst 
feature of the old system and the underlying cause of nearly all the inefficiency and the 
lack of energy they complained of. 58 
In September a compromise solution was adopted, mirroring the nature of the 
Report, with the creation of the Department of Overseas Trade, which was meant to be 
responsible for the collection and dissemination of commercial intelligence at home, the 
administration of commercial services abroad and the promotion of British trade. It was 
headed by Arthur Steel-Maitland who was responsible to both Departments. He 
s6 Cmd. 8715. Memorandum bv the Board of Trade and the Foreign Of)Tice with respect to the Future 
Organisation of Commercial Intelligence (1917) p. 8. 
57 Ibid., pp. 9-16. 
Nugent, at the FBI, was concerned that Clarke and Faringdon would get hold of the Prime %Iinister who 
would commit himself, as he was fond of doing, before he understood what the whole issue was abOLIt. 
FBI 
N1'SS 200il"3ý'131/8/2: Nugent to Docker, 3 March 1917. 
ý'ý FBI NISS 200/1' 3fDl, /-): Nugent to Algernon Firth, 23 January 1917. 
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acknowledged there would be difficulties but thought the scheme could work if both sides 
put away their separatist spirits and trusted his judgement. 59 
For the new Department to work effectively it had to control the activities of the 
Commercial Intelligence Department of the Board of Trade, as well as the War Trade 
Intelligence Dept and the Commercial and Consular Departments of the Foreign Office. 
Needless to say Crowe was loath to let control of the latter slip from the Foreign Office. 
Stecl-Maitland understood that the DOT was viewed with suspicion by the Foreign Office 
but was "apprehensive lest the new department should be deliberately starved into 
impotence". 60 Cecil preferred a more flexible approach without attemptincr) any scientific 
or complete division. 61 Eventually Steel-Maitland , for the sake of "peace and quiet", 
agreed to the Commercial and Consular Departments remaining within the Foreign Office 
until the DOT could be housed in the same building, although he continued to supervise 
them in his capacity as Joint-Parliamentary under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
The DOT was thus limited to the collection and distribution of commercial 
intelligence. This in itself was an important and vital task in order to promote and 
stimulate British export trade, especially now that the end of the war was in sight. The 
Department took over responsibility for compiling Form K Reports, an innovation to 
furnish all British exporters with the fullest infon-nation, based on consular reports, of 
potential buyers in foreign markets. 62 Whilst not exaggerating the degree to which 
Govenu-nent could help trade and industry, Steel-Maitland did believe that the DOT could 
59 ASM MSS GD 193/115/l/46-7. 
60 Ibid., Steel-Maitland to Cecil, 28 August 1918. 
61 ('ecil MSS Add. 51094: Note by Cecil, 6 September 1918. 
62 FBI NISS 200/F/1/1. "62: Overseas Trade and Consular Conuruttee, 5 October 1917. 
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make a difference. 63 Unfortunately the Department was not in such a favourable position 
as it was badly understaffed and lacked proper accommodation, and Its separation fFom 
the Foreign Office was used as an excuse by Hardinge to ignore the DOT. 64 
The necessity of maintaining a flow of exports from Britain. 
Alon with providing the commercial intell inI I igence to enable B itish traders to exploit 
openings left by Germany, Steel-Maitland attempted to draw attention to the continuing 
need to maintain a steady flow of exports from Bntain to supply demand. He warned that 
British interests in foreign countries were undoubtedly suffering heavily from the 
curtailment of the export of British manufacturing goods. He recognised the necessity for 
restrictions but urged that it was essential there be more elasticity in the administration of 
these restrictions. It was obvious that as the war progressed Britain was suffering from an 
adverse balance of trade and in view of heavy purchases from abroad it was necessary, 
from the point of view of the foreign exchanges, to maintain the highest possible level of 
exports. British export trade had been severely curtailed by this gradual increase in 
restrictions fi7om government licensing, shortages of shipping tonnage and reduction in 
output due to war production. Increased prices had helped to sustain the value of exports 
63 ASM MSS GD 193/115/6/34-37: Steel-Maitland to Bonar Law, 27, larch 1919. 
64 in, In January 1919 Steel-Maitland wrote to the Prime Minister request g to be made Assistant Foreign 
Secretary in order to strengthen his position. "Mr Balfour frankly takes no interest and Lord Hardinge is 
hopelessly incompetent- as any capable person who knows the Foreign Office from within can testify. The 
result is that I cannot get my business properly done". Lloyd George NISS F/36/3/3: Steel-%Ialtland to 
I- Im'd (1cor-c, 17 January 1919. For Balfour's lack of interest in the commercial side of the foreign Office I 
see Jason Torrics, Baýfour and Foreign Polic-v (Cambridge, 199 /, ) p. 195. 
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throughout the war years. 65 However, the true decrease m. exports is exposed from 
examining the figures for exportation by volume. By 1919, exports were at just 55% of 
the 1913 VOJUMe. 66 
Steps taken to destroy German trade abroad, under the Tradm, --7 "'Ith the Enemy 
Acts, could not be truly effective unless Britain was able to step Into the position vacated 
by the Germans. Steel-Maitland thought the Germans were undoubtedly anxious over the 
potential destruction of their trading position and by encouraging export connections 
between British and foreign fmns the Gennan trading community would become 
increasingly averse to the continuance of the war. This would have little effect unless 
Gen-nan loss of trade could be seen to be permanent and not just a temporary measure. 
Similarly the Germans were spreading the conviction that Bntish commercial supremacy 
was being gradually undermined and that Britain was only able to continue the war due to 
American help. This was given credence when neutrals discovered that British goods 
were virtually unobtainable. 
The ordinary channels of British trade with foreign countries were in danger of 
being destroyed from export restrictions, the trade embargo with the northern neutrals, 
government controls over purchasing and selling, foreign competition and the 
development of local industries in countries formerly supplied by Britain. Steel-Maitland 
wanted to maintain a certain flow of exports to those markets where, in the absence of 
such a flow, German influence would become predominant (e. g. Holland) or would be 
65 Average exports for 1910-13 amounted to f 581,20 1,000 annually. By 1918 this figure had only dropped 
fterthe War sh-litly to E532,364,078. A. W. Kirkaldy, British Finance during and a 1914-1921 (London, 1 1921)P. 360. 
66 Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter- War Econoiny. - Britain, 1919-1939 (London, 1970) Table 30, p. 246. 
In 1913 British exports amounted to 92.1 111111ion tons but by 1918 this had dropped to 39.2m tons. just 
43% of the pre-war figure. 'War and Export Trade: An Analysis, 1913-17, ' Board of Trade Journal. 
101 
(1918) pp. 736-8. 
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regained (e. g. Italy). He recommended the exports be spread o-ver as large a range of Z) 
articles as possible, even if the proportion was small in comparison to demand. Special 
consideration should be given to the export of goods to supply markets vý'hich formerly 
obtained similar goods from enemy countries. Export arrangements should be assimilated 
as closely as possible to the nonnal trade channels and whilst attention should be paid to 
the requirements of the Mirustries of Murutions, Blockade, Shippmg and the 
susceptibilities of allied or neutral countries, the departments concerned should be 
instructed to co-operate with the intended policy. He ended by stating: 
These proposals are put forward on the grounds of the importance of 
safeguarding our post-bellum trade position, of using the economic 
weapon during the war against the enemy to the fullest extent, and of 
carrying out by the most efficacious means commercial propaganda which 
will have a political as well as commercial value. 67 
He recognised the fact that consideration had to be given to post-war planning before the 
war actually ended if Britain was to gain any benefit. 
Steel-Maitland expanded on his proposals with reference to individual countries. 
In Holland, for example, the Germans were exporting machinery and merchandise 
formerly supplied by Britain despite their shortage of raw materials. They sought to 
obtain a permanent hold over the market by binding Dutch buyers to long-term post- 
bellum contracts in return for present supplies. The chief commodities recommended for 
exemption from the embargo and for export licence export in approved cases were 
textiles, iron and steel goods and machinery, chemical products, electrical goods, 
haberdashery, medicines, soap, rubber manufacturers, bicycles, high class stationary, 
cinema films and asbestos articles. Steel-Maltland was convinced that Germany was 
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gaining by her elasticity whereas the British were losing heavily by their rigidity. He 
thought there was every indication that Germany had embarked upon preparations for a 
policy of economic penetration in Holland after the war. Measures included the 
overrunning of Holland by German commercial travellers, the formation of Dutch 
companies as covers for German interests, public advertisements of German goods in 
Dutch cities and newspapers and long-tenn binding contracts. Although recent British 
embargoes on exports to Holland (in order to force her to conclude an agreement under 
which Dutch exports to Gen-nany were to be stopped or curtailed) had alienated Dutch 
sympathies, there were still powerful Dutch businessmen anxious to stem the present 
German tide. 68 The report concluded optimistically: "The markets are ours for the asking 
but an organic alteration of our methods is of utmost urgency. "69 
The Dutch Department of the Ministry of Information became interested in the 
paper. They noted cases in which the export of goods would not only serve the purposes 
of trade but also those of influencing opinion. Yet Cadogan, of the Foreign Office 
commercial and consular department, noted that the difficulties in the way of the export 
trade at present were insuperable. The War Trade Department and the Ministry of 
Munitions could help in some cases by granting export licences and priority certificates, 
67 CAB 27/44: 'Memorandum respecting the necessity of maintaining a flow of exports from the 
United 
Kingdom during the war' by Steel-Maitland, 29 June 1918. 
68 The British blockade action to interfere with the trade of neutrals carried the risk of alienating 
foreign 
customers in those same countries. Alan Johnstone (The Hague) wrote to Hardinge: "The 
French are a 
g the seas - , reat 
difficulty. We do all the hard and disagreeable work of squeezing the Dutch and policul 
and yet one hears from them perpetually how popular they are here and how unpopular we are. 
They are 
ready to take any advantage they can of the position for future commercial use and peaceful penetration 
to 
our disadvantage. " Hardinge MSS 29: 17 January 1917. 
69 CAB 27/44 EDDC. 11: 'Trade with Holland', 12 June 1918. 
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but this depended on the needs of the moment and was unlikely to support a sustained 
poliCy. 70 
Unsurprisingly these recommendations met with little enthusiasm from other 
departments concerned. Steel-Maitland could be accused of political naivet6 if he 
believed that the blockading authorities would allow the free export of goods on his list. 
Sim-kin, of the Ministry of Blockade, responded that it was essential that any counter- 
measures aimed against a German economic offensive among the northern neutrals 
should not impair the efficiency of the blockade. 
The future of our export trade will largely depend, if not entirely upon the 
result of the war, on a direct operation of war like the blockade which must 
not be sacrificed in the least degree to considerations of post-bellum 
commercial development. Moreover it is by no means certain that in some 
commodities at any rate the German economic offensive is not being 
prosecuted at the expense of their own domestic requirements. If this be 
the fact so much the better for us. 
Eyre Crowe commented that there was undoubtedly an immediate clash of interests was 
and stated categorically "there never was a blockade which did not also hit the blockader 
but this as a general proposition is not sufficient reason for giving up the blockade. " Lord 
Robert Cecil expressed dismay that the Overseas Trade Department had circulated a 
paper criticising the policy of another department without submitting the paper to that 
department for comment first. 71 Cecil's comment reveals as much about the inter- 
departmental friction between the Foreign Office and the newly established Department 
of Overseas Trade as it does about blockade policy. However Steel-Maitland's 
Department had been established with the specific remit of promoting British trade and 
70 FO 395/245/fl 13026/113026: 'Trade in Relation to Propaganda' by Eric Hambro and NIr Guest. -2 June 
and minute by Cadogan, 28 June 1918. 
71 CAB 27,144 EDDC. 20: Comments on EDDC. 11,4 July 1918. 
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therefore his proposals, although likely to fal fu 'I, were only concerned with rthenng this 
aim. 
The failure of the Department of Overseas Trade. 
The Federation of British Industries (FBI) decided to take independent action, despairing 
of the Government's ability to provide adequate commercial intelligence for 
manufacturing interests in addition to those of the merchant, banking, shipping and 
insurance interests. Since late 1916, the organisation's Consular and Overseas Trade 
Committee had examined the issues of commercial intelligence, the consular service and 
international trade. They aimed to organise British manufacturers into selling 
organisations to represent each trade. It was thought that this scheme would reduce the 
cost of overseas representation for individual firms, eliminate counterproductive 
competition and produce better commercial intelligence. 72 
Guy Locock, the assistant director of the FBI, thought that too much was expected 
by the business community from resident consular officials abroad and that government 
action alone would never be able to revitalise British foreign trade. 73 In 1919 the FBI 
began to appoint general Trade Commissioners to overseas markets where It was thought 
desirable to represent the interests of the manufacturer m the marketplace. These 
72 R. P. T. Davenport-Hines, Dudley Docker: The Life and Times of a Trade Warrior, p. 112. 
73 Locock, as assistant director, was responsible for overseas policy. He had been a former official at the 
Foreign Office and in 1917 had served as Steel-Maltland's Private secretary at the DOT before leaving to 
join the FBI. The director, Roland Nugent, had also come from the Foreign Office. He was head of the 
Foreign Trade Department in 1915 and had taken the lead in reorganising the consular service and 
establishing the DOT. 
Yet despite this representation, there were complaints from members that the FBI was not regarded as a 
body that could take effective action with government departments and its political influence was 
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locations included Morocco, Portugal, South Affica, Italy, Turkey, Greece. Spain, Brazil 
and Scandmavia. 74 Yet despite the fact that the FBI were providing a specific service for 
manufacturers, it was recognised by members that they were undertaklngvý'ork v. -h1ch 
should have been ftinded by the government. 
In pressing the stringent Treasury for further funds, the combination of the 
Foreign Office and the Board of Trade appeared a source of weakness rather than 
strength. 75 Montagu Villiers described the DOT as, 
that mongrel product of Board of Trade and Foreign Office 
interdepartmental squabbles- a Department well conceived but rendered 
sterile in spite of the self-sacrificing and heartbreaking efforts of its 
original organisers, as they themselves will be the first to admit. 76 
Steel-Maitland was anxious that the Department be accommodated with the Foreign 
Office as quickly as possible, not only so that communications and personal relations 
between the two Departments could be improved, but also because the present offices in 
Basinghall Street were unsultable. 77 When the Department was granted extra staff by the 
negligible. FBI MSS 2001F/3/DI/2/10: Gilbertson (chairman of the South Wales group of members) to 
Nugent, 6 October 1919. 
74 FBI MSS 200/F/l/l/62: Overseas Trade and Consular Conu-nittee correspondence, November 1918. 
One of those appointed was Montagu Villiers who had recently resigned as commercial secretary Ln Spain, 
citing financial constraints as the reason. He believed that after the war, and as one of its direct lessons, 
financial provision would be made to enable public servants to perform more adequately the duties 
apparently demanded by the commercial community. He had optimistically trusted that the DOT would be 
granted the funds necessary to enable its higher officials abroad to render really useful services to British 
commerce but had been proved wrong. His salary of E2000 (with E3000 for expenses) was far higher than 
his previous govenunent salary. ASM MSS GD 193/115/10/220- 1: Villiars to Sir I lamer Greenwood, 20 
September 1919. 
7 The Treasury allowed the department L 114,000 for its first year. The Wilson admimstration had voted 
f 40,000 for the Latin-American department alone in their equivalent organisation. It was thought the DOT 
needed at least fI million per annum to fulfil its functions adequately. J. M. Kennedy, 'The Functions of the 
Overseas Trade Department, ' Fortnightly Review, 104 (1918) pp. 133-5. 
76 H. %M ontagu Villiers, Chamis of a Consular Career (London, 1924) p. 153. 77 By Nlarch 1919 the pressure of bad housing and under-staffing began to take its toll. Sir William Clark, 
the Comptroller-General, and Frederick Butler, his Deputy, suffered breakdowns due to ovenvork, the 
former being confuied to a sanatorium. The pressure affected the health of the staff and also the amount of 
work achieved. Steel-Maitland noted: "What ought to be most valuable work from the point of vieNN of 
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Treasury there was no room to house them. A temporary piecemeal solution ývas to housc 
various departments of the DOT in different buildings. 78This state of affairs was not 
uncommon at a time when Government bureaucracy expanded greatly to cope with the 
organisation of the war and office space was at a minimum. However the DOT Nvas not a 
temporary wartime department and warranted better treatment. 
Steel-Maitland was anxious lest the move to new offices in Queen Anne's Gate 
was considered final. He wrote to Curzon: "Contiguity with the Foreign Office is 
absolutely essential". 790ut of a DOT staff of 400 there was not one First Division 
Foreign Office clerk represented. He warned if the Department was to remain, as it ought, 
in integral connection with the rest of the Foreign Office, it was essential that some of the 
regular Foreign Office staff should serve there. 80 Despite repeated requests Hardinge 
declined to send any Foreign Office staff to reinforce the DOT, despite the fact that the 
Foreign Office could find temporary replacements from the Consular Service. Contact 
between the Departments was therefore minimal. Steel-Maitland wrote frankly to 
Hardinge claiming that the latter was playing straight into the hands of those who wished 
to see the severing of connections between the commercial services abroad and the 
Foreign Office. 81 
British trade and industry, is largely diminished m value owing to the conditions here". ASM MSS GD 
193/115/6/34-37: Steel-Maitland to Bonar Law, 27 March 1919. 
78 BT 61/3/3-. 'Department of Overseas Trade: Organisation and Staff, ' 1 August 1919. After the main 
Secretariat moved to new offices in Queen Anne's Gate Building, the Enquiry Room and Library were still 
located in Basingliall Street. Meanwhile the Russian Section remained in the Hotel Windsor, the Belgian 
Section at Regent House and the Exhibitions Branch at Kingsway House. Altogether a third of the total 
staff were spread around London. 
79 Ibid., GD 193/115/3/23-26: Steel-Maitland to Curzon, 6 May 1919. 
80 
ý, VSNI MSS GD 193/115/6/38: Steel-Maitland to Curzon, 17 March 1919. 81 ASNI MSS GD 193/115/6,, '60: Steel-Maitland to Hardinge, 24 February 1919. He wrote to Crowe: I 
ieve it is think that I am the only person who at the present time is saving that connection, because I beli 
essential". Same date. GD 193/115/6/56. 
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Rehousing was stalled by Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, who 
claimed that the Department was to be separated from the Foreign Office and relocated 
entirely within the Board of Trade. 82 Stanley believed that his proposal for a new building I 
to house both the Board of Trade and the DOT was more feasible than the mooted plans 
to build an extra storey on to the Foreign Office. 83 Steel-Maitland saw this as an attempt 
to take the Commercial and Consular Service out of Foreign Office control. Steel- 
Maitland was now of the opinion that if it came to a straight choice, commercial 
intelligence should come under the remit of the Foreign Office. 
The creation of the DOT was intended to unify the commercial intellig, Yence 
services previously found in the Foreign Office and Board of Trade and to pool resources. 
The Department was split into two sections, the Overseas Division and the UK Division. 
The fortner was subdivided geographically and responsible for administrating overseas 
services and collating economic and commercial information received. The latter 
analysed reports from abroad from the point of view of benefiting industries at home. 
However instead of unifying and simplifying commercial procedure all three 
Departments simply overlapped. The geographical sections of the Overseas Division were 
not the same as these of the Political Section of the Foreign Office. There was an overlap 
between the UK Division of the DOT and the Home Industries Department of the Board 
82 Ibid., GD 193/115/6/47-8: Steel-Maitland to Hardinge, 24 February 1919. Hardinge also received a letter 
from Renriell Rodd at the Rome Embassy stating the'Mommg Post'had announced the merger of the DOT 
with the Board of Trade. GD 193/115/6/49. 
83 Ibid., GD 193/115/6/71: Stanley to Steel-Maitland, 22 February 1919. This scheme Nvas actually earned 
out and work completed in 1925 but only due to the intervention of the Prime Nfinister and Foreign 
Secretary, Ramsey McDonald, who secured the required funds. Ephraim Maisel. The Foreig" 
Office al"i 
, Foreigii Policj,, 1919-1926 (Brighton, 1994) p. 10. 
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of Trade and there still existed duplication of Commercial Departments in the Forei, ---n 
Office and Board of Trade. 84 
Due to the unsettled state of affairs a Committee was appointed, headed by Lord 
Cave, to determine the future of the present system. The Committee heard evidence from 
Sir Auckland Geddes, the new President of the Board of Trade, who advocated the 
creation of a new'Ministry of Commerce' combining both the DOT and the Consular 
Department with the Board of Trade. Eyre Crowe, who returned from the Peace 
Conference in Paris especially to give evidence, recommended that the DOT be 
transferred to, and become a department of, the Foreign Office thus combining foreign Z: ) 
trade with foreign policy. Representatives from the Chambers of Conu-nerce and the 
Federation of British Industries expressed the view that separating commercial from 
political work would be disastrous. Due to its prestige abroad the best policy would be for 
the Foreign Office to be'commerciallsed' and take control of foreign commercial policy. 
The Committee recommended that the DOT continue with the present system of 
dual control but that a Standing Committee be established to facilitate discussion betwccn 
all three Departments. The Consular and Commercial Departments of the Foreign Office 
should be transferred to the DOT along with the War Trade Intelligence Department. The 
Committee also suggested that the DOT should be located in close proximity to, and if 
possible in the same building as, its parent Departments. The dissenting voice came from 
Dudley Docker who in a Minority Report stood by the views he had expressed in the 
earlier Fanngdon Report. He saw the system of dual control as "the root of the trouble" 
84 ASM NISS GD 193/115/3/11-13: 'Notes on the Present Position, ' 25 Ni lay 1919. 
I -, -) 
and the best solution for the Foreign Office to take control of foreign conu-nercial 
poliCy. 85 
The Report was adopted by the War Cabinet. 86 Steel-Maitland had resigned his 
post, dogged by administrative details which had diverted his energies from his objective 
of assisting export industries and improving Britain's trading position. The question of 
departmental control was settled but the duplication of functions continued. The meetings I 
of the Standing Committee offer evidence of the confusion that still existed between the 
three Departments. 87 The real problem lay not with the departmental structure but with 
the people controlling it, who refused to put aside departmental rivalries and give the 
scheme a chance. The Foreign Office, already suffering a loss of prestige and influence, 
was loath to agree to anything which might further undermine its status. Similarly the 
Board of Trade was loath to relinquish any of the wartime functions it had arrogated to 
itself in the process. The DOT was the Government's attempt to prove that steps were 
being taken during the war to improve trade connections and boost British export trade 
after the war. It was a practical measure, part of Carson's "organic institution, " but it was 
not given the necessary backing or authority. 
Conclusion. 
The prosecution of the trade war as a psychological weapon against Germany continued 
85 Cmd. 3 19. Report of the Cominittec to Examine the Question of GovernmentAfachineryfor Dealing with 
Trade and Comincrce (1919). 
CAB 23/101WC. 598: 23 July 1919. 
87 See BT 60/4 4: Minutes of the Standmg Conuruttees. 
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throughout the war. From the end of 1917 the policy of substituting British firms for 
German ones placed on the Statutory List in neutral and Allied countries was carried out 
by the Foreign trade Department and the Overseas Trade Department. 88 This dual polic,,, 
of 'sever and supplant' reached its official height in April 1918 when a British mission, 
under the charge of Maurice de Bunsen, toured South America. Its general aims Nvere the 
strengthening of political and economic relations with certain South American countries. 
However the Mission concerned itself with war-time problems concerning trade war and 
the economic offensive. The Foreign Trade Department considered it a priority of the 
Mission to induce South American governments to take further measures against 
Germany's economic position in their countries and to supplant German influence in the 
area by British. Shortly after the Mission left Brazil, the Brazilian Government decldcd to 
close down the remaining German businesses in the country. 89 
Yet in spite of the best efforts of the officials concerned, the trade war was not 
effective enough to have a decisive effect on German opinion. German importing houses 
in South America may have found it increasingly difficult to carry on trading but they 
still retained their personnel and they were able to plan for the future. There were 
estimated to be 350 German import houses still functioning in Brazil after the war-10 4D 
Britain also lost trade and goodwill overseas, although not as a result of a determined 
campaign by the enemy. British manufacturers were displaced by the United States, Japan 
or native products. 
88 CAB 27/16/EOC. 35: 'Ntemorandum on closer organisation between finance and industry as part of an 
economic offensive' by Steel-Maitland, 25 November 1917. 
89 .ý 1-10-37. Scc Roberta M. Warman, The Foreign Office 1916-1918 (Nex York, 1986) pp. 
D. C. N 1. Platt et al, Decline and Recovery in Britain 's Overseas Trade (London, 
1993 3) p. 66. 
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Practical measures such as the British Trade Corporation and the Imports and 
Exports Bill were calculated to disturb the minds of the enemy, provided theywere 
carried through promptly and with determination. The Import and Export Bill had been 
treated to a hail of criticism from Free-traders when introduced into Parliament in 
November 1917 and was withdrawn a month later. The Bill was designed to extend 
controls over goods and raw materials into the post-war period when wartime legislation 
ceased. It was thought vital as a means of preventing German dumping and controlling 
British resources. In a harmless light the Bill was a mere administrative measure for 
smoothing the transition from war to peace. In its most smister light it was the beginning 
of state control for external trade. 91 The British Trading Corporation had been similarly 
criticised in the Commons. 92 Carson was led to note that if such measures were stillbom, 
or whittled down or if there is an impression abroad that they will not be seriously 
enforced, then they are likely to cause more harm than good. 
For in that case Germany will regard them as mere bluff. The German 
Government (quoting from the House of Commons debates and the press) 
will represent them to their people as measures which are not seriously 
intended, and to which the trend of British opinion is traditionally and 
instinctively opposed. 93 
Yet British blockading officials had attempted to convey the impression to Genuan 
commercial interests that they would be the real losers if the war continued for any length 
of time. This threat now had less of an immediate impact and German merchants 
91 The Manchester Guardian thought that the period of control (3 years) was too long and the powers too 
wide. It constituted a "blank cheque to three years of officialdom [continuing the] muddle of war control 
due to self-sufficiency of bureaucrats. " 4 December 1917. 
92 The BTC had openly been called a "dangerous and rnischievous innovation". One MP declared 
he could 
not conceive "a more hopeless, destructive and suicidal way of seeking to further the trade interests of 
British commerce and trade". 93 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 1840 and 1865,17 May 1917. See also col. 2448. 
questions to Cecil, 24 May 1917. 
Q3 CAB 21/108 G-190: 'Econornic Offensive Committee' by Carson, 21 January 1918. 
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expected to regain lost ground against a weakened Britain and an inexperienced Unitcd 
States, whose products they thought of as infenor and their methods rigid and inflexible. 
However this depended on there being a 'fair field' for commerce and no post-war 
economic penalisation of Germany. The Allies had already decided that this privilege 
should be denied Germany and their collective economic strengolh harnessed to expel 
German influence and products. The Government attempted to intervene to officially 
collaborate with her Allies in establishing an economic bloc which would punish 
Germany and benefit their own economic security. 
PART TWO 
SUPPLY AS A WEAPON OF WAR AGAINST 
GERMANY 
V 
Allied planning for a policy of exclusion: The Paris 
Economic Conference of 1916. 
Whereas Gen-nan traders were confident that their resourcefulness and experience 
would allow them to overcome any temporary trade loss due to the blockade, the 
situation would be different if German goods, trade and services were fori-nally 
excluded firom Allied markets. The list of possible economic measures contemplated 
was seemingly endless, covering differential tariffs for imports from the Empire, 
Allies, neutrals and enemies; stringent naturalisation regulations and the 
denaturalisation of all enerny-born subjects; a timed embargo and then a tax on the 
export of raw materials to enemy countries; high duties on Gennan shipping using 
Allied ports; restrictions on enemy subjects working, living or holding property in 
Allied countries; restrictions on financial assistance to enemy countries and the 
prevention of enemy banks from establishing branches in Allied countries. ' 
Although these economic measures had potentlal, the practIcal problem of 
converting them into a defined strategy, calculated to hasten peace, required precise 
planning. At the Pans economic Conference of June 1916, the Allies formallsed 
arrangements for the prosecution of the economic war against Germany. The measures 
proposed at the Conference were designed to aid Allied reconstTuction, whilst at the 
same time penalising Gennan economic activity. 
See, Cor instance, MIdner NISS Box 129: 'A memorandum of economic measures which should 
be 
adopted by the Allied countries against enemy countries before the conclusion of hostilities': 
WO 
106/15 10: 'Note on Restriction of German Trade' by the Director of Military Intelligence, 
25" February 
1916. 
138 Planning for an Allied economic bloc. 
The notion of an integrated Allied economic system was proposed by Etienne 
Cl&mentel, the French minister of commerce, who was concerned with the problem of 
securing raw materials to restore devastated French lands once the war had ended. He 
wished to use the present solidarity between the Allies to form an economic bloc 
which would continue after the war. The main aim of this organisation would be to Z! D 
control the raw materials the Allies possessed in order to ensure steady supply at fair 
prices and to keep German economic 'aggression' in check. This scheme was the 
international manifestation of a general attempt by C16mentel to corporatise the 
French economy. ' 
However similar schemes were being advocated in Britain. Edwin Montagu, 
financial secretary to the Treasury, officially defined such a scheme as early as 
December 1915. If the Germans refused to make peace on Allied terms they should be 
prevented from rehabilitating themselves after the war. Measures would include 
refusing to buy or sell to the Central Powers, breaking post-war contracts and denying I 
access to ports and coaling facilities. To be in a position to make such a statement 
would require immense preparation. The Government should negotiate with as many 
countries as possible for a treaty under which preparations could be made to issue a 
prohibition of German goods, or a prohibitionaiy tariff, which would be kept M effect 
for two years for every month Germany prolonged the War. 3 Montagu recognised that 
2 For a detailed analysis of French policy see Marc Trachtenberg ' "A New Economic Order": Etienne 
Clýmentel and French Econorruc Diplomacy during the First World War, ' French Historical Studies, 
10 (1977) pp. 315-341. This article also forms chapter one of his discussion in Reparatiotis in iforld 
Politics. - France and European Economic Diploinac v. 1916-1923 (New York, 1980) pp. 1-77. 
Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Or et le sang. - les buts de guerre econoniiques de la Preinijre Guerre 
i? zoiidiale (Paris, 1989) chapter 5. ' See CAB 21 1081 G-161: 'Trade War -A rough preliminary note' by NIontagu, 
8 October 1917. 
Letters from private individuals had been received earlier by Runciman proposing a scheme to 
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before the war could end the Allies would require geographical and political 
guarantees and the Germans required economic guarantees. 
In December 1915 the French requested a confercnce to be held in Pans for 
the purpose of studying measures of economic defence against Germany. The topics 
suggested for discussion included: legislation prohibiting trading with the enemy, 
regulation of export prohibitions to afford reciprocal assistance between the Allies, 
measures for the reconstitution of the machinery for the resumption of normal trade, a 
study of measures for the liberation of Allied countries from any economic 
dependence on Germany and the suppression of German activities in the Far East. ' 
At the same time, at the Board of Trade in London, a memorandum was 
written on the proposed economic entente. It stated that, 
it is the duty of the Goverranents to consider all the hypotheses, not the 
most favourable only; they must take into account the possibility that 
Germany at the opening of peace negotiations might still be in a 
position to discuss the conditions without being reduced to submit to 
them, and even the possibility that Gerinany might not yet, up to that 
moment, have been forced to evacuate completely the territories which 
she is actually occupying. 
The Allies could not accept a peace proposed by Germany; it would be 
too onerous, or it would be only a truce ... 
But how could a victory be 
achieved which force of arms had not as yet obtained? There are strong 
reasons for believing that the exercise of concerted economic pressure 
would succeed in this; it is even probable that the threat would be 
sufficient, but it must be a threat evidently ready to be transformed into 
5 immediate acts. 
conclude a commercial treaty amongst the Allies agreeing to ten years of reciprocal free trade, 
including freedom of navigation between their ports, and offering neutrals to chance to join. It was 
sug', ested such a plan represented "a weapon so powerful, that the effect, if utilised quickly and 
launched against the Germans without warning would ... prove equal to a second 
Kitchener army with 
the additional advantage that it does not require any training or munitions. " See Runciman MSS %VR 
124(l): William Petersen to Runciman, 20 September 1915. 
FO 368/1668/f6672: 22 December 1915. 
Runcuinan MSs VvR 143: 'Note on the project of an Economic Entente among the Allied 
Powers'. 8 
December 1915. The memorandum is unsigned and hand-written (possibly by a foreigner as the word 
ýcrash' is spelt 'Krach'). Whether or not it was ever circulated beyond the Board of Trade it must 
certainly have influenced Runciman's planning for inter-Allied economic collaboration. 
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A close economic Entente between the Allied Powers, who represented almost tN-,., o- 
thirds of the markets of the world and a population of 600 million customers, and the 
ability to close or open progressively this market offered the possibility of tremendous 
leverage over Germany. The rapid resumption of the German post-bellum export trade 
would be vital if she were to have any chance of restoring her economic life. Delay at 
the beginning, or a long-continued hampering, might be fatal to Germany. In the case 
of complete victory this economic weapon could be used to make sure Germany 
complied with whatever conditions were imposed upon her by the Allies. In the event 
of an indecisive victory at the time of peace, it could be used to compel Germany to 
vacate any territory she still occupied. It was not merely the political duty of the Allies 
to conclude such an Entente but an economic necessity to counter the threat of a 
Gennan dominated Zollverein. ' 
Attention was drawn to the conclusions of the Central European Economic 
Association meetings in Vienna at the end of 1915, which called for the laying of 
foundations for a comprehensive econoMlc rapprochement between the Gen-nan 
Empire and the two states of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before peace 
negotiations were entered into. Calls were made for reciprocal preferential treatment 
embracing all aspects of economic life. In response, similar calls were made in the 
Commons for Britain to prepare for corresponding Allied organisation. 
Recommendations for consideration included a mutual agreement amongst the Allies 
Allied economic planning was partly a response to fears of a Europe economically dormnated by 
Germany. Friedrich Naumann's book Mitteleuropa, published in 1915, quickly became a best-seller in 
Germany and confirmed the Allies' worst fears. Although the views expressed N ere private and not 
official a geopolitical entity, from Heligoland to Baghdad, was forming on the Continent. See Henry 
Cord Meyer, Ilitteleuropa. In Gerinan thought and action, 1815-1945 (The Hague, 1955) pp. 206 and 
215. 
At the Dresden Conference of November 1915 the Gerrrian and Austro-flunganan Economic Lea( gues 
passed a Resolution declaring it desirable that the Central Powers conclude an economic alliance and 
ý. _, arry on a common commercial policy with unity of customs rates. Bulgaria and 
Turkey were to be 
included in this economic sphere of interest. I Vest7ninster Gaýette, I December 191 ý- 
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not to conclude any separate conventions with Germany, special reciprocal trade- 
tariffs, a common surtax on German goods (to either prohibit goods altogether or 
provide a fund to compensate territories occupied by the Germans) and the closing of 
ports to products carried on a Gen-nan ship or on a ship built in a German port. ' 
Steps toward inter-Allied economic collaboration in order to prosecute the war 
in a more efficient manner were already afoot. On 27 and 28 March 1916 a meeting 
was held in Paris of Allied political and military representatives to discuss further co- 
operation during the war. In a resolution published at the end of the conference, the 
Allies stated their determination to integrate their views and interests in the economic 
sphere. A month later on 27 April the International Parliamentary Commercial 
Conference met, again in Paris, to discuss problems that were likely to anse in the 
prosecution of the war and also on the conclusion of peace. Issues such as favourablc 
tariff regimes, transport and communication integration and international patent 
agreements were considered. ' 
The general remit of the Economic Conference was agreed beforehand by 
Cl&mentel and Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade. Runciman, a 
prominent Free-Trader in the Liberal Government, was well aware of the difficulties 
that a shift towards a more mercantilist economic system might entail. In 
conversations with C16mentel in February 1916 three general objectives were 
outlined. First, the natural resources of Allied countries should be conserved to ensure 
priority for the Allies and neutrals after the war. Secondly, during and after the war 
the Allies should endeavour to procure their supplies first of all from within Allied 
I goods countries. Finally, independence from the Central Powers should be sought in ,, 
3D 0 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 387,25 November 1915.77 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 612,2 ecember 1915 and 
cols. 1307-8,10 January 1916. 
' See Marion Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 (Michigan, 1957) pp. 175-6. 
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needed for the prosecution of war and peace. 9 The Board of Trade assumed that some 
penalisation of German trade would forin part of commercial policy. This . vould be 
necessary to satisfy the desire of the Allies to foster closer commercial relations, to 
satisfy public sentiment against a revival of commercial relations with Germany, to 
provide security for new industries and independent sources of supply, to afford the 
basis for bargaining when the time came for reopening trade relations, and to allow 
time to reconstruct and consolidate Britain's Industrial and commercial position after 
the war free from hostile interference. " 
These objectives did not meet with universal approval. If the object of the war 
was to convert the Gennan public from militarism, a continuing trade war was 
unwise. A country hedged in by trade restrictions, designed to keep it in pen-nanent 
impoverishment, might resort to military preparations with a view to another war to 
end the pressure. " H. N. Brailsford wrote that "the armed peace, with its basis of 
economic rivalry, is not our ideal". The acquisition of spheres of influence and 
economic preserves enhanced competition in armaments, accentuated by the fact that 
politics govemed markets. His book The War of Steel and Gold, published just prior 
to the war, anticipated conflicts over access to the under-developed areas of the world 
and for investment opportunities and raw materials in the colonies. " 
During a debate on the forthcoming conference in the House of Lords there 
were calls for the conference to be used for an alternative purpose. By bringing about 
agreement for a policy of equal treatment in international trade the regeneration of 
Runciman MSS WR 149: Runciman to C16mentel, 12 February 1916. 
Bonar Law MSS 19 1/5 3/1/3: Memoranda on Britain's Commercial Position after the War by the 
Board of Trade, February 1916. Memo. 2: The Penalisation of Gen-nan Trade. 
Bonar Law MSS 191,52A 4: Lord Hugh Cecil to Bonar Law. 4 March 1916. 
'On Peace and Tariffs' by H. N. Brailsford in The DailY News, 5 April 1916. 
Europe and civilised humanity could be assured. Viscount Bryce made an 
impassioned speech for the cause of inclusion over exclusion. 
It would be a great comfort if one could entertain the thought that out 
of this Conference with all its perplexities, with all of its evil chances, 
with its threats of mischief and embroilments with our friends, 
difficulties with our Allies, and exasperation on the part of the neutrals, 
we could see the way to adopt some rule of inclusion instead of 
exclusion, of united and friendly forces, of bringing together in the still 
undeveloped spaces of the world, where there is room for the 
introduction of European industry and capital, of the principal of 
association instead of the principle of antagonism, the principle of 
working together instead of the principle of continued and pen-nanent 
animosity. " 
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He was joined by Lord Courtney who thought the conference perilous to the 
reallsation of the principle of helping to re-establish European peace and partnersliip 
based on the recognition of equal rights. He thought it an attempt to pursue after the 
war, in an arena other than the battlefield, a similar enmity and antagonism towards 
Gennan people, trade and prosperity. "However Lord Crewe, who was to lead the 
British delegation, thought there was no reason for such a despondent view that the 
future state of Europe was to be one of permanent hatred dividing the great peoples of 
the world. I' 
In settling the remit of the conference with C16mentel, Runciman also outlined 
three 'delicate' points he wished to avoid in future conversations to avoid 
embarrassing Great Britain namely; relations between Britain and her empire, old 
fiscal controversies over protectionism and free trade and the dependence of the 
United Kingdom on America and other countries for food supplies and raw materials. 
These points were not just relevant to the Pans Conference but were to dog the entire 
21 111. Deb. col. 643-4,11 April 1916. 
Ibid., col. 612. Bryce and Courtney were both early advocates of a League of Nations organisation. 
Courtney had been a critic of Grey's foreign policy and before his death in 19 18 advocated a 
negotiated peace as a means to shorten the war. 
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process of Allied economic co-ordination. Runciman now believed that subsequent 
discussions would be "freed from misunderstandings which are apt to anse if the aims 
and intentions of ourselves and our respective Governments were left to vague 
supposition without expression in qualified terms and subject to some limitation. "" 
However Montagu warned that the Government should not be huMed by her 
Allies, "who have rushed us in so many instances into something prejudicial to British C. 
interests". Such a conference might have far-reaching results and was unthinkable 
unless the Government was represented by strong and prominent representativcs. '- 
Crewe thought it too soon to settle post-war questions as there was little Impression as 
to conditions after the war. It was impossible to formulate policy to deal with 
unpredictable conditions. He thought the representatives should do nothing to restrict 
the absolute freedom of the country to detennine fiscal policy. " 
Runciman did not attend the Conference due to illness. " Instead Hcrbert 
Llewellyn Smith, of the Board of Trade, was sent along to "try so far as possible to 
prevent any positive mischief being done. " Writing to Runciman before the 
Conference, he said: "I think that we all here [at the Board of trade] feel that in view 
of the large number of divergent interests of the allies represented at Pans little 
practical result of a concrete kind is to be expected. , 20 The British delegation was 
headed by Lord Crewe, and contained the Conservative Party leader, Andrew Bonar- 
15 Ibid., col. 649. 
16 Runcirnan MSS WR 149: Runcirnan to C16mentel, 12 February 1916. 
" Runciman MSS WR 142: Memorandum by Montagu, 21 February 1916. 
21 11. L. Deb. cols. 646,649,11 April 1916. 
'9Asquith's announcement that Runciman was to head the delegation had caused bad feeling. It Nvas 
felt that die Unionist section of the Cabinet should take a lead on econorruc policy. Bonar Law NISS 
BL 53,0: Bonar Law to Asquith, 23 March 1916. 
'0 Runciman NISS WR 143: LleNvellyn Srmth to Runciman, 7 June 1916. 
Law, and William Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, both pron-unent 
protectioni StS. 
21 
The Resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference. 
14S 
The Conference met from 14 to 17 June with delegates attending from Britain, France, 
Italy, Russia, Belgium, Portugal, Serbia and Japan. It defined three periods (the war, 
post-war transition and 'thereafter') and proposed Resolutions to be acted upon. The 
war was largely covered by the current blockade policies of Britain and France and the 
Resolutions would have the effect, if adopted, of bringing the practice of other Allied 
countries (namely Italy and Japan) in line. Allied nationals and residents were 
prevented from trading with residents of enemy countries, whatever their nationality, 
enemy subjects, wherever they resided; persons and companics whose business was in 
whole or part under the control of enemy subjects. The Allies also agreed to prohibit 
the importation of all goods of enemy origin and make efforts to unify Allied embargo 
and contraband lists. 
The post-war transition period (of 6-18 months) would consist of a modified 
blockade to give the Allies a head start with reconstruction and to place further 
pressure on Germany. The Allies would Jointly consider means of restoring temtory 
ravaged by the war, conserve and prioritise the distribution of natural resources and 
promote trade between themselves by means of special facilities for the transport of 
goods. The Resolutions were based on what was perceived to be a German economic 
2' Walter Carter, private secretary to Llewellyn Snuth, later wrote: "They were not very 
impressive ,, 
debate, as Lord Crewe was a very hesitating and halting speaker, Bonar La\N Nvas 
inclined to speak in 
Frcnch (\\ Ilich he did badly) and Hughes was very deaf'. See FO 370/PS40 
L2228,21 jýpnl 1949. 
The Frankfurter Zcitung described Crewe as "a distinguished nonentity. A high authority on 
ties and 
vests but not on economic affairs. " 22 June 1916. CreN-, -e NISS. \ 116 (5). 
threat. Firstly, that the conduct of the war by the Central Powers had attempted to 
destroy the economic resources of the Allies. In the occupied territories 'industrial 
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machinery (of no use for munitions purposes) had been systematically carried off to 
industrial centres in Gen-nany and Austria. Damage had been deliberately caused to 
plant not carried off and industrial quarters of French towns had been deliberatelv 
selected for bombardment (e. g. the textile producing area in Reims had been reduced 
22 to rubble). Secondly, the Germans were orgamising their industries for an attack on 
Allied markets whilst the latter were still attempting to restore the devastated areas of 
Belgium, Northern France, Serbia and Poland. There were known preparations to 
continue further the industrial combinations which characterised Gen-nan economic 
organisation before the war, efforts for closer economic relations between Germany 
and Austria and for a privileged position in Turkish and Bulgarian markets. 23 
The proposal was to bind the Allies not to grant most favoured nation 
treatment to the enemy for a number of years after the war to ensure complete 
freedom of action for the Allies. Special measures were also to be taken to prevent the 
'dumping' of German goods after the war whilst the Allied economics were still in the 
period of dislocation and transition from war to peacetime economy. However in both 
cases the exact number of years was left to be fixed at a later date. The precise 
measures to be taken were left to each Allied country to decide, indicating that 
although the general sentiments were shared by all Allied countries the future fixing 
of exact details was likely to prove more difficult. 
IInig 'Thereafter' (a period of anything up to five years) saw the Allies striving to 
be 
independent of Gen-nany in raw materials, industrial products, finance and commerce 
22 FO 902/2: Secret weekly bulletin of Trade Information from the WTD. -. ""o. 20,25-31 
March 
1916. For the economic exploitation of Belgium and the occupied regions of France see 
Hans Gatzke. 
Geri? iam, 's Drive to the West 2nd edition (Baltimore, 1966) pp. 151-161. 
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to prevent the Central Powers ftom pursuing an economic policý' of restriction and 
domination. The Allies would also co-ordinate merchant shipping, telegraph and 
postal services and patents to place on a secure foundation the common economic 
prosperity of the Allied countries. At the outbreak of war it soon become obvious that 
Britain was dependent upon Germany for a number of products vital for war 
production such as synthetic dyes, optical and chemical glass, spelter, magnetos and 
synthetic drugs. This prompted the govenu-nent to encourage the development of such 
products in Britain to lessen dependence on enemy supplies. These fledgling 
industries would need protection against the renewal of severe German competition 
after the war. 24 
The reaction in Britain to the Paris Resolutions. 
The Resolutions aroused mixed passions when debated In the Commons on 2 August 
1916. Asquith claimed that Britain's aim at the Conference had been twofold: Firstly 
to ensure the Allies were resolved to wage war with complete unity and deten-nination 
in the economic as well as the military sphere and secondly, to make preparations 
for 
the period following the declaration of peace as seemed essential to the Allies in view 
of the known attitude and will of Germany. He found it impossible to believe that 
Germany would not be animated by the same aggressive commercial spirit and would 
not pursue the same trade policies after the war as she had done before . 
2' This echoed 
Briand's opening address to the Conference when he stated: 
13 Asquith NISS Box 133: Board of Trade memorandum on Germany and the 
Econornic War. 1916. 
24 Cd. 82,71, Recontinendations oj-the Econonlic Confei-ence of the. -Illies (1916). 
Runcinian MSS NVR 
143: 'Niemorandum on the Paris Econorruc Conference' unsigned, 30 June 
1916. 
" 85 II. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 332-3,2 August 1916. 
To conquer is not enough. Not merely military and diplomatic unity 
has been secured but also economic unity which will ensure for us, by 
means of fruitful harmony, the intensive development of our material 
resources. 26 
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The Resolutions were approved but not before the Free-Traders had criticised 
the measures. Philip Snowden saw the Resolutions as an attempt by Protectionists to 
use the circumstances of the war to carry out the policy they had been denied before 
1914. The Resolutions were based on the fallacy that the present alliances N-vould be 
lasting and that the current hate and enmity towards Germany would be permanent. 
Once the present fear that bound the Allies together with unity of purpose dissipated, 
the political alliances would lose their potency as other interests arose. " The Great 
War had been coined 'the war to end all wars' but this would not be the case if 
resentment and animosity were prolonged beyond any peace. Similarly Sir John 
Simon stated: 
I would very much sooner see an economic conference where we are 
going to enforce terrns upon our enemies which will result in an 
expansion of the trade of the world, and which will really promote 
peace and prosperity, rather than that we should go in for adopting just 
the same kind of restriction which has failed to enable Germany to 
win. 28 
In an editonal, the Manchester Guardian commented that at the end of the war the 
Allies would have to ask themselves whether they wished to divide Europe into two 
economic camps, which inevitably meant two military camps, and whether their 
motivation was their own safety or the desire to pwush Gen-nany. 
" 
2' Runciman MSS WR 143: 'Memorandum on the Pans Economic Conference' unsigned, 30 June 
1916. 
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See also Harold Storey, The Paris Conference and Trade After the JVar (London, 1916). Storey 
thought the adoption of the Paris Resolutions would shatter the hope of preventIng a 
future European 
NN. ir and inflict unnecessary econorrUc injury on the British population. 
Bonar Law defended his actions by reporting that the feeling of the I'D 
Conference was that as the Allies had stood together in war, so they should harness 
the goodwill between those countnes and do the same dunng the period of 
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reconstruction. 30 However, in extending the discussion over the Pan's Resolutions into 
the free-trade debate the rationale behind the measures had been missed. The 
Resolutions were designed to operate effectively in the event of an inconclusive 
peace. Churchill was one of the few who recognised this fact. He saw them as 
preparations to keep Gennany as materially and financially weak as possible and to 
secure the greatest concentration of resources for the almost inevitable renewal of 
conflict. " Temperley, picked up the point in his official history of the Peace 
Conference. He stated the measures were "short-sighted, impracticab1c, and running 
counter to the permanent economic interests of the Allies" and found their only 
possible justification in the fact that if the progai=e could be put into effect "it 
might contribute toward a state of preparedness for another war. "" Coupled to this 
notion of an indecisive outcome to the war, the Allied bloc could provide a powerful 
economic counterweight to German territorial advantages in Belgium and northem 
France during any peace negotiations. 
In the event of the Allies being victorious, the imposition of the Pans 
Resolutions, beyond ensuring that devastated areas were restored, would undoubtedly 
be fatal for European economic prosperity. The creation of rival economic blocs ran 
contrary to the economic interests of the Allies. In a multilateral trading communitý,. 
I ict of which Germany played a major role, it was impossible for one nation to infli 
commercial punishment without injurin,, -,, 
her own interests. This theme was taken up 
30 85 1 I. C. Deb. 5s, col. 398. 3' Ibid., col. 359. 
k2 ll-W-V. Temperley, The History of the Peace Conference ofParis (London, 1920-14) vol. 
V, p. 65. 
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in the foreign press once the Pans Resolutions had been announced. An article in the 
Dutch newspaper, Nieuaus van den Dag, thought there was no more dangerous C) 
regression conceivable than a partition of the civilised world into M, o enemy camps 
for a period after the war. It went on: 
The decision of the Paris Conference to erect a Chinese Wall between 
civilized nations is an insane proposal. Both for Belgium and for other 
countries of the Entente ... enormous damage would accrue if they cut 
themselves off firom economic relations with Gennany. An economic 
war to follow the present war would simply signify the suicide of 
Europe ... Even to men on the side of the Entente, the difficulties are 
perceptible, and they will not really venture to carry out the proposals. 
It would be impossible to think of a step more detrimental and 
reactionary. 
In Switzerland the Neue Zuricher Nachrichten claimed the Resolutions were an attack 
on the economic independence of neutral countries and an attempt to bring them into a 
position of pen-nanent economic vassalage of the Allied Powers. In Den-mark the 
Politiken forecast that the end of the war would see the Entente Powers and the 
Central Powers as great fighting economic organisations. Consequently "the treaty of 
peace, which will end the world war as such, will afford the neutral states of Europe 
no economic peace. " In Christina, Dagbladet reported that trade would no longer be 
the peaceful and friendly bartering of goods but "war to the knife. "" 
The fear was that if Germany was shut out of Allied markets by a system of 
preference, she would focus her attention on secunng the great neutral markets in the 
world (the Uruted States, China and South America) over whose commercial policy 
the Allies had no control. " The Allies would face vigorous competition 
from an 
33 Crewe NISS M6 (5): Dossier of comments from the press on the Pans 
Economic Conference. 
. \rticles from Nezie Zuricher Nachrichten 21 June, 
Nieucits van deii Dag 22 June, Politiken 
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DagbIadet 25 June 1916. 
34 'nie Commercial Department reported that it was widely understood 
in Scandinavia that the Paris 
Rcsolutions would in all likelihood lead to an inter-Entente customs tariff, prejudicial 
to the interests of 
neutral countries, and there was a movement in favour of countermeasures. 
FO 368/1 S491-186/62172: 
organised, disciplined and skilled commercial nation in markets where competition 
was already marked before the war. Amongst the Allies it would be Britain who 
1 -1; 1 
would bear the brunt of this competition. 35 With America still a neutral country at this 
time, such a prospect was unthinkable. The present poll 11 between Britain and tical ties 
the United States were strengthened by the huge amount of business the two countries 
were engaged in during the war, which ultimately ensured Britain's survival. The 
prospect of Gennany having a close post-bellum political relationship with the United 
States, founded on mutual economic need, was an uncomfortable prospect. 
The response to Lord Lansdowne's famous peace letter, published in the Dailv 
Telegraph on 29 November, 1917, indicated the Government's difficulty over their 
contradictory economic aims. Amongst other issues Lansdowne thought the prospcct 
of a commercial war after the peace was unacceptable: 
Commercial war is less ghastly in its immediate results than the war of 
armed forces, but it would certainly be deplorable if after three or four 
years of sanguinary conflict in the field, a conflict which has destroyed 
a great part of the wealth of the world, the Powers were to embark 
upon commercial hostilities certain to retard the economic recovery of 
all the nations involved. 
Before printing his letter, Lansdowne had consulted Arthur Balfour, the Foreign 
Secretary, over the prospect of a peace debate in Parliament. In his reply, Balfour 
addressed the issues which would later feature in the letter including observations on 
the economic war. Balfour stated: 
That they [His Majesty's Government] do not desire to destroy or 
paralyse these [the Central] Powers as trading communities, but that 
they were determined to secure for this country, from sources upon 
which it can depend, an adequate supply of the essential commodities. 
23 March 1917. 
15 Runciman NIISS WR 143: 'Notes on Post-Bellum Commercial Policy with Special Reference to the 
Penalisation of German Trade' by Percy Ashley, Aprnil 1916. Sir John Simon in TIle Daiýj-. Vejts. 
30 
September 1916. 
I quite agree that we do not wish to destroy Austria and Germany as 
"trading communities", but nothing ought to be said which hampers the 
attack on German commerce as a war measure, or (if it should prove 
necessary) the threat of post-war action in case Germany shows herself 
to be utterly unreasonable. 36 
The implication was that economic measures by the Government were aimed at 
defeating Germany during the present conflict and securing British recovery. They 
1ý-) 
were not overtly aimed against post-war Germany but the effect of achievm, --z,,, British 
aims could only be at the expense of Gennany. 
After the war, the British statesmen responsible for the Resolutions claimed 
they were purely defensive measures designed to counter similar German proposals to 
establish a Mitteleuropa trading area. Writing in The Times, Runcinian stated: 
I was determined that the economic threat and challcrige of Mittel- 
Europa should be met wholly and promptly ... All served their purpose, 
and were out of date when the emergency, political or other-wise, for 
which they were contrived had passed away. Mittel-Europa had 
disappeared. " 
In September 1914 Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, had outlined what 
become known as 'The September Programme'. This far reaching economic 
programme envisaged a commercial treaty making France economically dependent on 
Germany by allowing Gennany financial and industrial freedom and securing the 
French market for German exports whilst excluding British goods. Belgium was to 
become a vassal state, economically a province of Germany, and Luxembourg a 
German Federal State. It anticipated the establishment of a central European economic 
association through common customs treaties with France, Belgium, Holland, 
Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Non-vay. These 
'61-ansdowne peace letter and Balfour to Lansdowne, 22 November 1917. 
Reproduced in Lord 
Newton, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929) pp. 464-8. 
3' The Pines, 29 March 1920. 
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states would fonrially be equal but in practice would be under German leadership and 
economic dominance. " The Pans Resolutions supposed a peace which left the encmY 
unified and strong with political and economic control over Europe and the Near East. 
Their pretext perished with complete victory. 
Asquith declared in 1920 that the Paris Resolutions were in reply to the 
economic war aims of the Central Powers which threatened the Allies with continuing I 
economic and financial warfare after the hostilities were over: 
The Paris Resolutions were purely defensive, a declaration of policy 
directed against that contingency, and that contingency only, and they 
expressly preserved to each country that it should have complete 
freedom to use its own fiscal discretion and act within the limits of its 
fiscal system. There is nothing whatever in the Pans Resolutions which 
has any application to the circumstances as they now exist, because, as 
you know, Germany and Austria are impotent to wage anything in the 
nature of an economic war against us, and there is nothing in them 
which is inconsistent, or would bind us to do anything which is 
inconsistent, with Free Trade. 40 
On the eve of the Armistice, Lloyd George was being assured by the Board of Trade 
that the Paris Resolutions were consistent with a reasonable interpretation of free trade 
policy but one based on the necessity of maintaining national security and 
development, a factor the old free trade argument failed to take into account. The 
Resolutions contained nothing committing the Government to any particular fiscal 
policy but temporary measures included the denial of most favoured-nation treatment 
and the plan to ration raw materials, both inconsistent with Eree trade. 41 This would 
Fritz Fischer, Germanv's Aims in the First World War (New York and London, 1967) pp. 103-5.1 The 
Programme also advocated the creation of a Central African colonial empire to supply 
Germany with 
necessary raw materials. 
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suggest that with the complete capitulation of Germany Imminent, the implcmcntatioii 
of the Pains Resolutions still occupied the minds of the Govemment. 
The hesitancy of Allied nations towards adopting the Paris Resolutions. 
Each Allied Government still maintained the freedom to eventually determine its own 
individual economic policy. The prospect of renouncing trade with Germany was not 
popular with every country. At a preliminary conversation on the subject of the Pans 
Conference with Runciman, Hymans, the Belgian Minister, stated that geogaphically 
Belgium was bound to be mainly dependent upon Germany for trade although her 
sentiments lay with the Allies. The restoration of Belgium was thought irnpossible 
without the restoration of her hinterland, i. e. Germany. Rotterdam and Antwerp were 
outposts of this hinterland. In 1913 Belgium imported goods worth 600,000,000 
francs from Germany, namely coal, tools and machinery. If she reftised to import 
these goods from Germany after the war she would place her industries under great 
disadvantage unless they could be supplied more cheaply from Britain or America. 
The cheapness of supplies was considered essential by the Belgian Governi-nent in 
restoring the country's industry. Belgian exports to Germany amounted to 
350,000,000 francs and any policy which prevented theIr selling theIr goods to this 
extent would be most damaging to Belgium and could only be contemplated if there 
were new and equally remunerative markets elsewhere. Hymans was also wary about 
Bel,,, ium coming too closely under the economic influence of France. 42 
The British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir C. Greene. reported that the Paris 
Resolutions were uniforrnly unfavourable in Japan. The Govemment stressed that the 
Resolutions were passed only ad referendum and were not binding on the Allied 
15,5 
Governments. General opinion deprecated any commercial measures against German,,,, 
after the war. It was thought that any economic alliance betxcen Britain and flic All I cs 
would only benefit the former and that a system of preferential tariffs to trade between 
Britain and her colonies would be to the exclusion of Japanese gpods. " 
The Russian delegation to Pans had not been empowered to give definite 
promises as to future economic policy, particularly with regard to trading privileges. I 
British delegates reported the main difficulty was the nervousness of Russia and Italy 
over markets for their produce to compensate for the loss of German markets. ' The 
Russians did not want to agree to any conditions which interfered with their economic 
development, such as freedom to decide tariffs, and resolved that the naturc of future 
trade treaties could only be decided at a later date in relation to the political situation 
ansing from the war. Russian economic warfare was charactensed by considerations 
of expediency and opportunism which made post-war planning difficult to 
45 
anticipate. 
At a meeting of the All-Russian Agricultural Congress on 10 March 1916 
Sorodaevsky, Assistant Manager of the Department of Commerce and Industry, read a 
paper on the 'War, Agriculture and the future of Treaties of Commerce'. The general 
tenor of the paper, thought to reflect official views on Russian economic policy on the 
conclusion of peace, was as follows: 
The destruction or undue humiliation of Gen-nany, fully attainable if 
desired, Is not Russia's aim. Germany's Isolation would be at variance 
,, Runciman MSS WR 143: Report by Runciman, 27 March 1916. 
43 FO 368/1670/163741: Greene to Grey, 27 June 1916. 
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" For Russian considerations see B. E. Nolde, Russia in the Economic Wal- (N'cxN- Haven, 
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with Russia's welfare, and the next treaty of commerce must be based 
on the principle of most-favoured nation treatment. Of late years 
Russia exported to Germany a third of her total exports, to the value of 
500,000,000 roubles. Where will Russian agriculturists find another 
such market? 
Timinazeff, a member of the Council of the Empire and former Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, voiced similar comments in an article in the Petrograd 
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Bourse Gazette. He wanted Russia to maintain complete liberty of action with respect 
to her customs tariff and thought it a mistake to have separate tariffs, onc favourable 
to the Allies and the other unfavourable to Germany and Austria. All concessions 
obtained by the Allies would, sooner or later, have to be granted to GenTiany. Russia 
had in fact used the freedom of action presented by the war to strengthen her tariff 
system to the deti-iment of Allies and neutrals, as well as Gci-many and Austna. " 
These views were by no means popular or generally accepted in Russia but 
they did provide an ominous portent for the intended unity of Allied economic action. 
In September 1916 Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador to Russia, 
communicated a confidential declaration from the Russian Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs to be signed by the Allied Governments at the same time as the act of 
ratification. The declaration would, in giving practical effect to the Resolutions, take 
into account special economic conditions as well as exceptional situations which it 
47 
accorded to certain categories of enemy subjects. 
For the Contraband Department of the Foreign office this was the first blow to 
the Pans Resolutions and evidence that the Russians would not be bound to a boycott 
of Germany as the volume of cross-border trade was simply too large to replace. 
Victor Wellesley, head of the commercial department, commented that it N-vas almost a 
46 1 Runciman NISS WR 143: Enclosures in Sir George Buchanan's despatch No. 91 Commerc al of I 
Marcli and No. 37 Commercial of 9 February 1916. 
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law of nature for Russia and Germany to trade owing to their continuous frontiers, 
diversity of natural resources and econornic development. Russia, a large agricultural 
state with few industries to protect, was well suited to German dumping methods as 
she looked to purchase manufactured goods in the cheapest markets. Russian desires 
not to have to relinquish this system were reasonable and loggical. He concluded: 
"Personally, I have no great faith in the efficacy of the Pans Resolutions if only for 
the simple reason that general agreement as to the measures in which effect should be 
given to them is impossible of attainment. "' 
This divergence of opinion within the Allied camp did not go unnoticed in the 
neutral and enemy press. The general consensus was that the interests of the various 
Allied countries were so divergent that no arrangement agreeable to all parties could 
be made. If the Allies did reach an agreement, they would damage their own and I 
neutral interests before those of Germany. This left the Resolutions as a bogey raised 4: ) 
by the Allied Powers to frighten their enemies. As the Frankurter Zeitung reported the 
Pans Conference endeavoured to intimidate Germany through the collection of 
concessions to bargain with, such as the raising of the blockade and the arrangement 
of commercial treaties. " 
America and the Paris Resolutions. 
The Resolutions of the Pans Economic Conference were greeted with consternation in 
Washington. The failure of the Allies to consult the Amencans before the conference 
and the lack of any explicit mention of policy towards the United States left the 
" FO 368/1670/190286: Buchanan (Petrograd) to Foreign Office, 21 September 1916. 
" FO ', oS 1670 190590&190612: Minutes by Wellesley, Hardinge and Cecil. 
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impression that America, as a neutral, would be treated as an outsider. 'O The New York 
Times thought the post-war plans economically unsound and believed that the , -, -ar 
might be prolonged as a result of them. " 
President Wilson was as wary of the Allied economic plans as he was of 
Gennan proposals for a Mitteleuropa trading area. Any organisation consisting of 
Allied inclusion inevitably meant American exclusion. The Americans had been 
taking great pains to use the opportunity of the war to increase their share of world 
trade at the expense of European competitors and in June 1915 they became the 
world's leading exporter. The success of this policy and the expansion in the export 
trade of the United States would be jeopardised by the establishment of post-war 
protectionist trading-blocs. The post-war American industrial sector was increasingly 
dependent upon foreign supplies of raw materials and so Allied plans to control the 
domestic and foreign resources they possessed was a cause for concern. The British 
Rubber Growers Association alone controlled 70% of the world's rubber supply, a 
vital commodity in the American economy. In 1913 over one half of United States 
exports had been to Britain and her Empire and one-third of imports were from the 
same source. 
Walter Page, the United States ambassador in London, felt that the notion of a 
general Allied Zollverein would never be carried into effect or would quickly break 
down. The Allies would find it impractical to discriminate against neutrals and In the 
long run trade made its own laws. "It is a war measure", he concluded, "a piece of 
Article in the Frankfurter Zeitung, 22 June 1916. 
ý' Burton Kaufman, Efficiency and Expansion: Foreign Trade Organization 
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Allied 'frightftilness', like German Zeppelins. " Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
had other thoughts. He sent a letter to Wilson waming of the dangers the Pans 
Resolutions held for the future trade of neutral countries. He feared that the 
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preferential system was a real threat due to the vast resources controlled by the Allies I 
and their great merchant manne. He concluded that "the consequent restnction upon 
profitable trade ... will cause a serious if not critical situation for the nations outside the 
union by creating unusual and artificial economic conditions. " He suggested 
convening a conference of neutrals to meet the threat as "the best way to fight 
combination is by combination. "" Similar sentiments were echoed by Henry P. 
Fletcher, soon to be United States Minister to Mexico, who suggested in November 
the formation of an 'American Economic League' to protect commercial gains made 
by the war. " Many at Washington, including Wilson, preferred to wait and see what 
measures the Allies took to implement the Paris Resolutions before taking action. I 
Rather than hastening the commercial division of the world by establishing a 
retaliatory economic system, he attempted to break down Allied protectionism with 
his desire for open world trade. 
The Allies were vulnerable to pressure from the United States since they were 
increasingly reliant upon American finance and material supplies for their war effort. 
However the Allied-American trade relationship was a mercunal affair. As the Allies 
became more dependent upon the United States so the reverse was true. Amencan 
economic pressure on the Allies, especially Britain, might have been successful but 
the political cost would have been high, incurring complaints from American 
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merchants and resentment from the British. New York banking circles and certain 
sections of American industry supported the Allies, if only to ensure payment or the 
return of their loans after the war. The Americans were linked too closely Nvith Allied 
financial strategy and purchases to consider risking dislocation. " 
The beginning of post-war commercial rivalry between the United States and 
Britain was already evident. It was recogillised that the notion of using national 
economic organisation as a weapon was not only aimed at the Central Powers but 
could be easily redirected. Senator Lodge thought that victory for either side would 
bring economic problems for the United States and that the ability to deny an 
exporting nation access to the American market would be a potent weapon. He stated 
in the Senate that the victors in Europe, 
will try to close the gates of trade and commerce upon us in any 
directions I regard as highly probable ... 
But if we are to meet this 
situation, successfully, we must be prepared economically and 
industrially as I believe we should be prepared physically and in arins. 
To this end the essential thing is so to organise our industries that they 
will be strong, independent and ready for the conflict when and if it 
comes ... 
56 
Instead of joining with the Allies to hold an economic advantage over Germany, 
Wilson preferred to hold advantage over all parties. He was aware that Britain and 
France did not share his views with regard to peace and wrote to Colonel House in 
July 1917: "When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking, because 
by that time they will, among other things, be financially in our hands. 
1157 
Yet it was thought in Britain that any attempt to read into the Pans Resolutions 
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a determination to carry out a post-war policy of aggression against the Central 
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Powers could only be based on an entire misconception of their scope and purpose. 
The Foreign Office tried to reassure Washington that the policy of the Pans 
Conference was defensive, designed at assisting the Allies rather than deliberately 
boycotting Germany. In such a process the treaty rights of neutral countries v-, 'ould be 
scrupulously respected. It was recognised that Britain and the Allies would still be 
dependent upon the United States after the war for raw matenals. " Albert Stanley, the 
President of the Board of Trade, stated that however complete the victory over the 
Central Powers might be, the Board had no desire to impose terms of peace inspired 
by motives of commercial revenge. He recommended that plans for economic peace 
should be based on economic defence not aggression. He went on: 
The permanent crushing of the commercial and industrial power of 
Germany, even were it practicable, would not be to the eventual 
advantage of this country, while the attempt to effect it (though 
doomed to failure) would alienate the good opinion and outrage the 
moral sense of the civilized world. " 
Although the Resolutions were never ratified or implemented in Britain they were 
never renounced either. Fear of upsetting French sensibilities, the propaganda value of 
such measures and the possibility of a negotiated peace meant they remamed. " The 
reasons for non-implementation were the reverse of those for non-renunciation; 
suspicion of the French as commercial rivals rather than allies, the fact that they had a 
useful psychological rather than actual effect and the fact that the Resolutions were 
only necessary in the event of an inconclusive peace. 
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Consequently the policy of the Pans Conference suffered from major flaws. 
The policy was designed as a bargaining counter to offset the territorial advantages 
held by Germany and to counter any Mitteleuropa trading bloc. Yet the policy 
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remained a threat rather than a fact. The programme outlined was not being steadily 
implemented as an assurance against defeat nor as a reinforcement of victory and 
certainly not as a punitive measure against Gen-nany. The hesitatlon and doubts 
amongst official circles in Britain and amongst the Allies in general undoubtedly 
conveyed a less than convincing unpression to the Central Powers. The continued 
opposition of the United States to the scheme, even after their entry into the war, was 
a major stumbling-block. The vagueness and ambiguity in the drafting of the 
Resolutions, such as how close relations between the members of the Allied bloc were 
to be or how elaborate the organisation. set up would be, did little to dampen 
apprehensions on the American side or instil anxiety in the Gernian. 
The call for clarification of British policy. 
This left British commercial policy in a state of confused limbo which led to calls 
from various quarters for clarification by the Government. The drift in British 
economic policy had not gone unnoticed. If the Pans Resolutions were a shift towards 
protectionism, it was negated by the complete lack of Government resolve 
for 
implementation. Ronald Nugent, Director of the Federation of British Industries, 
doubted whether anyone in high quarters had the faintest conception of a national 
economic policy and the issues involved. He was worried that at the peace 
negotiations Gerniany, and to an extent France, had a full and complete conception of 
hat thcy hoped to achieve from this sphere and of the immense consequences 
that 
163 
might follow from the material settlements . 
62 
In April 1917, Lord Milner's committee of the Imperial'War Committee 
reported that the Paris Resolutions did not, under the present circumstances, provide 
any stable basis for the guidance of the British Goveniment with regard to the objects 
to be aimed at in any negotiations of peace. 63 Similar sentiments were made at the 
Foreign Office where it was thought a fresh conference should be called. ' Eustace 
Percy commented that the Resolutions were a stagge in the development of British 
policy and there was no finality about them. That stage had now been advanced Z 
beyond. " At the Pans Conference the Allied Governinents had felt bound to prcpare 
for every eventually but as the war progessed the situation had changed. This factor 
was clearly argued in a memorandum by the Reconstruction Committee. Since the 
entry of the United States and other neutrals into the war, the increasingly favourable 
military situation meant the prospects of the continuance of German economic control 
over territory in eastern Europe and Near Asia was considerably reduced. The 
apprehension that the Central Powers would be able to renew the economic contest at 
the moment of peace with "its full scope and intensity" was no longer worrying. The 
Committee believed that there was ample evidence to show that the Central Powers 
had nearly exhausted their supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. Even if the 
blockade did not bring about a collapse of their power, they would still face the 
gigantic post-war task of restocking their countries. It was thought that it would be Cý 
many months before the German authorities could overcome the problems of the 
FBI MSS 200/F/3/DI/2/9: Nugent to Sir Robert Hadfield, 6 February 1917. 
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demobilisation of industrial workers, the importation of raw materials and the 
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provision of credit in order to produce on a large scale for export. 
The situation at the present called for concerted action amongst the Allies to 
combat the probable world shortage in raw materials and foodstuffs accentuated by 
the recent bad harvests and the increased shortage of shipping. It Nvas not so much a 
case of defending against Gennan aggression, as the Allies providing co-operatlvcl,,, 
for their own post-war needs. The Committee recognised that despite the final 
Resolution calling for immediate action, subsequent events had shown the policy 
proved less acceptable to many Allied countries. The change of regime in Russia 
added considerably to the difficulties of implementing the measures. Italy had found it 
difficult enough to enforce the wartime blockade measures against the Central Powers 
making it unlikely that the Pans Resolutions would be effectively camed out In the 
post-war period. Belgium also expressed apprehension at the effect of the Pans 
Resolutions on the prosperity of Antwerp. The Committee concluded that there was a 
strong case for a reassessment of the problems considered at the Pans Conference and Z-) 
the methods for dealing with them. 
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Montagu, at the India Office, thought the Resolutions had become dangerous 
because most of the official activity connected with the preparation of post-war 
economic policy proceeded on the assumption that the Resolutions held. In a speech 
introducing the Non-Ferrous Metals Bill into the House of Commons on 3 December 
1917 the President of the Board of Trade implied the continued acceptance of the 
Pans Resolutions. Similarly in a series of supplementary questions in the House of 
Commons on 13 May 1918 the Chancellor of the Exchequer implied that the Pans 
65 CAB 27/44/EDDC. 5: 'Statement on our Econormic Pollicy' by Eustace Percy. June 1918. 
BT 55/13 C&IP 43: 'Memorandum on Post War Commercial Policy in the light of recent events' 
by the 
Resolutions were the basis of the Government's economic polic,,,. ", %Iontagu 
advocated the sweeping away of this assumption in return for a surer foundation to 
British policy, of which the United States were a part. 68 
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Eustace Percy, who was closely involved in the problem of relations ýN'Ith the 
United States, thought that since the Government had practically abandoned the Paris 
Resolutions as a satisfactory basis of policy, the continued implied acceptance of the 
Resolutions was counter-productive to good relations with America. 69Hc stated that 
Wilson wished to decide policy in conjunction with the British but the latter's silence 
implied that Britain was still under the influence of C16mentel and the Tory 
protectionists over ideas on trade. A British declaration of agreement with Wilson's 
definition of the economic war-aims of the Allies would be "a weapon against 
Germany of the first magnitude. " Such a declaration need not involve an explicit 
abandonment of the Pans Resolutions. It could be made more threatening by referring 
to the economic peace terms imposed by Gennany on Russia, Lithuania, the Ukraine 
and Romania "as representing the kind of settlement which, if persisted in, must in our 
opinion involve the forfeiture by Germany of free commercial intercourse with the 
Western nations. , 70 Britain saw its pre-eminence in world finance, trade and shipping 
under threat from the United States during the war. Eustace Percy was an advocate of 
offering to share world economic leadership with America and by conceding some 
ground to prevent being totally overwhelmed. 
Reconstruction Committee, July 1917. 
67 100 II. C. Deb. 5s. 3 December 1917 and 106 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 31,13 May 1918. 
The Afanchcstcr Guardian commented on Bonar Law's statement: "A world in which each PoNý er or group 
o I'Power's seeks to monopolise markets and sources of raw materials and to deny these to other PoN% ers 
is 
not a happy world to contemplate. " 14 May 191 S. 
68 CAB 21/108/G-161: 'Trade War'by Montagu, 8 October 1917. 
69 01e ing th Percy, had been posted to the Embassy in Washington from 19 10- 14 and 1917- Sb 
fore join Ie 
PID. 
FO 371 4360, '81: 'The United States and the Economic Offensive' by Eustace 
Percy. 26 April 1918. 
Others held the opposite view. Sir Edward Carson, champion of Torv 
protectionism, was disturbed by the failure of the Governinent to carry out the 
Resolutions of the Paris Conference. He believed the policy contained in the 
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Resolutions was just as vital to the interest of the country and to the prosecution of the 
war as anything that had ever emanated from the War Office. " The central difficulty 
agitating the Gennan authorities was the provision of raw materials indispensable to 
the renewal of industrial life and export trade. He commented on a report in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung which stated that German economic aims were much more 
important than her geographical alms and constituted the central question of the future 
peace. Gennany must secure the absolute right of settlement in foreign countries, 
complete freedom to import raw materials and must defeat the economic schemes of 
her enemies by securing most-favoured-nation treatment. Carson thought the best way 
to profit from German fears about their commercial future was to convince Germany 
that the longer the war continued the worse her commercial prospects would be and to 
prepare for the Allies a sound economic foundation to serve as a basis for negotiation 
when serious peace negotiations were discussed. 
" For Carson there was no distinction 
between Allied economic co-operation for mutual post-war recovery and the 
prosecution of the war against Gen-nany. 
Conclusion. 
The fact that Britain and France were the only two nations to ratify the 
Pans 
Resolutions could indicate that the policy was a failure. The Allied economic 
85 H. C. Debs. 5s. col. 347,2 August 1916. 
72 CAB 24'4 G-156: Wernorandum. on Econormc OffensIve'by Carson, 
20 September 1917. 
community the Conference was supposed to inspire did not matenalise. Yet the 
willingness of Britain and France to organise a concerted economic policy was 
enough to have an impact. After initial scepticism Germany did begin to take the 
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threat seriously. Georges-Henn Soutou sees the importance of the Pans Conference, 
not necessarily in the implementation of the Resolutions, but in the process of co- 
operation itself. The Resolutions continued to inspire, and opened economic and 
political dialogue between London and Pans . 
7' This was important if both countries 
were to use the potentiality of their combined economic strength, whether for the 
purposes of Influencing German economic opinion, reconstruction purposes, post-war 
security or commercial advancement. 
73 Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Or et le sang: les buts de guen-e &onomiques 
de la Premiýre Guerre 
mmidiale, p. 271. 
vi 
The strategy of control: Allied hold over raw 
materials and the effect on Germany. 
At the Paris Economic Conference of June 1916 the Allies sketched out a 
comprehensive package of economic war aims. Converting many of these aims into 
policy was for many Allied countries, such as Russia and Belgium, neither easy nor 
desirable. lt becarne increasingly obvious that the Pans Resolutions would not be 
implemented in the way in which they were intended. Nevertheless, it was thought 
that some measures would make greater headway if disassociated from the 
controversial Resolutions. One such measure was that of controlling Allied raw 
materials. 
Since the outbreak of war there had been calls to capture German trade as part 
of an economic offensive, but almost exclusively from the perspective of exports. One 
vital factor on which the German export trade was based had been ignored, namely 
raw materials for utilisation in industry. German industrial activity could be curtai led 
by absorbing the bulk of the world's raw materials. A plan materialised to use the near 
monopoly the Allies possessed in certain raw materials to secure materials necessary 
for post-war industrial recovery. At the same time Germany would be denied raw 
materials which she might have used to launch a post-war economic offensive or for 
reconstruction. Certain blockade measures would be used to more long-terin effect in 
order to achieve Allied control over the world's supply and distribution of raw 
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matenals. ' This 'economic weapon' was even grandiosely touted by some as a 
possible method of coercion for use by the new League of Nations, the q,, en-n of 
economic sanctions 
2 
The threat of an economic boycott as a war weapon had many advocates in 
political and military circles. It was generally believed that planning for the economic I 
penalisation of Gennany after the war could be used to induce Gen-nany into an early 
settlement or at least cause friction between industrial and business classes and the 
ruling caste in Gennany. 1 The prospect of inter-Allied econorMc planning alienating I 
the world's most powerful neutral temporarily abated with the entry of the United 
States into the war as an Associated Power. The United States joined with the Allies 
in vigorously enforcing blockade and other economic measures against Germany for 
the prosecution of the war and it was hoped, given correct handling, that this wartime 
collaboration could be capitallsed upon. 
' It was clear that if Germany was free to dispose of her mercantile marine on the open market she 
would be at liberty to procure the resources of countries not presently at war with her. On the other 
hand, if Germany were denied the use of her mercantile marine, whether under German or neutral flag, 
such a denial would be equivalent to the holding up of materials. A lack of carrying facilities would 
mean a lack of goods to be carried. The Allies could bring about such a result by refusing to supply 
Germany with bunker coal, refusing to allow Germany to use coaling stations, denying access to the 
Panama and Suez canals and to port facilities. CAB 27/15/EOC. 4: 'Economic Pressure on 
Germany' 
by Alexander Shaw, 14 October 1917. 
2 Peter Yearwood puts forward the view that the attempt to link the idea of a League with the conduct 
of an economic offensive against Germany was perhaps the most important and certainly the most 
controversial of the new ideas in the second half of the war. Previous histories of the 
League haý c 
tended to concentrate on the origins of various clauses of the Covenant, such as guarantees, sanctions 
and disan-nament, rather than the strategy of the 'economic weapon'. See ' 'Real 
Securities against 
New Wars': Official British Thinking and the Origins of the League of Nations, 
1914-1919, ' 
Diploinacy and Statescraft, 9/3 (1998), pp. 91-93. 
3 See Runciman MSS WR 142: Kitchener to Runciman, 25 February 1916; CAB -14110/GT. 
41 1: 
Memorandum by Reconstruction Committee, 11 April 1917; CAB 21/108/GT. 2113: Memorandum 
by 
Henry Page Croft, 21 September 1917; CAB 24/28/GT. 2239: Note by Montagu, 8 October 1917: 
CAB 
21/108: Tyrrell to Hankey, 21 May 1918. 
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The control of channels of supply as a method in British economic warfare. 
In December 1916 Alfred Zimmern, at the Ministry of Reconstruction, circulated a 
paper which stated that Germany would come to a peace conference with an economic 
programme of a liberal nature, designed to attract the sympathy of neutrals, and 
attempt to persuade the 'League of Nations' or other international body to secure its 
implementation. ' He thought the general terms of the programme could include: the 
freedom of the seas; most- favoured-nation treatment in perpetuity between Germany 
and her present enemies on the model of the Treaty of Frankfurt; a most-favoured- 
nation clause to include prohibition of differentiation against German immigration, 
trading interests, patents, shipping etc.; maintenance of the 'open door' in all 
dependencies of European powers and equal shipping facilities for all nations. 
Preferential trading between colonies and the mother-country, including self- 
governing colonies, would not be permitted. 
Although these terms would render the Pans Resolutions nugatory by virtue of 
international action, Zimmem believed they were not the main preoccupation of the 
German mind. The Germans were aware that passive resistance amongst the 
populations of Allied countries to Gen-nan goods would be prevalent immediately 
after the war, regardless of whether their trading rights had been secured by treaty. 
Therefore the Germans were prepared to meet the difficulty by finding fresh markets 
in neutral countries (which at this time still included the United States) and exporting 
through neutral countries to hide the origin of their goods. They had enough 
confidence in the technical excellence of their goods and their commercial techniques 
to always find a market somewhere. German merchants were increasingly of the 
' Steel-Niaitland NISS GD 193/113/5, 'l Item A: Memorandum on trade after the Nvar by 
Zimmem. 
December 1916. 
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opinion that as the war progressed both Germany and Britainwere equal losers in the 
economic war for markets to the United States. 5 What they were more anxious about 
was the safeguarding of sources of supplies of indispensable raw materials for their 
exporting industries. 
During the war the world had been consurm-rig raw materials at an increased 
rate with the Central Powers taking less than usual. It was reasonable to expect that at 
the conclusion of peace the reserve stocks of raw materials imported from abroad 
would be depleted in most countries and exhausted in the case of the Central Powers. 
World production would not be able to cope with the sudden increased demand to 
make good the deficiencies. Even if Germany were able to secure quantities of raw 
materials the purchase price would probably be excessive. The economic struggle at 
the end of the war would centre around the purchase of raw materials rather than the 
sale of goods. Trade prosperity in the future would rest with those who managed to 
secure adequate supplies of raw materials as demand for reconstruction was expected 
to be high and available tonnage in short supply. In this sense supplies gradually 
became more important than markets in the formulation of British war aims. Allied 
post-war recovery depended on the efficient economic organisation of the resources at 
their disposal and this meant to the exclusion of the Central Powers. 
British planners returned to the notion of using the prospect of a trade war 
after the end of hostilities as a means to pressunse Germany to hasten an acceptable 
peace. Such a threat could not only induce peace but also secure a satisfactory 
settlement for the Allies, for example by trading 'most-favoured-nation' status 
for 
territory. The desire was to discredit the policies of the ruling caste 
in Germany 
amongst their own population. Measures could be taken to exploit the alarm, alrcadN, 
Runciman MSs wR 143: Translation of an article from the Ncue Hainburgische 
B5rsen Halle 
entitled 'Considerations concerning the future of German export by sea - 
An enquiry', 9 April 1916. 
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considered manifest in Germany, at the idea of a post-bellum trade vvar and the 
retardation of Gen-nan commercial recovery by the creation of a weapon to permit 
such action to be taken effectively if required. There was a strong case for abandoning 
the trade war once these objectives had been achieved. There seemed little sense in 
forcing German commercial interests into alliance with the military caste in order to 
fight a punitive war to overturn post-war economic discrimination. There may haý, e 
been differences of opinion over the expediency of using such a weapon but this did 
not diminish the desirability of its creation. What needed to be stressed was that the 
danger of the Allies continuing a post-bellum, economic war was contingent on the 
actions of the Germans themselves. ' 
French motivation and drive for the adoption of such a scheme. 
Such ideas received an impetus in August 1917 with the visit of Etienne C16mentel, 
the French Minister of Commerce, to Britain to discuss arran-g)ements to combat 
supply and distribution problems. ' The opinion was held by certain sections of the 
French Government that complete military victory over Germany could not be 
achieved! Mutinies swept the French anny in May and June after the failure of the 
Nievelle offensive and the descent of Russia, France's long-standing ally, into 
6 CAB 24/20/GT. 1447: 'Memorandum on Trade War' by Ernest Pollock, 27 June 1917. 'Me 
memorandum was accompanied by two appendices consisting of reports from a variety of German 
newspapers. The first dealt with German opinions of the trade war under the headings of (a) Tariff war 
after the War, (b) The destruction of overseas trade connections and (c) Withholding from Germany of 
necessary raw materials. The second dealt with the merchants in Hamburg and Frankfurt and the trade 
war. 
' See J-13 . Duroselle, 'Strategic and Economic Relations 
during the First World War' in Troubled 
Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the Twentieth Centuty, (ed. Neville Waites) (London, 1971) 
pp. 54-56. 
' Such views were enunciated ui Britain but not officially. In the Commons Henry Page 
Croft dcclared 
that out and out victory was not possible any more for groups of nations in the war, 
because it meant ail 
interniinable campaign where decimated nations would be called upon to wage war 
for many years to 
come. Ironically this I statement was made on 8 August 1918, 'the black day of the 
German anny'. 109 
LIC. Deb. 5s. col. 1603. 
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revolution raised doubts over how long her co-operation in the war would continue. 1. 
With the offensive capacity of the French army curtailed Cl&mentel advocated the 
abandonment of all military offensives for the remainder of the war. The Allies ýý ould 
stand on the defensive and rely on the pressure of an economic offensive to force 
Germany to accept terms. 9 
In order to turn this idea into a practical scheme four things were required, 
namely; credit, ships, the co-operation of the British Empire and the United States, 
and organisation. Of these four essential elements the French possessed only the last 
and even then in a rudimentary state. It was with British ships, credit and colonial 
markets that France proposed to organise this economic pressure. There was no 
objection to this from Britain as she too desired the defeat of Germany, so long as the 
policy did not prejudice the interests of the Dominions. It was essential that control of 
a policy vitally affecting the interests of the British Empire should not pass into the 
hands of French organisations. 10 It was suggested that France was aiming to secure a 
position of greater importance (as regards raw materials) than was justified by her 
standing in world industry and was also counting on more favourable treatment from 
the United States than the British Empire would receive. " 
During his visit C16mentel took the opportunity to circulate proposals for 
utilising Allied control over the principal raw materials of the world as a bargaining 
asset in the eventual peace negotiations with Germany. 12 There was another motive in 
his proposal, namely to secure by agreement a certain proportion of British-controlled 
raw materials for France without having to be dependent upon British bounty for 
9 CAB 27/15/EOC. 3: Cl6mentel on his scheme for a joint econonuc offensive, 14 
October 1917. 
10 CAB 24/29/GT. 2379: 'French Economic Policy', 18 October I1 917.11 
tu e CAB 27/1 O/EOCAS: The assistant Bnfish commercial attach6 . Paris wrote that It was te na r 
of the French people to take Mi every possible advantage in matters affecting their 
financial and 
economic interests without being too scrupulous as to the methods employed". 19 
No%-einber 1917- 
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them. " C16mentel noted that with the exception of the Argentine Republic all the 
world's major producing countries were on the side of the Allies. By reaching an 
agreement between themselves the Allies could gain control over the principal 
economic markets, controlling and distributing raw matenals and food. Dunng the 
war this obviously made for a tight blockade and adequate provisioning for the Allied 
armies. After the war it could act as a powerful lever to persuade Germany to accept 
Allied peace terms. This scheme would only be possible with the complete co- 
operation of France, Britain and the United States. It would be necessary to enlarge 
the scope of the existing inter-Allied Executives which already controlled the 
purchasing and supply of many main commodities, such as wheat. It should also be 
made clear that the use of this weapon by the Allies was for altruistic ends, "a 
powerful means of decision in favour of the humane peace, based on the law of 
nations, which is their common aim. 1514 
The machinery of inter-Allied economic co-operation. 
Economic co-operation between the Allies began at national level. In Britain the 
gradual imposition of a controlled economy meant that by 1918 over 90% of supplies 
imported were purchased, transported and allocated by official bodies. Between them 
the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Munitions (ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
chemicals for explosives and mineral ores) controlled 70% of the country's imports. 
The War Office (wool, flax, jute, hemp, hides and leather) directed another 10%. The 
'2 Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Or et le sang, les buts de guerre &onolniques 
de la Pi-einiýre Guerre 
inondiale (Pans, 1989) pp. 481-90. 
" CAB 233/W. C. 220,20 August 1917. The War Cabinet instructed the President of the Board of 
Trade to report on Clýnientel's scheme after consultation with the Foreign Office, the 
Nlinistry of 
Blockade and the Ministry of Munitions. 
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Board of Trade established some regulations and controls over the remaining imports 
(important commodities included timber, cotton, paper and pulp) and the Admiralty 
also controlled certain articles. Together the latter two Supply Departments directed 
15% of total imports. 
This national control extended gradually into the international field. In the case 
of wheat, during 1916 a Royal Conu'russion on Wheat Supplies was established to 
purchase, import and distribute supplies, replacing the ad hoc measures the 
Government had previously relied upon. This was soon followed by the creation of a 
Wheat Executive, which also included representatives of France and Italy, in order to 
arrange for the pooling of wheat supplies for all three countries and allotment by 
agreement. Purchases in bulk avoided wasteful competition and restrained prices. By 
the end of the war the Wheat Executive not only arranged supplies for the Allies but 
also for many neutral countries. In December 1916 purchasing arrangements moved to 
a more official basis with the creation of the Ministry of Food. During 1917 the Allies 
bought wheat from North America, Australia, India and Canada through bulk 
agreements between Allied Governments rather than individual producers. Argentina 
was the only notable producer left out of this system of control. The Allies bought 
produce from Dominion and Allied countries direct from Governments and at fixed 
prices. The acquisition of bulk supplies from neutral countries was assisted by varying 
fonns of pressure. These included the control of shipping and bunker facilities, the 
conditional supply of commodities required by the neutral, diplomatic and political 
pressure and by official trade agreements between Govenunents and private 
merchants associations. 
CAB 24ý27 GT. 2101: 'Control of Raw Materials'. Translation of a Note given 
by C16mentel to 
Stanley, 23 August 1917. 
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In the autumn of 1917, at the same time C16mentelwas advocatmg his scheme 
for the utilisation of Allied economic power to directly influence the war, planning 
began which could have made his scheme a reality. The shipping crisis, brought on by 
the unrestricted sinking of merchant vessels, threatened to disrupt the flow of Allied 
supplies and compelled them to seek a collaborative solution. Crucially the Americans 
agreed to co-operate with Allied planning. At the Paris Conference of Novembcr 1917 
it was recognised that the key to Allied economic co-operation was shipping and the 
Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC) was established. It considered the import 
requirements of the Allies as a whole and the tonnage available to meet them. Its remit 
was to make the most economical use of tonnage under Allied control, to allot the 
tonnage between the Allies in the interests of the general war effort and to adjust the 
requirements of the Allies to bring them within the scope of the available tonnage. To 
this end it was decided that Allied bodies for food, munitions and raw materials be 
established along the model of the Wheat Executive. 
The aim of closer Allied economic co-operation was not to impose on Allied 
countries as a whole an overarching economic structure but to link together the 
mechanisms of national control that already existed. The intemationalisation of 
domestic control of commodities came through the Programme Committees. These 
committees attempted to co-ordinate along the lines of the Wheat Executive with 
varying degrees of control. During 1918 some of the comnuttees were grouped for 
further administrative control under the headmgs of food and munitions. The 
Programme Committees covered many staple commodities: wool, cotton, flax, hemp 
and jute, hides and leather, tobacco, paper, timber, petroleum, coal and coke; and 
IN'CS. Linder the Munitions Council (from April): nitrates, aircraft, chemicals, explos' 
non-ferrous metals, mechanical transport and steel; and under the Food Council (from 
July): cereals, oil seeds, sugar, meats and fats. Some of these committees had 
executive powers of purchase and applied to the War Purchase and Finance Council 
for funding. Others had more modest, though no less important, functions in preparing 
and revising supply programmes in relation to tonnage. Although these committees 
were not subordinate to the AMTC they were all dependent upon shipping for the 
implementation of their programmes. In this sense the AMTC became the centre of 
Allied co-ordination and guided the whole organisation. " 
British reactions to C16mentel's proposals and subsequent planning. 
Three objections were raised by Ernest Pollock, controller of the Foreign Trade 
Department, in response to C16mentel's proposals. Firstly, such a scheme would be 
regarded by the Central Powers as a confession of failure that the Entente Powers 
were unable to secure a military victory and would consequently resort to economic 
threats to secure terms. Secondly, so crude a threat would stiffen the resolve of the 
Central Powers. It was difficult to submit to a threat as opposed to actual results. 
German opinion was not yet ready to regard such an economic threat as effective and 
unanswerable. Finally, it was doubtful whether the United States would co-operate on 
the basis of the proposal. They would have the strongest objections, on both 
humanitarian and business grounds, to a trade war after the secession of hostilities. 
Yet Pollock qualified his objections with the statement that it was continually 
important to emphasise the Entente economic map as a set-off against the Gennan war 
map. There was no doubt that the Allied negotiating position would be strengthened 
greatly if any means were devised to increase the menace of unpleasant post-Nvar I 
" LA. Salter, Allied Shipping Conti-ol. An Expei-imentin Intemational A dininisn-ation (Oxford, 
1921) 
esp. pp. 89-97,151-4 and 181-3. 
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conditions for Germany, or rather to make it clear that these could be only avoided at 
16 
a pnce. 
On 20 September 1917 a meeting took place at the Ministry of Reconstruction 
comprising representatives from the War Cabinet secretariat, the Treasury, Colonial 
Office, War Office, Board of Trade, War Trade Intelligence Department and the 
Department of Information. It was proposed that a committee was needed to bring C) 
together and classify the available information bearing on economic conditions in 
enemy, Allied and neutral countries, with special reference (a) to commercial and 
financial questions likely to anse in connection with peace negotiations, and (b) to the 
furnishing of such information as might be required by the Ministry of Reconstruction 
for the assistance of the Reconstruction Minister or other committees set up by him. " 
On 9 October the Cabinet discussed the question of trade war against Germany with 
emphasis on the importance of making the best use of the Allies' economic lever 
against the German territorial lever. The suggestion of a strong committee was raised 
to consider proposals from the British point of view as a preliminary to any agreement 
with France and the United States and to assess the effect any action would have on 
the Empire. Any co-operation with the Allies would naturally limit British freedom in 
the economic field. 
18 
As a consequence the Economic Offensive Committee (EOC) was established 
with Sir Edward Carson as chairman. In an opening memorandum Carson outlined the 
committee's fields of enquiry. Firstly, it would investigate methods of inflicting I 
inancial economic injury whilst the war was still in progress, e. g. the trade and fi 
16 FO 368/187 1 /fI 70481/17048 1: Minute by Ernest Pollock, 9 October 1917. 
Me International Parliamentary Commercial Conference (held in Pans) passed a resolution urging 
Allied Goverriments, with a view to hastening victory, to profit by the weapons placed at their 
disposal 
in the importance of their markets and by their preponderance in the production of ra%-, - materials. 
'M. P. 's and the Economic War' in. the Daily Mail, 18 October 1917. " FO 368, /1871/1-170481/174877: Vaughan Nash to Foreign Office, 2 October 191 
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blockades, the statutory lists and the capture of Gerinan established interests in all 
Allied countries and, more particularly, America. Carson thought the more the 
Gen-nans realised these methods were being pursued with vigour, the more anxious 
they would be to finish the war before every vestige of their world-wide commercial 
and financial orgamsation had been eliminated. Secondly, the Committee would 
recommend protective measures to secure Britain and the Allies against post-war 
German trade monopolies. This meant the safeguarding of specific industries, such as 
metals and dyes, and the development of Allied resources with respect to any industry 
or raw material, such as potash, in which the Central Powers had a particularly strong 
position. Thirdly, the Committee would investigate measures to make use of the 
economic resources of the Allies for effective bargaining in the peace negotiations and 
to counteract the possible dangers of an unsatisfactory peace. 
In relation to his third point, what Carson envisaged was a system of 
organisation amongst the Allies covering the raw materials and resources of the world. 
Enemy nations would be automatically excluded unless they secured concessions 
which allowed them to participate. What was central for Carson was not necessarily to 
agree upon the issue of a threat "but to set to work without delay to establish a world 
control of all the essential supplies both present and prospective. " Merely threatening 
speculative punitive treatment would be ineffective. " What was needed was visible 
action, and this also applied to planning for post-war fiscal regulations and economic 
treaties . 
20 
At the first meeting of the EOC Sir Albert Stanley, President of the Board of 
Trade, favoured control over raw materials for British trade interests. The absence of 
'8 CAB 23/411W. C. 247,9 October 1917. 
'9 Ilie avoidance of an untruth likely to be contradicted before the achievement of a strategic 
purpose 
was a basic tactical objective of propaganda. See Harold D. Lasswell, 
Propaganda Technique in World 
War O? ie (London, 197 1) p. 200. 
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any organisation or control after the war would lead to enormous inflation, pricc 
fluctuations and economic instability. This aspect of control had been anticipated by 
the Service Supply Departments earlier in the war. They predicted that reserve stocks 
of raw materials in all countries would be low and in the Central Powers practically 
exhausted. World production would not have increased sufficiently to meet the 
abnormal demand to replace these stocks and world shipping would be insufficient to 
supply world demand in the immediate post-war period. The purchase or control of 
supplies was considered vital in providing the Allies with a head-start and to check 
any endeavour by the enemy. Home raw materials should be ean-narked for the Allies' 
own use, German firms should be prevented from purchasing and holding stocks 
before Allied needs were met and rationing schemes should be continued for 
neutrals. " 
Carson expanded on his theme of the control of raw materials in a further 
memorandum. He recognised that those able to secure access to raw materials would 
have enormous competitive advantage over their rivals by being the first to set the 
wheels of industry and exchange in motion. Although shortages were acute in 
Germany, she had industrial and manufactunng plant intact necessary to commence 
work, and a considerable volume of merchant shipping which had remained 
untouched in port during the war. Should Germany be allowed to re-establish hcr 
industry and trade on a favourable footing It would be at the expense of the weaker 
Allies, preventing their full recovery. In order to prevent this, raw materials could bc 
organised to supply the Allies whilst crippling Gen-nan export (but not necessarily 
domestic) trade. The use of bunker facilities and shipping could further strengthen this I 
'0 CAB 27 , 15 EOC. 1: 'Comrnittee on the Economic Offensive' by Carson, 17 October 
1917. 
2' NIUN 5/113/600/20: 'Memorandum on control of certain raw-matenals by the Allied 
Governments 
after the war' by the War Office, I June 1916. Later in the year there -, vas a scheme proposed 
for the 
appointment of a controller of raw-matenals. See MUN 4/1288. 
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control. "The knowledge in Germany that such an organisation was in hand mav be an 
important, even decisive, factor in shortening the war and moderating German 
claims. 1922 Carson thought it logical and natural that existing Allied controls over 
certain raw materials and foodstuffs be adapted to meet post-war conditions. 
The necessity for an alternative economic strategy and the dangers of making a 
direct threat to Germany. 
At the end of 1917, with the Allied military offensive on the Western Front boc:, )ged 
down in the mud of Passchendaele, it was becoming obvious to some that altemative 
methods had to be found for securing victory. Henry Page Croft presented a 
memorandum to the Cabinet outlining a plan in which Germany, for every six months 
she continued the war, would be ostracised from entry into world markets for a year. 
He claimed, "the result would be complete victory instead of a stalemate peace. "" 
Control over economic resources was a way of achieving complete victory by 
economic rather than military means. Page Croft found it hard to understand how, 
when the lives of soldiers were sacrificed without thought on the Western Front, many 
politicians seemed reluctant to press for the development of the economic weapon as 
one of war, not just propaganda. 
24 
Such debate took place in the press as well as in Whitehall. Professor L. T. 
Hobhouse, wnting in The Guardian, advocated a strategy similar to that proposed by 
Carson. He believed that British statesmen should make it clear to Germany that if 
22 CAB 24'4, G- 175. 'Control of Raw Materials' by Carson, 16 November 1917. 
CAB 21/108/GT. 2113: 21 September 1917. He went on "When men die like flies it is inconceivable 
that any financial interest or sentimental idea should prevent the adoption of such a policy 
forthwith. " 
4 Croft, a conservative backbencher, had left the Commons for France in Nioý ember 1914 . -%-Ith the 
V 
Verritorial Batallion of the Hertfordshire Regiment. In 1916 he commanded the 
68" Infantry Brigade 
and saN%, action at the Somme. 
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they agreed to a reasonable settlement and gave good grounds for believing that she 
intended to live within the comity of nations in future, she could share in the 
allocations of the world's materials. If Germany gave no such assurance shc would be 
confronted with a policy of economic exclusiveness. He concluded that, "allied 
statesmen had a weapon powerful enough, if properly used, to blow the enemy's 
position away. 
9925 
Yet it was the qualification 'if properly used' that indicated a potential cause 
for concern. There was a real fear that deliberately confronting Gennany with an 
economic ultimatum might push the enemy to greater military efforts because they 
would have nothing to lose by fighting on. " The Economic Offensive Committee was 
already acquainted with views of this nature. " Lloyd George had never been 
favourable to the Pans Resolutions because he believed they helped to prolong the I 
war by showing Gennany that the Allies wished to 'starve her out' after the war. " 
Non-nan Angell complained that the Pans Resolutions, combined with the perpetual 
talk of the destruction of Prussian militarism, was enabling the enemy to create a 
morale founded on the impression of fighting against national extinction . 
2' Alfred 
Zimmem, from the Ministry of Reconstruction, thought that any statement regarding 
" 'Trade and the War. The Economic Weapon against Germany' by Hobhouse in The Manchester 
Guardian, 2 November 1917. 
e al War Cabinet. See CAB 32/l/lWC (1917): 26 April 1917. 2' Such a view was expressed by the IMP ni 
The President of a German Textile Association in an address to his members feared a compromise 
peace. He thought that England and the Allies would endeavour to realise to the greatest extent the 
programme of the Paris Conference, and in the form of a masked economical war, try to do further 
harin to Germany. "The temptation is great, for the possibility to do us harm continually is given and it 
is worthy of all our attention to acknowledge the possibility of this threat in our industrial circles and to 
Oppose it firnily. " CAB 27/16/EOC. 38: November 1917. 
2' W. A. S. Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, vol. 2 (London, 1929) p. 133. frorucally, Lloyd 
George did 'starve Germany out' during the Armistice, without any need for the Paris Resolutions. " See Arthur Link (ed. ), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, New Jersey, 1966-94) vol. 43. p. 
401. Proposal by Norman Angell, August 1917. 
On I July 1916 the Hainburger Nachrichten reported: "the attempt is now being made to throttle 
Gennany by a ruthless trade war after the war. The recognition of this fact must strengthen our will to 
Victory. Our Victonous arms must enable us to make peace on such terms as will frustrate our enemies 
, 
evil intentions against the German people and its well-being. " Quoted in Harold Storey, 
The Paris 
Conference and Trade,, I. ficr the War (London, 1916) p. 32. 
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the Allied economic stranglehold should take the form of a warnin., to the German 
people. It could warn of the seriousness into which their Government had placed them 
by antagonising much of the civillsed world and also stress the hopelessness of their 
position against such a concentration of economic power. Such a statement should be 
accompanied by a reiteration of Allied peace terms and a declaration that it had never 
been the policy of Britain to crush or dismember the Gennan people, or to hamper 
their economic development. 30 Cl6mentel believed that any statement to the Gennan 
people should be ftamed as an offer, to join a 'society of nations', rather than as a 
threat. " 
Carson and Lord Robert Cecil both emphasised that the best method would be 
to take measures to secure raw materials for Britain and the Allies and thus 
automatically reduce the supplies available to Germany, rather than attempting any I 
form of direct threat. If measures for mutual help amongst the Allies became known it 
would have as much, if not more, effect on German opinion as any direct threat. 32 
There was a clear line of distinction drawn between keeping a share of raw materials 
ftom the enemy, of which a large proportion would be needed by the Allies, and 
depriving them of a share of materials of which there was likely to be a surplus after 
Allied requirements had been satisfied. The appropriation and equitable division of 
matenals would in itself act as an economic offensive. 33 
Yet if there was to be no direct threat, the indirect warnings could not be 
clearer. Cecil stated in a Reuters interview that "the Gennans fully realised the 
immense power of the economic offensive. " The increasing danger of a world 
30 Zinunem MSS 79: Zinimem to RSG, 21 June 1917. Zimmem later served in the Political 
Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918-1919. 
31 CAB 27/15/EOC. 3: C16mentel on the econormc offensive, 14 October 1917. However if the 
Gennans failed to accept this 'offer' on Allied terms the war would be followed by a period of 
econornic blockade, to last one year for every month's delay. 32 CAB 27/15, EOC 6" Meeting, 9 November 1917. 
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shortage of essential materials was bound to increase as the war ývent on. Opponents 
of Gen-nany commanded the sources of a vast proportlon of those materials and aftcr 
the war would first have to consider their own needs, followed by the neutrals and 
finally, if anything was left, the enemy. He ended with a overtly threatening 
statement: "I see nothing but greater economic ruin for them [the Central Powers] 
after the war the longer it lasts. "" 
The effect of threatened Allied economic retribution in Germany. 
Members of the Political Intelligence Department were convinced that the subject of 
an economic boycott dominated the attention of Germans. " They were undoubtedly 
influenced in this thinking by monthly economic intelligence reports compiled by 
36 Max Muller on the economic situation in Germany and Austria-Hungary. It was 
generally recognised that the commercial transactions of the Central Empires fell into 
four categories: the purchase of supplies for immediate delivery (despite the 
blockade); speculative purchases to be re-sold to neutrals; the purchase of stocks to be 
held until after the war and restrictive purchases intended to limit the supplies of the 
Allies. British officials believed that the Prussians were already efficiently preparing a 
general programme for the provisioning of Germany after the war and the immediate 
33 CAB 27/16[EOC. 50. Memorandum for the EOC by Hewins, 19 December 1917. 
34 The Morning Post, 3 November 1917. 
35 See CAB 21/108: Tyrrell to Hankey, 21 May 1918 and Headlam-Morley MSS HDLM 35: Headlam- 
Morley to Philip Kerr, 9 January 1918. 
f led reports for Muller, a former British consul in Budapest, was an intelligence of icial who assemb 
the Foreign Off-ice fi-om the censored newspaper press, the letters of dead German soldiers and Private 
intelligence. His assertions from nud-1917 onwards that German commercial interests were 
increasingly concerned with the post-war commercial situation coincided with Ludendorff-s 
decision at 
the end of 1916 to lift restrictions on the discussion of German Nvar ainis in the press and official 
circles. What British intelligence sources could have been witnessing was a general gro-vN-th in 
debate 
ON CF the POst-war situation by German commercial interests, after a period of suppression, rather 
than a 
sudden increase in concern. 
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revival of the export trade. " They noted circulars dispatched in January 1916 from the 
Foreign Ministry in Berlin to German consuls concerning the co-operation of 
industrial and commercial forces in Germany and the huge export societies which 
were preparing the outgoing cargo of ships which would fetch from overseas the raý, ý 
material necessary for an economic revival. Provision trusts were being formed to 
discover a financial means to prevent a drop in the German exchange at the time , -N, hcn 
exports reduced through lack of raw materials would be unable to counterbalance 
sufficiently the huge purchases which would be indispensable to the provisioning of 
Germany. " At the Paris Economic Conference, the Allies passed an unpublished 
Resolution relating to the collection and circulation of information regarding stocks of Z: ) 
raw materials and manufactured articles collected by the enemy for use after the war. " 
Soon after the outbreak of war Walther Rathenau had been employed to 
establish a Raw Materials Department (Kriegsrohstoffabteilung) by the Ministry of 
War after he warned that the war would last longer than Gen-nany's supplies of 
essential raw materials. Instead of the military taking possession of materials they 
were left in the hands of individual commercial corporations (often owned or 
controlled by the largest companies requiring the raw materials) and the Raw 
" See FO 368/1530/fl25845: The British consulate in Vigo reported on 28 June 1916 that orders were 
being solicited so that goods might be packed and ready for shipment as soon as hostilities ended. 
"This seems to prove up to the hilt that the Germans are bent on their 'dumping' methods directly their 
ships are allowed to put at sea". The British consulate in Rotterdam reported on 27 June 1916 that 
German firms were attempting to obtain neutral representatives to conduct business for them after the 
war in the UK and Allied countries. German agents were accumulating merchandise, especially raw 
matenals, in the Dutch East Indies and South America and other neutrals for shipment to Germany 
after the war. It was thought many Dutch and neutral firms would return to their former German 
suppliers after the war. 
" FO 902/2: Secret Weekly Bulletin of Trade Information, 18-24 March 1916; 
FO 382/1129/fl8l4/191280: 'German arrangements for financing cotton shipments post-war' by the 
WTID, 28 September 1916; Steel-Maitland MSS GD 193/307: 'Purchases made by the Central Powers 
and the Allies' by M16B, September 1916. There were reports that wool purchased in South America 
was being stored on interned German merchant vessels ready for immediate transport home. See NFUN, 
5 113/600/20: 'Memorandum on control of certain raw-matenals by the Allied Governments Lifter 
die 
war' by the War Office, I June 1916. 
39 Bonar Law MSS BL 191/6: 'Supplementary Note on the Pans Economic Conference', 
14 July 1916. 
It Was thought unwise to publish the Resolution and warn the enemy. It was also 
thouglit neutrals 
might resent inquiries by Allied agents into their post-war transactions. 
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Materials Department regulated their disposal. Scarce raw materials were only 
distributed to companies which produced goods for the war effort. 4' The orgaru ion sat 
of the Raw Materials Department reflected Rathenau's own philosophy of industrial 
reorganisation as chairman of AEG, one of Germany's largest cartels. Since the 
purchasing, storing and distribution of materials was largely left in semi-private hands 
there were hopes to continue this machinery after the war for the butk purchasing of 
materials from foreign markets for the benefit of German industry as a whole. The aim 
would be to regulate prices through enon-nous purchasing power and secure cheapcr 
raw materials for Gennan industry. " 
In August 1916 such a central authority was created with the Office of 
Imperial Commissariat for the Transition from War to Peace Economy. The 
Commissar dealt with the problem of tonnage, distribution of home and foreign raw 
materials, the employment of demobilised workmen and the question of rationing. In 
October 1917 this department was transferred to a separate central authority, the 
newly established Imperial Ministry of Economics, which handled all matters 
connected with social and economic policy previously dealt with by the Ministry of 
the Interior. " However, the longer the war continued and the more the blockade 
" See Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Indust7y and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (reprint, Providence, 
R. I., 1992) pp. 45-52. Board of Trade Journal, 100 (1918) p. 193. Holger H- Herwig, The First If"Orld 
War. Gennany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 (London, 1997) pp. 255-7. 
T 172/446: 'Finance and Post-Bellum. Measures [111 Germany]' by Rumbold (Berne), 28 September 
1917. 
Naturally whilst big industrialists found this a favourable prospect, mercantile interests were strongly 
opposed to the continuance of state controls which eliminated competition through central purchasing 
Mistrust of the German Government was evident at a meeting of the Hansabund (an important 
commercial organisation) in which the following resolutions were passed: 1) state interference must 
be 
limited during the transition period and completely eliminated after the war; 2) the closing down and 
amalgamation of factories must be stopped; 3) former freedom of trade must be restored as soon as 
possible after the war and trade and industry interests consulted on all questions of supply, 
distribution, 
raw materials and foreign exchange; 4) the principle of monopolies must be abandoned since "free 
economic activity in *industry and trade is the economic guarantee for the financial capacity of the 
German people. " Churchill MSS CHAR 27/13: 'Foreign Office Reports on the Econonuic Situation in 
Gerniany and Austria-Hungary' by Max Muller, 21 October 1917. 
42 See Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War (Oxford, 1993) pp - -50- 
5 ". Bessel comments 
that planning suffered from a lack of clear direction and from uncertainties as to 
how or when the war 
would end. 
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intensified through continual refinements, the worse Germany's position gre"'. With a 
lack of raw materials it was necessary to use all stocks for home consumption. 'Whilst 
the shortages could be managed and substitutes used so as not to crucially effcct 
Gernian fighting capacity, they could not afford the luxury of maintaining large stores 1. 
of manufactured articles ready for 'dumping' after the declaration of peace. '3 
With the entry of the United States into the war Germany became increasingly 
apprehensive over the problem of economic reconstruction (iibergangswirtschaft). 
The United States inflicted a serious blow to Germany's plans by seizing raw 
materials accumulated in America intended to supply Gen-nan industry after the war. ' 
It was acknowledged that if Germany was deprived of her colonial possessions aftcr 
the war and Britain and France closed their colonies to foreign trade, as outlined in the 
Pans Resolutions, Germany's position would be intolerable. " The Pans Conference, 
followed by the entry into the war of Italy", the United States and many of the South 
American Republics, brought economic matters into the foreground. 47 
See Runciman MSS WR 144: Paget (Copenhagen) to Grey, 23 October 1916 and FO 
368/1530/fl25845/150887: British Consulate General (Philadelphia) to Foreign Office, 18 July 1916. 
44 See CAB 24/ 1 O/GTAI 1: 'Post-war commercial policy In the light of recent events' by the 
Reconstruction Committee, II April 1917 and Steel-Maitland MSS GD 193/73/7/3: 'German Post-War 
Economic Policy - III The bearing of American intervention upon 
German post-war economic plans' 
by the Reconstruction Committee, April 1917. 
45 Passage from an article in Nord Deutsche A 11gemeine Zeitung, 5 August 1917. 
46FO 382/1589/f60138/60138: The British embassy in Rome reported to Balfour that the growing 
needs of Italy and the difficulties of transport and obtaining supplies had very largely settled 
automatically the question of accumulation of stocks in Italy for enemy account. Requisitioning 
by the 
Italian Government had deterred enemy agents from attempting to store large quantities of goods until 
the end of the war, 14 March 1917. 
47 The Hamburger Nachrichten commented in relation to Brazil: "Her entrance into the war 
from a 
military point of view is of no interest one way or the other ... But 
from another point of view the fact 
of her taking a hand is not without significance. For whether it is a question of 
Guatemala, Liberia, 
Honduras, or Brazil, each case accentuates that commercial isolation into which 
Germany is being 
gradually pushed and which it is the principal object of her enemies to achieve. 
" CAB 24/20/GT. 1447: 
Appendix I- German Opinion of Trade War. 
Retired infantry general Wilhelm von Blume commented on 2 August 1918: 
"We must face the t, act 
that since the beginning of last year the United States of North America and, 
folloNving in their N, ýake. 
China, Panama, Cuba, Liberia, Siam, Guatemala and Costa Rica have Joined themselves to the 
coalition of our enerrues; in addition Brazil and eight other South American states ... 
have declared their 
hostility towards us by breaking, off diplomatic relations. This means that, out of 
1,565 million %vho 
currently inhabit the earth, more than 1,000 rrullion stand against us - compared with 
10 million of 
our own four-nation alliance. " Prince Max von Baden. soon to become 
Chancellor, noted the 
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The Reconstruction Committee declared that the supply of raw materials was 
no longer one of many problems but was the problem of Germany's immediate 
economic future. The whole fabric of recuperation, the re-establishment of Germany's I 
export trade and of her foreign exchanges rested upon the replenishment of her 
exhausted stores of raw materials. " Reports of large-scale storage by Germany of 
commodities the Allies wished to control were dismissed by the Board of Trade. It 
was considered natural that the Germans were looking for raw materials in neutral 
countries given the immense shortage of raw materials. Yet they were still small 
amounts in companson with pre-war German imports of materials. There was nothing I 
to indicate that the purchases would appreciably lessen the power of the Allics if they 
decided to use the weapon of economic pressure or materially interfere with the 
Allies' ability to meet their own requirements . 
49The German Government faced the 
serious problem of an exhausted population and having to attempt to restart 
manufacturing before dangerous revolutionary action could ensue. With the free flow 
of food and raw materials into the country and ftee markets for Gen-nan produce, the 
energy of the people could be directed towards the restoration of commerce and 
industry and away from political considerations. Yet to achieve this there had to be 
ftee and favourable commercial intercourse with the rest of the world. The formula of 
Mitteleuropa would not be sufficient to satisfy German trade. " 
"complete helplessness against the growing hostility towards us in the neutral countries. 
" Quoted in 
Gordon Brook-Shepherd, November 1918: ne Last Act of the Great ýVar, p. 29. 
48 z immern MSS 79: 'German Post-War Economic Policy' for the Reconstruction Comnuttee. revised 
to May 1917. 
" CAB 21 /110: 'Storage of goods for enemy account in neutral countries' 
by the War Trade 
hitelligence Department, 21 August 1918 and comments from the President of the 
Board of Trade. II 
September 1918. 
'0 Steel- Maitland MSS GD 193/310/5: 'Memorandum on German War Aims' b-v JAVH 
(Intelligence 
Bureau), 15 July 1917. 
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Mitteleuropa as a factor in planning for economic warfare 
fnvestigations by the Reconstruction Committee into post-war German economic 
policy concluded that Germany must aim at emerging from the war as a self-sufficient 
empire, in ependent of sea commum cations. " It was thought that plans for a 
Zollverein to bring the central states of Europe and the Balkans under the control of 
the Central Powers by commercial union would be in place by the time peace 
negotiations were initiated and would constitute afait acconipli for Germany. it was 
recognised there was reluctance on the part of Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey for a 
scheme which necessitated parting with some of their sovereign fiscal rights. 
Nevertheless a reconstruction policy was being formed on the basis of autonomous 
tariffs, mutual preferences, alteration of most- favo ured-nation clauses and a new 
series of conunercial treaties. Nothing had been done by the Allies, notwithstanding 
the Pans Resolutions, to counter these preparations which would leave Germany in a 
strong position should the Central Powers resolve upon an early termination of the 
war. 
52 
During the war, notions of Mitteleuropa were revived and rejuvenated in 
Germany to provide a solution to lack of access to foreign markets and sources of raw 
materials. The notion of creating a Central-Eastern European economic bloc 
dominated by Gen-nany was not new. The concept of Drang nach Osten had been 
prevalent in pre-war German thinking. " Behind Caprivi's trade policies of the early 
1890s was the desire for closer tanff links in Central Europe to counter competition 
5' CAB 21/73: 'German Post-War Economic Policy' by the Reconstruction Committee, January 1917. 
52 FBI MSS 200/F/3/DI/2/2: Nugent to Lloyd George, 15 January 19 17 and FO 371/3102, /116120: 
Townley (The Hague) on economic relations between the Central Powers, II 
June 1917. 
5' The concept had many variations and detailed analysis can be found in Henry 
Cord " leyer. 
Milteleuropa. In Gerinan Thought and Action, 1815-1945 (The Ha-ue, 1955) and 
Fritz Fischer, 11'ar of 
I1111sions (London, 1975). 
No 
from the Bn 54 itish Empire and the United States. Nevertheless, by the turn of the 
century German economic expansion was primarily focused along global lines and 
dependent on the sea. Interest in a Central European organisation remained on 
political and cultural Imes but Gen-nany was economically being compelled outývards. 
Although Austria-Hungary and Russia were important providers of primary produce, 
the bulk of German raw materials came fi7om outside Europe . 
55 The imperialist 
ambitions of Wilhelm 11 and Tirpitz's naval policy were political and military 
manifestations of this economic engagement with the wider world. Yet as German 
imperial ambitions were checked by the established powers of Britain and France, for 
instance in Morocco in 1911, some considered it necessary to use Mitteleuropa as a 
safe base from which Germany could project her world power. " World policy and 
continental policy were interdependent. Mitteleuropa could become a fourth great 
economic empire, with Germany at its head, alongside Russia, the United States and 
the British Empire. 
57 
Renewed discussion of Mitteleuropa during the war was certainly a reaction to 
the blockade, forcing the Central Powers to turn in on themselves and solve their 
problems of supply internally. " What was envisaged by nationalists was a huge 
II -key customs union centred on the Hohenzollern and Habsburg empires, embracing Tw 
and the Balkan states. Bethmann Hollweg's ambitious September Programme of 1914 
envisaged adding Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Poland and perhaps Italy, Sweden and 
Norway to a Central European association, to be achieved through common customs 
" Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 6-7. 
55 See Henry Cord Meyer, 'German Economic Relations with South-eastern Europe, 1870-1914, ' 
A? nerican Historical Revieiv, 57 (1951-2) pp. 77-90. 
" Such a policy was recognised by the Allied press during the war. Germany was a great 
industrial 
state and Austria a developing industrial state. Bulgaria was a source of agricultural supply and 
Asiatic 
Turkey xvas a region from which raw materials could be drawn. Combined they could 
form an cmpre 
within which trade was free, but which also served as a consolidated base for operations against 
the 
trade of the outside world. 'Days of Preparation' in The Globe, II February 
1916. 
57 Fischer, War of flhisions, pp. 35-6 and 270 -1. 
191 
treaties. 59Yet to its advocates, Mitteleuropa was not merely intended to be a 
combination of resources and policies but a creative and productive economic 
organism greater than the sum of its individual parts. ' 
However, the former Colonial Secretary Demburg believed the 'cry' of 
'Central Europe' was a mistake and that Germany could not continue to exist without 
foreign trade . 
6' He was joined in this belief by Reinhold von Sydow, the Prussian 
Minister of Commerce, who declared to the Prussian Diet that Germany needed 
economic and industrial traffic with her Allies but also with neutrals and states which 
were at present hostile. "We shall not in future be able to do without the world 
markets for our industry and our trade. "" 
Whilst German business undoubtedly wished to be left fTee in the economic 
exploitation of Mitteleuropa it was recogniscd that the Near East of Europe and Asia 
Minor could not provide adequate compensation for the loss of overseas markets 
(especially the British Empire). The purchasing power of the countries concerned was 
limited and their considerably lower population placed limits on importing capacities. 
Moreover it was politically undesirable for German manufacturers to intensively 
expand their trade at the expense of Austrian industry. 63 More importantly this region 
could not match overseas markets for the import of goods. 64 In 1913, Mitteleuropa 
(Austria-Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Turkey) provided less than 
" Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa. In German Thought and Action, 1815-1945, p. 116. 
'9 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (London, 1967) pp. 103-5. 
60 Meyer, Mitteleuropa. In German Thought and Action, 1815-1945, p. 163. 61 CAB 27/16/EDDC. 52: The Deutscher Wirtschaft Verband fur Sud und Mittel-Amerika, 14 
November 1916. 
62 'Central Europe. A WamMg' in The Times, 25 February 1916. 
"A congress of Hungarian manufacturers expressed opposition to the idea of a German/Austro- 
f lungarian economic union. It was thought Hungarian industry would be sacrificed as Germany sou 
lit 
z: 1 -2 
fic\v outlets to replace lost markets worth f 200 million. Daily Telegraph, 28 Fcbruary 1916. 64Runciman MSS VrR 143. Translation of an article from the Neue Hamburgische B61-sell Halle 
entitled 'Considerations concerning the future of German export by sea - An enquiry'. 9 April 
1916. 
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I% of Gen-nany's supply of wool, cotton and iron ores and could not pro-vide anly 
rubber or copper. One Gen-nan commentator noted: 
The most important thing is, and remains, that Germany must keep a 
free hand, and be put in a position to carry through far-reaching 
connections with the business of the whole world. She must not hang 
'Mitteleuropa', like a weight of lead, to her feet, to retard her progress 
in dealing with the outer world; on the contrary, she must discover a 
method which will make possible an economic rapprochement with 
those countries, without prejudice to her economic position in the 
world as a whole. " 
Thus it appeared from their own intelligence reports that there was scope for 
the British to attempt to influence Germany over her post-war commercial position 
using raw materials and access to foreign overseas markets as bait. Muller thought it 
highly probable that the realisation of the approaching exhaustion of stocks of 
essential raw materials and of the enormous difficulty of replenishing them after the 
war was at the bottom of the growing desire in Germany for a peace which would 
66 
allow the renewal of normal belligerent relations. In December 1916 there came an 
offer by the Central Powers to negotiate peace. The tenns on which Germany was 
willing to enter negotiations included treaties to guarantee the freedom of the seas and 
the renunciation of all agreements between the Allies which might prevent the 
resumption of normal economic relations after the war. This was undoubtedly a 
response to the actions taken by the Allies at the Pans Econorruc Conference earlier in 
the year. The Pans Resolutions were a blow to the German economists who had 
initially rejected plans for a mid-European economic organisation in favour of 
retaining most-favoured-nation status with the world at large. This status was lost to 
bs Dr voiiTyska writing in the Europiiische Smatsund TFinschafts-eitung, 20 April 1916. 
Quoted in 
Zinirnern MSS 79: 'German Post-War Economic Policy' by the Reconstruction Committee, revised to 
May 1917. 
"" Churchill MSS CHAR 27/13: 'Foreign Office Reports on the Economic Situation in Gernianý, and 
Austfia-Hunpary' 23 July 1917. 
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Germany at the Pans Conference and these nevv economic pressures intensificd 
planning. " 
The Germans also wanted "restitution of colonies in the fori-ii of an agreement 
which would give Germany colonies adequate for her population and economic 
interest", which suggested an enlarged colonial empire from which Germany could 
draw on raw materials unhindered. " It was thought essential that Germany should be 
able to obtain raw materials for her industries from her own resources. So long as 
Germany was dependent upon British commercial goodwill she was at the latter's 
mercy. A great deal was talked of the 'world syndicate' formed against Germany. Tile 
only way Germany could secure herself against this peril was by having a sufficicntly 
large empire to make herself absolutely independent of any economic boycott. " 
Despite the categorical rejection of the peace offer by the Allies, Gen-nany 
continued negotiations in early 1917 through the mediation of President Wilson. 
Bernstorff, the German ambassador to the United States, repeated to Colonel House 
that the tenns under which Gennany would be prepared to enter peace negotiations 
included the abandonment of all economic agreements and measures which would 
form an obstacle to normal commerce and intercourse after the war and their 
replacement by reasonable treaties of commerce . 
70 Although the hope of achieving a 
military victory was still strong, especially with the imminent declaration of 
unrestricted submanne warfare, concern over an economic settlement was a 
67 Meyer, Mitteleuropa. In German Thought and Action, 1815-1945, p. 240. 
Resolution B. 11 stated that most-favoured-nation treatment would be withheld for a number of years 
after the cession of hostilities. During this time the Allies would under-take to assure for each other 
compensatory outlets for trade resultin- from such action. Cd. 827 1, Recommendations of the 
Economic Conference of the Allies (1916). 
68 See Hans Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West: A Study of Gel7nany's Western I Far. I ims during the 
First World War 2 nd edition. (Baltimore, 1966) pp. 136-144. 
CO 92/11644: 'Memorandum on a German Scheme for an African Empire' by the 
Intelligence 
Bureau of the Department of Intelligence, March 19 18. Such an empire Nvould encompass the 
Belgian 
and French Congo, Nigeria, Uganda, Zanzibar and German East Africa, comprising sea to sea territor% 
across the central part of the Continent. 
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recognition that for Germany to win the military war only to lose an economic peace 
was self-defeating. In July 1917 the Reichstag presented a Peace Resolution in which 
they stated only an economic peace could prepare the ground for friendly intercourse 
between the nations. The Reichstag rejected all plans which aimed at economic 
isolation and hostility amongst nations after the war and the freedom of the seas was 
also to be guaranteed. 
The Peace Resolution expressed the fear that the armed entente against 
Germany would evolve into a hostile economic alliance. Albert Ballin, the German 
shipping magnate, told the Emperor that the markets of the world would be closed to 
Germany for every year of the post-war period that the war was continued in months. 
He ended by stating that the war could no longer be tolerated by the mercantile classes 
in Germany. " 
Demburg, the former Colonial Secretary, stated in an article in Neue Frcie 
Presse that the threat of boycott must weigh heavy in the peace scales. Gen-nany's 
acquisitions in the East could not compensate for losses of raw materials in one-third 
of the globe or markets on which pre-war prosperity was based. Germany was worried 
about the effect of measures such as the Non-Ferrous Metal Bill, the Anglo-Australian 
Zinc agreement, export duties on palm kernels, the Indian jute monopoly, and British 
control of Egyptian cotton and Australian and South African Wool. 
72 Dr Helffench, the 
federal Minister of Finance, declared in a speech on 9 April 1918: 
We may maintain and safeguard our frontiers, but if the peace does not 
restore to us what the British economic war has destroyed, if it does 
not recoverfor usfreeplayfor our work and enterprise in the outer 
world ... we have lost the war and with it ourfuture. 
Then we have 
" See Link- (ed. ), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 4 1, p. 8 1. Bemstorff to House, 
31 January P) I 
" FO 371/2941/2-30177: Walter Page to Cecil, paraphrase of a report received by the American 
le-ation at Copenhagen concerning a session of the Reichstag, 29 November 1917. 
Churchill CHAR 27/56: 'Foreign Office Reports on the Economic Situation in Germany and 
Austria- 
I fungary', 23 June and 27 August 1918. 
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played for our stakes and lost them; we shall be suffocated; with our 
population diminished and our standard of life reduced. " 
It was inconceivable that Gennany would conclude a negotiated peace which did not 
secure the freedom of the seas and access to markets and ravv materials. 
The trade war after the war - which is most dreaded - is to be avoided by negotiation; Belgium and occu ied French territory being a pawn, p 
not only in all matters relating to the colonies, but in all guarantees 
required against commercial differentiation by tari ffs or harbour dues 
to Germany's advantage. 
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It was feared in Gennany that even if a peace to protect her from active 
economic discrimination was concluded, she would still find the Allies had aIrcady 
secured access to the world's raw materials and Gennany would be unable to 
replenish her depleted stocks. " They called for the world distribution of raw materials 
for the benefit of the whole of humanity. At a peace conference the Gennans would 
hope to secure an international instrument, backed by neutrals, outlining the 
conditions under which economic relations would continue, hopefully rendering Zt) 
impossible the policy of the Paris Conference. " 
Conclusion 
The PID used such intelligence reports in their own memoranda to advocate the 
strengthening, with every means at Britain's disposal, of the machinery of economic 
" Quoted in FO 371/4357/174: 'Memorandum on Recent German Pronouncements on Economic 
Policy' by the PID, 14 June 1918 [italics in originall 
74 1 ics in o CAB 24/63/G. T. 5615: 'Memorandum on German War Aims' 5 September 1918 [ itali n 
75 FO 371/2941/191285: Sir W. Townley (Hague) to Balfour, 'Review of the situation in Germany 
today', I October 1917. 
sm which German Leo Chiozza Money predicted that at the conclusion of the war the antag0ru 
al:; -gression 
had aroused would help to deny her trade and sh, *ppin, -,. Daily Chronicle, 
10 August 1914. 
76 On 9 June 1916 The Times stated that "Germany has dliscovered that she is not self--sufficient, 
that 
he'- fiscal system is in rums, that no 'Central-European' consolidation and expansion can restore 
her 
fortunes, and that she has been cut off from the world trade that she must have. 
It is not for her, but for 
die Allies to detennine whether the world's 'need of Germany' is such that she can quictly recover 
the 
Position in which ... she has been the econornic 
dictator of Europe. " 
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control in the hands of the Allies and the British Empire. The Germans , vere believed 
to rate highly the potency of the econorruc weapon. The economic issue was the best 
leverage at the disposal of the Allies for influencing German opinion, for the 
restoration of domestic comfort and national prosperity rested upon the economic 
settlement. Any suspicion that there existed reluctance on the Allied side to perfect 
their machinery of joint economic orgarl'satlon or to adopt measures of purchase, 
control and unification would only act as encouragement to the enemy. The confusioii 
that existed amongst the Gennan public as to the economic policy of the Allies, 
enabled the military party to stir up lagging support. They believed that if it were 
made perfectly clear that the Allies intended to use the economic weapon to its fullest 
extent in order to achieve their declared purposes, but nothing more, it would have 
more of a disintegrating effect upon Gennan opinion than any statement so far 
issued. " Planning in Britain to exploit this potential weapon had been proceeding 
since the autumn of 1917. Throughout 1918 British officials worked to reconcile the 
aims of the French, the hesitancy of the Americans, the interests of the Dominions and 
concern. for the neutrals. The task of hannonising these discordant elements and 
creating a defined policy, capable of having an impact on German opinion, was an 
intricate task for the British. 
FO 37 1 /'4357/174: 'Memorandum on Recent Pronouncements on 
Econonuc Policy' by the PID. 14 
June 1918. 
Vil 
The politics of control: Reconciling the interests of 
America, the Empire and the neutrals. 
By 1918 the question of the strategic use of raw materials was under active 
consideration across Whitehall by the Colonial Office, the Economic Offensivc 
Committee, the Ministry of Reconstruction and the Board of Trade. The Foreign 
Office and the Ministry of Munitions also had an interest in the subject but the 
Colonial Office and the Reconstruction Ministry were primarily concerned, the former 
with imperial aspects and the latter with the domestic aspect of the question. 
Christopher Addison, the Minister for Reconstruction, thought that the 
business problem of how to obtain control of raw materials must be separated fi7om 
the political problem of how the supplies should be allocated once obtained. ' He 
suggested the formation of a Materials Supply Committee. It would firstly consider 
the extent of supplies of raw materials required by British manufacturers for restoring 
and redeveloping trade after the war and secondly, the extent to which such supplies 
might be obtained from Britain, the Empire, Allied or neutral countries and the 
methods of securing and allocating them. ' The Ministry of Reconstruction set up a 
Central Committee on Raw Materials, under the chairmanship of Sir Clarendon Hyde, 
to consider these tenns. In true bureaucratic style after a respectable period the 
Committee gave birth to a host of sub-committees on which experts dealt with 
CO 532/11411991: 8" meeting of the Corrimittee on Trade Relations of the United Kingdom within 
die Empire, 2 January 1918. 
2 CAB 24, '27'G T. 2170: Memorandum by Addison, 28 September 191 
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individual matenals or groups of matenials separately. ' However it was considered 
manifest that the problem of securing and handfing supplies of raw materials for 
meeting the needs of the Britain required the co-operation of the Dominions and the 
Unite tates, along with the Allies 
American thinking over the utilisation of economic organisation. 
The intense hostility felt in the United States in 1916 towards the Pans Resolutions 
did not abate with her entry into the war. Americans, from the President down to the 
general public considered them not only politically and economically but also morally 
distasteful. The prospect of an economic offensive was considered illiberal. ' 
Recommendation III in Wilson's 'Bases of Peace' provided for: "Mutual guarantee 
against such economic warfare as would in effect constitute an effort to throttle the 
industrial life of a nation or shut it off from equal opportunities of trade with the rest 
of the world. "' This later became the third of Wilson's Fourteen Points announced on 
8 January 1918. He endorsed the 'Open Door' policy calling for: 
'The following main groups of material were brought under review: Non-ferrous materials 
(aluminium, antimony, copper, lead, nickel, spelter, zinc and tin), Ferro-Alloys (tungsten, 
molybdenum, chromium, vanadium), iron and steel, leather, wool, cotton and timber. 
4 The general terms of reference to the Committee and Sub-CorrUnIttee's were to consider and report 
upon 1) the nature and amount of the supplies of materials and foodstuffs which would be required by 
the United Kingdom during the period which would elapse between the termination of the war and the 
restoration of a normal condition of trade, and the steps which should be taken to procure these 
supplies having regard to a) the probable requirements of India, the Dominions and Crown Colonies 
for such supplies, b) the probable requirements of belligerents and neutrals for such supplies, c) the 
sources from which, and the conditions under which, such supplies might be obtained and transported, 
and in particular, the extent to which they InIght be obtained through the United Kingdom of within the 
Empire, or from Allied or Neutral countries; 2) To consider also whether any measure of control will 
require to be exercised, and the extent and character of such control. Cd. 923 1, Report on the work of 
the Ministry of Reconstruction for the period ending 31 December, 1918 (1919) pp. II- 12. 
' However, the Wilson administration was not unmoved by economic factors. Hewins reported that the 
word at the Carlton Club preceding the entry of the United States into the ý, N ar was that the , \-mericans 
saw two great economic combinations being formed from which they would be shut out. I levvins. 
The 
. 4pologia oj'an Imperialist (London, 1929) vol. 2, p. 117. 6 , \r1hur Link (ed. ), The Papers oj'111oodrow lVilson (Princeton, Nev, - Jersey, 1966-94) vol. 
41, p. 160. 
Eansing to ýVilson, 8 February 1917. Lansing recogmsed that such a proposal was aimed aý_, ainst the 
Paris Resolutions. 
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The removal so far as possible of all economic barriers and the 
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations 
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its 
maintenance ... We do not wish to fight her [Germany] either ý, vith arms 
or hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself 
with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of 
justice and law and fair dealing. 
He recognised that Europe was America's best customer and that any preferential 
arrangements would hamper German recovery and encourage economic dislocation. 
Unstable conditions in Europe threatened the United States' export trade. He 
consistently advocated the open door of non-discrimination as the economic basis of 
peace. Lansing in his letter to the Pope of 27 August 1917 had condemned "the 
establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues. " 
Emest Pollock thought that Ameiican adhesion was an essential yet also a 
difficult part of the problem of planning economic action. 
The conception of favourable trade relations as dependent upon the 
mutual good behaviour of nations and as a means of dealing with bad 
behaviour could not be too careftilly developed; in the first place in 
regard to the preservation of future peace but also as a possible means 
for inflicting punishment for the war. It might conceivably be possible 
to refuse to admit Germany to a system of mutual help towards 
economic recovery unless she so changed the balance of her 
government as to give greater safeguards for peace by making it more 
democratic (grave though the difficulties in attempting to force 
Germany to modify her internal system would be). 
He thought if the United States were prepared to accept such a scheme it could be 
advertised through another Economic Conference, which would represent a substantial 
modification of previous resolutions. The Americans could claim that they had not 
accepted the original policy but had been instrumental in securing a new one which 
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did not fail to utilise economic weapons but which sought to use them in a morc 
justifiable spint. ' 
The United States Government supported Britain in the first of the Allied 
economic aims, namely to interrupt German commercial and financial operations 
during the war. They supported the blockade and statutory list policy but only as a Nvar 
measure which was temporary for the duration of the conflict. Such measures could 
only be justified by the existence of intolerable conditions and to achieve some lofty 
end attainable within a given time. Wilson realised that the economic weapon (i. e. 
Germany's fear of being excluded from overseas markets and denied access to raw 
materials) might have to be utilised in the event of an unsatisfactory peace, as he 
hinted in an address to Congress on 4 December 1917. However such measures were 
for achieving a specific purpose and would not continue indefinitely. The aim was to 
redeem, not to punish Germany. ' 
The Wilson administration came increasingly to recognise the importance of 
co-operation with the Allies, especially Britain, and the possibility that a satisfactory 
peace might largely depend upon the ability of the Associated Governments to play on 
Gen-nan's fear of being excluded from overseas markets. It was even thought the 
Amenicans were ready to admit that such a threat might have to be executed, in the 
event of an unsatisfactory peace. 9 An investigation undertaken by the Peace Inquiry 
Bureau into American preparations for peace reached conclusions similar to British 
and French thinking. It suggested the possibility of continued commercial exclusion 
weighed heavily on the German mind. Successful demobilisation at he conclusion of 
peace would rest upon raw materials and markets for the resumption of 
German 
' FO 30818711170481/170481: Minute by Ernest Pollock, 9 October 1917. 
' Georges-Henrli Soutou, 'German Economic War Aims Reconsidered: The American Perspective , 
in 
Con ontation and Coopeiation, Schr6der, (ed. ) (Oxford, Providence, 199 1 pp. 
33 19ff. 
. 
fi I-- 
FO 371 4360/117: 'American attitude towards Post-War Economic Policy' 
by the PID, Nlay 1918. 
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industry. The ability to prolong peace discussions at the industrial expei-ise of 
Germany and to the benefit of the United States would afford a bargaining power of 1. 
great advantage. "This is our strongest weapon, and the Germans realise its menace. 
Held over them, it can win priceless concessions. " It was recognised that with skilful 
handling this asset could be used to both lure and to threaten. " 
There had also been the suspicion amongst business circles that British 
economic warfare was directed as much against American trade as it was against I 
German. The restrictive blockade of neutral Europe, censorship of cables, the 
Statutory List and the Paris Resolutions were all resented as unwarranted interfereiicc. 
However the entry of the United States into the war meant that American businessmen 
no longer had to fear open discrimination from the Allies. There were even signs that 1. 
they would be willing to join in discrimination against Gennan goods after the war 
unless the German Government had become a responsible instrument controlled by 
the German people and the dairiger of excessive armament had been removed. " It was 
thought that businessmen were willing to pledge themselves to the policy of the 
economic weapon should the Wilson administration give the word. 12 
American public opinion in general followed the lead of the President. 
Through confidential discussions it was clear that the Wilson administration was 
increasingly favourable to co-operation over the use of the economic weapon. Lansing 
was impressed by reports of anxiety amongst German financial, commercial and 
industrial leaders over foreign trade after the war. The impresslon created was that the 
" Link (ed. ), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. vol. 45, p. 462. Memorandum by Sidney Mezes, David 
Miller and Walter Lippmann, members of the Peace Inquiry Bureau. 'The Present Situation: The War 
Aims and Peace Terins it Suggests. Assets. Our Economic Weapon', December 1917. 
'' Link (ed. ), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. vol. 46, p. 6. Chamber of Commerce of the USA, 'On a 
Proposal to Discriminate against Germany in Trade After the War if Necessary for Self-Defense', 
January 1918. 'Me Chamber of Commerce noted that the size of German armaments after the war 
would fundamentally depend upon her post-war receipts of raw materials and the profits 
from her 
foreign trade. 
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repeated efforts of the Imperial Government for peace negotiations were due, in 
considerable measure, to pressure by these economic interests in order to deflect 
commercial isolation. Whether these fears were justified was of less importance than 
the fact that they existed. Lansing wondered whether the mental state of the influential 
German business class ought to be turned to the advantage of the Allies by making 
fears of post-bellurn trade conditions more intense by threatemng cornmercial rivalry 
after the war. Although he personally did not believe the imposition of penalties could 
be carried out, the threat might have the desired psychological effect in Germany. No 
stonc should be left unturned to weaken the control of the German Government over 
the people. " in reference to the scarcity of raw materials, Wilson thought that 
economic concessions would be cards as valuable as occupied territory. He stated to 
William Wiseman: "I shall go to the Paris Conference with these cards in my pocket, 
and there they shall stay until the Gen-nan military party give way. "" 
Yet regardless of how similar the proposals seemed, the Americans considered 
their conception of the economic weapon to be different from that of the European 
Allies. Wilson made it clear that if Germany were willing to join a partnership of 
peaceful nations then Gennany would not be subject to hostile trade arrangements. An 
economic boycott was not to be imposed after the right kind of peace had been 
secured but the threat of a boycott was to bring about the right kind of peace. The 
adverse impression created by the Pans Resolutions in America left the impression 
The Daily Telegraph, 5 March 1918. 
Link (ed. ), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. vol. 45, p. 354. Lansing to Wilson, 25 December 1917. 
Also see vol. 46, p. 417,23 February 1918 for a suggestion by Rollo Ogden that Congress enact a 
statute stating that unless Germany quit and restore Belgium and evacuate northern France within tv, o 
months, for a term of ten years no German ship would be allowed to enter a US port, no 
German goods 
would be allowed entry through US customs houses and no German subject would be permitted on 
Arnerican shores. The threat of non-intercourse would only be contingent and automatically removed 
by a reasonable attitude on the part of the German Government with regard to ending the Nvar. 
" Link (ed. ), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. vol. 46, p. 87. Memorandum 
by Wiseman after an 
interview with the President on 23 January 1918. William Wiseman was the 
British Governments 
unofficial contact with the Wilson administration. 
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that the European Allies wanted to pursue post-war economic discrimination for its 
own sake. In America the economic weapon could not be justified as a war mcasure 
without eing cloaked in Wilsonian morality. Indeed, Wilson seemed ready to link the 
idea of co-operation for the economic defensive with the broader political ideal of a 
League of Nations and deepen co-operation to something verging on the 
internationalisation of resources. Hurley, chal II irman of the Shipping Board from the 
spring of 1917, believed that American control of the world's raw materials could 
prevent another war. He wrote to Baruch, of the War Industries Board, in May 1918: 
Whilst the bloodiest war in history is progressing every nation is 
preparing not merely to get its share of foreign trade, but is trying to 
find out how much it can take away from other nations. The question 
as to what nation will control the raw materials of the world is 
uppermost in Europe. Whatever nation does control them (unless it be 
America) will make other nations pay a heavy toll. " 
Yet the Wilson administration would ultimately hesitate to participate in international 
deliberations which they had themselves proposed. 
British approaches to Washington for the organisation of practical economic 
measures. 
Some fortu of accommodation was necessary in order to move beyond the shadow 
cast by the Paris Resolutions. In February 1918 Cecil reported positively on a 
conversation with Mr Sheldon. The latter thought his government would be willing to 
enter discussions with a view to imposing pressure on Gen-nany to end the war but 
a(g, ainst anything like a post-war boycott with a view to disabling her. Cecil thought I 
15 He advocated control of Brazilian manganese ore, Chilean nitrates, Bolivian tin, 
Caledonian 
chrome and Mexican oil, for fair distribution among the nations of the -world for the 
benefit of 
niank-ind. Likewise Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, called for a bIlljon-dollar 
American raw 
204 
the question a difficult one but of great urgency and in need of thorough examination 
in the United States. 
16 
A month later Lord Reading, the British ambassador to Washington, reportcd 
that the time was npe to combine consultation over post-war control vk, ith control 
during the war. The idea of co-operation between the Allies had been studied in a 
preliminary way but not by the administrative officials in charge of war trade matters. 
He thought it necessary to emphasise the practical nature of consultation. 17 Reading 
believed it was important that any steps to lead the United States into preparatory 
economic measures, in the direction of consolidating the resources of the Allies 
against the Central Powers, should be taken under British leadership. Administrative 
co-ordination between the Allies and the United States, in the matters of the 
repression of enemy trade in neutral countries, the allocation of tonnage and the 
restriction of imports had fallen increasingly into British hands. Whilst France was 
America's spiritual home, Britain was regarded as their only effective business partner 
in the war. " 
Nevertheless it was recognised that the problem of taming the broad principle 
of economic exclusion against the Central Powers into practical measures would not 
be easy. The First World War saw American leaders confronted with the dilemma of 
reconciling the demands for central direction and state control of the war effort with 
matenals corporation controlled by holding companies under the i urisdict, on of the Treasury. See 
Kaufman, Efficiency and Expansion (London, 1974) pp. 188 and 213. "' CAB 27/16/EOC. 63: 'Control of Raw Matenals. Note by Cecil of a conversation with Mr Sheldon', 
7 February 1918. 
FO 368/2038/f39617/57526: Reading (Washington) to Foreign Office, 30 March 191 X'. 
Ckmentel and de Fleufiau, the Counsellor at the French Embassy in London, were increasingly 
worried by the prospect of an Anglo-American economic entente which would hold France 
in tutelaec. 
They believed such commercial dominance could only be avoided by insisting on Allied resources 
being controlled by supra-riational committees. See David Stevenson, Ft-ench wai- ainis again5t Gennany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982) pp. 109 and 113. 
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the American belief in individualism and voluntary action. 9 A lack of close touch 
between high policy and administration in Washington meant that practical co- 
operation would mean careful and patient missionary work for the British amongst Z 
administrative officials. " These were factors already familiar to British officials 
attached to the Ministry of Munitions mission working 'on the ground' in America. 
They reported departmental organisation along horizontal lines with no easy means of 
communication. There was a failure to grasp the fundamental requirement that 
materials should be available well in advance of contract need and there existed no 
authority in Washington able to collect the tonnage demands of all departments and 
compare it with the tonnage available. " The Balfour Mission, which went to America 
soon after her declaration of war to liaise with the Washington administration on 
issues such as shipping, supply and the blockade, reported that war administration was 
in a state of chaos. " Bernard Baruch, in charge of raw materials on the War Industries 
Board, noted a period of indecision and drifting in Washington during the autumn and 
23 
winter of 1917-1918. 
" Robert Cuff, 'American Mobilization for War 1917-45: Political Culture verses Bureaucratic 
Administration' in Mobilizationfor Total War: The Canadian, American and British Experience, 
(Dreisziger, ed. ) (Ontario, 1981) p. 79. 
'0 CAB 27/16/EOC. 67: 'Probable attitude of United States Government to EconornIc Offensive against 
Central Powers' by Reading, 13 February 1918. 
21 Churchill MSS CHAR 15/23: J. W. Flavelle to R. H. Brand, 9 September 1918 and R. H. Brand to 
Churchill, 7 January 1918. Brand reported: "Both as regards purchasing and shipping, Government 
Organisation here is extremely defective. There is nothing in the shape of a war cabinet and no 
authority co-ordinating the work on all these departments or getting a view of the whole situation. " 
On a visit to the United States 111 1917 Sir Arthur Salter noted: "Coming from London, after nearly 
three years of war Organisation, constantly made more effective under the impelling force of scarcity 
and dire need, Washington seemed a chaotic scene. Committees were ill-defined and overlapping 
duties sprang into existence on all sides. it was difficult in the extreme to discover what they were 
really doing beyond talking and where, if anywhere, was the official authority which, on any particular 
question, had the power to act. " Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant (London, 196 1) p. 97. 22 Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-18 (London, 1985) p. 135. Along with 
the practical task of developing the American economy for war, the Mission also aimed to create a 
better understanding between both countries and dispell American mistrust of British motives. 
See 
Doreen Collins, Aspects ofBritish Politics, 1904-1919 (Oxford, 1965) p. 28 1. " Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York, 1960) pp. 50-52. 
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An editorial in the New York Journal of Commerce on 10 June 1918 obser-ved 
there was a lack of co-ordination between the workings of the Presidential mind and 
the sub-official mind in Washington. VVhilst the Wilson administration seemed to be 
coming to terms with the idea, 
the necessity of employing economic pressure to bring the German 
people to reason has, in the councils of the Entente, long passed 
beyond the stage of controversy. This, be it noted, is without any 
reference to the Pans resolutions, from which our Government very 
properly withheld its approval ... 
Against a Germany which hesitates to 
make full restoration or to join a general pact of disarmament, and 
conciliation, it must be prepared to impose a boycott so stiff, so United, 
so effective, that these hesitations will disappear. The more united and 
decided the threat of economic war the less risk there is that it will 
have to be enforced. 24 
The economic weapon was becoming divorced from the stigma of the Pans 
Resolutions and coming to be regarded as a necessary policy in its own right. 
Relations between Britain and neutral countries with regard to Allied schemes 
for the control of the world's resources. 
The lynch-pin to most of the measures concerning the orgarusation of Allied 
economic resources envisaged by the Allies at the Pans Conference was the position 
of existing commercial treaties . 
2' However it was recogruised that differentiation in 
favour of the Allies over neutrals, might be held to conflict with the most-favoured- 
24 Quoted in 'Further notes on the United States and the Economic Offensive. ' 
FO 371/4360/249: 25 
July 1918. 
ri rv 'or claim on the 21 In Resolution B. 1 of the Transitory Measures, the devastated count es rese ed Pn 
raw materials, industrial and agricultural plant, stock and mercantile fleet of the 
Allies. 
i 
In Resolution 
B. 111 the Allies agreed to conserve for themselves their natural resources 
during the period of 
coniniercial, industrial, agricultural and maritime reconstruction, and, to 
facilitate the interchange of 
these resources. Commercial treaties with enemy nations had already lapsed at the outset of xvar and 
Resolution B. 11 stated that most-favoured-nation treatment Nvould be withheld 
for a number of years 
after the cession of hostilities. DurMg this time the Allies would undertake to assure 
for each other 
compensatory outlets for trade resulting from such action. Cd. 827 1, 
Recominendations qf the 
Econoillic Confereizcc of the Allies (1916). 
I- 
nation clauses in commercial treaties with neutral states. 26 Such selective treatment in 
the distnbution or rationing of raw materials to Allied countries would not be possible 
without revising existing most-favoured-nation clauses Nvhich meant denouncing 
present commercial treaties. This did not necessarily mean adopting an unfriendly 
allitude towards neutrals but merely recognising that future British commercial 
arrangements must consider conditions different from those which existed xvhen the, " 
were first framed. In Britain's case a similar situation would ensue if any system of 
imperial preference were to be instigated. 
The Foreign Office, who were not consulted departmentally either before or 
after the Paris Conference, considered such a threat with real concern, particularly 
when the United States was still a neutral. Victor Wellesley, head of the commercial 
and consular department, thought that to differentiate in favour of the Allies to the 
detriment of the neutrals by denying the latter benefits of most- favoured-natto n 
treatment would lead to resentment. They could resort to measures of retaliation, such 
as differentiating in favour of the Central Powers, which could hardly fail to react 
unfavourably on political relations. 27 
It was not only political relations that caused concern but also the effect such 
action might have on economic relations. Before the Pans Economic Conference 
Llewellyn Smith, permanent under-secretary at the Board of Trade, examined the 
consequences of promoting inter-Allied trade with preferential customs and the 
practicability of these proposals with regard to provisions in Britain's existing 
commercial treaties. He concluded that any plan to give preferential treatment to the 
Allies involving a four-fold import tariff (imperial, allied, neLitral, enemy) might 
"Li loyd-Georoe MSS F/194/1 4ý Memorandum on the Control of Exports during the transitional 
period after the war, with a view to the conservation of the resources of the 
Empire and the Allied 
Countries' by the Board of Trade, 15 March 1917. 
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necessitate the denunciation of some or all of Britain's commercial treaties ývith non- 
Allied countries which gave reciprocal most- favoured-nation rights. 
The likely results of such action on British commercial relations were varied. 
Any preferential treatment to Russia regarding gram would be likely to adversely 
affect Important British interests in Argentina, the economic development of which 
had mainly been with British capital. There were perhaps good grounds for i-ving the 91 1" 
Dominions preferential customs treatment over Argentina in respect of grain but not 
Russia. Discrimination against Norway would penalise a country markedly less 
difficult during the war than other Scandinavian countries and with whom good 
relations should be retained. The cessation of treaty relations with adjacent neutrals 
might push them towards Germany. The denunciation of the Treaty of 1815 and the 
cessation of most- favoured-nation treatment to the United States could lead to 
potentially disastrous retaliation. In Central and South America the British trade 
position was already insecure and there was constant pressure on states in these 
regions to enter into closer relations with the United States. Any purposeful 
weakening of influence by Britain could lead to complete dominance by America. " 
The issue highlighted inconsistencies for post-war policy over relations between 
Britain and the Allies, her Empire and neutral states. It also threatened to renew debate 
between protectionists and free traders over the course of post-war economic policy. 
The Federation of British Industries urged the Goven-iment to denounce all 
commercial treaties immediately in order that there might be a clean slate for the 
future development of British industry. 
2' FO 368/1849/f386/27165: 'The Treaty Position' by Hewins, 4 September 1916 and imnute by 
Wellesley of II September 1916. 
Asquith NISS Box 29: 'Post-Bellum Tariff Policy and British Commercial Treaties' by Llewellyn 
Sinith, 10 March 1916. 
29 CAB 24/28,1GT. 2254: FBI to Prime Minister, 6 October 1917. 
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In the event the Foreign Office followed a subtler policy which allowed the 
Government freedom of action in the immediate post-war period without resorting to 
such drastic a measure as complete renunciation. Cecil Hurst, the Legal Adv1ser to the 
Foreign ice, drew a distinction between the offensive and defensive elements of 
the measures. It had already been necessary to unofficially suspend most-favoured- 
nation clauses in order to provide the import/export control over trade needed to 
conduct the war and ensure inter-allied co-operation. This was taken as understood by 
the neutrals as a necessary but ultimately temporary measure for the duration of the 
war. Similarly, temporary prohibitions on exports amongst the Allies for the 
accumulation of stocks to replenish damaged lands and allow industry and 
manufacturing to return to nonnal pre-war conditions would not violate the pro,,, isions 
of various commercial treaties with neutrals if they continued for a defmed period. 
However the same case could not be made for any temporary prohibition 
imposed for the purpose of preventing Germany from obtaimng raw materials in order 
that British manufacturing might have unrestricted opportunity to flood foreign 
markets free from competition. Cecil thought temporary prohibitions for 
reconstruction were a legitimate departure from the strict letter of the treaty but not 
ftom its spirit. Any moral justification would disappear if this was used to obtain 
unfair commercial trade advantages. Any denunciation of commercial treaties would 
give a wholly erroneous impression of the intentions of the Allies as to trade after the 
war. Ultimately it should be left to the neutrals to complain if they felt unfairly 
treated. 
Wellesley was certain that the neutrals would contest any prohibitory measures 
and unless Britain was prepared to uphold the doctrine in the face of all legal and 
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political considerations It would be unwise to adopt such a poliCy. 
30 Consequently the 
advice of the Lord Chancellor was sought. He thought the moral obligation towards 
the Allies outweighed the strict point of law regarding most-favoured-nation clauses 
in commercial treaties, especially as such circumstances could not have been 
contemplated by parties at the time a treaty was made. 31 
The pressure for a decision was maintained with the announcement by the 
French ambassador in April 1917 that the French Government intended to denounce 
commercial treaties with foreign powers to secure a free hand for commercial policies 
necessary to give effect to the Paris Resolutions. Strictly speaking there was nothing 
in the Pans Resolutions to necessitate the abolition of most- favoured-nation clauses 
except with regard to enemy countries. The French were attempting to pull other 
Allied countries into following suit and pave the way for Allied preference. The 
potential problem of offending the neutrals was lessened by the entry of the United 
States into the war dunng the same month but the problem still bristled with 
difficulties. The remaining disgruntled neutrals could join with the Central Powers 
whilst the United States showed no inclination to adhere to the Pans Resolutions. 32 
Sir Albert Stanley thought denunciation was premature and undesirable unless 
the Government had actually decided upon a course of economic policy inconsistent 
with the commercial treaties. He considered denouncing all commercial treaties would 
in certain cases needlessly expose British trade to considerable peril after the war. 
FO 368/1849/f386/19281: Minute by Hurst on most-favoured-nation clauses of 9 February and 
the Foreign minute by Wellesley of 10 February 1917. The Board of Trade were inclined to follow g 
Office line not to denounce the treaties but to continue to ignore the most- favoured-nation clauses 
which, in any event, had provoked little opposition from neutrals during the war. Ibld., 
f386/110842, 
Fountain (BT) to Balfour, 2 June 1917. 
ti in favoured- See also FO 368/2030/fl540/5747: 'Memorandum on proposed declara on respect g most- 
nation clauses in British commercial treaties' by the Commercial Department of the Board of 
Trade. 9 
January 1918. It , vas thought the neutrals would lose more in retaliation as the 
British import trade 
from them was much greater than British export trade to them. 31 1ý0 3681849/086,63293: Lord Chancellor to Balfour, 23 Nfarch 1917. 
32 1-() ' %8,1849, f386,790 10 and 110842: Minutes by Wellesle%, of 24 April and 
6 June 1917. 
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Several of the treaties, although they did not give British trade all the protection it 
desired, were valuable safeguards as far as they went and could not be renegotiated at 
the present time on such favourable terms. " 
The Imperial Trade Policy Committee, who established a sub-committee to 
consider the denunciation of treaties, reported that Britain had been compelled by 
wartime conditions to depart from most-favoured-nation clauses. They recommended 
that a declaration be issued pointing out that Britain did not intend to renew most- 
favoured-nation clauses for a fixed period after the war. Precautions should also be 
taken to prevent German goods from being imported into the British Empire as neutral 
goods and to prevent neutrals from buying impenal goods for the German account. At 
the same time neutral countries should be infon-ned by circular despatch that despite 
great efforts it had not always been possible during the war for Britain to give equal 
treatment to all nations, whether friendly Allies or neutrals. During the period of 
reconstruction, Britain would be unable to do more in carrying out her obligations 
under the most-favoured-nation clauses than to stnve to give her Allies equal, though 
not identical treatment, and to give to neutral nations "the nearest approach to equality 
and identity which could be achieved consistently with the interests of Britain's 
financial and commercial situation, and that of her Allies. " Any country who felt 
3' CAB 21/108/G-158: Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade, 4 October 1917. 
The similarity is striking with arguments used in the early 1930s, when the 
Board of Trade resolutely 
opposed the voluntary abandonment of the most-favoured-nation clause 
during negotiations for 
protectionism. The Board of Trade considered British trade far too diversified to 
benefit from 
abandonment and the danger of discrimination was thought enormous. 
Britain had more than 40 
treaties, some of which had no provision for termination, and the Board of 
Trade was alarmed at the 
prospect of renegotiating such agreements. They thought it was really the 
decision of Britain's partners 
in the trade negotiations to denounce their treaties and most-favoured-nation rights. 
See Tim Rooth. 
British Protectionism and the intenzational econonýy: overseas commercial policY 
in the 1930s 
(Cambridge, 1993) p. I 11. 
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dissatisfied with Britain's actions could denounce commercial treaties with Britain 
altogether. " 
It was considered doubtful whether an announcement by the British 
Government that she proposed to adopt a) Imperial preference, b) Allied preference 
over neutrals and c) neutral preference over her enemies, would be a cause for great 
concern on the part of the Central Powers. " The ability of the Government to carry 
out such a policy depended upon the result of the war and whether the Allies could 
defeat Germany and Austria to such an extent to impose terms upon them. If it came 
to a peace by compromise the Govemment might be forced to modify her claims and 
risk looking foolish at having announced a policy she was no longer able to carry 
out. " Nevertheless the policy was approved by the War Cabinet who ordered the 
drafting of a circular. The neutral countries whose treaties with Britain contained 
express stipulations as regards export and import restrictions included many important 
Latin American trading nations; Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela, and, European neutrals; Sweden and Switzerland. Britain 
hoped that the repayment of a 'debt of honour' to her allies would not be regarded by 
the neutrals as grounds for terminating commercial relations but also recogn-Ised that 
the power to denounce was mutual. 
37 
;4 FO 368/1849/f386/217453: 'Commercial Treaties. Interim Report to the Cabinet' by the ITPC 
(drafted by Robert Cecil), 7 November 1917. 
'5 Yet it was thought that a valuable impression would be created in neutral circles if it were to be 
known that the British were arranging their post-war financial policy and the question of the 
apportionment of raw materials was one of the main items in any such consideration. The Principle on 
which such apportionment would be decided was to place the Allies first, neutrals next, and enemies 
last. The implication was that any country which desired to come in on a better footing should 
lose no 
time in placing itself in the first category. CAB 21/108/GT. 4368: Hardinge to Hankey, 25 April 
1918; 
FO 371/3381/52478: Mmute by Cecil, April 1918. 
in ir I Z: 1 
I 36 Ibid., Mi ute by Charles Tufton, 17 November 1917. Si Eyre Crowe brushed aside his misgg vings 
believing such a Declaration to be 'perfectly sound and practical'. 
37 CAB 23/5/WC. 283(17)10,27 November, 1917. 
Mr Sperling, of the Prize Court minuted that the Declaration could hardly fail to 
have an unfortunate 
effect on commercial relations with Latin Amencan countries. The despatch of circulars coincided Nvith 
a commercial mission to South America by Sir Maurice de Bunsen. A treaty for 
facilitating the 
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Sir Edward Carson, always one of the most vocal advocates of adopting the 
Pans Resolutions, now used his official position as chairman of the Economic 
Offensive Committee to press the Government. The Committee were clearly 
convinced of the necessity of comprehensive measures for the acquisition and 
distribution of raw material supplies, the instruments of production arid transportation, 
and the effective control of exports and imports by the Governments of the British 
Empire and their Allies. It was recommended a declaration denouncing commercial 
treaties should be issued with least possible delay to make the enemy realise the futurc 
danger of prolonging the war and peace negotiations. " 
In discussion in the War Cabinet, Cecil declared the power to suspend the 
most-favoured-nation clauses was vital to enable Britain to fulfil obligations to her 
Allies. Churchill was in agreement, in so far as they were war measures and necessary 
for wearing down the enemy. The Report was approved, with suspension rather than 
abrogation confirmed as policy. " However in the House of Commons, Bonar Law 
gave a positive reply when Carson asked whether the commercial treaties of Britain 
were to be denounced. " This appeared to constitute a volteface on the part of the War 
Cabinet. In actual fact Bonar Law had been misinterpreted. He had merely intended to 
answer that the Government had decided to give themselves a free hand with regard to 
the maintenance of existing commercial treaties. 41 
exchange of goods with Argentina was now far less desirable from the latters point of view. 
See FO 
368/2030/fl 540/80009. 
31 CAB 24/4/G-177: 'Interim Report No. 6 of the Committee Appointed by the War Cabinet to Consider 
the Question of an Economic Offensive, 6 December 1917. 
31 CAB 23/5/WC. 312: 3 January, 1918. 
On 18 July 1918, Cecil reported to the War Cabinet that the circular regarding most-faN-0 , 
ured-nation 
clauses and the 'free hand' had been sent out with the approval of the Dominions. 
CAB -3/6/W. 
C. 448. 
106 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 31,13 May 1918. 
CAB 23,, '5, -WC. 4l3: 17 May 1918. Chamberlain was to explaiii the position to the Board of 
Trade 
and Walter Long without the necessity of a special explanation to Parliament. 
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Yet the resulting confusion over policy led to criticism of the Goý'ernrnent's 
seeming reluctance to subscribe to definite economic measures. 42 A lead article in The 
Times described the attitude of the Governinent over economic policy as "incurabl"'. 
vacillating". Allied control over raw materials was one of the most powerful means of 
convincing the German people that the war would not be profitable for their industries 
or their commerce. Yet it was thought that effective control of raw matenials or any 
other concerted economic measures of the Allies was impossible without denunciation 
of most-favoured-nation clauses. It was considered a test-case for Germany and as 
long as the British Government hesitated, Germany would doubt whether Britain 
wished to destroy the economic basis on which their militarism rested. 43 
The role of the Empire. 
When British politicians spoke of controlling raw materials they were largely referring 
to imperial resources. ' From this point of view, before Britain COLIld become involved 
4' The Government was besieged with parliamentary questions from Members demanding to know 
what line the Government was taking over denunciation. 107 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 713, Holt to Bonar 
Law, 24 June 1918; col. 1849, Major Newham to PM, 4 July 1918.108 H. C. Deb. 5s. cols. 691 and 
1044, Capt. George Lloyd to Balfour, 15 July 1918 and to PM, 17 July 1918; col. 1045, Carson to 
Bonar Law, 17 July 1918. 
43 'Economic Vacillation' in The Times, 18 July 1918. 
" The most zealous officials envisaged extending Allied control to resources in neutral countries. For 
instance, plans were set in motion for the British to obtain control over the surplus production of 
Norwegian pyrites in order to cut off supplies to Germany. The purchase of the Orkla mine in Norway, 
the greatest producer of pyrites in Scandinavia, was under consideration 'in order to control the 
European market. If such control was not obtained it left 600,000 tons of pyrites, vital for agriculture 
and the chemical industry, on the open market. CAB 27/16/EOC. 22: Memorandum on the dependence 
of Germany on pyrites for the chemical trade and fertiliser manufacture, 5 November 1917; CAB 
27/44/EDDC. 12: Findlay (Christina) to Balfour, 18 June 1918; CAB 23/6/W. C. 405,6 May 1918. 
Meanwhile the American Department of the Foreign Office considered buying stocks of coffee 
accumulating in Brazil. The Foreign Office were primarily concerned with increasing British prestige 
by assisting Brazil through the economic crisis brought on by difficulties in disposing of coffee stocks. 
The Foreign Trade Department saw the potential for elimiriatmig the influence of German coffee 
merchants who before the war practically controlled the Brazilian market and continued to maintain 
themselves despite efforts by the Allies to dislodge them. CAB -'17/16[EOC. 
80: 15 Nlay 1918 and Cecil 
i%lSS Box 51093: Sir Percy Bates to Cecil, 30 May 1918. 
Some questioned whether the crippling of German trade after the Nvar was stil 
iI 
Government policy and 
if so, would it not be better to begin with property situated in the British Empire and Allied countnes. 
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in any inter-Allied action she needed to take into account the views of the Dominion 
Governments. " At the opening meeting of the Economic Offensive Committee both 
Walter Long, the Colonial Secretary, and Addison stressed the importance of first 
completing organisation with the Dominions. Long pointed out that there could be no 
question of a single-handed economic system for Britain. The necessi ring a ity for secu 1 2, 
united imperial front on such questions was emphasised by the tendency of the united 
States and other Allies to play their own hands first. " 
From September 1915 W. A. S. Hewins pushed Asquith for an imperial 
economic council through which the Government could bring the whole economic 
strength of the Empire into co-operation with the Allies in a policy directed against 
the "German economic OCtOPUS.,, 
47 Before the outbreak of war Germany imported 
many important commodities from the British Empire. For instance in 1912 the 
British Empire supplied Germany with 72% of her jute, 89% of her palm kemels, 79% 
of her rape-seed, 93% of her shellac and 77% of her merino wool. In combination 
with other countries the potential for control by the Allies was ftirther increased. Of 
Germany's pre-war supplies of zinc (ores and metals) 2.8% came from Britain, 43.3% 
came from British possessions and 50.4% from other Allied countries (and their 
CAB 27/44/EDDC. 17: Memorandum by Mond, 2 July 1918. Schemes such as these were abandoned 
when the EOC metamorphosed into the Economic Defence and Development Coninuttee and shifted 
the emphasis of its focus. 
45 See Paul Barton Johnson, Land Fit For Heroes (Chicago, 1968) pp. 123-4. 
46 CAB 27/15/Minutes of the first meeting of the EOC: 18 October 1917. 
47 W. A. S. Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, vol. 2, pp. 54-6 1. Hewins wrote that even Asquith's 
inertia could not stop the progress of such plans. In the Commons on 10 January 1916 the Government 
accepted such a scheme. Hewins kept up the pressure for action through the Unionist Business 
Committee. See Balfour MSS 49779: Hewins, to the Prime Minister conveying a Resolution of the 
UBC, 29 January 1917. 
HeNviris had been the first director of the London School of Econonucs (1895 -1903) and a member of 
Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Campaign before becoming a Unionist NIP in 1912. He served as 
under-secretary of state for the colonies from September 1917 until January 1919. 
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colonies). The potential for economic pressure on Germany through raw matenals,, vas 
clearly recognised. " 
Discussions for an economic weapon of war merged with notions of imperial 
self-sufficiency and imperial preference which had been fostered through the I 
experience of war. " The Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy 
recommended that steps be taken to stimulate the production of foodstuffs, raw 
materials and manufactured goods in the Empire wherever the expansion of 
production was possible and economically desirable for the safety and welfare of the 
Empire as a whole. They wanted the Government to accord the products of overseas 
dominions preferential treatment in respect of any future customs duties imposed on 
British imports. Furthermore, they considered the desirability of establishing a wider 
range of customs duties which could be remitted or reduced on the products and 
manufacturers of the Empire which would form the commercial basis of a treaty with 
Allied and neutral powers. " 
At the Imperial War Conference (IWC) of 1917, the Colonial representatives 
agreed to take the power to restrict imports from enemy countries to prevent dumping 
or unfair competition during the transition period. However they stopped short of the 
total prohibition, subject to exceptions by licence, which the Board of Trade had in 
mind for Britain. With regard to exports, there was apprehenslon that Germany mIght 
" Figures from Cd. 9034, Interim Report on the Treatment ofExportsftom the UK and British 
Overseas Possessions and the Conservation of the Resources of the Empire during the transitional 
Period after the War, 14 December 1916, pp. 11 - 12. Also see CAB 27/15/EOC. 
2 1: 'Econonuc Pressure 
on Germany. Control through raw materials' by C. W. Fielding (Ministry of Reconstruction) and 
EOC. 19, a memorandum by Hewins on German dependency on raw materials of the 
British Empire, 
both dated 6 November 1917. Also CAB 27/16/EOC. 26. 'Control of Raw Materials. Draft Interim 
Report 5 by the Comnuttee appointed by the EOC to consider the economic offensive', 
16 November 
1917. 
49 See Robert Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War, 1914-1919 (Hamden, Conn., 1975) pp. 
47-5 1. 
50 BT 11/1 I/c. 8237/17. Resolutions and Interim Report on the treatment of exports and conservation of 
resources, 2 February 1917. Llewellyn-SrMth minuted: "The value of imperial preference apart 
from ail 
extended tariff would be mainly sentimental but in respect of certain articles e. g. 
Colonial Nvine, I think 
some of our Allies - France, Portugal, Italy - may be somewhat alarmed. 
" 
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retaliate by prohibiting the export of goods the British Empire wished to import. There 
were some German goods, such as dyestuffs and chemicals, for which altemative 
supp ies in a equate quantities would not be available. 
They also feared that neutral nations might reftise to provide essential supplies 
unless they received equal treatment with the Allies. They wondered whether the 
enormous pre-war export trade to Germany could be absorbed within the Empire and 
Allied countries. They suggested that though it might be desirable to limit intercourse 
with the Central Powers after the war, any surplus (after home and allied needs had 
been satisfied) should be exported anywhere. The Dominions had stocks of materials 
to dispose of which had been held up by a lack of tonnage. As for imperial preference, 
they encouraged moves to make the British Empire independent of other countries in 
respect of food, raw materials and essential industries but they doubted whether the 
recommendations of the Balfour of Burleigh Committee were capable of enforcement 
in practice. Low cost transportation was considered just as effective as a customs 
preference and less overtly discriminatory against present Allies who were major 
wheat and meat producing nations, such as the United States and Russia. " 
The IWC charged Lord Milner with chairing a committee to consider 
economic terms of peace. The committee rejected the Pans Resolutions as being 
unable to provide a stable basis for the guidance of the British Government. It stressed 
that the British Empire should be free to control imperial resources, their development 
and utilisation for essential national purposes. It was important that steps be taken 
The issue is treated at greater length in Ian Drummond, Iniperial Econoinic POlicy. 
1917-39 (London. 
1974) esp. pp. 34ff and 425ff. 51 CAB 32/i/IWC (1917): Resolution XVII of 27 April and XXI of 26 April. FO 368/1, S491386/7577 
71 
and 202023. Memoranda of the discussions of the Impenal War Conference (213 
April, 1917) by 
Nlaurice de Bunsen. See also Ian Dnnnmond, British Econonzic Policy and the 
E111pire. 1919-39 
(London, 1972) p. SHE 
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towards the management of imperial commodities. 52 India, for instance, had a 
monopoly over the supply of jute and the Indian Government was in a position to 
control the distribution of the crop. In June 1916 the British Government had 
established machinery to buy the domestic wool clip and this was followed in 
November with the purchase of the whole Australian and New Zealand clip. 
The emphasis placed on taking control of imperial resources was due to the 
fact that it was often not enough for commodities just to be produced within the 
Empire. Even though sources of supply were found in the British Empire or owned by 
British companies, control could still be exercised by foreign interests. In the case of 
spelter, the world's largest supplies were found in Australia. Yet before the war 
Britain had imported much of her supplies from Germany and Belgium. The output of 
Australian ores was controlled by German interests by means of long-penod contracts 
with Australian producers. Thus the world's spelter trade was controlled by a Gen-nan 
company operating through a series of allied or subsidiary companies for production 
and marketing world-wide. " William Hughes, the Australian attomey-general, set 
about breaking this foreign hold by introducing the Enemy Contracts Annulmcnt Act 
in May 1915.54 
One of the innovations of the Conference had been the Imperial Mineral 
Resources Bureau. " Its task was to advise the governments of the Empire on what 
action might be desirable to enable their mineral resources to be developed and made 
available to meet the military and commercial needs of the Empire. It was to be 
based 
'2CAB 21/7 1. Lord Milner's Committee to consider the Economic and Non-Temtonal Desiderata 
in 
the Terms of Peace: April 1917. 
after the Par, (1918) " Cd. 9035, Final Report of the Conimittee on Cominercial and Industrial 
Policy 
p. 15. 
ver to a German 54 Die Broken Hill Junction North Silver Mining Company was under contract to dch ý 
firm its entire output of zinc concentrates up to the end Of 192 1. The Australian 
Nletal Company. an 
offshoot of the MetallgeselIschaft, had exclusive rights to act as broker and agent 
for the products of 
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in London and contain representatives of the Impenal Governments and commercial 
interests. Trade co-operation was essential as the Bureauvvas to be directly concerned 
in the mining, mineral and metal industri 56 es. 
The impetus given by the Committee on Trade Relations of the United Kingdom 
within the Empire. 
After the Conference a Committee on Trade Relations of the UK within the Empire 
was established, under the chaumanship of Walter Long, to give effect to the IWC 
Resolutions. ln January 1918 the Coinnuttee took up the question of control of raw 
materials after the war, primarily for conservation of materials required for the 
Empire. It was anticipated that any system of licensing exports by the British 
Government and the Dominions would prove inadequate. Long was not optimistic 
believing that the Committee must investigate but that the Dominions would never 
agree to surrender control of their own raw materials. " 
In late 1917 the Committee had before them Carson's views on the control of 
raw materials embodied in a report from the EOC. " They also examined a Ministry of 
Reconstruction memorandum on economic pressure which stated that the Government 
should be ready to confront the Central Powers with secured control of commodities 
related to agriculture, mining, the textile industries, chemical and metal production-59 
In considering their own lines of enquiry, it was thought the Long Committee should 
several Australian mining companies. See H. W. Carless Davis, A Histoty of the Blockade. Einergen(y 
Departnients (HMSO, 1920) pp. 105-6. 
"I WC ( 1917) Resolution XIII. 
56 CO 532! 116/30712: Report of the Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau Committee, 
30 July 19 1 
57 CO 532/114/1991: 8' meeting of the Conirruttee on Trade Relations of the UK within the 
Empire, 2 
January 1918. 
5' CAB 27/16ý10C. 26: Interim Report No. 5 from the EOC on the control of raw materlals, 16 
November 1917. 
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assess what raw materials should be mcluded in the policy of control and for v. -hat 
purpose post-war control was intended. There was a clear economic and political line 
between keeping Germany from a share of raw materials which Britain and the Allies 
wanted and keeping her from those they did not want. State purchases of wool and 
similar commodities as required would automatically keep Germany from many 
commodities she badly needed to restart her industries. As soon as Britain went 
beyond this policy she stood to incur a much greater financlal nsk and considerable 
political difficulties. 'O Hewins thought the Government had to consider a) what 
proportion of raw materials Britain and the Empire needed were controlled by itself or 
by the Allies, and b) what proportion the Allies needed of those materials controlled 
by the British Empire. " Then one could be off-set against the other, presumably to the 
benefit of the Empire. 
It was decided that the investigation by the Long Committee should proceed 
along both defensive and offensive lines. The objects of control were to secure for the 
British Empire and belligerent Allies a sufficiency of raw materials in order to repair 
the effects of war and safeguard essential industries. They were to exert pressure on 
enemy powers so as to Induce them to conclude an early peace through fear of 
economic ruin after the war and strengthen the Allies' hand in conducting negotiations 
at a peace conference. it was recognised that some method of inter-Allied co-operation 
was essential. It was thought probable that direct controls by an Inter-All, ed body 
were impractical but that the machinery of control should be such as to be suitable for 
negotiation and co-operation with the Allies. This machinery should be created at the 
earliest possible moment in consultation with the Dominions and India. Steps should 
"' CAB 27/16/EOC. 3 1: Memorandum on econormc pressure by the Commerclal and Industrial 
CoulIC11 
of the Ministry Of Reconstruction, 20 November 1917. 
60 CO 537,997/59795: Minutes by Edward Harding and Henry Lambert, assistant under-secretary of 
state for the colonies, 30 November and 12 December 1917 respectively. 
22 1 
therefore be taken to consult with belligerent Allies and particularly with the United 
States over their requirements for imperial raw materials, the reciprocal assistance 
they could give with raw materials under their control and the use which could be 
made of this control for exerting pressure on enemy powers. 
During this process the principle should be maintained that in all negotiations 
the British Empire would operate as a unit. It was suggested that in any despatch to 
the Allies it should be stressed that the self-governing Dominions would probably be 
disinclined to control a large number of their products, or to appropriate any single 
product in its entirety for the use of Britain or the Allies. It was felt these scruples 
were both natural and reasonable because the preferential treatment of the Allies by 
the Empire was likely to excite resentment in neutral countries if it resulted in 
depriving the latter of raw materials they were used to receiving. Also priority given 
to the Allies and enforced in the fonn of Govermnent restriction would undoubtedly 
leave producers under the impression, rightly or wrongly, that their pecuniary interests 
were being injured. " Following these criteria for investigation, the Foreign Office 
initiated an enquiry to see whether any organisation had been created in another 
country for ascertaining its resources and needs in respect of raw materials, similar to 
that contemplated by the British. " 
The Committee was in favour of leaving each of the Dominions to decide, in 
respect of each of the raw materials it produced, whether to exercise control, by what 
method and to what benefit. They deprecated the idea of pressing the Dominion and 
Indian Governments to adopt an inflexible system of control devised in Britain 
without regard to local interests and circumstances. There was no good reason for 
61 CAB 27/16/EOC. 50: Memorandum for the EOC by Hewms, 19 December 1917. 
62 CO 532/114/10132: First Report on Raw Materials and minutes of the I I' meeting of the 
Committee on Trade Relations of the UK within the Empire, 20 February 191 
S. 
insisting on mechanical uniformity of administration so long as the object in view was 
achieved. This view was to ensure specified quotas of raw materials for the Allies and 
(perhaps) for bargaining with present enemies. " It was proposed to the War Cabinet 
that the Imperial War Conference be asked to approve the policy and the list of 
materials to be considered. " Once the principle of control had been established at the 
Conference the detailed negotiation could commence. Along this line the Foreign 
Office dispatched a circular to their ambassadors in Allied countries requesting 
information regarding raw materials required from Britain and raw materials that 
those countries could provide for Britain. " Addison suggested the establishment of a 
Central Raw Materials Board to act as an international clearing-house for materials 
dealing with their acquisition and allocation. " 
For the policy to succeed the Dominions had to adopt the power to prohibit 
exports and re-export (except under licence) and reserve the right to requisition goods 
stored on foreign account. Precedents and models for ftirther control were the existing 
purchasing schemes (such as the Central Wool Conirruttee of the Commonwealth) and 
63 FO 368/2038/f39617/39617: Foreign Office to Paris, Rome, Lisbon, Havre, Athens, Corfu and 
Washington, 11 March 1918. 
64 FO 368/2038/f39617/48558: Second Report on Raw Materials, 12 March 1918. 
65 CAB 21/108/GT. 4470: Report presented by the Committee on Trade Relations of the UK within the 
Empire and action taken up to I May 1918. 
66 CAB 21/108: Circular from Wellesley to Pans, Rome, Tokyo and Washington, 23 May 1918. 
Materials recommended for control included: Asbestos, cotton, copper, hides and skins, jute, lead, 
manganese ores, mica, nickel, rubber, spelter and zinc concentrates, steam coal, tin and ores, tungsten 
ores and wool. The circular also requested details of the quantity of domestic production before and 
after (estimation) the war, the quality of present domestic production and estimated quality of further 
production according to world standard, domestic requirements of materials before and after the war, 
and, sources of imports, exports and re-exports before the war. 
67 The Board would deal with all questions connected with the acquisition of materials and be 
responsible for shaping any scheme of international allocation and carrying through negotiations with 
the Dominions and Allies. The Board would consider what Government action might be required to 
obtain necessary supplies of raw materials for British industries during the reconstruction period and to 
arrange, with sanction of the Treasury, for such purchases with a preference given to imperial sources 
Of supply. It would also facilitate any arrangements which representative trade associations desired to 
in or British Empire Governments for the supply of raw materials and negotiatc with make with forei 9 It, 
the Dominions, India, Egypt and the Allies for any special facilities desired for purchases 
intended for 
Britain. Finally, the Board would facilitate negotiation between the Government's of the 
British 
Empire and those Allies who wished to obtain impenal raw materials. See CAB 
27 44 EDDC. 47: 'A 
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licensing schemes (such as the Jute Control scheme proposed by the India Office and 
the rationing of rubber and tin from various colonies and protectorates). 68 If the 
Committee was mindful of the Dormnion and Indian position, others in the Colonial 
Office were concerned with the effect of policy on the colonies. Mr Harding, from the 
Empire Trade Committee, warned that it was a primary feature of British colonial 
policy that the interests of the colonies should not to be sacnficed to the interests of 
Britain. The colonies had acquiesced in restrictive policies, firstly to stop supplies 
reaching enemy countries and later to ensure supplies for the Allies and safeguard a 
reasonable price. The resulting losses were considered a 'war contribution' from the 
colonies but the position could not continue once the war was over. 69 
The representatives at the Imperial War Conference met in June 1918. In his 
opening speech, Long stated that the most important subjects for consideration were 
connected with economic questions; namely the control of raw materials, 
import/export legislation, the Non-Ferrous Metals Bill, and wool and meat control . 
70 It 
was agreed by the delegates that it was necessary for the British Empire and 
belligerent Allies to command certain essential raw materials to repair the effects of 
war and safeguard industrial requirements. It was recommended that the governments 
of the Empire should make arrangements for the provision and utillsation of essential 
raw materials. Those commodities to be considered were asbestos, cotton, jute, wool, 
hides and skins, leather, rubber, oleaginous products, petroleum, copper, lead and 
Central Raw Materials Board' by Addison 1918 and RECO 1/408/8040. See also Johnson, Land Fitfor 
Heroes, pp. 253-7. 
68 CO 532/116/27364: Third Report on Raw Materials, June 1918. The other options were 
for the 
British Government or some purchasing organisation with Government sanction to conclude simple 
contracts for the purchase of quantities less than the total exportable surplus. It was 
difficult to 
conclude contracts of this kind without some threat of control M the background. Another option was 
to prohibit export except under licence, combined with a rationing scheme, without any sYstern of 
purchase. This option was not likely to be applicable as a general rule. " CO 5321/ 116/32806: 'Control of Oleaginous Produce' by A. J. Harding, 18 
June 1918. 
'0 CO 532/116/28812: Notes of opening speech at IWC (1918) by Walter 
Long. 
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ores, manganese, nickel, spelter and zinc, tin, tungsten, mica, molybdenum and steam 
coal. " 
Alexander Cadogan, a clerk in the Commercial department, commented that it 
was "another short step on the long road. 172 Imperial planning was outlined in a report 
by the Committee on Raw Materials, largely inspired by Hewins and adopted by the 
IWC. The Domimons were to consi IIII gin 
ider action in the light of local conditions but begi 
immediate consultation with producers and traders of the materials specified. In other 
departments there was disappointment that the Dominions appeared to have shown so 
little readiness to convert measures seriously and it was felt they had never been 
seized with the gravity of the problem or got beyond a purely parochial view. " The 
Report of the Raw Materials Committee considered it difficult for the Dominion 
governinents to settle post-war policy with regard to various raw materials until they 
had some idea of the likely requirements of the Allies. The time had now come for an 
inter-Allied conference on raw materials to provide the necessary estimates. 74 
The economic boycott and the propaganda effort. 
In February 1918 Lord Northcliffe was appointed as director of propaganda in enemy 
countries. His organisation, based at Crewe House, intended to intensify the 
psychological offensive against the enemy by revealing to them the 'hopelessness of 
71 CAB 31/I AWC (1918). Resolution III and IV of 26 and 28 June respectively. 
The Committee on Trade Relations of the UK within the Empire circulated reports to the Board of 
Trade, India Office, Treasury and Ministry of Reconstruction concerning the production of many of 
these commodities. See FO 368/2039/f39617/160098 (tin)/161239 (tungsten)/ 161240 (lead)i 161245 
(spelter)/161484 (rubber, copper, manganese). 72 FO 368/2039/f43016/114348. IWC, Fifth Day, 26 June. 
7' FO 368/2038/'t-39617/129590: Minute by Arthur Steel-Maitland, 11 August 191 s. Cecil added that 
the IWC, in this matter, had been sadly nusmanaged and he doubted now whether things could 
be put 
riv , ht. CO 53 2,, 116/36167: Report of the Committce on Raw Materials. 23 July 19 
1 S. 
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their cause and the certainty of Allied victory' . 
75 In May, H. G. Wells drafted a 
memorandum which became the basis for the propaganda campaign at Cre, ývc House. 
Wells thought the Germans would have to choose between their own permanent ruin, 
by adbenng to the present system of government and the prospect of economic, and 
political redemption by overthrowing the militarist regime to join an Allied scheme 
for world organisation. It was therefore essential to announce Allied war aims and 
inform Germany of her destiny. " 
The notion of making a public statement as a warning to Gennany, or to secure 
the co-operation of the United States in the 'econonuc defensive', or to reconcile 
Parliament to measures such as the Import and Export Prohibition Bill, had been 
considered reluctantly by British officials who were wary of anticipating Allied 
planning or encouraging German resistance. In October 1917, C16mentel proposed to 
President Wilson that such a statement should be made from the international 
perspective. 
As soon as an agreement is arrived at, we must publicly, and solemnly 
declare to Gerinany that we will liberate the raw materials which are 
our property as soon as she will liberate the territories which she 
retains or occupies by force. Such action on our part will demonstrate 
to Germany and her Allies, that the Entente have at their disposal a 
most formidable weapon. " 
Since January 1918 Carson urged for such a statement from the British domestic 
perspective. Carson was of the opimon that the most important need at present was 
for 
the Government to decide upon the general principles of their economic policy and 
then make a "clearly reasoned and temperately worded statement of their intentions" 
" M. L. Sanders and Philip A Taylor, British Propaganda During the First 
TForld H'ar, 1914-18 
(London, 1982) p. 89. 
" Ibid., p. 216. 
7" CAB 27,15, FOC. 3: 6 October 1917. The letter, like most appeals to Washington on the subject of 
economic war alms, went unanswered. See David Stevenson, French war ai"zs against 
Gerniany, 
1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982) p. 85. 
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for the benefit of the British public, the Allies, neutral countries and the enemy. A 
clear and vigorous declaration would be a source of strength not ofvý-eakness. 
Proceeding with proposals in a piecemeal fashion before the basis of economic policy 
had been decided, had created confusion and suspicion amongst the first three groups 
and had little moral effect upon the last. The guidmg principle of policy -, ý'as "reason 
and security, not sentiment or passion. ý17g However it was still thought desirable that 
any announcement should contain a threat as well as an offer. This meant having a 
functioning Allied economic bloc from which Germany could see she would be 
excluded. 
In his speech at the farewell dinner of the International Parliamentary 
Commercial Conference in July 1918, Bonar Law stated that the Allied Govenu-nents 
were thinking of using the economic weapon. After outlining the use of economic 
force for winning the war and for reconstruction, he introduced another aspect which 
he declared was "not so safe to speak of" He stated that if he were the ruler of 
Germany: 
I would take up the map of the world, and go round the world. 
Beginning at China, Japan, India, and going West to the whole of the 
North American continent and the large part of the South American 
continent, the countries from which in the past the raw-matenals of the 
world have come from, and I would say to myself, "What will be the 
fate of Germany if, as a result of our action, we are shut out from the 
economic rights of the world and our people are threatened as outcasts 
of humanity? "" 
Despite the rhetoric, such comments by Bonar Law were hardly an official 
annunciation of government policy. The Globe reported that the country had a 
tremendous weapon ready to hand if only the Government chose to use it. HowcN, cr, 
78 CAB 21/108/G-190: 'Economic Offensive Committee' by Carson, 21 January 1918. . ves from 79 Thc Daily Telegraph, 6 July 1918. The Conference, held in London, attracted representati 
France, Italy, Japan, Brazil, Belgium, Portugal, China, Slam- Greece and Serbia. 
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up to the present, there were "very few indications that the Government either 
understood how powerful it is or have the will to Yield It with determination and 
courage. "" The National Party, guided by figures such as Henry Page Croft, " took 
matters into their own hands by organising 'The National Boycott Pledge' which 
declared: 
Germany attaches no value to loss of life. Her only dread is loss of 
TRADE! Tell Germany now that for every month the war continues we 
will not buy German goods for a whole year. 
The Government refuse to use this deadly economic weapon. So WE - the PEOPLE _ MUSt! 82 
The Govermnent was challenged in the Commons to explain why they had 
apparently dismissed the power of a post-war economic boycott of the enemy as a 
means of bringing war to a satisfactory conclusion. " On 31 July, in a speech to the 
National Union of Manufacturers, Lloyd George warned Gen-nany that the longer the 
war lasted, the sterner would be the economic terms imposed. He declared that 
essential industries would be maintained and Government controls would only remain 
for the transitional period, statements designed to appeal to his audience of trade 
warriors. However he qualified the warning to Gennany by insisting that policy had to 
be in accordance with Britain's Allies and the Dominions. As the United States had 
expressed no opinion on the Paris Resolutions, it was essential for both countries to 
'0 'The Economic Front' in The Globe, 25 July 1918. 
" Croft returned from the Western Front in August 1916 after figures such as Sir Henry Wilson 
thought he would make an effective advocate in the debate over manpower resources. In September 
1917 he founded the National Party which had an extreme imperialist programme. He only returned to 
the Conservatives after the fall of Lloyd George. 
The Times, 3 June 1918. Similarly it was reported from the United States that a new American 
League was being formed pledging members to refuse to trade with Germany for a minimum period of 
25 years. By 15 July it had 12,000 members but it was hoped to extend this to I million by the end of 
the summer. The Daily Telegraph, 20 August 1918. 
This notion of a self-i lemented economi ht on throughout 1918. On I July the IMP c weapon caug 
Liverpool Cotton Association passed a Resolution which declared that no member should trade, 
directly or indirectly, with the present enemies of Britain for ten years after the conclusion of peace. 
Other trade associations followed with similar declarations. 8' 11 C. Deb. 26 June 1918. Sir R. Cooper. Bonar Law responded that there , vere no grounds for making 
such a statement. 
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agree over economic issues, and the partnership between the Allies and the Dominions 
must remain "cemented in blood. ýi84 
Page-Croft saw Lloyd George's speech as the first indication that the 
Government would use the economic weapon and urged the declaration of a definite 
ca year for a month' policy. " Yet it was revealing that in his speech Lloyd George 
attributed delay in economic action to absorpti in 11 the more immediate problems of 
winning the war, and the necessity of keeping in line with the Allies and Donunions. 
On the contrary, economic measures against Germany were advocated by many as 
measures of war, part of the great task of convincing Germany that her military aims 
during and after the war would only come at the expense of her economic position. 
Yet it would appear Lloyd George saw economic measures as only a secondary 
weapon in the struggle, or as a measure for pressunsing Gen-nany after she had been 
defeated by military methods. Similarly, there could be no effectual agreement with 
the Allies until Britain had first decided on a definite economic policy. In the absence 
of such a policy, planning amongst Britain, the Allies and the Dominions was 
condemned to remain inconclusive and ineffectual. " 
In January 1918 Edward Carson, chairman of the Economic Offensive 
Committee, reported that the Committee had reassessed its way of thinking on 
I lew to economic warfare. Originally the economic offensive had two aims with a vi 
shortening the war: Firstly, to inflict material Injury on Germany to weaken 
her power 
to wage war and, secondly, to produce anxiety in the minds of the German 
Government and business community over the future of their trade, thus 
forcing them 
84 The Times, 2 August 1918. 
'5 Letter from Page-Croft to the Moming Post, 8 August 1918. 
86 This point was not lost on Germans commentating on the speech "In 
his quite unfounded 
megalomania Mr Lloyd George threatens us not with half but v, ith complete destruction unless we 
immediately with folded arms surrender ... and 
he does this although he does not yet even kno,, v 
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to seek peace in order to prevent commercial ruin. It had become clear to the 
Committee that the direct material injury left to inflict on the enemy v, -as limited and 
German anxiety over her commercial future would not be effective until she faced the 
prospect of military defeat. The EOC thus rejected the fon-nula of threatening I 
Germany with commercial boycott unless she made peace on Allied terms. If 
Germany suffered anything less than total defeat she would insist on the negation of 
such terms and if the Allies were totally victonous the imposition of such terms would 
prolong feelings of hostility beyond any peace treaty. Carson stated: 
We strangely misinterpret the spirit of Germany if we imagine that a 
commercial boycott, or the threat of a commercial boycott, can ever 
become a substitute for victory in the field. I do, however, believe most 
firmly that, when the final issue of the stricken field begins to appear 
grave and doubtful to German eyes, the economic menace may then 
play a most important part in ending the war. But in order that it may 
play such a part the menace must have assumed a concrete shape. 87 
By the end of the summer of 1918, the Allied forces had contained the Spring 
Offensive and it was hoped that the Gennans might be vulnerable to suggestive Allied 
propaganda. In June Northcliffe circulated a scheme as the basis for British and 
eventually Allied propaganda in Germany. "Propaganda, as an active forrn of policy, 
must be in harmony with the settled war aims of the Allies. "" He found fault with the 
proposed plan not to make any statement to the enemy regarding the economic 
weapon but merely to continue to make progress with its organisation. Northcliffe 
believed that British war aims, if presented in a suitable form, could do much to 
strengthen whatever 'opposition' existed in Germany. It was necessary to impress 
upon the Germans that the Allies possessed a determined and immutable will to 
continue the war regardless of German military successes and as a consequence vvould 
ývhether America will join the League for the economic destruction of Germany. " Article from the 
Berlin Lokalanzeiger quoted in the Manchester Guardiaiz, 6 August 1918. 
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continue a ruthless policy of commercial blockade. For that reason military success 
was not the only way to bring about the peace they desired. 
The German Government fostered the belief that any peace imposed by the 
Allies would mean the internal ruin of Germany. At present the Allies considered this 
could be avoided if Germany consented to accept the Allied scheme for a new 
organisation of the world. Yet until now, Northcliffe claimed, Allied policy and -, var 
aims had been too loosely defined to be comprehensible to the Germans and they had 
taken advantage of the inconsistencies. It was easy for the German regime to 
misinterpret British war aims in their own imperialistic vision of annexations and 
indemnities. The real object was to establish a 'League of Free Nations' in order to 
ensure future peace. Gen-nany's admission to this League would guarantee against 
economic discrimination and Allied peace terms would be the condition for German 
entry. Economic benefits could only be secured by political conditions. Northcliffe 
advocated the issuing of a statement which would in effect be an offer of peace on 
stated conditions. If it was accepted Germany could join the new League after the war, 
otherwise the war would continue. " Instead of showing Gennany what pUrUshment 
she would receive if she did not come to satisfactory terms with the Allies it was 
preferable in propaganda terms to stress what she could gain. 
Linking the economic weapon with a post-war world organisation was 
common but not always considered desirable. Cl&mentel suggested the ordering of the 
world economy in the common interest of all nations by the League of Nations. 
The 
machinery of Allied economic control could remain intact after the war 
for 
international use to secure the maintenance of peace. For France this Nvas 
both as a 
CAB 21/108 G-190: 'Econormc Offensive Conuiuttee' by Carson, 21 January 
1918. 
CAB 27,44'EDDC. 30: Northcliffe to Balfour, 10 June 1918. 
CAB 27, '44/EDDC. 30: Northcliffe to Balfour, 10 June 1918. 
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means of providing security against German economic domination within an 
international framework and assurance of access to world markets and resources. " 
Eustace Percy advocated a policy which was not dissimilar. He thought it is no lon-ger 
a question of fori-ning some narrow defensive alliance, but of laying down the 
economic principles for the Association of Nations which was now in existence. 91 
Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, saw the nucleus of the machinery of a League 
of Nations in the political, economic and military organisations that existed to 
facilitate Allied co-operation. He thought such organisations should be more closely 
linked "with a view to the formation of a veritable League of Nations. " The whole 
economic offensive of the war could be brought under the control of the league which 
might also be used to conduct peace negotiations with the enemy. After the war the 
league could be converted from a wartime organisation to a peace-keeping instrument. I 
Neutral countnes and former enemies would be compelled to join due to the league's 
overwhelming hold on the world's economic resources. 92 
Hankey's plan merged the boundaries between a wartime league of free 
nations and a powerM economic coalition in the post-war period. This led to 
warnings that a clear distinction should be drawn between a League for the 
preservation of peace and a League for ensuring and regulating, for the benefit of the 
members, the supply and distribution of raw materials. Whether It was desirable or 
practical to deliberately establish a connection between the two was considered a 
matter of considerable debate. " Cadogan minuted that proposals with regard to raw 
materials were "not conducive to brotherly love as between the Allies and the prescnt 
enemies and to that extent economic policy and the idea of a League of 
Nations are 
"0 CAB 27/15! EOC. 3: C16mentel on the economic offensive, 14 October 1917. 
"' CA B 27 44, EDDC. 5: 'Statement on our Economic policy' by Eustace Percy. 
June 191 S. 
ary'. 16 January 191 S. CAB 24/39,, G. T. 3344: 'The League of Nations, Observations by the Secret 
FO 371/4367/ MMute by Crowe? July 1918. 
incompatible. 
ý, 94 Maclay, the Shipping Controller, thought that unless a strong 
position was taken, controls might be carried on beyond a reasonable time by an 
'idealistic group' who had visionary ideas of a League of Nations. 'Whilst lie had 
nothing against the League of Nations as a political conception he ýý as anxious lest the 
British committed themselves to any arrangements which invol-ved the sacrifice of 
95 British economic independence. Lord Parmoor was of the opinion, shared by many, 
that a league of nations and an economic boycott could not exist at the same time. The 
peace would either be permanent or pumtive. 96 Therc was also a desire on the part of 
groups supporting a League to keep the idea of a league separate from the cry for a 
negotiated peace. " 
Eustace Percy and Alfred Zimmem, of the Foreign Office's Political 
Intelligence Department, submitted a memorandum in response to the encouragement 1: 1 
of Northcliffe. They declared there were two ways to win the war, either through 
victory on the field or by breaking down the determination of the German people to 
support their Government in its resistance to Allied demands. Current hopes and fears 
were vested in the High Command and the Allies had to give the Gennans something 
to fear, which Ludendorff could not save them ftom, and something to hope for, 
which Ludendorff could not secure for them. One such fear was the economic 
predominance of the Allies and their control over world production and markets. 
Access to these was thought *indispensable to the prosperity and survival of Gen-nany 
as a civilised country. It was thought the Germans were impressed by force and not 
by 
the 'shadowy sanction' of a League of Nations. In this sense the programme of the 
Pans Economic Conference had come closer than Wilson and his pronouncements in 
, )4 FO 
-)68/2030/fl540/110692: Mmute 
by Cadogan, 14 June 191S. 
95 Lloyd George MSS F/35/2/89: Maclay to PM, 7 December 1918. 
"' Da i1v News, 21 October 19 IS. 
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influencing German opinion. Yet the Paris Resolutions had not been implenicnted and 
were a threat rather than a fact. What was needed was a policy Nvith an "absolute and 
unalterable programme which is being in reality steadily and relentlessly carried 
through. " 
Percy and Zini-mern believed the best way to accentuate German fears in 
regard to economic conditions after the war would be to build up a unified and 
impenetrable system of control, during the war, over the commoditics and services 
Germany would require. Instead of threatening to exclude Gennany from such a 
organisation after the war, Germany would automatically excludcd. Germans would 
then be concerned with the problem of how to gain access to supplies of raw 
materials, forcing them to face the political issues and confront Ludendorff. The work 
should be camed out without threatening references to Germany but important results 
could be announced by periodic Government statements which would convey fear by 
conveying the impression of concrete organisation and power. " Like C16mentel, Percy 
and Zimmem advocated developing the present Allied Progarnme Committees and 
Inter-Allied Executives into the machinery needed to form an economic association of 
nations during the reconstruction period. " 
Sir Eyre Crowe was in entire agreement with the venture and thought the 
issues raised would materially affect the question of how to bring about and organise 
peace. Hardinge minuted that it contained a definite policy for economic questions 
which was lacking at present and based on a picture of German mentality which he 
9' See George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations (Chapel 
Hill, 1978) 
P. 4Q. 
98 CAB 27/44, 'EDDC. 3 1: Memorandum by Percy and Zinimem, July 1918. 
"' Clýmentel believed his attempt to continue post-war economic collaboration 
bem cen the Allies stood 
a good chance of success because it involved simply extending a system that already existed. 
See 
Trachtenberg, Reparations in World Politic's (New York, 19 80) p. 6. 
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believed to be accurate. " in summarismg the scheme Cecil stated that economic 
policy for the reconstruction period should be worked out In closer agreement with the 
Allies, especially the United States, without any immediate reference to the question 
of the treatment of Germany after the war. That question should be left until such time 
as the Allies actually formed an economic bloc and had something collectively to 
withhold after the war. 'O' The development of a concrete organisation was essentially 
the same programme that Cecil and Carson had promoted ten months earlier and the 
issue of inducing nations into closer agreement had still to be resolved. 
On 14 August 1918 a four day inter-Allied conference opened at Crewe 
House, chaired by Northcliffe, to examine measures relating to propaganda in enemy 
countries. "' The Policy Committee was in full agreement with the approach outlined 
by Northcliffe. The chief objective of the Allies was to change tbc political orientation 
of Germany not to destroy the German people. The latter could hope for an adequate 
position in the world and future admission to the society of nations once they had 
qualified by making reparations and overthrowing Prussian militarism. The 
Committee thought it expedient to make it plain to enemy public opinion both the 
principle of Allied economic action arid their results as worked out in daily practice. 
They would stress the gravity of the danger which threatened the enemy and the 
advantages assured to those who were admitted to co-operation with the Allies. The 
Committee ended with the observation that the Allies had through joint economic 
action "begun to give effect to economic co-operation which is to-daY a powerful 
FO 371/3474/60910/125128: Minutes by Crowe and Hardinge, 17 July 1918. 
FO 3713475/00910/144473: Cecil to Chamberlain, 9 August 1918. 
The memorandum was sent to the EDDC who decided that the scheme should 
be "vorked out in ureater 
detail by the Foreign Office. CAB 27/44/6"' minutes of the EDDC, 13 August 1918. 
102 Gary S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (NIanchester, 
1992) p. 
154. 
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instrument of war, and which may, after the war, serve as a basis for the systematic 
organisation of the resources of the world. ""' 
Proposals for an Inter-Allied Conference on Raw Materials. 
The various aspects of British planning for developing controls over supply condensed 
into the issue of an inter-Allied conference for the apportionment of raw materials. " 
The French had been advocating such a conference since April 1918. " The Foreign 
Office had turned down the suggestion on the grounds that in the first instance the 
question had to be discussed separately by each of the Allies. Replies to their overseas 
enquiries showed that the Allies had not made much progress with the matter. 106 
However others in the Government were dismayed at the apparent lack of progress. In 
Aphl Hardinge had wntten to Hankey to enquire whether the Cabinet had pronounced 
on the subject of financial policy after the war, with regard to the apportionment of 
raw materials. Hankey could only reply that the "position was far fTom satisfactory" 
but that he had brought the matter to the attention of the War Cabinet. 107 In general it 
'0' CAB 24/61/G. T. 5492: 'Propaganda in Enemy Countries' Report of the Policy Conu-nittee, August 
1918. 
IN On 17 July 1918, the War Cabinet approved recommendations for preferential trade with the Empire 
but qualified this by stating that, in carrying out he policy, the Government would have careful regard 
to the interests of their Allies, especially those who had suffered special econorruc injury from the 
ravages of war. CAB 23/6/W. C. 447. 
'0' Georges-Henn Soutou, L'Or et le sang, les buts de guerre econoiniques de la Premiýre 
Guerre 
inondiale (Paris, 1989) pp. 564-6. 
'06FO 368/2038/f39617/73055: Contr6le des matiýres premi6res. Proposition franqaise en vue de la 
rýunion d'une Conf6rence Interalli6e, 23 April 1918. 
Lord Bertie, the British ambassador to France, had suggested that the Permanent 
EconorrUc Commiucc 
(largely a French body with Allied members attached) could be used to obtain 
from the French 
Government their views on the purchase and exchange of raw materials. FO 368/2038/09617,141-4 
5 
Bertie to Balfour, 2 March 1918. 
107 CAB 21/108: Hardmge to Hankey and reply, _25 and 27 April 191 S respectively. 
See also CAB 
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was felt that any move would be premature until the Imperial War Conference had 
taken place. "' 
Yet during the Imperial War Conference it had been noted that Dominion co- 
operation was also failing due to uncertainty over the position of the United States. 
The sessions on the raw materials question were proceeding less well than expected 
because Dominion ministers took the line that it was fruitless to discuss the matter 
unless they could be assured of the attitude of the United States. " in fact the Foreign 
Office thought the reverse should be the case. The United States, being in an earlier 
stage of war conditions than other countries, needed to havc her ideas precipitated by 
a definite lead from the Allies. As the chief preoccupation in the minds of American 
businessmen was the prospect of gaining adequate quantities of materials from the 
Empire such as Mckel, tin and wool, the necessary lead could be provided by the 
British Empire. 
Lord Reading, the British ambassador to Washington, attempted to induce the 
President's advisers (Baruch, McCormick and Polk) to take up the matter. "' He 
informed London that although interest in the question was rapidly growing, for the 
moment, matters should be confined to informal discussions rather than an open 
invitation to a conference. ' 12 Lord Eustace Percy thought the Americans would take 
the initiative sooner if only the British Goverm-nent would make some announcement 
of the principles on which their policy was based. Statements in the Commons 
by the 
'O'FO 368/2038/f39617/68138: Minute by Cadogan, 19 April 1918 and Foreign Office to Cambon, 16 
May 1918. 
'09 The War Cabinet, commenting on Interim Report No. 5 from the EOC 
dealing with the control of 
raw materials, had first stressed the importance of assuring the co-operation of the 
United States. CAB 
231/4/'W. C. 283,27 November 1917. 
"' FO 371/4360/209. Percy to Tyrrell. 29 June, 1918. The Washington correspondent of the 
Afornhig 
Post reported that US businessmen looked to England to take the lead, 4 July 
1918. 
... Bernard Baruch, head of the War Industries Board, Vance McCormick, chairman of 
the War Trade 
Board, Frank Polk of the State Department. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to the effect that the Govenu-nent's policy over the Pans 
Resolutions remained unchanged could not fail but to create the worst impression in 
the United States, indicating Britain's continuing adherence to the Pans Resolutions 
and su . ect on to French policy. "' Percy believed real progress would only be made 
by more open discussion of British aims. As British policy was essentially in 
accordance with Wilson's pronouncements, Percy consistently advocated an early 
declaration of policy. "A declaration of complete agreement between Great Britain 
and the United States on the basis of the President's definition of the economic war- 
aims of the Allies is a weapon against Germany of the first magnitude. -114 
In early July Cadogan noted that the British were now ready for a conference 
and could not afford to wait any longer for US opinion to 'mature'. "' Cecil gave an 
interview with the American Press to clear the ground for negotiations with the 
Wilson administration. He stated that it was not a question of fonnincy a narrow 
defensive alliance but merely defining the economic principles of the association of 
nations that already existed. Neither the United States or the British Empire had 
pursued a selfish policy and the econon-ýc door would be left open to a regenerate 
Gennany. Cecil hoped that the Associated nations would soon meet to discuss mutual 
assistance for the purposes of reconstruction. ' 16 
The Foreign Office were pressed by the French, Italians and Belgians who had 
all taken up a reference made in the circular despatch of 23 May to a proposed inter- 
Allied raw materials conference and forinally accepted the 'invitation'. Although the 
Sin-fflarly Tardieu, the French High Commissioner in the United States, resisted constant pressure 
from C16mentel to push the matter with Wilson. Tardieu advised the need for prudence 
during 
negotiations. See Marc Trachtenberg, Reparations in 47orld Politics, p. 2 1. 
113 FO 368/2038/f39617/84614: Reading (Washington) to Foreign Office, 10 May 1918 and minute by 
Percy, 14 May 1918.106 H. C. Deb. 5s, col. 31,13 May 1918. 
... FO 371 4360/81: 'The United States and the Econorruc Offensive' by Eustace 
Percy. 26 April 1918. 
FO 368,203S/'t39617/11861 1: Minute by Cadogan, 8 July 191 S. 
FO 395, )-'224/f`l06497/ll93l7: Foreign Office to Bayley (New York), 10 July 1918. 
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British had always intended to issue such an invitation in due course, this now 
reduced their capacity for manoeuvre. Co-ordination of policy with France was 
considered highly favourable in the Foreign Office. "There is scarcely anythin'. g more 
likely to produce a profound effect on the mind of the enemy" noted Wellesley. "than 
the conviction of the solidarity of the Allies as regards 'post-bellum' economic policy. 
It is an aspect to which too much importance can hardly be attached. " Hardinge 
agreed, adding: "Solidarity with France in economic questions is essential after the 
war, and if we could bring in the United States also the position would be 
impregnable. "' 17 
Percy believed that to sap German morale the best propaganda was the actual 
convening of a conference at the earliest possible moment. However i it was essential 
that Allied statesmen were ready to make the right kind of statements dcscribing 
activities and policy which would consequently determine the whole course of 
diplomatic action to be taken both during and after the war and might very powerfully 
affect the length of the war. It was essential not to repeat the blunder of the Pan's 
Conference or the semi-failure of the Imperial War Conference. Percy suggested a 
confidential preliminary conference, in the first instance, which would be non- 
committal in order to draw in the Americans. This would then pave the way for an 
official conference where public policy could be laid down. He suggested approaching 
Mr Summers, the representative of the US War Industries Board in Britain, to take 
charge of the work of the US sections of the Programme Committees and Inter-Allied 
Executive dealing with raw materials. "' 
117 FO 368/2030/fl540/105167: Minutes by Wellesley and Hardinge of 13 June 191', S. 
"' FO 368/2038/f39617/135555: Minute by Percy, 20 August 1918. 
At this point, the host of committees and departments dealing with the subject appeared to overwhelin 
the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office. Cadogan was at a loss to say who vvas responsible I- 
I'Or choosing the date of a conference or who had the final say in the matter. 
His superiors were 
Similarly baffled. George Villiers, the head of the department, minuted: "We seem to 
be in a blind 
231) 
The United States and co-operation over the control of raw materials. 
In reality it was with the United States that the matter now rested. If Lord Reading's 
view was true and Britain could direct America in her economic planning, steps , vould I: ) 
have to be taken to bring this about. On hearing that Chandler Anderson, a 
representative of the United States War Board, had returned to Washington and 
proposed to secure the appointment of a committee to consider post-war economic 
problems, a telegram was drafted for Sir Richard Crawford, British commercial 
adviser in Washington, to direct him as to the line he should take. Cecil outlined 
certain points for the Foreign Office to bear in mind when dealing with the Wilson 
administration. Every care should be taken to avoid unnecessary controversy such as 
references to the Pans Conference and the Imperial Conference. It was unnecessary to 
emphasise the far-reaching nature of the Allied proposals. Only immediate steps 
essential for the policy needed to be pointed out. Any government would hesitate to 
sanction schemes which would establish a forin of international statc control of the 
whole social and industrial life of the Allies. Cecil himself felt that he could not 
support such a scheme, which he considered quite impractical. The most the British 
could hope for was the maintenance of the existing machinery of control of 
distribution forced upon the Allies by the shortage of shipping with such minor 
modifications and extensions as were necessary to completelt. 119 
alley. I don't know what to do or to whom to write: and I am ashamed to say I haven't the 
faintest 
notion who Mr Summers Is, what he Is doing in this gal&re or how to get hold of 
him. " Victor 
Wellesley, the superintending under-secretary, commented: "The multiplicity of committees and 
individuals dealing with this vast subject is so great that I have not the foggiest notion of where or 
ho-w 
we stand. " Despite the prospect of loading the Political Intelligence Department with too much 
administrative work, Percy suggested the PID should deal with the subject given the confusion of 
the 
Commercial Department. FO 368/2038/f39617/135555: Minutes by Cadogan, Villiers, Wellesley aild 
Percy, 20-26 August 1918. 
"9 FO 371/4367/f354/364: MmUte by Cecil, 7 September 1918. 
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The telegram stressed that it was not at present the aim of Britain to fori-nulate 
any economic terms of peace to be imposed upon Germany at the peace conference, 
nor was there any policy of boycott as a substitute for military ,, ictory. The aim was to 
consider, on their own merits, the needs of the Allied and Associated nations during 
the reconstruction period to forestall industrial dislocation and consequent social 
unrest. There was a moral claim to perpetuate in the reconstruction period co- 
operation in domestic matters which were now growing under the stimulus of %var. 
The first step to returning to full, productive employment was to control raw materials 
and maritime transport to ensure Allied industries against shortage of supply and 
fluctuations in prices. Demands of neutral countries must be a material factor in all 
programmes and no opportunity must be lost of securing their adhesion to Allied 
economic partnership, if only for the purposes of widening the control exercised by 
that partnership over sources Of Supply. 
120 Immediate Allied consultation was 
necessary to ascertain the basis for such a policy and to make practical proposals. 
Otherwise there stood the danger that individual members of the alliance might I 
commit themselves prematurely to partial measures in the supposed interests of their 
own trade which were incompatible with the general interest of the Allies and likely to 
produce friction amongst them. In so far as Gen-nany was considered at all, post-war 
economic planning was not pnmanly devised as a threat but could not help but have a 
powerful effect on German morale. It was felt impolitic to issue an invitation to 
America for an inter-allied conference on raw materials until after the November 
120 Yet Emmott warned that whilst he agreed in principle that the claims of neutral countries should 
i-ank next to the claims of he Allies, the experience during the war had shown that neutral countries 
were very ready to pass on to the enemy anything from wh I cli thcy could make a satisfactory pro 
fit. He 
doubted whether an avowed preference to neutral countries as opposed to enemy countries would 
be 
effective as a practical matter. Cecil NISS 51093 3: Enimott to Cecil. 24 Januan- 
1918. 
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election. "' Meanwhile, Crawford was to guide the work of the Americans in 
considering their post-war needs in detail and take every opportunity to prepare the 
mind of the President for the invitation to a conference to be issued after the 
election. "' In the Commercial Department, Tufton noted dryly on the fate of the 
Conference: "We are, I believe, still waiting for opinion in the United States to 
mature. "123 
In attempting to draw the Americans into planning for the control of Allied 
raw materials, it was the Wilson administration and not Germany that had become the 
focus of British propaganda. Cecil advocated conducting propaganda as was possible 
in the United States with a view to influencing public opinion and governi-nent 
officials alike. Such statements should be worded with great care, taking into 
consideration American susceptibilities, and disclaim any intention of contemplating a 
trade war as a substitute for military victory. 124 In an attempt to court Wilson's 
agreement, British officials contemplated relinquishing the very measures through 
which they hoped to pressurise Germany once the Americans were on-side. Percy 
advocated a statement on economic policy declaring explicitly that the Government 
did not intend any special discrimination against her present enemies in sharing the 
world's resources in the event of a satisfactory and just peace-"' He also thought they 
should also agree with Wilson that most-favoured-nation treaties should be universal 
in application if economic jealousy was to be avoided. 12' Finally, the Goveniment 
12' The French had made a formal request for such a conference back in April 
but had met with little 
response. Tardieu, the French High Commissioner to Washington, reported that Wilson feared the issue 
would be divisive in Congress. See David Stevenson, French war aims against Germany, 1914-1919, 
P. 109. 
112 FO 371/4367/f354/354: Cecil to Crawford, 21 September 1918. 
113 FO 368/2039/f39617/165637: Minute by Tufton, 3 October 1918. 
124 CAB 27/44/EDDC. 37: 'Inter-Allied Control of Imports' by Cecil, 10 September 1918. 
"' Crowe thought this went too far, questioning whether Britain should 
be bound to guarantee supplies 
to her present enemies if there was not enough of a certain commodity to go around. 126 Crowe doubted whether such a pledge should be volunteered and 
Cecil agreed. 
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should assure her Allies that they had no policy of colonial economic exclusion with 
the non-self govenung possessions. "' 
In the event British efforts were in vain. Crawford could only report back, after 
discussions with American officials on the subject of the allocation of ra,,,, - materials, 
that the President was not sympathetic to the idea of a formal inter-allied conference. 
In fact he was further than ever from entertaining it. 
128 With the end of military It> I 
hostilities only days away Cecil attempted a last effort to persuade 'Wilson towards 
British thinking. It was obvious that Wilson was still unsure as to whether economic 
pressure was a legitimate war measure. Cecil backtracked, stating that it was of less 
immediate importance to secure a formal conference on raw materials than to secure 
Wilson's approval for the continuance and adaptation of existing economic machinery 
during the Amistice period. This was not only for the purpose of supplying the Allies 
but also for supplying the liberated territories, for controlling enemy purchases abroad I 
in the same way Allied purchases were controlled, for directing enemy shipping in the I 
common service and for providing better machinery than the blockade for controlling 
purchases and imports into European neutral countries. If this economic machinery 
existed, raw materials would be almost automatically considered. "' 
With the conclusion of the Armistice Wilson remained steadfast in his view 
but not necessarily because he entertamed. any suspicion that British proposals aimed 
at an economic boycott of Gennany. He felt that each of the Associated governments 
should approach the peace table with an open mind on the question of ravv 
matenals. "' At meetings of the Supreme War Councll Bernard Baruch, head of the 
US War Industries Board, stated that the continuation of controls on raw materials 
FO 371/4367/054/408: Nimutes by Percy, Crowe and Cecil, 2-5 October 1918. 
FO 371/4367/054,515; CAB 27/44 EDDC. 66: Crawford to Cecil. 6 November 191S. 
FO 371/4367/054/516; CAB 27,44, EDDC. 67: Cecil to Crawford, 9 November 191S. 
"0 FO 371 4367 t-354/557; CAB 27'44 FDDC. 74: Crawford to Cecil, 18 ovember 191 S. 
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could not have American approval without the sanction of Congress. American 
business opinion also opposed the extension of controls, correctly in his view, beyond 
the end of the war-"' Walter Long felt that the resolutions passed at the Imperial 
Conference M 1918 were lost sight of as a result of the changed conditions which 
followed the Armistice. 112 Without any centralised control world trade in raw 
materials reverted in the main, as Baruch observed, "to the system of automatic 
distribution under the principle of relative economic attractive power. " 13 1 
Conclusion. 
The sudden capitulation of Germany rendered planning for an wartime economic 
weapon, controlling supplies of vital commodities, redundant oven-light. There was 
little indication before October 1918 that a decisive victory would be achieved before 
the end of the year. "' In July 1918 the Supreme War Council reported that the 
processes necessary for transforming the present military situation into one of 
complete victory for the Allies were inevitably slow and laborious and could hardly 
reach their culmination before the end of 1919. They envisaged decisive action in 
... Jean Monnet commented: " Intrigues by American exporters induced the United States government 
to rob all these [wartime] agreements of their substance; lists of exceptions made the whole 
organisation useless. " Memoirs, p. 73. Quoted in Walworth, Wilson and his Peacemakers (New 
York, 
1986) pp. 164n and 169. 
"' Walter Long, Memories, (London, 1923) p. 243. The drive and commitment of both Long and 
Hewins were undoubtedly lost when they left the Colonial Office in January 1919. 
"' J. Hurstfield, 'The Control of British Raw Material Supplies, 1919-1939, ' Economic 
History Review 
XIV (1944) p. 6. 
134 A conference was held at Balhol College, Oxford on the last weekend in 
September 1918 to 
consider inter-Allied economic problems in relation to war and during the transitional period. 
Those 
present included Percy, Zimmern, R. H. Brand and J. M. Keynes, 'thinking' men within the 
British 
wartime administration. It was recogmsed that German access to raw materials would 
be a central point 
in peace negotiations. If the peace was inconclusive it was essential that 
inter-Allied machinery should 
be kept as without it no boycott of Germany could be effective. Even at this 
late stage in the militar, N 
conflict the prospect of an end to hostilities, let alone the assurance of an 
Allied victory, was not 
prevalent in official thinking. Zimmern MSS 80. 
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1920 and a defensive action until July 1919. "' By September they ývere a little more 
optimistic, believing that by the spring of 1919 Allied superiority in men, tanks, 
aeroplanes and other materials would "justify the expectation of a great success. 
which would be capable of being exploited to the extent necessary to bring about a 
final decision. , 116 Nevertheless, although the opportunity to develop the economic 
weapon as an alternative strategy to military victory was no longer an issue, it could 
still be used as a coercive instrument during the armistice period. 
135 CAB 25/122/SWC. 280: 'How are we to win the war in 19 19T 
20 July 19 1 S. 
136 CAB 25/84/SWC. 320: 'General Military POl, cy of the Allies for the Autumn of 
1918 and for the 
year of 19 19,, 10 September 1918. 
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The Armistice, trade and the economic boycott. 
By the time of the Armistice, the Allied system was working efficiently for the supply 
of food and it had begun to work for munitions but crucially, was still in the 
preparatory stages for raw materials for civilian use. In a sense the Armistice canic too 
soon for the full application of the international principle to be achieved. Arthur Salter 
thought that, if the war had continued, the real and crucial test would have come in the 
spnng of 1919. ' 
The fate of Allied controls over raw-materials during the Armistice. 
By the end of October 1918 the Political Intelligence Department had prepared a 
paper outlining detailed suggestions for the future of inter-Allied economic 
machinery. By this time it was recognised that the military situation had 
fundamentally altered. With the prospect of a peace near at hand the problem of 
exercising economic pressure on Germany receded into the background. However the 
memorandum identified several reasons for increasing the efficiency of inter-Allied 
economic organisation 
'Arthur Salter, Allied Shipping Control (Oxford, 192 1) p. 176. 
hi -er 2 The memorandum advocated the formation of a General Economic Board as supreme aut onty o,, 
the whole Allied economic organisation. The Board would take over much of the functions and 
machinery of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. A new Raw Materials and Finance Council 
would be established but should be purely technical administrative bodies, along with the 
Transport. 
Food and Munitions Councils. After the termination of hostilities the Raw Materials Council and the 
Muni 
* 
tions Council could be amalgamated. The existing Executives for wheat. meat and oil seeds could 
remain as s Uilgle buyers in the world market on behalf of the Governments. Wha L was envisaized was a 
10ose or-anisation providing the mechanism for consultation rather than limiting 
frccdom of action b% 
b individual governments. I 
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The contiriuation of such organisation was needed to maintain pressure on a 
recalcitrant Germany during the preliminary period following the termination of 
hostilities. Any supplies allowed to Germany should only be at the dictation and 
control of the Allies. All German competition with Allied purchasing organisations 
must be eliminated. Still further, it was thought necessary not only to continue the 
controls exercised through the blockade and inter-Allied organisation but also to 
extend them in order to counter the inevitable surge in the activities of private neutral 
firms in pnmary markets following the end of hostilities. It was recommended that, in 
the case of the more important controlled commodities, the British Empire and the 
United States should declare before the termination of hostilities that they ývould not 
allow any purchases, during the period of transition, in their markets except through 
Allied control, to which neutrals would be invited to adhere. 
Yet there were certain features of existing Organisation in which the 
Goverriment would not be able to acquiesce on account of British interests. With 
regard to raw materials the British Empire should maintain the right to produce and 
satisfy its own needs. Whilst it would be unwise to claim an absolute prior right in 
respect of the produce of the Empire, British representatives on inter-Allied bodies 
should be instructed to reserve in practice a more ample share than Britain was able to 
obtain during war-time conditions. ' 
Soon after the Armistice the War Cabinet considered and approved the 
4 
proposal. The Government communicated the scheme to the French, Italian and 
e tile %var. drafted 3 CAB 27/44[EDDC. 5 1: PID memorandum on inter-Allied economic organisation aft r 
by Percy, 21 October 1918. In the EDDC Churchill, the Minister for Munitions. expressed himself in 
favour of the proposals as did Lord Crawford (responsible for wheat supplies) and 
Major Astor 
(Minister for Food). CAB 27/44/Mlnutes of the 15' meeting, 5 November 191 S. 
'CAB 23/8[W. C. 501: 13 November 1918. 
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United States Governments. 5 However the latter felt that wartime bodies should be 
discontinued and new organisations fornied when it was found necessary to deal with 
problems arising after the suspension of hostilities. These organisations would not be 
part of a pan-Allied economic system but individual bodies responding to specific 
problems. Such bodies would preferably either be American-led or exclude America 
altogether. 
Herbert Hoover, the chairman of the American Food Administration and 
Wilson's chief economic adviser, was one of the fiercest critics in the United States of 
any continuation of inter-Allied co-operation .6 He stated categorically the American 
position in November 1918, that the UnIted. States Govenu-nent would 
not agree to any programme that even looks like inter-Allied control of 
our economic resources after peace ... the same applies to raw materials. Our only hope in securing justice in distribution and proper return for 
the service that we perform will revolve complete independence of 
commitment to joint action on our part .7 
Hoover's narrow economic nationalism was inspired by suspicion of the Allies and a 
desire to maintain American economic independence which he correctly saw as 
powerful enough to allow the United States to exert pressure on Allied leaders. In 
following this line, Hoover was drawing American commercial power alongside, 
rather than integrating it with, Allied economic power. Whilst the British were willing 
to subsume, albeit it in many cases reluctantly, control of imperial raw materials and 
'The French considered the continuation of wartime controls on shipping, 
food and raw materials 
essential. This was no longer in any attempt to regulate the world economy 
but merely to prevent 
economic disaster. If France was left to fend for herself in an unregulated world market 
her industrial 
reconstruction and social stability would be seriously threatened. See 
David Stevenson, French itur 
aiins against Gerinany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982) pp. 148-49, G-H 
Soutou 'The French Peacemakers 
and Their Home Front' *in The Treaty of Versailles, Boemeke et al (eds. ) (Cambridge, 
1998) PP. 171-2, 
Marc Trachtenberg, Reparations in PVorld Politics: France and European Econornic 
Diplonzac-v, 1916- 
1923 (New York, 1980) pp. 29-39. 
6 See Herbert Hoover, The A1einoirs ofHerbert Hoover (London, 1952) pp. 
278,291-2,422-1- 
' FRUS 1918 The World TVar (Washington D. C., 1925-33) Supplement 1, 
Volume 1, pp. 616-7, - 
November 1918. 
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shipping to the continuing Allied cause of reconstruction, the Amenicans v, ere more 
reluctant. In this sense America's adoptlon of the title of 'Associated' Po-, ver was apt. 
John Foster Dulles, an American counsel on the Reparations Commission, 
stated that at 
the peace conference the economic power of the United States must be 
entirely unrestricted, as this force in our hands may be a powerful 
assistance in enabling us to secure acceptance of our views. If any 
international economic control is to be maintained after the peace this 
will be decided at the peace conference. We must not, even by 
implication, be committed to it now .8 
Not all in the Wilson administration shared Hoover's views. Secretary of State 
Lansing qualified this policy of scrupulous avoidance of commitment. He considered 
it important to prevent any serious breakdown in the spirit and practice of inter-allied 
co-operation before the conclusion of the peace conference. The creation of a Leaguc 
of Nations must not be jeopardised by the internationaIjealousy and mistrust which 
would occur if the United States were to abandon participation in the blockade 
organisation. ' Frank Polk, of the State Department, warned Hoover "not to start a fight 
with the British by attempting to take the lead and ignoring existing organ i sations. " 
Vance McCormick, the chairman of the War Trade Board, thought that there should 
be as little disturbance as possible to an economic organisation prior to the peace 
conference. He asked the president to stress to Hoover the importance of working with 
the Allies, but to little avail. 'O 
8 Quoted in C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger 
(Athens, Ohio, 1985) p. 118, n. 21. 
9 FRUS. Pat-is Peace Conference (Washington D. C., 
ThcAlliedBlock-ade of GernianY, 1915-1919 
1942-47) vol. ", P. 737. Lansing to Sharp. 19 
November 1918. 
" Both quotations come from AMO I Mayer, The Politics and 
Diplomac. 1, of Peacenzakiiig (NeNN'York. 
1967) pp. 275-6. 
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The re-emergence of Anglo-American trade rivalry. 
The attempt to continue Allied economic co-operation was not aided by a polarisation 
of Anglo-American relations. " As we have seen, the Washington administration 
introduced wartime changes designed to shift the American economy to work co- 
operatively and bring about the efficient and systematic marketing of American goods 
overseas in order to find an outlet for the surplus of production the domestic market 
could no longer absorb. The extension of the American system of finance, the repeal 
of anti-trust legislation and the organisation of shipping were indicative of this 
effort. " Overt rivalry had been held in check by Washington and London due to the 
common desire to win the war, but the Armistice signalled a weakening of the co- 
operative wartime spirit. C16mentel asked himself whether it was not Germany but the 
uninhibited productive power of the United States against which Allied industries 
needed protection. Nevertheless, under the protection of French military occupation, 
French businessmen were evading German import tariffs and flooding the Rhineland 
with goods in an attempt to reorientate its trade. " 
To the United States, foreign markets were the difference between depression 
and prosperity but to Britain they were a matter of survival. " The economic outlook 
for Britain after the war was uncertain. Ramsay MacDonald believed the post-war 
industrial situation would be critical. Britain, he explained, would not just be 
competing with Germany who was already well down the road to bankruptcy: 
" Trachtenberg claims that French planning for reconstruction based on inter-Allied co-operation Nvas 
crushed between Anglo-American rivalry. See Reparations in World Politics pp. 23-25. 
For detailed examination of this Organization see Kaufman, Efficiency and 
Expansion: Foreign 
Trade OrganLation in the Wilson Administration, 1913-1921 (London, 1974) esp. pp. 179-228. 
13 Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers (New York, 1986) pp. 
3 14- 15 and 266. 
" Michael D. Goldberg, 'Anglo-American Economic Competition, 1920-19', 0. ' Economy and 
Historv. 
16(1973)p. 20. 
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But we have to compete with neutrals and with America in particular. 
and America is piling up colossal resources and capital which wi II be 
spent immediately peace comes for the purpose of maintaining the 
markets she has got and of extending them in every possible way. " 
For their part, American businessmen argued that European manufacturers had 
benefited from the experience of highly efficient industrial war production. They 
feared that increased centralised control of the economy, the use of the latest labour- 
saving machinery, the training of a new female workforce and the return of men 
drilled with discipline to the workplace would make for formidable competition. It 
was thought that Bntain and the United States would be logical and vigorous 
competitors for the world's colonial and Far Eastern trades. The United States, by 
reason of her supplies of raw materials, exportable surplus of merchandise, merchant 
marine and financial resources should have the better of the competition as America 
would be economically independent of Britain. The latter would still be dependent on 
America for supplies of food and commodities such as cotton, oils and copper. The 
interests of the United States would be best safeguarded by complete liberty of action 
as regards trade and a non-committal policy regarding the distribution of raw 
materials controlled by America. " 
Similarly on the British side, trade warriors such as Vincent Caillard of the 
Federation of British Industries, wrote to the Goverment urging that restrictions upon 
the export of raw materials from the British Empire should be retained after the war 
with a view to striking the best possible bargain with the United 
States Government 
over commercial matters. He stated: "This Government and this country 
has the 
control over many important materials which are essential to 
American industry, and 
the restriction of the supply of these to the United States would 
bc a most powerful 
` 90 H. C. Deb. 5. s. col. 345,12 February 1917. Fadden (War Trade Board). 9 November 1918. 16 FRUS. Paris Peacc Cmiference, vol. 2, p. 729, Mc 
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weapon in our hands. 1517 Sir Joseph Maclay, the Shipping Controller, thought 
prolongation of inter-Allied arrangements would only have the effect of giving the 
other Allies cheap materials at the expense of the British Empire without any 
reciprocal treatment. They would enable the Allies to compete with Britain in the 
future in a way they had never previously been able to and also restrict prices for 
imperial products. " 
In the closing weeks of hostilities the Foreign Office displayed awareness of 
these re-emerging rivalries. They thought that the present economi am ic org isation bred 
irresponsibility in the French and Italian Governments at the expense of Britain. The 
French and Italian supply programmes were drawn up and passed irrespective of 
France's or Italy's ability to carry or pay for the goods demanded. Britain provided 
much of the material for the programmes as well as the bulk of the shipping and the 
funds to finance them. The United States financed little more than that part onginating 
from America. If during the period of reconstruction France and Italy continued to 
rely upon indefinite assistance from Britain, a return to the nonnal basis of trade 
would be impossible. At present the Allies had the first call upon the resources and 
raw materials of the British Empire to the detriment of the British export trade. Whilst 
it would be difficult for Britain to refuse all aid to the Allies, it was imperative that 
some realism with respect to ability to pay and transport be gradually introduced. In 
the case of the distribution of raw materials under British control, the reconstruction 
needs of France and Belgium would call for constant consideration and the 
Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement would presumably remain for this 
purpose. 
" CAB 21/108: 20 December 1918. 
is Lloyd George MSS F/3 5 "89: Maclay to PNI. 7 December 19 1 S. fie added: "The sooner this countrv 
tý e can oret from any nation aný 
, -ets unshackled from all control the better. There is practically nothin 
everyone is out to see what he can get out of us. " 
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The Allied purchasing council, the Commission de Ravitaillement, came in for 
criticism for being too much under the influence of foreign governments. " The 
tendency to place so large a part of Britain's export trade to the Allies under the 
control of those governments was an undesirable result of the establishment of the 
CIR. It gave foreign governments too great an insight into British channels of trade 
and placed in their hands inforination which, with highly protectionist tendencies, 
might be used to the detriment of British trade in the future . 
20 There could be no 
indefinite obligations regarding the supply of raw materials from the British Empirc 
for the benefit of the Allies. " British needs could amply be provided for, but to be 
bound to France and Italy in any form would be detnmental to British industry and 
trade. Britain had thrived in the past because of her indepeiidence and no good would 
come from further Allied control of commodities. 22 
For many business groups this was a not altogether unwelcome as the prospect 
of continued governmental controls after the war was unpopular. The two factors 
underpinning the defensive elements of economic planning were fears of a shortage of 
raw materials and shipping in which to transport them. However, it was becoming 
obvious to some that the shortages of many raw materials would not be as great as 
anticipated, providing the transport was available. " Far from denying Germany raw 
materials, a report by the Supreme War Council found that Allied Governments were 
" Soon after the outbreak of war, in August 1914, the CIR was set up in London. 
Despite the name it 
was essentially a British organisation for co-ordinating the purchase of British materials 
for the Allied 
war effort. It contained representatives of the Allied purchasing departments who placed requests 
for 
supplies from Britain largely using British credits. 
20 Ernmott MSS 6: 'Departmental Demobilisation' Notes by Lord Emmott, 27 March 1919. 
2' FO 3 71/4367/f354/48 1. PID memorandum on inter-Alhed economic organisation after the \\ ar, 
21 
October 1918. 
22 Lloyd George MSS F/35/3/23. Maclay (Shipping Controller) to PNI. 13 June, 1919. %laclay added: 
"The French are too clever for us. They'never give anything away and 
if they do not get in at the front 
door they try the back door and if they do not get in there they try a window. 
" 
2' Cecil MSS 51072: Loncy to Cecil, 15 November 1918. 
23 
all hoping to dump their unwanted stocks of war materials on Germany. - 24 At the same 
time the concern over shipping was also being questioned. Maclay, the Shippm" i 
1ý 
Controller, was confident that within a short period after the cessation of hostilities the 
supply of tonnage would be equal to any real demand and there would be no need to 
maintain Government controls either for the purpose of ensuring essential supplies or 
in order to keep down freight rates . 
2' Thus, the whole rationale behind the need for 
continued control was being undermined. 
Shortly after the Armistice, Addison stated that the return to normal trading 
conditions in which individuals, and not the state, were the purchasers, and in which 
competition in the export trade reasserted itself, could not be delayed indefinitely. He 
would not do more than suggest that a policy of converting Programme Committees 
into Executives was likely to be fraught with serious danger. It was still far from clear 
that the colonies and dominions or the United States could be persuaded to continue 
the existing system of export under licence. It was not clear that the British 
manufacturers would content themselves with a ration of raw materials largely 
determined by an international body. Addison suggested making generous allowances 
24 FO 382/2314/f297/60647: Report to the Raw Materials Section of the SWC on German Rations for 
the principal raw materials, April 1919. 
te is were, in the A memorandum by the Ministry of Munitions stated that world stocks of raw ma nal 
majority of cases, not too great for world needs. It was the distribution which was abnormal with 
surplus supplies in Allied hands and the Central Powers bare. It suggested German demand could be 
relieved by a direct arrangement with Allied Governments in which the latter would provide monthly 
shipments of raw materials. The instability caused in Allied countries by the disposal of abnormal 
stocks would be alleviated and prices would stabilise in accordance with market demand. 
German 
production could also be restarted at the earliest possible moment. Materials for consideration were all 
former contraband wares: wool, cotton, linen, jute, hides and leather, iron-ore, non-ferrous materials. 
nitrates, pyrites, sulphur and glycerine. See MUN 4/349 1: 'Supply of Raw Materials to 
Germany', 24 
May 1919. 
2' CAB 27/44/EDDC. 50: 'Extension of Inter-Allied Organisation' by the Shipping 
Controller, 21 
October 1918. Maclay was worried over commitments for the control of imports/exports and 
the 
significance which may not be realised at the time but regretted later. 
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for the needs of the Allies, just as some allowance should be made for the needs of the 
enemy, but in both cases he deprecated commitments of too great definiteness. 26 
The continuance of the blockade during the Armistice period. 
The failure of the attempt to convene a conference on raw materials meant that the 
likelihood of the Allies using the control of supplies as a weapon to constrain or cajole 
the enemy was remote. With dernobilisation beginning in eamest, the blockade was 
left as the only effective means of exercising any control over Germany. On the eve of 
the armistice, in early October 1918, British, French and Italian leaders met in Paris 
and used the opportunity to produce draft armistice terms. At these discussions Lloyd 
George advocated the continuance of the blockade beyond any armistice. This 
satisfied the dual aim of ensuring German compliance through non-military methods 
and satisfying the protectionist lobby at home . 
2' Lloyd George used clause 17 of the 
terms drawn up at Paris, concerning the prolongation of the blockade, to deflect 
attacks from nght-wing protectionists in the Impenal War Cabinet. William Hughes, 
the Australian Prime Minister, suggested that a western armistice should contain 
clauses to protect imperial economic interests just as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had 
contained clauses to safeguard German economic interests in eastern Europe. Lloyd 
George assured delegates that clause 17 would provide a lever for the enforcement of 
these conditions without the need for a renewal of hostilities. " 
At the Annistice Day War Cabinet, despite receiving reports warning of food 
shortages in Gennany, Lloyd George stated that the blockade was really 'rationing' 
26 ic Considerations Affecting the CAB 291 /P-3 3: Memorandurn by the Board of Trade on Econorm 
Tem-is of Peace - Annex 18,28 November 1918. " Minutes of an International Conference at the Qua, d'Orsay, Paris, 7 October 19 1 S. Quoted in 
D. 
Newton, Bi-itish Policy and the Weimar Republic, 1918-1919 (Oxford, 1997) p. 
149. 
25 5 
and must be kept Up. 
29 Article XXVI of the Armistice subsequently stated that: "The 
existing blockading conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to 
remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to 
capture. " The provisiomng of Germany during the Annistice was left to the discretion 
of the Allies and the Umted States. " The Allies were fearful of a revival in German 
military strength if supplies were freely admitted to the Continent and did not vvant 
Germany to use gold and securities as payment for imports which might otherwise be 
used to finance reparation payments to the Allies. 
On the day of the Armistice the Minister for Blockade, Laming Worthington 
Evans, circulated a memorandum concerning the change in circumstances. " He 
recommended that the list of prohibited items be re-examined, and all articles be 
removed unless they were necessary for military reasons, or subject to shortage, or if 
their export was thought generally undesirable. Where shortage of material was 
relative, not absolute, reliance could be placed on priority regulations to decide. 
Whilst the removal of articles from the prohibited list appeared a liberal concession, 
the list of exceptions to the rule was probably enough to render the action little more 
than a gesture. However Worthington Evans went on to recommend that the ratloning 
of neutrals be re-examined with a view to increasmg their supplies. He thought that 
the Statutory List should be retained for certain classes but that the importance of the 
general Black List in preventing contraband was probably outweighed by the 
advantage of removing this obstacle to export trade. It should be retained only for 
enemy firins or firms whose records showed they could not be trusted and should only 
2' IWC minutes, 11 October 1918. Quoted ibid., p. 157. 
'9 CAB 23/14,, WC. 50OB: II November 1918. 
A joint memorandum by the Foreign Office, Director of Nlilitary Intelligence and the 
Director of the Zý 
Intelligence Division of the Admiralty concluded that the provisioning of a beleaguered 
fortress was 
forbidden during an armistice and there would be no question of raising a maritime 
blockade. See FO 
371 4367/061ý162. 
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be enforced with a refusal to grant licences for export, not with regard to granting 
- 32 financial facilities or allowing imports from such firms. 
Yet the blockade was actually strengthened with the entry of the British fleet 
into the Baltic. It was now possible, for the first ti I ips 'me, to directly prevent shi 
travelling to and from Gem-lany across the Baltic. This could be used to prevent 
exports from Germany and to secure Allied predominance in Scandinavian markets. If 
exports from Germany could not be prevented altogether, owing to the necessity of 
allowing her to pay for imports considered necessary, German exports should be 
confined to raw materials such as coal, with manufactured goods being absolutely 
excluded. The Minister of Blockade argued that the blockade bad attained its object 
and that it was impolitic to introduce a new form of pressure at the present juncture 
and that blockade pressure could not be fruitfully employed for trade purposes. " 
However in February 1919 French destroyers sailed into the Baltic, stopping all 
coastal trade and ordering the Gennan fishing fleet back to port. With the Allies 
having decided not to occupy Gennany militarily and with dernobilisation continuing 
apace, the blockade was the only weapon left to the Allies to ensure German 
compliance. " 
By early 1919 there was a desire by manufacturers and merchants to allow 
unlimited quantities of goods to go to neutral countries contiguous to Germany. 
" Evans, a Conservative MP, had been controller of the Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign 
Office during 1916. 
32 CAB 27/44/EDDC. 7 1: 'Blockade and trading with the enemy policy as it concerns exports and 
trading with neutrals' by Worthington Evans, II November 1918.1 1h C " CAB 21/108/EDDC. 73: Memorandum of 20 November 1918; CAB 27/44: Minutes of 7 in eting 
of the EDDC, 20 November 1918. 
34 Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Inteipretation (Oxford, 1989) pp. 383-4. Offer 
believes that after the Armistice the blockade became decisive. In the ensuing diplomatic struggle the 
food blockade, he argues, finally forced the surrender of Germany and her signature of the Treaty of 
Versailles. pp. 77-78. The continuance of the blockade, especially of foodstuffs, also robbed the Allies 
of their moral supremacy in Germany, making it easier for the Germans to reject the eventual peace 
settlement. 
For the politics behind the continuance of the blockade on foodstuffs see C. Paul Vincent. 
The Politics 
of Hunger: The, 41lied Blockade of Gennany, 1915-1919 (Athens, Ohio. 1985) pp-77ff. 
Auckland Geddes warned that a heavy responsibility lay with those officials who 
administered restrictions and controls, for if they exercised their powers unvvisely, 
they could damage the basis of Britain's national prosperity beyond repair. " Mr 
Edgcumbe, head of the War Trade Statistical Department, proposed a plan to ration 
Gennany until peace was signed, which he considered preferable to allowing 
Gennany to be supplied via neutrals. Rather than profiting the entrep6t trade of 
neutrals, direct British trade would be reopened with 100,000,000 potential 
purchasers. Rationing would ensure the charging of reasonable prices without the 
neutrals making large 'middlemen' profits at the expense of potential German 
reparation funds. The Allies would know exactly how much of a commodity had been 
imported into Germany and goods could reach all provinces, not just the border or 
richer regions. Direct supply could be organised through the Allied Control Board, 
allowing pressure to be retained over Gennany until suitable peace conditions were 
obtained. It would allow Gennany enough scope to reorganise her industries in order 
to pay an eventual reparation whilst allowing British trade to widen its scope for 
export. 
36 
At a meeting held on 17 January to discuss the proposals, the Board of Trade 
and the War Trade Department were in favour but the War Office, Foreign Office, 
Admiralty and the Restriction of Enemy Supply Department were against. 
Nevertheless, Arthur Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, took it upon himself to 
send a memorandum to the War Cabinet and to Lloyd George in Pans to push the 
proposal. A very limited list of free articles had been issued by the Blockade 
Committee but the cautiousness with which they proceeded meant that no substantial 
Lloyd George NISS F/17,; -5/28: 'Draft 
Report on the Rehabilitation of Trade' by Geddes. 7 Nlarch 
1919. 
cumbe. 8 36 FO ý82.23136/53M: Wernorandurn on the continuance of Blockade until Peace 
by Edge 
Januarv 1919. 
2S 
increase in freedom for the export trade of Holland and Scandinavia could be looked 
for without a definite change in Government policy. Under present conditions there 
was no prospect of any effort being made either to regain Britain's pre-war position in 
those countnes or to secure trade formerly in German hands. 
Stanley suggested that the time had come when regulations designed to 
prevent manufactured goods reaching the enemy via neutral countries could be safely 
suspended. He proposed that the Allies approach the problem of the blockade from a 
reverse angle: "Le. that they should not seek to detennine what specified articles can 
with absolute safety be allowed to be exported to the European neutrals without 
guarantees but rather what articles it is so essential to keep out of enemy hands that 
the whole complicated system of guarantees rationing and licensing must be 
maintained in regard to such articles. " He went on 
I believe that if a sturdy common sense is applied to the consideration 
of this question, a very limited list of articles will emerge, and should 
such be the case there is no doubt whatever that the greatest possible 
benefit will result to the trade of this country and a very substantial 
step will have been taken to promote that feeling of absence of restraint 
and freedom from control which is the very life-blood of business. " 
Undoubtedly alanned by Stanley's action, Cecil Harinsworth, under-secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, and representatives of the dissenting departments held a 
meeting at the Foreign Office. All agreed that the blockade was the prIncipal means to 
control Germany and that once it had been disbanded it would be difficult, if not 
or the inu-nediate impossible, to re-impose. They countered the Treasury's wish f 
export of accumulated stocks in Britain to the northern neutrals to help the exchanges I 
by stating that the desire for increased trade could largely be met by increasing the 
rations to the northern neutrals. it was decided that "the volume of trade affected bý 
CAB 24,73/GT. 6682: 'Export Restrictions to "Blockade" countries' by Stanley, IS January 1919. 
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the blockade, however important, is not important enough to constitute in itself a 
deciding factor. ýý3' A memorandum was drafted by Harrnsworth embodying the 
sentiments of the meeting. It was pointed out that the blockade was the most effect' 
weapon left to secure an early peace and obtain suitable peace tenns. It Nvas added that 
the blockade ensured co-operation, and that the abolition of restrictions vvould lead to 
fierce trade competition amongst the Allied and Associated Powers, whichvvas not 
conducive to presenting a united front at the Peace Conference. " 
The General Staff produced a memorandum of their own statmg that the I 
announcement of relaxed restrictions would have a prejudicial effect on the troops. 
The blockade was the one weapon left, without further bloodshed, to ensure adherence 
to the Annistice tenns and to obtain an early peace. It would also enable a reduction in 
the anny of occupation which was a considerable financial burden to the Treasury. 40 
This was sent, along with Harmsworth's memorandum, to Pans on 20 January to 
ensure that "both sides of the question were adequately heard. " 
In response Lord Emmott, director of the War Trade Board, entered the debatc 
in what was now clearly inter-departmental skirmishing. He questioned the 
fundamental assumption of the Foreign Office and the Service Departments that the 
continuance of the blockade was the only weapon for controlling Germany. He 
thought that partial supply with the threat of complete stoppage was as efficient a 
weapon as absolute shortage, to which the German people had already become 
accustomed. " German purchasing power could be restricted by undertakings that they t: l 
were not to sell securities to fund imports. He took issue with the Foreign Office 
FO 382, /2336/10278: Meeting held at the Foreion Office under Harnisworth on 18 January 
1919. 
FO 382/2336/11214: 'Memorandum respecting the Continuance of the Blockade, ' 20 January 
1919. 
Ibid., 'Memorandum embodying the views of the General Staff respecting the continuance of the 
Blockade' by Major-General Thwaites, 20 January 1919. 
Such av ur ng the Ann st cc' 
by 
iew was also shared by Hoover. See 'Economic Adn-dn, stratlon 
digII 
Hoover in What Really Happened at Paris, House and Seymour (eds. ) (New 
York. 192 1) p. 344. 
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assertion that pre-war trade with the northern neutrals formed only a small part of 
Britain's total export trade. Due to Britain's reduced tonnage, European markets had Ib 
become increasingly important as America and Japan found it easier to supply 
Britain's distant markets. In any case food and raw materials, the main articles the 
blockading authorities wished to prevent reaching Germany, did not come fi7om 
Britain who mainly supplied manufactured goods. Emmott's arguments fell on deaf 
ears. Mr Leslie of the Contraband Department minuted: I trust we shall avoid 
detailed criticism of it, as we shall never get to the end of the subject if ýve argue it 
further on paper with every Government Department. "' 
In Pans it was found that the blockade was bound up inseparably with 
questions of relief, supply and finance. On 8 February, 1919 a Supreme Economic 
Council was established to co-ordinate inter-allied activities including blockade 
control. " The chief British delegate, and first chainnan of the Council, was Lord 
Robert Cecil. Despite being a former blockade minister Cecil had been convinced of 
the need for a relaxation of the blockade, not only in relation to food but also to 
certain raw materials and exports. He stated to the Council of Four that it was 
essential to restart industries in Germany and Europe and that this could not be done 
without raw materials. He added that the maintenance of the blockade prolonged 
distrust and instability. ' In response to these liberal views the Foreign Office sent 
over William Mitchell-Thompson, the director of the Restriction of Enemy Supplies 
42 CAB 24/74/G. T. 6789: 'Blockade Restrictions on Exports' by Enimott, 25 January 1919. 
43 Its remit was "To examine such economic measures as shall be taken during the period of 
reconstruction after the war so as to ensure (a) a due supply of materials and other commodities 
necessary for the restoration of devastated areas; (b) the econorruc restoration of the countries which 
have suffered most from the war; (c) the supply of neutral and ex-enemy countries without 
detnment to 
the Supply of the needs of the Allied and Associated countries. " Quoted in H. 
W. V. Temperley, Histon- 
qf the Peace Conference of Paris (London, 1920-24) vol. 1, p. 297. The SEC replaced the 
Supreme 
Council of Supply and Relief. 
14 Session on 9 May, 1919 at 11.30am. Arthur Link (trans. & ed. ), The Deliberations QI'the 
Council of 
Four, (24 March-28 June, 1919) vol. 11, LXLX (New Jersey, 1992). 
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Department, to act as blockade advisor to Cecil and act as the British Govemment's 
45 representative on the Supreme Blockade Council. 
Strong pressure was also coming from the United States to end the blockade. 
Robert Anderson of the War Trade Board thought it was time to relieve Scandinavian 
countries of Allied import and internal controls upon an assurance of effective 
enforcement of provisions against exporting to enemy countries. There could be more 
effective administration of export restrictions if neutral countries were treated as co- 
operators instead of opponents. It was desirable during the transition period for the 
Allies to draw the neutrals closer to them, through fairer treatment and freer trade, 
instead of alienating them by the continuance of internal interference established at a 
time when blockade in the Baltic had been impossible. " 
However Harmsworth was worried at attempts by the UMted States to lift 
censorship and so break down the blockade. The Board of Trade and the Postmaster 
General also thought that the recovery of export trade was hindered by the delay 
involved in censoring and the expenditure incurred in sending open messages in place 
of abbreviated commercial codes, as had been the pre-war practice. Yet the Foreign 
Office, Admiralty and War Office all pointed out that any abolition of censorship 
would diminish the effectiveness of the blockade machinery. 47 Harmsworth wrote to 
Cecil emphasising the "great importance of maintaining the machinery of blockade" 
45FO 382/2336/21049: 21 February 1919. 
There was undoubtedly an institutional support for the blockade. At the time of the armistice Keynes 
concluded that it "had become by that time a very perfect instrument. It had taken four years to create 
and was Whitehall's finest achievement; it had evoked the qualities of the English at their subtlest. Its 
authors had grown to love it for its own sake ... it was very complicated, and a vast organisation 
had 
established a vested interest. " Quoted in Vincent, The Politics ofHunger, p. 115. Similarly Hoover 
commented: "The blockade was more than a naval blockade - it was an effective control penetrating 
back to every seaboard country in the world with a vast bureaucracy that did not easily yield to the 
sudden change in direction. " See Hoover in What Really Happened at Paris, House and Seymour 
(eds. ) p. 340. 
46 Robert Anderson to Vance McCormick, Chairman of the Superior Blockade Council (Paris), 26 
February 1919 in S. L. Bane and R. H. Lutz, The Blockade of Germany after the Arnlistice, 
1918-1919 
(Stanford, 1942) p. 159. 
4' CAB 23/9/WC. 531: 12 February 1919. 
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as the easiest method to pressurise the Germans. He identified the influences work-ing 
against the continuance of the blockade as Hoover (who believed It destroyed 
enterprise and prevented recovery) and the British trading community, supported by 
the Board of Trade and the Treasury. However he believed that the blockade must not 
be sacrificed for an earlier but not very material contribution to the payment of 
indemnities. " 
The Americans were losing patience with wartime procedures continuing after 
the end of hostilities. For American businessmen it still took five weeks between 
securing an order and closing the contract by receiving the necessary export licence 
from London. There was no longer any need for strict conservation of articles in the 
United States and public opinion would no longer pennit the continuance of 
restrictions unless they were absolutely necessary. The Wilson administration wished 
to simplify remaining procedure and see an increase in the ration of all commodities 
to the northem neutrals to meet the economic and industrial needs (especially cotton 
supplies) to these countries. " it was observed that restrictions of food and 
manufactured goods to the northern neutrals had no military implication except to 
uphold the theory that the Armistice period was still war. Restricting goods except for 
conservation for inter-allied needs and relief was a political injury to neutrals and an 
economic injury to all nations that had an exportable surplus. Tonnage scarcity was 
rapidly becoming a fiction and control was no longer necessary. 
" The Allied 
Blockade Committee declared that unrestricted importation by the northern neutrals, 
4' FO 800/250/10: Hannsworth to Cecil, 11 February 1919. Harinsworth's brother was the millionaire 
press proprietor Lord Northcliffe, who had an ulterior motive in having the Allies continue 
the 
blockade until the Germans were forced to accept reparations. As Northcliffe remarked to 
his brother, 
Lord Rothermere, he did not intend to spend the rest of his life 'swotting to pay excess profits 
tax and 
supertax for the benefit of Germany. ' Northcliffe to Rothermere, 10 April 
1919. Quoted in Bruce Kcnt, 
The Spoils of War (Oxford, 1989) p. 39. 
*'9 FRUS. Paris Peace Conference, vol. 2, pp. 748-50. Polk (acting Secretary of 
State) to Lauuhlin 
(charg6 de affair in London) 7 and 10 December 1918. si 
Ibid., p. 774. Sharp (US ambassador to France) to Polk, 23 December 
1918. 
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even if immediate leakage to the enemy did not ensue, would be tantamount to 
permitting Germany to accumulate large stocks of commodities she required for post- 
bellum re-equipment in border countries, and would weaken economic pressure. 
However the Americans remained unconvinced, believing that increased trade with 
the northern neutrals would still be regulated by existing trade agreements and the 
necessity of those countries to show good faith in anticipation of the restoration of 
free trade. Unless the northern neutrals were flooded with Allied manufactured goods 
Germany would have a rich field for exploitation when peace was declared. " 
Cecil reported to the War Cabinet that the Americans were pressing for the 
abolition of trade restrictions. One of the strongest opponents of such action had 
traditionally been the military. It was an indication of how, since the Armistice, the 
blockade had become primarily a military not an economic weapon, a force for 
effective coercion rather than just exerting passive influence. Nevertheless Sir Henry 
Wilson, the Chief of Imperial General Staff, now proposed that the curtain of 
blockade should be opened, though without total abolition. The military had become 
increasingly woMed over the effect food shortages were having on Gennan society. 
They had the benefit of constant reports from military intelligence observers in 
Germany reporting on living conditions. It was Churchill, at the War Office, who 
feared that starvation and shortages would foster the spread of Bolshevism and see 
Germany slip into anarchy. " 
The War Cabinet were in favour of a relaxation in trade restrictions as a 
concession to the United States without destroying the actual blockade maclunery. 
5' Ibid., pp. 766 and 785. Davis (US ambassador to Britain) to Polk, 20 December 
1918 and Polk to 
Davis, 3 January 1919. 
52 CAB 24, /78/G. T. 7149: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for NVar on the relaxation of the I Blockade. Haig and Wilson had both come around to this point of vieNN 
by the end of February 19 9- 
For British fears of the impact of the blockade, particularly of foodstuffs, on 
the process of 
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ft. 5 Cecil was empowered to take action as he saw I' At the Supreme Economic 
Council Cecil introduced resolutions designed to end the blockade. In taking into 
account the need to resume normal trading conditions in Europe as quickly as possiblc 
he proposed the suspension of all remaining regulations governing the trade of the 
northern neutrals, especially those governing the control of re-exports to Germany and 
controls on German exports and imports (with the exception of gold, sil-ver, securities 
and war materials). The suspension would be temporary and could be withdra-,, N, n if the 
German Government refused to co-operate. 
With the support of the British, American and Italian delegates the resolutions 
were carried but the proposals were rejected by the Council of Four. With the Gen-nan 
Peace Delegates due to be confronted with preliminary peace proposals at the end of 
April it was considered impolitic to take such significant action at such a juncture. 54 
Indeed Mitchell-Thompson was confident that the Germans would refuse to sign the 
peace preliminaries and that a stringent blockade would have to be re-Imposed. " 
Allied statesmen were prepared to sanction such action right up until the signing of 
the Versailles Treaty. 
56 
democratisation in Germany see Newton, British Policy and the Weimar Republic, 
1918-1919, 
especially pp. 322-60 and 375-89. 
53 CAB 23/10/WC. 558: 17 April 1919. 
54 CAB 23/IOIWC. 560: 29 April 1919. 
55 FO 382/2318/f297/75298: 20 May 1919. The measures recommended included suspension of all 
exports by sea between Scandinavia and Germany, the suspension of all 
food imports, cutting off 
traffic between the left and right bank of the Rhine, stopping German exports and 
the re-imposition of 
the General Black List and Statutory List. FO 371/2314/f297/60055: 
April 1919. 
56 S. L. Bane and R. H. Lutz, The Blockade of Germany after the Armistice, 
1918-1919, pp. 528-3 1. 
Minutes of the 23' meeting of the SEC, 16 June 1919. Preparations to re-impose 
the blockade short ot 
The position of trade during the Armistice blockade. 
In March 1919 Edwin F. Stockton, President of the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce, wrote to Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, to state that in the 
Chamber's opinion the time had arrived to remove restrictions from the trade on 
manufactured goods exported to the neutral countries adjacent to enemy temtories, as 
no good purpose appeared to be served by their continuance. He stated that f 6-7 
million of yam and cloth was urgently desired by Holland, Deninark and Scandinavia 
for their own use. He wamed that although demobilisation was proceedmg, little trade 
had come for-ward from any part of the world and it would not be long before 
unemployment caused growing distress in Lancashire. 17 The cotton Industry had been 
one of the worst affected industries during the war due to restrictions on imports of 
cotton. Many factories had shut or operated on half time due to a decreasc in 
production capacity. 
Stanley was not unsympathetic and believed that the continued rationing of 
European neutrals and export by rationing was interfering with the revival of British 
trade in those countries. The War Trade Department was still issuing 2,000 licences 
per day. With greater freedom a good deal of business could be achieved. After years 
of rationing the blockade neutrals urgently required goods, Britain was geographically 
close to supply them and the neutrals were in a position to pay for them. Stanley 
questioned whether the elaborate system of certificates provided by the trading Trust tý, 
organisations in neutral countries to keep manufactured goods out of Germany had 
any appreciable effect on Germany's capacity to resume the war. He recommendcd 
n that all articles except for those used for mi itary purposes, rav, - mate ials and 
actual imposition were to be taken. There was to be no public threat but steps taken to ensure 
that the 
public were aware of the action. To this end, destroyers were to show thernselVes 
in the Baltic. 
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foodstuffs and articles needed in Britain should be freely exported without licence. He 
was supported in this view by the Treasury but not, unsurprisingly, by the Ministry of 
Blockade. " 
Manufacturers complained that the only way to prevent the Americans from 
getting a fin-n hold in the Scandinavian market and to secure the interests of British 
traders was for the Goverriment to curtail the restrictions which impeded business. 
Members of the Foreign Office Contraband Department had their own viexs as to 
where the problem lay. Mr Bland commented that the only expedient was to try to 
outdo the Americans at their own game, with vigorous commercial travelling but, he 
added, "our people prefer to expend their energies in unavailing correspondence and 
complaint against the very necessary restrictions of the blockadc. "" These comments, 
although unsympathetic, were true to an extent. Mr Broch, the Norwegian agent for 
Vickers, observed that the Americans were adopting the German approach to 
business, with experienced commercial travellers calling on buyers and informing 1: 1 
them they were willing to manufacture exactly what was required. The British still 
persisted with their 'take it or leave it' attitude. However he still considered that 
Britain's worst enemies at present were the authorities who prevented their own 
people from doing business. 
60 
In a speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce, Stanley stated that 
outside war production, manufacturers were doing little more than providing 
for 
immediate and bare necessities. If the country was to succeed In the great struggle It 
was evident that the maximum efficiency of economy of production 
had to be 
57 Lloyd George MSS F/2/6/26: Stockton to Stanley, 4 Nlarch 1919. 
" Lloyd George MSS F/2/6/25: Export Restrictions to 'Blockade Countries, ' r, March 1919. 
59 FO 382/2258/44928: Jones Brothers Ltd., 6 March 1919. 
'0 FO ', 82/2258/74088: Letter from H. H. Broch, 6 May. Enclosure in Findlay's 
despatch No. 465 
Commercial of 10 May 1919. 
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maintained and the largest possible output secured . 
61 Manufacturers were busN, 
satisfying the urgent demands of the home market rather than concentrating on 
overseas markets. It was one thing not to be able to export due to restrictions and 
another because goods were not available in sufficient quantities. " A report by the 
Federation of British Industries had identified this potential problem during in the 
war. It stated that the "irigrained tendency of British manufacturers and working man 
is to be content with the work which immediately lies to his hand, and to neglect the 
preparation necessary to secure foreign markets. " The FBI warned that neglect of 
foreign markets, on which the ultimate prosperity of the country depended, would be 
most acute during the reconstruction period when immediate talk of replacing 
depreciation at home and restoring ravaged territories would fill attention. 3 
The success of American competition was put down to the fact that 
commercial staff at United States legations abroad were m direct contact with the 
American War Trade Department and could give a definite pronuse that if orders were 
placed with an American firm, export licences would be forthcoming. The British War 
Trade Department kept in contact with its legations through the Foreign Office. Lord 
Emmott thought it was a fair assumption that American commercial and financial 
houses were engaged in a well-orgarused campaign to obtain European orders on an 
extensive scale, perhaps as the price for their departure from their traditional policy of 
non-interference in European affairs. He feared that if a similar campaign was not 
organised in Britain export markets would be lost. if this happened, Emmott could not 
6' Board of Trade Journal, 100 (1918) p. 428. 
62 Lloyd George MSS F/ 195/4/14: 'The Improvement in the Trade outlook" by Auckland Geddes, 
undated but 1919. Mr Edgecombe, from the Latin American section of the Department of Overseas 
Trade, commented in July 1919 that the moment was favourable for trading in the 
Spanish market 
owing to the Germans being temporarily out of the market and the Americans still comparatively new 
to the trade. "The chief difficulty in taking advantage of that opportunity lies in the 
fact that British 
capital and British goods do not exist in the volume in which they did , N-hcn the opportunities wcre 
less 
favourable. " Lloyd George MSS F/195/4/1: 21 July 1919. 4! ) 
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see how the financial position of the country could be rectified. His thoughts Nvere 
dismissed as "fanatically exaggerated" by the Contraband DepaTtment. 64 
There were widespread complaints from traders about the SA, cdish Trade 
Commission seizing rationed goods received from firms in Britain. Imports into 
Sweden were controlled by Trade Associations who confiscated and distributed 
amongst their members all rationed imported goods. As a result, goods licensed for 
export from Britain often failed reached their consignees, ruining trade relations. This t) 
stemmed firom the difficulty of allocating limited rations amongst all members of the 
Association. However the United States Consulate contacted firms with difficulties 
ordering goods from abroad and offered help in finding alternative supplies from 
America . 
6' Despite the United States refusal to provide credit to finance the 
reconstruction of Europe, McAdoo was sympathetic to pressure from Amcrican 
exporters, and he proposed credit for the purchases of goods produced in the United 
States that could not be otherwise financed. " The worst fears of British officials 
seemed to be confirmed in January 1919 when a telegram was intercepted from the 
American mission in Paris to the American mission in Prague, at a time when the 
reopening of trade with Czechoslovakia was under discussion. It was feared the 
Americans were attempting to steal a march and immediate steps were ordered to 
forestall American enterprise by promoting British trade with Czechoslovakia, a 
country considered to have a great industrial future. " In March 1919 the State 
Department was instructed by Lansing to facilitate trade development in central 
Europe. Consulates were to be opened and passports issued to responsible 
63 FBI MSS 200iF/3/DI/I/I7: "'Reconstruction" and the Future of British Trade, Industry and Labour' 
by E. F. Oldham and R. T. Nugent, July 1916. 
64 FO 382/2258/41975. WTD to Foreign Office and subsequent minutes, c. April 1919. 
('5 FO 3SD2258/70451: Garnock, Bibby and Co. Ltd. to the Department of Overseas 
Trade, 6May 
1919 and Mr Grove (Gothenburg) to the Foreign Office, IS February 1919. 
See Walworth, Wilson and His Peaccinakers, pp. 166 and 169. 
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businessmen. There is little doubt that the American trade bogey was used in an 
attempt to panic government officials into relaxing trade restrictions, Just as fear of a 
German military revival was used by blockading authorities to Justifý' the continuancc 
of restrictions. With two such diametrically opposing objectives, compromise ývas 
difficult. 
The issue of trade restrictions was taken up in the Commons. Sir Donald 
Maclean was typical of many opinions expressed: 
Why hurry and bother businessmen by these ridiculous restrictions, 
with no clean-cut, sound policy that they can respect? As long as we 
have these parasitic Departments feeding upon our national industries, 
so long will these things happen. " 
Stanley had fallen ill and his place at the Board of Trade had been taken by Auckland 
Geddes, the Minister for Reconstruction. Geddes announced, on 10 March, that 
exports to non-blockaded countries were to be unrestricted except for goods necessary 
for naval or military purposes, those required for home consumptIon or those which 
had benefited from state subsidy. As for blockaded countries, some goods would be 
placed on the free list and re-exports would be assisted "consistent with Inter-Allied 
agreements. "' 
Reflecting on the history of the War Trade Department after the Armistice, 
Emmott concluded that it was "one long tale of protests against what appeared to be 
rigidity and red-tape 0 gling of policy. " He doubted ,r constant chopping and chan,.:, 
whether the Department could have used its theoretically independent status (being 
accountable only to the Prime Minister) to decide applications for licences merely on 
the merits of the case. In cases such as the placing of a total embargo on exports to 
67 FO 382/2037/29077: Waterlow (Pans) to Curzon, 19 February 1919. 
the 29 68 113 H. C. Deb. 5s. col. 950,10 March 1919. Maclean, Liberal MP for Peebles as one of 
independent Liberals returned at the 1918 election. 
Ibid., col. 956. 
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Scandinavia and Holland in October 1917 in the hope that these govenurients would I 
accede to British demands, the WTD could only accept under protest the opinion of 
the departments in question and loyally carry out their POJIC, ý,,. 
7' The Department was a 
"lightning conductor for annoyance of trades. 17l 
The damage caused by goods making their,, vay to Gen-nany Nvas not 
comparable to the injury caused to the British export trade by not exploiting exporting I 
opportunities to a acent neutrals. The reason for the Government's reluctance to relax 
the blockade on enemy countries was purely political. In a statement in the Commons 
on 27 March, which deserves to be quoted in full, Geddes elucidated the policy: 
Every day that passes makes it more clear that the policy of 
maintaining the machinery of the blockade and a great part of the 
substance of the blockade was well advised. If we had thrown away 
that weapon, as we are now laying by a large number of our swords 
and bayonets, there would have been a great deal of work which was 
done at the cost of much blood to be re-done. So for a little time the 
Government, recognising fully the difficulties, must maintain in 
connection with its Allies the restriction upon exports to the blockaded 
countries ... I hope they will 
be removed quickly, but they will not be 
removed until our beaten enemy admits in writing her defeat. That is 
the policy of the Government. We are full of desire, full of sympathy, 
recognising that it is of vital necessity to do everything that we can for 
British trade. There is nothing within the agreement with our Allies, 
and within the limits set by the interests of the nation we will not do for 
British trade, but there is one thing we will not do. We will not be 
pushed by uniformed criticism into a course which, after full 
consideration of the many facts which can only be known to the 
Government we believe to be wrong. 72 
Not for the first time during the war, political motives were to override economic 
concerns and British exports were to be sacrificed in order to ensure German 
compliance at the Peace Conference. " 
70 Emmott MSS 6: 'Departmental Demobillsation' by Lord Emmott, 27 March 1919. 
7' Emmott MSS 6: Emmott to Bonar Law, 25 November 1918. 
'2 114 H. C. Deb. 
-5s. col. 750. 73 , \rthur Stanley admitted at the 58th meeting of the Associated Chambers of 
Commerce, on 9, April 
1918, that he had not hesitated to sacrifice trade and commerce when necessary in the national 
interest. 
Thc Tinies, 10 April 1918. 
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Lord Robert Cecil, now the chief British delegate on the Supreme Economic 
Council, considered that in order to keep the blockade over Germany complete it v, 'as 
necessary to maintain control over the trade of the blockade neutrals. He v, -as stronglý, I 
in favour of the abolition of restrictions, from an economic point of vievv, but onl-v 
when safe to do so on military grounds. Lloyd George stated that peace Nvas essential 
to reconstruction and recovery. He invoked an image of "men of every trade NN-Ith 
hands on the lever waiting for the announcement of peace" but he made peace a 
prerequisite, stating that the certainty manufacturers and traders required would only 
come with the end of the Peace Conference. Instead of recovery beginning with the 
Armistice in 1918, it was effectively delayed until Germany had sl, --ncd the Trcaty of 
Versailles. " 
On 28 June 1919 the Treaty of Versailles was signed. A month later, on 31 
July, it was announced that the blockade had been raised and that there was no 
restriction on exports or imports (except where prohibited by proclamation). It was 
stated that "it is no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government to discourage 
British trades from competing in German markets, and it is desirable that British 
traders should make every effort to secure a footing in Central Europe. "" The call was 
eagerly heeded. By the end of 1919, British traders had sent f 23.2 million of exports 
to Germany, rising to E51 million in the following year. British exports and re-exports 
also flooded to the neutrals adjacent to Gen-nany. Exports to Den-mark rose from just 
f 3.9m, in 1918 to f4lm a year later. " A general increase in British exports and 
inflated prices helped to reverse the current account balance from a deficit of f5 
8m in 
1919 to a surplus of E213m in 1920. An end to the blockade meant the re-opening of 
Ibid., cols. 2954 & 2969,16 ApnI 1919. 
,5 Cind. 274, Trade Conditions after the Raising of the Blockade (1919). 
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former lucrative European markets and the dislocation of the European economy 
meant that Britain enjoyed a temporary balance of trade surplus with Scandinavia and 
Germany. Export values reached a high in 1920 (f 1557.2m) until the summer when 
the post-war slump set in. 77 
Conclusion. 
As any hope for the utilisation of the economic weapon faded, so too did everything 
associated with it, such as continued inter-allied co-operation over purchasing and 
shipping. The informal war-time negotiations for the equalisation of access to raw 
materials were never officially raised at the Versailles Peace Conference. The 
proposal to use Allied control of exportable surpluses of raw materials as a means of 
enforcing the Central Powers to fulfil the peace tenns also failed to receive serious 
consideration. 
The blame for the demise in Allied co-operation is nonnally levelled at the United 
States, due to their refusal to co-operate ftuther with inter-Allied administrative 
bodies. However the British also had an interest in restoring independent action, 
especially once it became clear that inter-Allied action without the Americans was 
" Similar increases were recorded (from 1918 to 1920) in Sweden: E2.8m to E44.3m, Norway E5.6m to 
E35.3m and the Netherlands E23m to E86m. Kirkaldy, British Finance During and After the War, 
1914-1921 (London, 1921) pp. 370-2. 
77 However, as a memorandum from the Board of Trade just before the lifting of the blockade 
observed, it was vital not only to re-establish the old export trade but also to expand it. The credit and 
position of Britain in the commercial and financial world could only be re-established by exporting to 
meet war indebtedness and provide new capital for investment. European markets would be 
disorganised for years and the United States was in a better position to capitalise on opportunities with 
accumulated stocks, a large reserve of funds, large scale production methods and better industrial 
organisation and productivity of labour. Production was a key factor in post-war recovery. Lloyd 
George MSS F/195/2: 'State of Trade since the Armistice and the Present Position' unsigned, 16 June 
1919. 
Auckland Geddes identified the central economic problem as that of exports. Not only did Britain have 
to win back markets but E75,000,000 (pre-war value) of trade went to enemy countries or European 
countries in a state of disorganisation. Lloyd George MSS F/17, '5/38: 'Permanent Trade Policy' by 
Geddes, 3 June 1919. 
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more of a hindrance than a help to recovery. At the conclusion of peace, 
reconstruction would depend entirely upon the rapidity with which export trade could 
be revived. British interests would be best served by exporting to the United States 
and other countries with whom Britain had a large floating debt, rather than exporting 
to the European Allies for reconstruction purposes. The gradual but rapid release of 
British shipping for use at her own discretion could be achieved by utilising German 
tonnage to relieve the Allies, insisting that each country carry out its own 
demobilisation (especially the transport of troops back to America) and pressurising 
neutral governments into continuing their existing tonnage agreements until the 
signature of the final peace. As regards raw materials, the British Empire could 
establish the right to utilise its resources for its own needs. With the end of hostilities, 
the revival of the export trade would fundamentally alter the way in which supplies 
were allocated between the Allies and priorities determined between manufacturers at 
home. 
The consequences of failing to develop a mechanism for controlling Gen-nany 
through the supply of raw materials meant the continuance of the blockade as a means 
of ensuring German compliance during the armistice period. This, in turn, directly 
jeopardised the speedy revival of Britain's export trade by delaying the re- 
establishment of normal trading relations between Britain, Europe and the wider 
world. Balfour also noted that Allied diplomacy during the Armistice had been 
seriously embarrassed by military weakness due to rapid demobilisation. The problem 
related to the smaller Allies and smaller enemies who had not obeyed the larger 
Powers at the Conference either through gratitude or fear. At different times the 
Greeks, Romanians, Poles, Czechs and Yugoslavs had all disobeyed explicit 
instructions. However the big Powers had becn compelled to talk when action NN as 
required. Balfour complained there was no method of coercion except for the 
economic weapon. This only existed in the crude form of the blockade and had not 
been systematically employed on a large scale as an engine of persuasion. He called 
for a closer study of its capabilities. " 
However there was a more serious long-term consequence. By maintaining the Zý 
rigid blockade, which continued to deny Gen-nany food and raw materials, instead of 
substituting it for a mechanism which only threatened, in the first instance, punitive 
economic action, the Allies ensured that the legacy of the economic blockade during 
the armistice period gained a reputation out of all proportion to its wartime 
effectiveness. This legacy of the"hunger blockade'would unden-nine the Versailles 
settlement, perpetuate the myth that Germany was starved and not defeated into 
submission, and determine the strategy by which Gennany fought the next world war. 
" Balfour NISS 49750: 'Armies and Econornics 
Situation of July 27,1919' by Balfour, 27 Julý, 
. 
Being Reflectlons on Some Aspects of the AlIled 
1919. 
Conclusion 
In his review of Soutou's L'Or et le sang, David Stevenson noted that his analysis read "in 
large measure as a study in failure". ' Similarly this thesis has examined measures which 
largely failed to materialise owmg to the complexities of organising wartime strategy. A 
vigorous trade war, maximising the potential of the Statutory List, failed for strategic 
reasons. It was blunted by policies supporting the British war effort which priontised 
economic preparation for military action above all else. The policy of exerting control 
over materials failed for political reasons. The differing interests of the Allies, the Empire 
and the United States were too varied to ensure effective action. Moreover, the policy 
was never given a proper chance to work as ongoing planning was thwarted by the 
sudden and unexpected end to hostilities. 
In Britain, the use of psychological pressurc to force Gen-nany to see thewriting 
on the wall' became increasingly unnecessary as the government lost interest in pcace by 
negotiation. Once the Americans entered the war the Allies could afford to wait for 
victory and were less inclined to seek peace. If the Allies relied too heavily on an 
economic threat, this might be construed by the enemy as an indication of military 
weakness. A negotiated peace was a theme taken up by pressure groups such as the 
Union of Democratic Control who believed that a lasting settlement could not be secured 
by a peace based upon the right of conquest and followed by a commercial war. However 
their grounds for believing that Gennany would negotiate had little factual basis. The 
construction of the Lloyd George coalition, with its determination to effect a'knock-out 
1 English Historical Reviciv 105,417 (1990) p. 983. 
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blow', polarised the stance between Britain and Gen-nany. 2 The theme of a negotiated 
peace became an issue of domestic politics. It was seen by some as a means of restoring 
the fortunes of the Asquith Liberals, especially after the publication of the Lansdowne 
letter. 3 Meanwhile the govenu-nent mounted campaigns during 1917-18 that sought to 
reinvigorate national values to support the case forholding on' until a military victory 
had been achieved. 
There existed a parallel between the political aim of Lloyd George's 'knock-out 
blow' and the economic aim of the remaining Liberal free-traders. Both parties envisaged 
a choice between ending the war in a way that would ensure lasting peace, or concluding I 
an arrangement which would stop the fighting but leave nations in hostilc array. The 
latter alternative, of Britain and Germany nourishing an undiminished enmity through a 
commercial and diplomatic war whilst preparing for a renewal of armed hostilities, was 
not InViting. 5 A negotiated peace envisaged implementing the Pans Resolutions in order 
to keep Germany in check and to prepare for future hostilities, realising the worst fears of 
the Liberal free-traders. It was considered much better for the cause of future peace and 
security to end the war on the field. The peaceful and ordered world the liberal consensus 
hoped to achieve after the war would be impossible unless Germany was decisively 
beaten and disarmed. 6 For Lloyd George it was easier to impose conditions through 
military victory than to implement them as war policy. Shortly after the outbreak of war 
H. G. Wells had written "A war that will merely beat Germany a little and restore the 
2 Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War (Oxford, 
1971) pp. 66-82. 
3 Keith Robbins, TheAbolition of War. 'The Peace Movement'in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff, 1976) pp. 
151-2. 
4 John Horne, 'Remobilizing for'total war': France and Britain, 1917-1918' in State, sociqv, and 
mobilization in Europe during the First I forld I Var (Home, ed. ) (Cambnd( ge, 1997) p. 
2 10. 
5A. Shadwell, 'Victory and the Altemative' in The Nineteenth Centurv andAfter, Februan, 1916. 
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hateful tension of the last forty years is not worth waging. As an end to all our efforts it 
will be almost an intolerable defeat. v, 7 Until August 1918, Ludendorff also clung to the 
conviction that war would need to end in outright victory. 8 
However it was inconceivable that as men, in the words of Henry Page-Croft, 
"died like flies" the government would not utilise every weapon possible to attack 
Germany. In a sense there was a strong ethical argument for attempting to end the war by 
attacking trade and prosperity rather than life. As the war progressed attrition became the 
order of the day, both economic and military. In the dehumanising process of 
industrialised war, soldiers became another commodity to be judged statistically along 
with wool, cotton, jute and zinc. Yet the strategy of attrition followed by British military 
planners was flawed. 9 Throughout the war the number of Gcrman men reaching military 
age was always greater than the number of German soldiers the Allies managed to ki 11.10 
Theoretically the flow of German manpower was inexhaustible. Britain did not have the 
capability to control fresh supplies of recruits to the German army but, along with her 
Allies, she did have the power to control supplies of vital commodities indefinitely. 
A breach existed between policy-makers and policy implementers. Political 
leaders underestimated the potential of the economic measures to act as an additional 
psychological weapon against Germany. The bureaucrats and officials who suggested 
policy and worked on its daily operation had an exaggerated vision of its likely 
61 Dare we boycott Germany? 'by Robert Blatchford in the Illustrated Sunday Herald, 8 September 1918. 
7 Daily Chronicle, 20 August 1914. 
8 Wilhelm Deist, 'The Military Collapse of the German Empire: The Reality behind the Stab-in the-Back 
Myth', War in History 3,2 (1996) p. 189. 
9 The strategy of attrition went from allowing Germany to exhaust her troops on Allied lines, to the Allies 
adopting an 'active defence' by striking the German Imes, to finally adopting 'offensive attrition' Nvitli large- 
scale attacks. See David French, 'The Meaning of Attrition, 1914-1916', English Historical Revieit- 
CIII. 
407 (1988) pp. 385-405. 
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effectiveness. For Alfred Zimmern to declare that "the economic weapon is the most 
powerful in the varied annoury of the Allies" was surely to overstate the case. ' 1 Yet 
equally Lloyd George's 'knockout blow'was a luxury for which Britain could 
increasingly ill-afford to wait. Once the resources of the United States were behind them 
the Allies felt they would eventually be assured of victory. However, Smuts was one of 
many to observe and wam the War Cabinet that British power was waning in comparison 
with the United States and Japan. He feared that the country would end the war as a 
second class Power. He saw little point in destroying Gerrnany at the expense of imperial 
prestige. He called for the perfection of economic policy, not as settled post-war policy, 
but as a sword to hang over Germany. 12 
It was hoped by advocates of the econornic weapon that a fin-n declaration by the 
Allies would sow dissension in the ranks of the enemy. By indicating to Gen-nan leaders 
that the longer the war continued the more Germany's overseas trading network would 
suffer and the less chance there would be of obtaining industrial raw materials, it was 
hoped that Gen-nan merchants would not allow the Hohenzollems to drag them into 
universal bankruptcy. The sooner the Germans realised that post-war peace and 
prosperity could not necessarily be won on the battlefield, the sooner the war would come 
to an end. 
13 
The results of German economic mobilisation for total war had ultimately been 
counter-productive. The mismanagement of the economy, with increasing privation and 
no end in sight to the war, had left civilians frustrated, with low morale and an increasing 
10 On average the surplus of German males reaching military age over war deaths 
during 1914-18 
numbered 349,400. Figures from Niall Ferguson, The Pity of JV, 11- (London, 1998) p. 297. 
11 Alfred Zimmern, The Economic lVeapon in the IVar against Germany (London, 1918) p. 20. 
I CAB 23/7/WC. 458: 14 August 1918. 
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desire for the conflict to end, with or without the'victorious peace. 14 In this atmosphere, 
economic psychological warfare could have constituted an additional worry for the 
authorities concerned with maintairiing good order during dernobilisation, merchants and 
industrialists worried about future trade and profits and civilians worried about future 
employment. 
Yet Balfour, in a memorandum calling for the abolition of post-Nvar commercial 
treaties with Germany, ended with the caution: 
German leaders of commerce might rate high the injury which would be inflicted 
upon their interests; but to the great mass of the population, the loss of 100 square 
miles of worthless bog would probably seem a more serious blow to German power 
and prestige. 15 
Whilst it was true that German commercial interests were concerned about their 
economic future, their way out was not to campaign for peace but for a settlement to 
ensure victory. The German Associated Chambers of Commerce urged trade and industry 
to agitate for an adequate war indeninity in the forni of raw materials in order to escape 
problems of exchange and boycott. 16 Similarly, as Germany came increasingly under 
military dictatorship, Hindenburg and Ludendorff reacted to the threat of economic 
isolation with the resolve to prevent such an outcome by military action. On the domestic 
front a 'victorious peace' was to be the reward for the hardships endured by soldiers and 
17 
civilians and, from 1917, the bribe with which to push the nation to greater exertions. 
The continuance of the pre-war political system in Germany rested upon the ability of 
13 The Outlook, 6 October 1917. 
14 Richard Bessel, 'Mobilization and demobilization in Germany, 1916-1919' in State, sociqv and 
inobilization in Europe during the First World War, pp. 214-5. 
15 Runciman MSS WR 142: 'Conunercial Treaties and German Credit'by Balfour, 5 Nlarch 1916. 
16 'The Scramble for Raw ItIvIaterials' in the Dines, 30 May 1918. 
17 Wilhelm Deist, 'The GermanArmy, the authoritarian nation-state and total Nvar' in Statc, society and 
i? iobilLation in Europe during thc First It *Orld War, p, 169. 
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that system to deliver victory and security. 18 
In foreign affairs, the German High Command (OHL) believed that whatever the 
outcome of the war Britain would attempt to attack Germany as soon as possible. 
Therefore Germany had to achieve a military and economic position at the peace which 
would preserve the national economy against the demands of the Allies. Hindenburg's 
answer was a'fortress Germany' supplied by a vast German merchant fleet supplemented 
by captured enemy vessels. New German lands, adequately supplied with phosphates, 
animals and machinery, would provide Germany with food to withstand a further three 
years of war. 19 To this end the OHL abandoned Mitteleuropa for their own notion of how 
best to secure Germany's future security. The focus shifted from south-east to eastern 
Europe with visions of a sphere of influence curving from northern France and Belgium 
through Poland, the Baltic Provinces, north-west Russia, the Ukraine, Romania and the 
Caucasus, the oil fields of Baku, and ending at underdeveloped Turkey. Mitteleuropa was 
to form a secondary flank to act as protection for the eastern goals. 20 German ruling elites 
came to regard the world war as a prelude to future major wars in which world powers 
continually redefined their spheres of influence in constant competition. 21 The Treaties of 
Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest confirmed this policy of securing treaties of commerce 
favourable to Germany principally through imposition rather than negotiation. 
For Germany to sue for peace the military party had to be convinced of its 
necessity or be rendered powerless to prevent it. As it was, Ludendorff and Hindenburg 
18 Holger H. Herwig, The First World War. Gennany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London, 1997) p. 
302. 
'9 Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the Gennan High Command under Hindenburg 
and Ludendoiff 1916-1918 (London, 1976) p. 106. 
20 Henry Cord Meycr, Mittcleuropa- In Gel7nan thought and action (The Hague, 1955) pp. 252-58 and 264- 
74. 
21 flans-Ulrich Wehler, The Gcnnan Empire, 1871-1918 (Lenun-ton Spa, 1985) p. 211. 
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saw off all political challenges to remain in control of the direction of war planning and 
peace proposals. The Supreme Command had too strong a hold over policy for Allied 
economic propaganda to have any effect, despite the impression It may have made on the 
Gennan population at large. They failed to recognise that the disparity between their 
resources and those of the Allies was due to the huge human and material resources the 
United States was bringing to the Entente and not necessarily due to failings in the 
German war economy. 
Ludendorff s self-belief meant that after victories had been secured over Russia 
and Rumania he had great confidence In the Spnng Offensive of 1918. The British 
expected that only if the war consistently went against Germany and pressure reached a 
certain point would Germany offer to conclude peace. 22 This point was only reached on 8 
August, 'the black day of the German army', which saw an end to Gen-nan offensive 
capacity. Thus only after all the military options had been exhausted did Ludendorff 
senously contemplate an alternative end to the war. After the collapse of Bulgaria on 28 
September, Ludendorff admitted the war was lost and the government should negotiate 
an immediate armistice. Even then, Ludendorff recovered his composure to the extent 
that he believed Germany could go on the strategic-defensive and hold the Allied armies 
through the winter until Germany could get better peace tenns in 1919.23 Given resolute 
leadership there was almost no limit to what the German people would endure. 
24 The 
subsequent approach to President Wilson to sue for peace on the basis of the Fourteen 
Points was held as the best hope for a lenient peace and a settlement which still secured 
22 CAB 24/23/GT. 1792: Memorandum on Gennan War Aims by the Department of Information 
(Intelligence Bureau), 15 July 1917. 
23 Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the Germaii High Command iinder Himlenbtirg 
and Liidendorff' 1916-1918, pp. 2 -54-5.261 and 
263. 
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for Germany the freedom of the seas and an open trading system. 25 
In the end, the talk of using the economic weapon to bnng about peace was 
unrealistic. British leaders did not have the political will to pursue the possibilities an 
economic boycott could have on the diplomatic field. Both in Britain and Germanv there 
was a determination to achieve total victory by military means. Neither was xvillmg to 
show any compromise whilst there was still a chance of total victory. Wilson's 
declaration to the Senate, in January 1917, that there should be "peace without \, ictory" 
struck the Allies as defeatiSt. 26 After such hardship and sacnfice neither side could afford 
to conclude a peace which did not include significant gains to vindicate the effort so far 
expen ed. 27 Lloyd George countered Wilson's approach by declaring "Victory is essential 
to sound peace. Unless you have the image of victory stamped on the surface the pcace 
will depreciate in value. " 28 
Both British and German leaders thought a negotiated peace, with its inherent 
notion of compromise, would only postpone the question of European security until 
another war. British politicians had little desire to carry on punitive post-war economic 
measures against Germany in order to limit her military potential. Such measures would 
only complicate the natural workings of the world economic system and breed hostility in 
the post-war era. Paradoxically, only total victory could impose the desired peace terms 
and restore a liberal world economic order. Nevertheless it was a victors'peace which 
was simply to postpone the fate of Europe for an altogether more devastating conflict. 
24 A fact Hitler would note. Michael Howard, The O-isis of theAnglo-German Antagonism 1916-1917 
(London, 1997) p. 17. 
25, J. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis ofPower. The Gel7nan A rm -v 
in Politics 1918-4-5 (London, 19-53) p. 15. 
26 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (London, 1967) p. 264. 
27 David French, The StrateD, of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (London, 1995) pp. 33 and 38, 
Niall Ferguson, The Pio, of lVar, p. 286. 
28 The Times, 13 Septernber 1918. 
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